

**CLASS at Wisdom's Goldenrod, Hector, NY
with Anthony Damiani (AD)
March 2, 1983
PB PARAS; MENTALISM**

TOPIC: PB Paras
SUBJECT: Mentalism

SUBSUBJECTS: Epistemology, World-Idea, World-Mind, Individual Minds, Subtle
Materialism, Intelligible World, World Creation, Personal Creator

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BOOKS READ FROM OR REFERENCED:

- Paul Brunton, *Notebooks*. 16 vols; Vol. 1 entitled *Perspectives*, published 1984-1988. Some Paul Brunton Notebook paras are, as of 2018, unpublished, and are noted as such.
- Paul Brunton, *The Wisdom of the Overself*
- John N. Deck, *Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus*

NOTE: Unpublished PB paras, even if sourced, should be proofread.

TRANSCRIBED Verbatim by IT 2018. Reformatted from V11a version by JRM & JF 2019-2020, with Subheads and Table of Contents added by JRM. In 2023, IT reformats again to accord with new conventions, fixes prefatory matter and footer, updates audio file name, fixes/completes Book List, fixes typos/minor errors, adds new note within transcript. In 2025, MW expands Subsubjects and alters Subheads to make more accurate. **Archival verbatim transcript – V14.1a.**

AUDIO FILES: 1983 0302a. [Note 1: “Tape” and “Side” refer to original audio cassette tapes later digitized into .MP3 Audio Files. Note 2: We are missing the first audio file for this class.]

1983 03/02 at Wisdom's Goldenrod

PB Paras; Mentalism

Archival verbatim transcript

DISCUSSION OF TWO PB PARAS: 1) "THE WORLD OF HIS EXPERIENCE IS A WORLD OF IMAGES AND FEELINGS WHICH HIS OWN MIND PRODUCES"; 2) "THE WORLD THAT IS SEEN IS A CEREBRAL CREATION"

[Audio File 1983 0302a Begins; this is the second part of class]

AD: --these two together.

AH: See that's what I was trying to get to. If the-- if the brain is going to create a world, a cerebral world, that's a world of images also. Ok. There's a-- there's a-- there's images created in the brain and that's what we call our life. But then there's another way of speaking about image as presentation of the world *and* the brain. And I was trying to find that distinction in these two quotes.

RG: I don't think you can find it in the quotes, Andrew, I think ea-- I think you could find anything we want in those quotes about that. I don't think it speaks to that, you know, particular an issue.

AH: Well then how shall we put the two quotes together?

HS: So would you say that there's a-- there's an-- in terms of what the mind images, the brain sees, is that-- is that like a viable approach? [TS(?) simultaneously: (Well the mind--)] That there's a seeing that's of the mind's image by the brain which is, you know, the cerebral?

VM: I don't think you'd say the brain sees, would you?

HS: Well that's-- that's a quote [one word inaudible]

TS (simultaneously): Yeah, that's what the first quote said.

HS: Whatever's [VM simultaneously: No, no.] seen is of the cerebral.

VM: I thought that the-- what we see is a functioning of the cerebral processes, it doesn't [S simultaneously: Product.] say the brain-- or [student assents] the product of the cerebral process, it doesn't say the brain sees.

AS: Right.

VM: Right?

RG (faint): I don't know, yeah.

VM (simultaneously): I-- I mean because I would take the seer as somehow more connected with the mental principle [couple/three inaudible student words simultaneous with VM] or at least more directly connected with a knower whereas the brain is more a mechanism that provides the space-time world of empirical experience.

HS: For-- now in con--

VM: For the-- [HS simultaneously: (For/Or) the imaging of the mind?] the (imitation) or education of that higher self.

DB: Well any [couple/three inaudible student words simultaneous with DB] produ-- the problem is that any production, you know, any kind of-- whether it's a cere-- a cerebral production or not is going to be a thought, ok, I mean, you know if it's the thought of a cold, thought of last week, whatever. Now insofar as it is a thought, it would be logical to assume that its creator was some sort of mind.

VM: Sure, I'm not-- don't disagree with that at all.

DB: Ok, so that in some sense then we're speak-- when we speak of the brain then, do we mean by that another form of mind?

TS: [half/one word inaudible] I mean the perhaps naïve interpretation is simply to say that the first quote which says "The world that is seen is a cerebral creation" is a subset of the second quote, which is that "The world of his experience is a world of images and feelings which his own mind produces"; [VM, faint: Ok.] that not only does the individual mind-- it's not-- the function of the individual mind isn't limited to simply producing the bare form of sense-perception but is actually that which projects its own experience, which would include feelings and images which might encompass other--

S: Right, thoughts and images.

TS: Yeah, thoughts and (religions), things that are other than sense percept. I mean that's a real simple--

S: So that image would include thoughts.

TS: Yeah, thoughts are images, just images. I mean that's-- that seems to-- yeah, the most basic, you know, interpretation.

HS: And now throw the brain in there?

S: Uh-hm, throw the brain in there(./?)

HS: No in that-- in what you just said.

DR: You mean call the brain an image?

BS: Would it-- would it be too simple to say that the brain produces *what*-- *what* is seen but the images and feelings determines the who that is seeing it and that would be a subjective experience?

S: Yeah (it is).

LR/S(?): I [few words inaudible]

BS (simultaneously): Of course all contained within mind but that's not being the issue here?

LR: I wouldn't agree with that.

BS: Sorry?

LR: I wouldn't agree with that, that the brain produces what is seen.

BS: Why you--

LR: The “what” would be-- would have its orig--

BS (simultaneously): The whole productive-- production we spoke about. No?

DB: It almost seems as if the brain--

LR (simultaneously): The brain might have to do more with how the mind is constrained to s-- to have sense-- sensible perception. But certainly not *what*.

BS (faint): (Not arguing with you anymore.)

DB (simultaneously): Isn't the brain an image of the mind that is producing all of these images?

PB [unpublished, 21b.0 (10v/79/4), LR reading (simultaneously with DB above)]: “The world that is seen is a cerebral creation.”

PB [unpublished, 21b.0 (10v/79/4), AD reading]: “The world that is seen is a cerebral creation.”

AS/S(?): Uh-hm.

PB [unpublished, 21b.0 (10v/79/4), AD reading]: “The world that is seen is a cerebral creation.”

AD: The next quote says it is the mind that produces images. Can you get these two things together?

DB: Could it be said that the brain is an image of the mind which is creating all of these images? It's the-- if the-- if anything that is produced by the mind is an image, one of those images would have to be of the mind which is producing those images and that image [AD simultaneously: Wait, wait, wait.] would be the brain.

AD: What?

DB: Uh-hm, I don't know.

AD: Again?

DB: I'm asking if the brain is an image of the mind.

AD: Is included--

DB: No it's included within the-- [AD simultaneously: Image.] within the mind's functioning. But I'm asking is the brain an image of the mind which is producing images. One of those images which it produces is an image of itself.

