

**CLASS at Wisdom's Goldenrod, Hector, NY
with Anthony Damiani (AD)
March 30, 1983
PB PARAS; MENTALISM**

TOPIC: PB Paras
SUBJECT: Mentalism

SUBSUBJECTS: Epistemology, Knowledge, Sensation, Sense Organs, Phenomenalization,
Individual Mind, World-Idea, Deep Sleep

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YOUR EYES DON'T SEE THE OBJECT, YOUR MIND SEES THE OBJECT

DON'T TRY TO PRACTICE RENUNCIATION BEFORE YOU'RE READY FOR IT

"THE WORLD-IDEA'S END IS FOREORDAINED FROM THE BEGINNING"

IF THE WORLD-IDEA DOES NOT ENTER THE MIND, E.G., IN DEEP SLEEP, CAN YOU MAINTAIN YOUR CONSCIOUSNESS?

THE WORLD-MIND IS THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF THE WORLD-IDEA THAT IS THOUGHT BY THE INDIVIDUAL MIND

THE EGO IS A REPRESENTATION OF THE OVERSELF WITHIN THE WORLD-IDEA, AND ANY STATE THE EGO IS IN, AWAKE, ASLEEP, OR DREAMING, IS A CHANGING ASPECT OF THAT WORLD-THOUGHT

BOOKS READ FROM OR REFERENCED:

- Paul Brunton, *Notebooks*
- Paul Brunton, *The Hidden Teaching Beyond Yoga*
- Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*

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1983 03/30 at Wisdom's Goldenrod
PB Paras; Mentalism
Archival verbatim transcript

[Audio File 1983 0330a Begins]

RC: Reviewing from a long time ago.

[short pause]

PB [V16, 25:3.552 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 25: World-Mind in Individual Mind, #58, RC reading]:
“There is no such act as a one-sided self-giving. Karma brings us back our due. He who spends his life in the dedicated service of philosophic enlightenment may reject the merely material rewards that his service could bring him, but he cannot reject the beneficent thoughts, the loving remembrances, the sincere veneration which those who have benefited sometimes send him. Such invisible rewards help him to atone more peacefully and less painfully for the strategic errors that he has made, the tactical shortcomings he has manifested. Life is an arduous struggle for most people, but much more so for such a one who is always a hated target for the unseen powers of darkness. Do not hesitate then to send him your silent humble blessing, therefore, and remember that Nature will not waste it. The enemies you are now struggling against within yourself he has already conquered, but the enemies he is now struggling against are beyond your present experience. He has won the right to sit by a hearth of peace. If he has made the greatest renunciation and does not do so, it is for your sake and [for] the sake of [those] others like you.”

[29½ second pause; some inaudible student words in background, possibly a word from AD]

S: Could you say exactly where that-- that's from?

RC: Yeah, that's from volume 12 in the-- the red one. It's on page 120. [31½ second pause while flipping pages] And this one is that one about the Sage's reaction to the cosmos. This is also from volume 12. I thought it was 10 so I had trouble finding it for a while. So it's volume 12, page 95, number 69.

PB [V16, 25:4.43 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 25: World-Mind in Individual Mind, #63, RC reading]:
“What is the sage's reaction to the cosmos? It is very different from that of the ignorant who have never asked the question “What am I?” and who may regard the calm visage of a Yogi as a “frozen face.” The sage has no sense of conflict, no inner division. He has expanded his notion of self until it has embraced the universe and therefore rightly he may say “the universe is my idea.” He may make this strange utterance because he has so expanded his understanding of mind. Lesser men may only say “the universe is an idea.”

[short pause]

S: (Speak.)

RC: So I guess the key points in that are that he's expanded his notion of self until it has embraced the universe, and he has done that through expanding his understanding of mind. [21½ second pause] I thought that was particularly interesting because the mind in there is-- is the small “m,” so he doesn't have a capital “M” on there.

[students assent, very faint]

[38 second pause with some inaudible background student talking]

RC: I think this one was written between the time that Tim and I were there, I think. Either that or during the time Tim was there.