AD: An image of the brain(/?)

DB: Yes, it's an image of-- is an image of the brain, yes, but that that brain image is a reflection of the mind which is producing the whole-- the whole business in the first place.

AD: I don't know what you mean it's a reflection of the mind.

DB (simultaneously): Well-- Alright, we have the mind, I mean from-- from the second quote. It's producing-- [AD simultaneously: Images.] it's producing images, ok, and feelings. One of the images which get-- is producing is the image of the brain, ok. I'm asking is-- does that-- is what that brain image is the real-- yeah, represents--

AD: The [DB simultaneously: (Never mind.)] image(d) brain represents?

DB: Right. What that is an image of, I'm asking, is that an image of the mind which is producing the whole business in the first place.

AD (simultaneously): You think-- you-- you think three pounds of flesh is going to be an image of the mind?

DB: No. No I don't. I don't.

S: [one/two words inaudible]

S (simultaneously): (It's hardly--)

DB: Ok.

S: Uh-hm.

DB: But that insofar as the world is going to be imaged forth by this mind, [AD: Uh-hm.] it would seem--

AD: To include a brain.

DB: It would include a brain, and it seems to--

AD (simultaneously): And the world that is created by that cerebral activity.

DB: Right. That is a subset, as-- as Tim was saying, of that functioning of the mind, alright. It's a specification within that, alright. The functioning-- this cerebral functioning depends on the mental function-- the functioning of the mind. I'm perhaps going in circles here.

S (simultaneously): David?

DB: Yeah?

S: Maybe you're saying is the brain is imagined, or the brain is imaged.

AD: Yeah, the brain is imaged.

DB: Right, ok.

S (simultaneously): As a vehicle for-- for seeing, for capturing a production of images--

AD (simultaneously): Well--

S: --in a--

AD: Not for-- not for capturing but for producing.

S: Pro-- producing. [one inaudible student word] I'm trying to get it out there.

AD (simultaneously): What it created.

S: Yeah, yeah.

S (very faint): (I see.)

S: See [S simultaneously: (I think you have to.)] but that's how the brain is imagined, that's incl-- the brain is-- the brain is an image but it's imagined in this way, as producing images.

[student assents]

DB (simultaneously): Right, and insofar as it produces images, ok, as the brain is producing the world that is seen, alright, it seems that its functioning is parallel to the mind that imagined it.

S: Yeah.

DB: Insofar as that's the case, I-- the-- the question simply was, is the brain an image of the mind which is producing this in the first place. [S, faint: Oh.] I mean it's a *specific* image. I mean it has a-- a unique place in the whole production.

AD: Tim, would you read the last quote first and first quote last, [TS simultaneously: "The world..."] reverse the order?

PB [unpublished, 21b-prj.0 (10v/17/17), TS reading]: "The world of his experience is a world of images and feelings which his own mind produces."

PB [unpublished, 21b.0 (10v/79/4), TS reading]: "The world that is seen is a cerebral creation."

[short pause]

AH: One way of putting the two quotes together would be to put--

AD (simultaneously): Oh no, I'm not putting them together. I'm putting them in order.

S (very faint): Yeah.

AH: Ok. You put them in order by saying that--

AD: Logical order.

AH: The first quote refers to the physiological explanation which is not wrong, just incomplete. And the second quote takes--

AD: Now I don't know which is the first and second now.

AH: The first one refers to the cerebral. That's physiological [few inaudible student words simultaneous with AH] description which is not incorrect, it's only incomplete. And the second quote is from the perspective of mentalism.

AD: Uh-hm.

S (faint): Right.

AH: It's like a higher point of view that explains a cerebral process as essentially mental.

RG (faint, possibly part of background): Uh-hm.

AD: And how do you connect now? You only have one more question. How do you connect the mind imaging forth a brain and the world that's associated with that brain, alright. How do you connect that mind with that brain.

[student assents, faint]

S: David's--

AH: I think the quote that Dickie read was-- was an explanation.

AD: Yeah.

AH: It's a-- it [one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): What quote? I want it.

AH: The one that it acts like a-- a transmission of-- transmission--

AD: So then you would read the first-- the second quote first, then the quotation that Richard read, and then the third quote-- [AH assents, faint] I-- the second quote.

AH/S(?) (faint): Yeah.

S: Do it. (bit of laughter, student words)

AH: Read the second quote first-- (laughter, student words)

AD (amidst laughter): Right.

AH: Passage of Dickie--

AD: Yeah.

AH: And then the first quote.

AD: Second.

AH: Yeah, that would be a logical-- (laughter, student words) that would be a logical explanation.

[few seconds of laughter, background student talking]

AD: You want to try?

Few students at once: Yeah.

AD: Go ahead, read it. (bit of laughter)

[short pause with faint background student talking]

S: Yeah read backwards [few words inaudible] (laughter, student words)

VM: Read backwards, it might make [couple words inaudible] easier.

TS (paraphrasing): “His own mind produces a world of images and feelings which is his world of experience.”

VM: You got it?

TS: Ok, um, same thing.

PB [unpublished, 21b-prj.0 (10v/17/17), TS reading]: “The world of his experience is a world of images and feelings which his own mind produces.”

[students assent, faint]

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, “The Birth of the Universe,” “The Birth of Individuals,” RG reading]: “In order to provide the conditions for a more fully externalized and awakened experience...”

VM (simultaneously): Louder Dickie, yeah I want you there (so--) You’ve been gone for a long time.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, “The Birth of the Universe,” “The Birth of Individuals,” RG reading]: “...the co-operation of the brain and the senses is required. ... Unless the world-image is caught by the brain, consciousness will remain at the dream level and physical experience becomes impossible. Hence the thought-form is transmitted to an image-magnifying centre in the outer layer of the brain by processes [analogically] like those used in the [wireless] transmission of a newspaper photograph...and to the special sensitive centres for seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. [RG reads: for seeing-- for the senses]. Here the brain reconverts the received vibrations into a highly magnified picture of which the individual becomes conscious... When all this has been accomplished the individual becomes fully aware of the transformed and magnified world-picture, which the mind now projects *as if* it were something outside.”

PB [unpublished, 21b.0 (10v/79/4), TS reading]: “The world that is seen is a cerebral creation.”

S: It is.

VM: There you go.

[clapping, laughter]

S: Hey, hey.

S: Yay!

S: Bravo!

S: Bravo!

S: Bravo!

[few seconds of background student talking]

TS: I think Mercury's void of course now. (bit of laughter)

AD: I noticed. (some laughter) Few more Tim.

THE WORLD AS AN IDEA ISN'T LIKE OTHER IDEAS THAT YOU CAN KEEP IN MIND OR DISMISS AT WILL

PB [V13, 21:2.93, TS reading]: "The mind creates these images by its own power and their totality constitutes the universe of its experience."

TS: That seems to be the same-- whatever quote number it is.

AD: But would you repeat that one?

S (very faint): Uh-huh.

TS: Uh-- (bit of laughter)

[few seconds of faint background student talking, laughter]

PB [V13, 21:2.93, TS reading]: "The mind creates these images by its own power and their totality constitutes the universe of its experience."

TS (faint): Oh dear. (bit of laughter)

VM: I think he's stressing something that Plotinus likes to stress too and that is that the soul is not passive to-- to perception, let's say, that it generates it.

[student assents] (bit of laughter)

S (faint): Go ahead.

[13 second pause]

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.0 (10v/52/66), TS reading]: "The world as an idea it's not like other ideas..." (bit of laughter)

TS (faint): That doesn't make sense.

S (very faint): Why not?

TS (faint): (What--)

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.0 (10v/52/66), TS reading]: "But the world as an idea is not like other ideas which he can keep in mind or dismiss at will."

S: Alright.

VM (simultaneously): Well, of course. (bit of laughter)

AD: Yeah, ok.

VM: Yes, he's making a distinction here between the cosmic *imposition*, if you like, and your fantasies.

TS (faint): Which you can dismiss at will. (laughter)

S (amidst laughter/clapping): Good save [couple words inaudible] that one there. (more laughter, student words)

AD: Let's try again. What was it?

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.0 (10v/52/66), TS reading]: "But the world as a..."

TS: I'm sorry.

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.0 (10v/52/66), TS reading]: "But the world as an idea is not like other ideas which he can keep in mind or dismiss at will."

AD: Now, there's some ideas that you can keep in mind or dismiss as you please, right?

VM: Well--

S: We didn't do--

VM: (To/There's) some [one word inaudible] of course.

AD (simultaneously): I mean, you have an idea of a table and you could [VM simultaneously: Sorry.] dismiss it.

VM: Yeah.

AD: Alright?

AH(?): Within certain limit.

AD (simultaneously): Now, [S simultaneously: Perhaps.] why can't you dismiss the World-Idea?

LR(?): (Aha/Uh-hm).

S: Uh-hm.

S (faint): Go to sleep.

DB: Well in the first place, it would seem that you're--

AD: First and last, yeah.

DB (simultaneously): --you're-- I mean it's-- (bit of laughter) insofar as you're-- insofar as you're bound up with it, it's not something that-- I mean you can't dismiss it. I mean it's not something objective to be dismissed.

RC: You can't dismiss it unless you want to dismiss *you*.

S: That's right.

DB (simultaneously): Right.

TS: Yeah. (AD laughs, bit of laughter)

DB: You know, I mean, you're either in it or you're not. (some laughter, student words)

RG: No but I think the point is that it *is* something objective that *can't* be dismissed. (bit of laughter)

AD: Well--

LR (simultaneously): Well so are you and that's--

RG (simultaneously): Or--

AD: I go-- I know-- I know you're back to that distinction, [RG simultaneously: Sorry I'm--] Dickie, but I think what you really mean is you can't dismiss Being.

RG: Sure, right, that's about right. Thank you.

VM: Well said.

AD: Yeah. Mercury's void of course, [RG assents] must be going 180 degrees off its usual path. (AD laughing)

RC: And it still-- it still remains in question whether you as a being are properly described as the subjective side of the subjective-objective duality.

AD: Well like I said you can't really speak analogously of the lower knower and the higher knower as, you know, a-- You can't make an analogy of that to the subject-object relationship that's here, I mean the analogy wouldn't be valid.

AH: Anthony, last week there was a discussion about, if you have the experience of mentalism, it's not-- it's really an ultimate sort of experience. Well, if that was applied to this quote, it-- that presented world as idea would be the experience of mentalism. But, there would be an experience beyond that--

AD: Yes.

AH: --where there's actually cessation of the *World-Idea*.

AD: The experience of the world as an idea is a mentalistic experience but it is not necessarily the experience of insight, yes.

AH (faint): (Uh-hm/Ok).

AD: Maybe, maybe we should read now that paper. [RC simultaneously, very faint: What?] Is it too long you think?

RC: I haven't seen it in so long I've-- it's about eight pages. I don't have it.

S (simultaneously): Oh.

AD: Oh you don't have it.

RC: No I threw--

AD (simultaneously): Oh, well then it'd be very hard to read it. (AD laughing)

DB: It's on the table-- (laughter, student words) it was on the table Sunday.

RC: Is it in the building?

S: It could be [one word inaudible]

LR (simultaneously): Yes it's here. It's in the book "Six Topics" which Eleanor has I think.

S (very faint): Yeah.

LR: Hm? Is that the one?

S: [three/few words inaudible]

S (very faint): Why not?

AD: Oh no, I brought it to the cottage, I'm sorry. Well we'll just have to put that off till next week.

LR (faint): I can go get it.

S (very faint): Maybe you should.

S (very faint): I'll go up.

AD: Hm? It's really off the point of mentalism. I thought it'd be better to conclude that paper now, I mean conclude mentalism with that paper, to make transition.

RC: Yeah this series--

AD (simultaneously): Do you have more or should I go get it?

RC (simultaneously): Yeah, this series is trying to put-- to begin to put the individual and cosmic mentalism in relation so that then we can come back and talk about the individual again.

S (faint): Slow down [couple words inaudible]

RC (simultaneously): That's what this series is trying to do.

AD: Alright, then keep it.

TS (simultaneously): There's quite a number, should I read straight through some?

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, continue then.

[short pause]

THERE'S NO PERSONAL CREATOR: INTELLIGENCE IS NOT ONLY THE VERY SUBSTANCE OF THAT WHICH IS BEING MANIFESTED BUT ALSO THAT WHICH GUIDES ITSELF INTO MANIFESTING ITSELF

PB [unpublished, 21b.1 (10v/82/6), TS reading]: "We admit that you have proved the world to be an idea, it will be said in criticism, but you cannot deny that there is an outside world after all which has led to the arisal of the idea."

AD: You see these people are always doing the same thing. The objectivity of the World-Idea is misconstrued as a material objectivity.

[student assents, faint]

S (faint): Go ahead.

S: Right.

TS: Yeah and that-- this next one leads us to that same thing.

PB [V13, 21:3.77, TS reading]: “The language of the workshops is meaningless when applied to the world. The question of who “made” it simply does not arise for the man who has pushed philosophical enquiries to their farthest conclusion.”

LR: And is that just because he already knows the answer?

RG: Sure.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah. (RG laughs)

[student assents, very faint]

VM: How--

LR: I (mean/may) not(--/.)

[student assents]

RG (simultaneously): Right! 'Cause he knows what-- (RG laughing)

LR: He doesn't have to ask it 'cause he's already gotten here? (RG laughing, bit of laughter) What is he trying to say in that quote, I'm not quite sure.

AD: Well, you wouldn't come up with a personal creator of any kind. [LR assents, faint] You would simply come up with the notion that mind, alright, is evolving itself and expressing itself through the variety of-- or all the facets (within the) manifested world. But you don't have to postulate an individual-- an individual creator.