YOUR SENSES DO NOT SEE THE OBJECT, YOUR MIND SEES THE OBJECT

PB [V13, 21:2.33, RC reading]: “The physical senses do *not* provide a picture of the object to the mind for the simple reason that all objects, including the senses themselves, are held in the mind. This is possible, this *could* only be possible, because the individual mind is not separate from the universal mind. As the Hindus say: Atman and Brahman are one. But that is carrying the discussion to a level that must be deferred for [RC reads: to] later study.”

[13½ second pause]

S: Could you read that again, what you just read?

PB [V13, 21:2.33, RC reading]: “The physical senses do *not* provide a picture of the object to the mind for the simple reason that all objects, including the senses themselves, are held in the mind. This is possible, this *could* only be possible, because the individual mind is not separate from the universal mind. As the Hindus say: Atman and Brahman are one. But that [RC reads: this] is carrying the discussion to a level that must be deferred for later study.”

[short pause]

DB: Randy, could you explain why the last-- without going into that further discussion, why that last portion of the paragraph explains the second portion? I--like I can see three ideas there [couple/three words inaudible]

RC: Well if the universal mind was outside or in any way separate from your individual mind, then you'd have to get it into you somehow, maybe by taking pictures with the senses or [short pause] some other kind of cooperation.

DB: Well, I mean it-- I just-- He's saying the senses and the object are both provided by the mind, right? The second-- the second sentence of this.

RC: The second half of the first sentence reads--

DB: Ah.

PB [V13, 21:2.33, RC reading]: “...that all objects, including the senses themselves, are held in the mind.”

DB: Right, ok, now that's all objects including the senses are held in the mind. Now, why-- why is it necessary to bring in the idea that the universal mind and the individual mind aren't separate in order to explain that?

[11 second pause]

RC: What I think that if-- if you're going to talk about objects as being in a universal mind, sustained by a universal mind, then [10¾ second pause] if that universal mind were separate from the individual mind, you couldn't say that-- that those objects were held in the mind that you're familiar with as being a mind.

S: I thought those two sentences were just a summary of the whole *Hidden Teaching* and that the first sentence was already thinking that you had gone through the disproving that you saw the orange with your eye, you know, you saw objects or you knew objects by your senses. And that-- that that's assuming that [AD simultaneously: Yeah.] right at first, you know already that you don't know objects with your senses.

DB: Right.

S: And he's saying it's simply because-- he's giving you a simple reason for it. And it-- for him it's simple. It's simply because the-- both the senses and the objects are both held by the mind, by universal mind. And that's a reason for--

AD: Individual mind, not (universal).

S (simultaneously): That-- Thought he said that it--

DB (simultaneously): See that's the part I don't understand because senses and the objects are held by the individual mind and, you know, I just-- And he's saying this is so because of the inseparability of the individual and the universal.

S: And universal.

DB: And I-- it's not that I'm disagreeing, it's just that I don't follow how that last statement--

AD: Because the individual mind sees the object and the senses that see the object, and the picture that it gets is from the universal mind.

DB: Right.

AD (simultaneously): Universal mind gives the picture to the individual mind and that's what the individual mind sees.

DB: Right. So that's what I was unders--

AD: Follow it up.

DB (simultaneously): --that's how I was understanding it.

AD: Then you follow, Linda, that your eyes don't see the orange, right?

[student assents, very faint]

AD: No, Linda. (bit of laughter) [short pause] Your senses do not see the object, your mind sees the object. Go back to the analogy of the dream. In the dream you see yourself, dream object, alright, and yourself, and in the dream you say, "Look, I'm looking at the bear." But it's not the dream mind, the dream character, alright, who's looking at the bear. It's *you* looking at the bear.

DB: Right.

AD: Ok. So then the object of the senses is seen by the individual mind.

DB: Right.

AD: Not--

DB: Not the senses.

AD: Not the sense.

DB: It's not the senses, right.

AD: Yeah. If you got that, you got a capital point. Because I don't think-- I don't think you'd agree with me. I don't think you'll agree with me. You're just being polite, you're acquiescing.

DB: No, well, I mean, that-- I think doesn't it-- My problem wasn't that. (some laughter)

AD: Well it's certainly my problem. (laughter, student words) Somebody ever told me I didn't see with my eyes I'd think he were crazy.

DB: Well, see but the-- I mean the-- there are two issues here. I think the one you're addressing is the question of whether the eyes can see and the eyes don't. The eyes are there, they're just as much of an object to the individual mind as the-- the visible objects which they pretend to see or which they're instrumental in seeing and presenting, something like that. But-- I'm--

AD (simultaneously): But the other part, the other part is very straightforward. The World-Mind gives to the individual mind the image of the world and this is what you see.

DB: Yes. Now what you're-- that giving of the-- by the World-Mind to the individual mind, that's what he means by the inseparability of the--

AD: Uh-hm.

DB: --of the two minds? Ok, well--

SD: There's not a hiatus between them like you said, you know, the way you'd imagine between an object and a subject having to have some medium of sensation or something, that transmission from the World-Mind to the individual mind is within. So--

[student assents, very faint]

S: (I see.)

DB: Well, you're just-- Oh ok, go ahead.

SD: Well, that's why he says that they're inseparable. It's coming from within.

[19¾ second pause]

RG: But, let's say it's [couple/three words inaudible] it doesn't follow logically in that quote that you would have to say just from that sentence before that-- you know, you wouldn't have to think that you should bring in universal mind [one/two words inaudible] the first sentence.

DB: Yeah, I mean I--

RG: But it's like this quote is being read out of another chapter in the book.

DB: Oh.

RG: I mean it's like not the *Hidden Teaching*. It seems to be a culmination of cosmic mentalism and individual mentalism in two sentences.

DB: Yeah.

RG: So we can't-- I mean it's like we have to bring in everything we understand about it to see why he says it's only possible. It's already given, I think, the idea that the stimulus comes from some-- some other principle than the individual mind.

DB: Right, exactly.

BS: Could you consider the individual mind as sort of a-- using the dream analogy that you presented, as some kind of nucleated structure itself, [S: No.] which we say produces the scenario of the dream or our world? In that case there would only be one mind anyway.

THE WORLD-IDEA IS GIVEN TO THE INDIVIDUAL MIND, AND THIS IS WHAT THE INDIVIDUAL MIND SEES

AD: No, it's two minds. The mind receives the World-Idea. The reception of the World-Idea is something given to it by the universal mind or the World-Mind. You remember when he says it's not the senses that see the World-Idea, it's the individual mind. The world is-- the world is given to the individual mind. We should say the World-Idea is given to the individual mind. [student assents, faint] And it's given to the individual mind by the World-Mind. And this is what the individual mind *sees*.

[12½ second pause]

RG: I mean he's allowing the realist-- the realist his due in this quote though.

AD: No, we're not allowing the realist to do anything in this situation. (some laughter, student words) Verboten. [RG simultaneously: You could (one/two words inaudible)] Mentalistic epistemology cuts that off, there *is no object*, there's only the image which is given or the World-Idea [RG simultaneously: If there's only the image (one word inaudible)] is given to the individual mind.

RG: (Ok.) (bit of laughter)

AD: I'm not agreeing, disagreeing, I'm just stating it.

RG: You didn't even listen to what I-- what I-- the explanation, so I'll shut up. Go ahead.

AD: Go ahead.

RG: No. (laughter) You'll disagree with it anyway [one/two words inaudible] (laughter)

AD: You mean on principle?

RG: On principle, yeah.

[short pause]

LR: Come on Dickie.

RG: No, no, it doesn't-- it's not important.

AD: Well what do you think Linda, wasn't that--

LR: (You win.) (laughter, student words)

AD (amidst laughter): Didn't that bother (you)? Huh? Didn't that bother you when he says that it's not the eyes that see the object?

[students assent, faint]

[10¾ second pause]

LR: Guys.

S: (He's) speaking. (laughter)

BS: Well--

LR: Well--

BS: Usually bothered me but-- (bit of laughter)

RG: That's right. (RG laughs)

AD: "Divide and [LR simultaneously: Doesn't--] conquer" is my motto! (laughter, student words)

LR: But this individual mind-- (more laughter, student words) Doesn't the individual mind need the senses to become self-reflective? Otherwise, it might contain an object but it doesn't know that.

[students assent, very faint]

[short pause]

LR: Don't the senses in some way provide the mirror for the idea say?

AD: Sure, your dream eyes provide a mirror by which you can see the dream table. And you can reflect that through your dream eyes you're seeing the dream table.