AH: So you'd say mind made it. It's a Chittamatra view.

AD: Yeah but mind here, [LR simultaneously: But (it makes/make sure) you see the point.] mind here-- mind here would be an aggregate of intelligences and not a personal creator. And that each intelligence, if the wor-- if the meaning of the word is truly understood, by definition, then intelligence would be, and *is*, not only the very substance of that which is being manifested but also that which guides itself into manifesting itself. So to speak about any kind of personality here is besides the point. It's the same theory like the Jains. There's no personal creator. In Buddhism there's no personal creator. They start speaking about intelligences or principles or-- or just--

AH: But it seems that this quote Anthony s-- is speaking to something a little different in the sense that he says-- it says it's like the extremity of philosophic reflection. Well certainly the n-- the-- the notion of a-- of a personal God as creator is not the extremity of philosophical reflection.

AD: I don't come from the workshop, right? Cobbler makes a pairs of-- a pair of shoes. It's very hard for you to conceive of the co-- of the shoes evolving themselves out of their own per se existence. (bit of laughter)

S (faint): Right.

S: Makes a good shoe.

S (very faint): Yeah.

AD: I mean s-- that's what we're-- that's what it amounts to. Conceiving that the world evolves out of its own intelligence.

AH: So in that sense it's not *made*.

AD: In that sense it's not made, it's not created, no. There's no creation here. Dualistic language always refers to the dualism that is inherent in the very nature of our experience in-- in the so-called empirical world. You want-- you want a closet, I go over to you and tell you to build me one. So you go out and get the lumber and you build me a-- a closet, alright? So there's always a creator and that which is created. But over here you're dealing with an intelligence which evolves itself into whatever status it wants to assume. So there's nothing out and beyond itself. And also you have to understand karma in this way. Karma is the functioning of that intelligence always adjusting itself.

AH: It's not being made in the sense there's nothing outside of itself.

AD (simultaneously): There's nothing outside of it.

AH/S(?): Yeah.

AD: Either that or you're forced into the absurdity of saying that the world is created out of nothing.
[short pause] That's it.

PB [V13, 21:2.51, TS reading]: "The existence of the world is not a testimony to the existence of a divine creator, but to the constructive capacity of [the] mind."

[short pause]

AD: So it's like you have to make an amalgamation, you know, of creator and the creation, they're one and the same thing.

TS (faint): Which is the [one word inaudible]

AD: The creator is *in* the creation or the creation is in the creator but you can't have two things here. [AH: Look--] You just have this pure intelligence functioning and evolving out of itself, alright, whatever it will manifest.

[short pause]

THE WORLD IS A PRODUCT OF OUR MIND BUT NOT OF OUR MIND ALONE

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.0 (10v/65/17), TS reading]: “How did this world idea come into existence?”

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.1 (10v/65/292), TS reading]: “Our world is truly a product of our mind, but it would be a grave error to believe that it is a product of our own mind alone.”

[short pause]

JfL: I thought there he was going to say that-- that there is no-- it doesn't come into being, the way you started that. Start-- start that again, Tim.

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.1 (10v/65/292), TS reading]: “Our world is truly a product of our mind, but it would be a grave error to believe that it is a product of our own mind alone.”

S (faint whisper): Yeah.

JfL: (Uh--/Yeah.) Forget it, I thought he was talking about the world sort of coming out of nothing.

AH: Well what-- [TS simultaneously: Well--] what else is involved besides our own mind?

RC (faint): Yeah.

TS (simultaneously): Yeah. Yeah we're trying to get there.

RC: It could be another one.

S: We don't know.

AD: Our mind would be a variation of Mind itself.

AH: Yes.

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.0 (10v/79/12), TS reading]: “It is true that the world is an individual creation, but it is not the whole truth.”

[9 second pause]

PB [unpublished, 21z-wm.0 (10g/24/28), TS reading]: “The human world experience may be illusory, but it is certainly not hallucinatory, for in that case it would have no cause or source outside the experiencer's own private fantasy.”

[15 second pause]

PB [V13, 19:1.29, TS reading]: “A “delusion” is wholly false and untrue, whereas an “illusion” has some kind of basis beneath it.”

[9¼ second pause]

PB [V13, 19:1.50, TS reading]: “What the Hindus call *maya* is what the Westerners often call “illusion”; it is also what Gandhi called “appearance,” Fichte called “idea,” and Schopenhauer “representation.””

[short pause]

LR: Would you read that again please?

PB [V13, 19:1.50, TS reading]: “What the Hindus call *maya* is what the Westerners often call “illusion”; it is also what Gandhi called “appearance,” Fichte called “idea,” and Schopenhauer “representation.””

THE WORLD-MIND ENCLOSSES WITHIN ITSELF ALL POSSIBLE VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF THE IDEA OF MAN, SO IT ENCLOSSES ALL INDIVIDUAL MINDS

TS: This is [one word inaudible] And here’s a-- here’s one that might get more (go).

PB [V13, 21:3.66 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 21: Mentalism, #50, TS reading]: “A popular misconception of mentalism must be cleared. When we say that the world does not exist *for man* apart from his own mind, this is not to say that man is the sole world-creator. If that were so he could easily play the magician and reshape a hampering environment in a day. No!--what mentalism really teaches is that man’s mind perceives, by participating in it, the world-image which the World-Mind creates and holds. Man alone is not responsible for this image, which could not possibly exist if it did not exist also in the World-Mind’s consciousness.”

[14¾ second pause with faint background student talking]

PB [V13, 21:3.70 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 21: Mentalism, #53, TS reading]: “The individual mind presents the world-image to itself through and in its own consciousness. If this were all the truth then it would be quite proper to call the experience a private one. But because the individual mind is rooted in and inseparable from the universal mind, it is only a part of the truth. Man’s world-thought is held within and enclosed by God’s thought.”

[short pause]

S: Will you read that last thing one-- the last phrase, man’s--

PB [V13, 21:3.70 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 21: Mentalism, #53, TS reading]: “Man’s world-thought is held within and enclosed by God’s thought.”

[9¾ second pause]

AH: You think that the reference to God’s thought is a reference to World-Mind?

TS: At least in the context of these quotes that would seem to be-- well it would be the World-Idea as thought by the World-Mind.

[short pause]

AD: Once more Tim.

PB [V13, 21:3.70 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 21: Mentalism, #53, TS reading]: “The individual mind presents the world-image to itself through and in its own consciousness. If this were all the truth then it would be quite proper to call the experience a private one. But because the individual mind is rooted in and inseparable from the universal mind, it is only a part of the truth. Man’s world-thought is held within and enclosed by God’s thought.”

[short pause]

S: Is the individual mind synonymous with the brain-consciousness?

S: (Uh-uh.)

S: I hope not.

RG: No.

[short pause]

AD: Individual mind here is at a much higher level. Individual mind here is at the level of World-Mind too. Included within the individual mind is the whole of the Idea of the World. And that would-- that would be true for every individual mind. But they're all, so to speak, variations upon the one Mind itself. [short pause] In other words, the World-Mind or the Intellectual-Principle encloses within itself all the possible variations on the theme of the Idea of Man within itself. So, it *encloses* all the individual minds but each individual mind participates in that World-Idea. [12 second pause] (I don't/Don't) think PB ever uses these two terms synonymously, brain and mind. Never synonymous.

RC: Not that he's got a-- he's got a lot of quotes that I put into a different section where he-- he says that to confuse the mind with the brain is just insufferable.

JfL: So the first of the previous quotes about the world-image and [couple/three words inaudible] the idea and the cerebral--

AD: Cerebral, that's all the way down, you'd have to go all the way down. In other words, the mind that produces the images is like the lowest faculty of that soul which has the Idea of the World within it. Now that lowest faculty of the soul which produces the images is going to contain within the image the brain and the world that that brain creates, alright, or produces. That's almost like *beneath* it. Not actually, but almost like beneath it. And then when he said that the lowest faculty of the soul which produces the image with which-- within which is included the brain and its production, we had to make a connection between those two and we read the quotation from the *Wisdom* to connect the sensitive faculty of the soul or that which perceives the image, alright, and the entity within that image. The connection has to be made with-- within those two and that's the quotation on the source of the sensations are not to be found in the brain but are much more [one word inaudible] [student assents, very faint] Let's have some more.

WHAT IS GIVEN TO THE INDIVIDUAL MIND IS A THOUGHT, NOT AN IMAGE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL MIND THEN MAKES AN IMAGE OUT OF IT

PB [V13, 21:3.64, TS reading]: "It is asked why, if the world is like a dream or a hallucination, we all have the same dream or suffer the same hallucination. Why do we project it in common instead of independently, since we all do have quite different dreams when asleep at night or quite different reveries when awake by day? The answer is that there is another and vaster Mind behind our personal minds which imposes the same world-image upon them all, so that all see it and live in it. Moreover, they are of necessity themselves projected by this Mind so that this image is not less real for them than their own selves. The mind makes for itself this world of illusion, this stage of space and time and form. But it does

not make it independently of all prompting. For the image that it constructs is imposed upon it--or projected into it--by the Mind behind it.”

[short pause]

RC: I thought that one of the things that was especially important about this, he talks about that larger mind as being behind the personal mind and not behind the world, so like the quotes we read before where he said to assume that there's some universal mind behind the world out there is just a grosser form-- a subtler form of materialism. But to put that mind behind the personal mind and not out there behind the world seems to be a-- a beginning of being able to understand the relationship in a mental way rather than to have a subtler form of materialism.

AD: Yeah, perhaps an example of that would be if you can imagine that I'm a master magician and I'm-- I speak to all of you and I say now you're going to see a boy climb up a rope, alright. Now what I communicate is simply a thought, alright, let's say a very powerful thought. What you're going to do is see a boy climb up a rope and disappear, [VM: Pull the rope.] alright. And so you're going to take let's say the thought, alright, which is not an image, alright, and *you're* going to make an image out of it. So the communication of the Idea which, let's say, the World-Mind let's say which is behind the individual mind and so-- and the individual mind is going to manifest, alright, what that World-Mind is communicating to it. So the individual mind in a sense we could say is mesmerized, alright, and is going to manifest this World-Idea because it's been given to it. Now the difficulty is when you say that the-- the-- it's given to the individual mind, you think of a whole imaged world being given to it, and what I'm trying to point out is no, what's given is the thought. It's the individual mind that's going to put it in space, time, causality, you know, make an image out of it. Yeah you've heard of that, haven't you, little boy climbing up the rope and then he gets up on the top and pulls the rope up? And hundreds of people have sworn to seeing that.

TS (faint): [few words inaudible]

TS/S(?) (faint): Yeah.

SUBTLE MATERIALISM: IF YOU THINK THE WORLD IS “OUT THERE” AND THE WORLD-MIND IS BEHIND THE WORLD, MANIPULATING IT

AH: I'd like to comment on what Randy said a minute ago, he said if-- if you imagine a universal mind behind the world, you can escape the consequences of mentalism.

LR: I don't get-- I don't--

AH/S(?): [couple/three words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): I think Randy said that that would lead you into materialism.

RC: Yeah, [AH assents] [S simultaneously with RC and AH: Some--] a [one word inaudible] form of materialism.

AH: Yeah. But if on the other hand you imagine it lying behind the individual mind, you can no longer escape the consequences of the logic.

RC: As your own presupposition, as the presupposition of your own experience rather than as the presupposition of a world *outside* your experience.

AD: Uh-hm. You see, [AH assents] you say the world is out there, alright, then you could place the World-Mind out there behind the world manipulating everything. And that's simply another kind of materialism.

AH: Right.

LR: Yeah but you can say it as long as you don't put the world I-- the world out there. And the World-Mind is behind the World-Idea, in fact--

AD: No. He [RC simultaneously: Can I--] just tried to point out if you say "behind" but you say that the world is *external*, alright--

LR (simultaneously): Who said that?

AD: Well, I mean, it's just the point he's trying to make.

LR: I know and I don't agree with it.

AD (simultaneously): That will lead you into a subtle materialism.

LR: And I don't agree with that part.

AD: Well, argue with Randy then!

LR (simultaneously): If you say-- I was trying to but--

RC/S(?): I didn't hear you.

AD (simultaneously): Alright, argue with him, go ahead, I dare you.

LR (simultaneously): The world-- if we say the World-Mind is behind the World-Idea which comes through the individual mind-- I mean, I don't think one-- I don't think it has to be one or the other.

AH: No, but you put--

RC (simultaneously): No, the point I was trying to make-- well, I'll just repeat the same words again so if they don't make sense try another way. To put it behind the personal mind makes it the presupposition of your experience. It doesn't make it the presupposition of a world *outside* your experience. To talk in terms of a world outside your experience I'm understanding as a subtler form of materialism.

RG: But isn't there in fact a world outside of your experience which the previous [one word inaudible] quotes [LR simultaneously: Oh.] spoke about?

RC: There is a world-image which is the presupposition of *any* experience. But whether or not that world-image corresponds to anything like the images and feelings that constitute your world, what you call world, remains a question for most people.

RG: That isn't-- right.

RC: But that-- that world-- to conceive of that world as external to you is automatically to deny yourself access to its reality in your own.

AH: Oh, its reality is--

RG (simultaneously): To consider it as an o-- to consider it as an o-- as objective and as independent of you-- of you is not necessarily to say that you cannot touch it. It only means that it has an existence apart from your-- your own mental functioning.

RC: I don't know that it would have an existence apart from your own mental functioning.

RG: Then I would ask that we read those eight quotes again and see what they really mean then if we don't-- if we disagree on that then I--

RC: Your mental functioning I would say is included within its existence. And to abstract your individual existence from it would be to reduce it as well as [couple inaudible RG words simultaneous with RC] to eliminate yourself.