LR: Would you like--

AD: Do you really believe that you see the things that are in your eyes, upside down-- [LR simultaneously: No, no.] down inverted images which are--

LR (simultaneously): No, but those aren't the organs either.

AD: Huh?

LR: Those aren't the organs.

AD: Well what organs are you talking about?

LR: Not this um--

AD: Oh, well then you're talking about the mind.

S: Huh?

[short pause]

LR: Yes, but not the undivided mind, not a seamless--

AD: I don't care what kind of mind, as long as it's mind.

LR: Ok.

AD: Well wait a while. Maybe you'll get--

BS: What does that mean? What does that mean that that is the mind?

LR: The organs have--

BS: Before mind was said not to be a nucleated structure, now it is cons-- the mind are the organ-- is the-- is the organ?

DB(?): [one/two words inaudible]

BS: So it is some kind of structure that--

LR: Well--

BS: Anyone.

LR: If(--) the mind's going to contain these objects, but it's still a channelized mind that's [couple words inaudible] separate to form experience. In other words, it's not a-- a seamless-- what-- how does he use this?

BS: [possibly another student: Well], ok.

LR: --homogenous--

DB: Undifferentiated.

BS: I look for that.

LR (simultaneously): --undifferentiated-- Right, it has to be in some way constricted or modalized. I mean it has-- it possesses organs, I mean it-- it's gotta experience self-consciousness. Those organs are the [one

word inaudible] what that would be [couple/three words inaudible] So, that would already-- well Anthony just said they're-- they're in the mind.

AD: If you don't see an object [LR simultaneously: It's those (one/two words inaudible)] with the-- if you don't see the object with these eyes in your head, alright, because you went through the physiology, the reasoning of the physiology, you come to the conclusion that the image which is in the back of the eye, you know, in the retina, inverted, disproportionate, all these things that you know about it, you know that that isn't what you see. Therefore, it can't be with your eyes that you're seeing the object.

JA: Yes but, I was just trying--

AD (simultaneously): But you can be seeing it with the senses of the mind, if you want to, so to speak, differentiate the term 'mind'.

JA: Is that what you mean Linda by the organs, the senses of the mind? Is that what you were talking about and trying to sneak in, [S: Yeah.] the eyes that give you--

LR: No.

JA: I just (pointed to) what it sounded like.

LR: No, I would a--

S: Yeah, right.

LR: It's not the eyes in that way. I mean if-- if you're going to differentiate between the sensible eyes and the mental eyes, then of course you see with the mental eyes.

DR(?): Why "of course"? I don't (have/get) mental eyes in my head. (laughter, student words)

DB: I-- I see with--

AD: In this class you do! (laughter, student words)

DB: I mean isn't-- isn't the point-- isn't the point have something to do with the fact that it's only the mind which is capable of knowing anything, the senses-- I mean, what we speak of as the physical senses are not capable of knowledge.

**# IF YOU START WITH THE MIND, YOU WILL END UP WITH THE IDEA
CORPOREALIZED, BUT IF YOU START WITH AN OBJECT THAT IS OUTSIDE THE
MIND, YOU WON'T BE ABLE TO COME TO KNOWLEDGE OF IT**

AD: The physical senses are not capable of perceiving because they don't *see* anything.

DB: Yeah, right, I mean they--

AD: Can we go to that point and just stay there?

DB: Yeah.

AD: You remember the whole business about the impression comes into the eye, goes to the back, the retina, then what happened?

DB: Magic.

D: Magic. So you know you can't see that way the object, alright.

RG: Yeah but you know there's a funny kind of magic that goes on with the same senses you're talking about as mental.

DB: No but, I mean isn't--

AD: Wait, wait, [student assents] wait, I want to hear this. Go ahead. (some laughter, student words) And what is that?

RG: That is, 'cause you can make the same argument that each sense delivers-- you could take the analysis of a sense to a dead end also and that-- and then there's a magical gap between that and the-- and then the knowing of it.

AD (simultaneously): What you're saying-- you're saying that the senses of the mind which produce the object for us has the same problem as a gap!?! (bit of laughter, student words)

RG: The problem of knowing the thing--

AD (simultaneously): Is that what you're saying?

RG: I'm saying-- (RG laughing, bit of laughter) I know [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Come on, right to the point, don't beat around the bush.