AH: You see the quote--

RG (simultaneously): It's very different to say that an individual mind is within the World-Idea than to say that the World-Idea exists independently of your mind's function-- of your mind's ideation. That they're not correlative. You could hold one and not hold the other.

RC: Well one is really-- [RG: Well I'd like--] it's a logical absurdity.

RG: Then I'd like to know what [RC simultaneously: I mean, none of the logic would say--] those quotes meant that the World-Idea--

RC: It seems to be a spirit-- seems to be dishonest, fundamentally dishonest that you're making a statement that you can't prove.

RG: Randy, we make statements all the time here that we can't prove, that's ridiculous. You can't appeal to that kind of logic. (bit of laughter)

RC: No I'm not saying--

RG: We can't prove anything.

RC: I'm not saying statements (bit of laughter) that we haven't proved. I'm saying a statement which *should* be proved. And I think there's a difference.

S (faint, possibly part of background): I'm sorry [few words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): Could I ans-- could I ask you the question about the eight quotes, I think the eight quotes were from the point of view of mentalism. And the example that you gave of-- of starting with an objective world and trying to put universal mind behind it, that's a mistake in terms of leading up to an understanding of mentalism. It's more--

RC (simultaneously): Yeah. If you take it as external to you.

AH: Yes. It's more efficacious to put universal mind behind individual mind, and that more logically leads to the consequences of-- of the *conclusion* of mentalism.

[student assents, faint]

RC: Yeah, in that context both the ego and the world can be seen as mental and you can be seen as essentially mind.

AH: Now I think-- I think Dickie's trying to verify the eight quotes where he talked about the objective validity of a world out there. That may be so from the point of view of mentalism. But the world that we experience, if we in our imagination put universal mind behind it (we'll/will) never get to mentalism.

RC: Yes. That's the basic point, yeah.

S: Dickie, would you make your point again?

RG: Uh--

S (faint): Yeah.

RG: But I don't know what it is anymore. I mean I don't--

LR (faint): It's not [couple/few words inaudible]

RG: I mean it's not that important. My only point was that you can choose a subjective approach and get to mentalism and you can choose the objective approach and get to the underlying ideal factors that go to constitute the world and either approach is valid. And to de-- and to-- to deny one I don't think is in the spirit of-- of enquiry in-- into ideas.

AH: I think you're right Dickie but I think if you-- if you posit-- if you try to put universal mind behind the object, the-- you have to be very careful in the logic because you've already put the object out there. You've already got a self-standing object if you're going to try to plug mind in behind.

LR: But wait that's not fair either, to say the word 'object' doesn't mean material object necessarily.

AH (simultaneously): No. I think Randy's-- if I may speak for Randy I think Randy was referring to the world that we experience materially, non-mental, illusion, appearance.

RC: Yeah. Talking about not words, not-- not logical arguments, but aligning the being with the insight. That to put-- to change your words into mental and say that the world out there has universal mind behind it and to still feel and believe the feeling that that universal mind is external to me I think is what keeps you from seeing it.

RG: And to say the words that everything's within me [LR, faint: That's good.] and that the mind creates all its experience is just as phony if you don't know it directly, and you could know either one directly or through your fantasy. You could have a direct insight into the reality of the object just as you could into the reality of your mind as constructing it. Either one could be real or either one could be phony.

RC: But if you-- if you posit it as external to you, then you can never get it inside you.

RG: I would not-- the positing of it as objective is not positing of it as external and I don't-- I don't understand-- I don't understand the criticism.

RC (simultaneously): Ok, if when you say objective you don't-- you don't really imply and you mean the external, then I don't-- I don't have any arguments.

AH: I wouldn't either, that-- that that statement that Dickie made *puts* mind *behind* individual mind by implication, [student assents, very faint] if the objective is not an external objective but a-- one within mind.

RC: Yeah. The only way that I can understand the words "putting the universal mind behind the world that's out there in front of my eyes", it just carries for me that it's outside me. And I'm in a subtler form of materialism.

AH: See that particular point was taken up in some of the Buddhist schools where they talk about if you posit an object at all, the difficulty of s-- of-- of understanding the reality is (impeded) by the very positing of that object. You remember those arguments we had, [RC assents, very faint] where in the Prasangika school they won't even allow the-- the positing of a thing because it just tightens the tendency for error.

[student assents, very faint]

VM: I think Dickie, you tend to keep trying to come from the side of Being or the Ideas.

RG: I just was trying to understand these last [student assents] quotes, yeah, of the World-Idea in a--

VM (simultaneously): In general.

RG: Yeah.

VM: Yeah in general you s-- you want to take that point of view. And I agree, it's a legitimate point of view. I would think that though pedagogically it might be at least initially more useful to come more from the subjective side because the dangers of-- of a habit of the mind reifying objects and objectifying and so on seems to make it harder to come to grips with that objective approach to men--

(Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1983 0302a Ends; Side 2 Begins)

RC: --seems to me to be a subtler form of materialism, that you still-- your ego can still heave that sigh of relief of, ha, he doesn't realize that he's actually making the world that he experiences. He's got God out there doing it for him and he's not that God. So, I don't have to worry about him. Whereas to-- to take the universal mind and put it behind your own personal mind and as a presupposition of that mind's very being, then your contact with that universal mind is inward in terms of being and not outward in terms of external non-self object.

HS: And when you do and you take the universal mind and put it behind *your* being, you-- you're not addressing the world anymore, I mean in some sense. Because, I mean in that you're the individ-- you know, the ego is a thought and the world is a thought, the universal mind seems to by necessity stand under both.

RC: Yeah.

HS: Now but you're saying-- you-- and I think Victor said it too, that you like the pedagogy of just repositing back to your subjectivity.

RC: I didn't understand (the/that) last part.

HS: Well it's bad-- I mean, like do you want to realize mentalism through your subjectivity seems to be the easiest approach, through one's subjectivity. But I-- I don't understand when you say it's--

RC: No I want-- I want to realize it through an alignment of my being with the truth of the World-Idea. And I don't think that that alignment is possible if I have the stance that the reality is out there outside me.

VM: Ok, but I don't think Dickie ever said [HS/RC(?) simultaneously: Ok that's--] out there in any kind of spatial [DB simultaneously: Right.] metaphor or anything like that. Hi-- his idea of objective is a higher notion than let's say an empirical kind of objective. [one/two words inaudible] but I think it's a lot of, you know, useful discussion but--

HS: But I still-- I-- I don't get how-- [VM simultaneously: Sorry.] I guess I have nice refined materialism. I like the World-Mind underlying the world. That's-- And I-- and I don't think I'm a materialist. (bit of laughter)

S: In fact--

LR: It doesn't contradict mentalism either [HS: I don't think--] necessarily.

HS (simultaneously): Yeah. I don't see any problem with that at all, I mean--

RG: I mean if you (want/wanted) to take--

TS (simultaneously): I think he's-- I think he's coming off this quote, I've been reading his quote a couple of times here and--

VM (simultaneously): Go ahead Tim, explain it to them.

S: (Do please.)

TS: See if this-- Who knows, it may be actually be(--/.)

S: Yeah read it.

PB [V13, 21:3.64, TS reading]: "It is asked why, if the world is like a dream or a hallucination, we all have the same dream or suffer the same hallucination. Why do we project it in common instead of independently, since we all do have quite different dreams when asleep at night or quite different reveries when awake by day? The answer is that there is another and vaster Mind behind our personal minds which imposes the same world-image upon them all, so that all see it and live in it. Moreover, they are of necessity themselves projected by this Mind so that this image is not less real for them than their own selves."

TS: I think that's a fairly important sentence here, that "they are of necessity themselves projected by this Mind [TS: Capital M.] so that this image is not less real for them than their own selves."

HS: And the “they” in that sentence is re-- refers to what?

TS (simultaneously): Is personal mind.

S (simultaneously): Individual mind.

S: The individual mind.

HS (simultaneously): And the image.

S (very faint): Right.

AH/S(?): Well--

PB [V13, 21:3.64, TS reading]: “...this image is not less real for them...”

TS: This “them” being the personal mind.

PB [V13, 21:3.64, TS reading]: “...than their own selves.”

HS: Well go back to previous sentence, he talks about the images and the-- and the individual mind. And they are of necessity--

TS: That’s the sentence I’m reading. That’s not the previous sentence, that’s this sentence. I mean--

PB [V13, 21:3.64, TS reading]: “...they are of necessity themselves...”

TS: This “they”-- Ok, well you want me to start over again.

PB [V13, 21:3.64, TS reading]: “The answer is that there is another and vaster Mind behind our personal minds which imposes the same world-image upon them all...”

S (faint): Yeah.

TS: Personal minds, all those personal minds.

HS: Ok then, you got the same image and then you got a whole lot of personal minds upon which thi-- that this image is oppo-- imposed upon.

TS: Yes.

PB [V13, 21:3.64, TS reading]: “...so that all [TS adds: individual personal minds] see it and live in it.”

TS: Live in this same world-image.

PB [V13, 21:3.64, TS reading]: “Moreover, they [TS: These personal minds.] are of necessity themselves projected by this Mind so that this image is not less real for them than their own selves. The mind makes for itself this world of illusion, this stage of space and time and form. But it does not make it independently of all prompting. For the image that it constructs is imposed upon it--or projected into it--by the Mind behind it.”

TS: Now, last time I thought I understood this. I thought that he was saying that to speak of-- to trace the-- trace mentalism in terms of a World-Mind ordering some world-image would first require tracing

the appearance of space time and form to that World-Idea or world-image. And that if you were to speak of a World-Mind underlying or organizing something it's not that space time form that it's underlying and organizing but it is at once the world-image and the individual minds which then construct those space time forms. So that in that sense there's a-- and it's sort of I guess you might say somewhat subjective bias in the original step of anal-- analyzing the mentalness of the ob-- the universal mentalness of experience. I think that's the quote that Randy was coming off of, [RC assents] or one of them. [student assents, very faint] [couple words inaudible]

S: Can't-- I mean can't you simply say that, you see a horse, you don't see the World-Mind's image production of the horse. Insofar as we can all identify a horse as horse, that bears some relation to the World-Mind's image but we see *our* image. We see individual image, it's colored, it's our image.

[student assents, very faint]

RC/S(?) (faint): Yeah, uh-huh, yeah.

S: It is--

RC (simultaneously): The horse-- the-- yeah.

S: You don't see the World-Mind's image when you see that horse.

TS: Right.

RC: Right.

TS: Yes. At least you don't see it.

JfL (simultaneously): But he goes one step further and says that we all are going to see the same horse because it's all being projected by-- because we all have the same image behind us at the same time.

TS: Well, and that that world-image seems to be a composite of these World-Ideas [student assents] and these individual minds which are going to project that horse.

RG: And I would say you don't *not* see the World-Mind's image of horse too. Because then you completely sunder the intelligible world from the sensible world when you do that. I mean if you got 'em both.

LD: And what other horse is there to see?

TS (simultaneously): Well then maybe there's just a point of [one word inaudible]

YOU DON'T LIVE IN TWO WORLDS; YOU LIVE IN ONE WORLD, FOR THE SENSIBLE IS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE

AD (simultaneously): You remember the quotation that was referred to before?

TS (faint): The quotation that was referred to before.

AD: About there not being two worlds?

[student assents, faint]

RG (simultaneously): Yeah, right.

[short pause]

S: So (would he see it) Dickie?

RG: Hm?

S: Would he see it?

RG: You see both. I mean I'm--

S: No but what object (would/do) you see?

LD (simultaneously): You do.

S: We cannot (see--)

LD (simultaneously): You see the World-Mind's Idea projected into time and space.

RG (simultaneously): You in fact see its essence.

S (faint): And that's the--

RG: In fact that's the only part you know.

S: But you see your mind's own version of that Idea.

S: Yeah, but he doesn't want [couple/three words inaudible]

RG (simultaneously) Right, but if-- but if you--

S (simultaneously): You don't see--

RG: --you can not also see the essence, if the essence of horse wasn't present in your perception first of all you could never identify it as horse and it wouldn't [student assents] have any particular shape for you.

S: Right, right, in that regard, [S simultaneously: That's a little more--] but I don't think Dennis was try-- tries to-- trying to sunder them.

S (simultaneously): No, that's the one working in the other, I grant that.

RG: No that's pro-- yeah.

S: There *is* a working of the one in the other but--

S (simultaneously): Your mind is transforming itself--

S: Personally, individually.

S: -- in-- with that essential idea it's trying to transform itself and make an image of this essential idea [RG assents] so we can know it.

RG: Right.

S: Right?

RG: Yeah.

DB: So in some sense it's immediately present and in another sense the essence is potentially accessible dependent upon how hard you're looking.

[student assents, very faint]

LR: That's quite strange.

DB: Yeah it is, I've never understood [S simultaneously: What--] that myself.

S (faint): Can we do--

DB: Well, [S, faint: Sure.] I mean, in the sense that the world-image is presented to the individual mind, that content is in some sense present there. Otherwise it wouldn't have anything out of which to construct its own world. [student assents] But, when you get down here to it, the essence of particular experience often, I've noticed, tends to escape us, I mean-- You know, I mean granted that you say well this is a horse and I--

LD (simultaneously): But is it-- is it proper to speak of the World-Mind's seed-thought as an image, because an image implies time and space already.

DB: Well he spoke-- in this particular quote, I was thinking about it earlier, he actually spoke of that as an image which the World-Mind is giving to the individual mind (of that--/ok.) But, whether-- I mean that-- that's not really the particular question here I don't think, I mean-- something is given to the individual mind. It's an essence, alright. Now, insofar as that's done, the individual mind has immediate contact with that. But, from, you know, our experience here, we certainly don't recognize the full implications or the totality of the essence of any particular object of-- [S simultaneously: (That's good.)] we have to live with.

RG: And I would say all you know is the essence. You don't know anything else.

S: But the-- but the rea--

DB (simultaneously): Right, but--

RG (simultaneously with S and DB): All you could know is the essence.

DB: But Richard, at the same--

S (simultaneously): The reason why you have to make an image is so that the mind can know the essence. If it could know the essence directly as we talked of in-- in another class, it would know it directly--

RG (simultaneously): Fine. But I-- all I'm saying is when it gets projected, when you speak of knowing anything, all you know is the universal. You don't know the particular, you may sense it, but all you know in the thing is the-- is the essence of it. You may have to manifest the particular [S simultaneously: I don't know the essence of it.] to get there.

AD (simultaneously with RG and S): You have-- you have to explain what you mean by knowing. I mean are you going to limit it to one thing or does knowing include, you know, different levels? Did you find it?

RC: You mean the one about putting the mind behind the object? Is that the one you mean?

S: No.

S (simultaneously, faint): (I already know.)

S (faint): Well, two worlds [couple words inaudible]

AD: Do you remember it?

RC: You mean not two minds from a long time ago?

LR (simultaneously): Yeah.

AD: Uh-hm.

LR (simultaneously): Yeah, yeah, a long--

S: (Yeah/Right).

RC (simultaneously): Yeah Peter knows that one.

PC: Oh.

RC: Volume 14?

S (simultaneously): Not two minds?

S: I thought two worlds.

PC (simultaneously): I don't have it with me. I know the one you're referring to.

S (very faint): (Well/Yeah) let's hear it.

PC: It would be wrong to believe that there are two independent minds, the ego mind and another Overself mind observing it. It's rather one independent illuminating consciousness with the ego being a thought-series within it. Something like that.

AD: Well you read it this-- you read it tonight.

RC: Oh tonight.

S: Oh.

S (simultaneously, very faint): Uh-hm.

RC: Well can-- can you remember it, a few more words maybe?

TS (faint): Who read it?

AD: I think Timothy read it.

RC: You read just [AD simultaneously: Well--] earlier in this sequence or the one before?

AD: You know, it was-- it was basically a criticism of the theory that there's no two worlds, there's only one world, it isn't that you have an intelligible world and a sensible world but you only have one world.

LR: So what the superior-- the one about planets, [AD simultaneously: No, no.] what the superior being(s) [one/two words inaudible]

S (very faint): No.

RC: The antique division of manifestation into self and not-self?

S (very faint): No.

AD: No. [short pause] The-- it was in my imagination.

RG: I don't think we read it tonight.

TS (simultaneously): Not tonight. (some laughter)

RC: Help me.

RG: I--

AD: You heard it, David?

RG (simultaneously): We did [one word inaudible] Do you remember how it went? (laughter, student words)

S: It's the magician at work. (laughter)

RG: Yeah, right. What magician was at work here? (RG laughs)

S (faint): I know.

AD: No, it was an important quote, I'm sorry I didn't comment on it because it was-- it's a critique that's often thrown at the Greek philosophers, [VM: Oh.] that they have an intelligible world and a sensible world, alright.

S (simultaneously, faint): We didn't read that, [possibly RG: we didn't].

AD: Huh?

RG/S(?) (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible] to reading that.

S (simultaneously): Is it-- is it the World-Idea-- (laughter)

LR (amidst laughter): Oh no, I know maybe what it is.

RG: We didn't read it though.

AD: We didn't read it?

LR (simultaneously): You mean the one-- the objection may arise well maybe it's so that we have a mental world but how does that-- that one?

AD (faint): No.

S (faint): [one word inaudible] The World-Idea is the-- (laughter)

S (amidst laughter): This is [one/two words inaudible]

AD: Alright, [VM simultaneously: Well--] it's a good note to end the class on, confusion. (bit of laughter)

S (simultaneously, faint): I think, I think I found it.

RG: We've read in Bombay tonight. (RG laughs, bit of laughter)

S (simultaneously, faint): Is it "The World-Idea is the world creation, [S simultaneously: We're going there.] the second is not a copy in matter of the first"?

AD (faint): Say it again?

S: "The World-Idea is-- *is* the world creation, the second is not a copy in matter."

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, that's it, yeah.

S (faint): (Uh-hm.)

RC (simultaneously): Oh. Wait, wait, [S simultaneously: Say it again.] I like that one, let's do the rest of that one if that's all we're going to do. Ok, (7.15/7:15). Uh--

PB [V13, 21:3.57, RC reading]: "How hard for the average mind to grasp this central fact, that the World-Idea *is* the world-creation. The one does *not* precede the other. The second is *not* a copy in matter of the first. Man has to work, with his senses and [his] intellect, when he wants to convert his ideas into objects. But the World-Mind does not need to make an effort in order to make a universe, [RC adds: for it] does not in reality have anything to do at all, [for] Its thought *is* the thing. Some mystics and most occultists have failed to perceive this. Their realization of the Spirit did not bring with it the full revelation of the Spirit. This is because they have not thoroughly comprehended--usually through lack of competent instruction--its utter emptiness. Nothing can come out of the Universal Mind that is not mental, not even the material world which men believe they inhabit and experience. Science is on its way, through its delvings into atomic structure, to a suspicion of this tremendous fact; but so many scientists are so devoid of metaphysical faculty that they uphold materialism and deny mentalism!"

AD: Yes, it was the first part that I-- I thought would really end tonight's class on a happy note. You don't live in two worlds, you live in one world. Do you remember when, in the study of *On Nature and the One*, I think it was Deck who pointed out that the sensible *is* [S simultaneously, faint: Is the intelligible (one word inaudible)] *in the intelligible*, it's not outside, it's not a copy, it's not something, alright. [Note: See John N. Deck, *Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus*.] And you know the classical [RG assents] interpretation of Platonism is you got the intelligible world here and down here you got an imitation copy of it, [RG assents] [RC simultaneously: Ok, here's even a better one.] alright, in the mirror of space.

RG: Uh-hm.

PB [V13, 21:2.3, RC reading]: “The falsity of the [RC reads: this] view that the real world is outside consciousness and that the mental copy of it alone is inside consciousness, becomes known only after thoroughly deep penetrative thought. There is no world apart and separate to be copied, for the idea *is* the world.”

[students assent, faint]

RC: That’s part of what I was, [AD simultaneously: (Uh-huh/Uh-hm).] you know--

AD: We’ll end it and begin it with that quote next [students assent] week, ok, because that’s-- that really shows, you either understand or you don’t. Another ten years or more won’t matter.

VM: I don’t want to--

TS/S(?): Like Barney Miller was it?

AD: Huh?

S: Like Barney Miller.

S: Yeah.

[Audio File 1983 0302a Ends]