RG: I'm not. That the problem of knowledge is the same exact problem in either case, of knowing the thing.

AD: No, I think that's your problem Dickie, you can't see that if you start with the mind you'll end up with the corporealized object or the idea corporealized.

RG: Right.

AD: Whereas you cannot start the other way-- and you can't start with an object which is outside the senses of the mind and come to a knowledge of it.

RG: I didn't try to. I--

AD: But I think what you're trying to do is that you can have an idea in the mind, alright, and this can get sensationalized, can I (use/using) a word incorrectly?, this can get put into sensational form. And then you would have the problem of saying, well how is that sensation the object? And I would say you'd have no problem there. It goes right through.

RG: Uh-hm. But are you going to-- but who knows that?

AD: Anyone who could think.

RG: Anyone who could what?

AD: Who could think.

RG: Right. But, I was just pointing out, does this-- would you still say the sense knows it or does the mind operating through the sense know it?

[short pause]

THE MIND, HAVING RECEIVED THE WORLD-IDEA, MAKES A REPRESENTATION OF IT AND THEN BECOMES REFLECTIVELY AWARE OF ITS THINKING THROUGH THE ACTIVITY OF THE IMAGINATION

AD: Well, I think what you're trying to say is that the mind would have different faculties. I think that's what you're trying to say, right? That there's one faculty the mind has which we can say, you know, the faculty of creating concepts and employing them. And another faculty the mind has is to represent sensations, unify them into a manifold, alright, and project them. But these would all be faculties of the mind. [RG assents] And we could use the general term 'mind', you know, to cover all those faculties, higher and lower. But I think if you-- if you followed it that way Dickie, I think you'll come to the crux of your problem and it would really be a-- a leap. Start at the other end, start with the mind producing, making the object. And you will see that you have no physiolo-- physiological gap.

S: Right.

RC: I mean when you do it that (way/well), when you say the mind is in the process of corporealizing an idea, do you conceive of this mind's knowing as concomitant with the process of corporealizing it through the senses?

AD: You can see the mind concomitant with?

RC: Then-- the arising of the knowledge in the mind that you're talking about, the moment of knowledge, taking the whole unit of this moment of knowledge, that an idea which previously was not being instantiated by that soul now gets that soul's attention and it's going to get instantiated. It seems that you have a choice to say, ok, the mind *knows* it, *then* it canalizes that knowledge through its senses; or you could say the mind-- the mind as knowing is concomitant with and identical with its spatializing and temporalizing of that idea through the sense function.

AD: Yeah, 'knowing' there would be a generic term and you could break down that whole process, say that the mind makes representations for itself. These representations are organized by the-- a faculty of the understanding into a unity. And then this unity, which is, let's say, unreflective is brought to a reflective awareness through lower faculties. You can go the whole-- the whole route. Or [RC assents] you can simply say that the mind does it.

RC: Ok, and then it seems that the third place you can talk about the knowledge actually arising is that *after* the whole thing has been spatialized.

AD: Oh sure, all these processes are unconscious. You're not conscious of the mind making sensations.

RC: Now, what's implied by saying that the knowledge arises at any one of those points, say, rather than at another?

AD: I don't know what you mean by point.

RC: Well, of those three steps, like you can say, the mind knows in a totally imageless way.

AD: In a totally what?

RC (simultaneously): Let's say A, B, and C. The-- the soul's energy, the soul's attention--

AD: Well, [RC: --these (possibly one word inaudible)] we'll have to say the mind is given the World-Idea. Or if you say "object", it's the same thing. When you say "the mind is given the object", in Kant's terminology, alright, you never get an object alone, *you get the world or nothing*.

RC: Ok. So you're saying that all three of these steps I'm talking about are the steps of the mind being given the object.

AD: The mind is given the object, makes a representation of the object for itself. You can call this its sensation. The mind's faculty of making a representation for itself, that is the sensation of the object. This sensation is not the sensation you'll see here [AD hitting something].

RC: Ok.

AD: Ok? Now, the mind also has a faculty of getting all those sensations, correlating them, unifying them, bringing them together, so to speak, make a unity out of that manifold. This is still not the object. This-- this is all unconscious processes that are going on. [student assents, very faint] Ok? [student assents, faint] Then what's the next thing it has to do?

RC: Well having--

AD (simultaneously): You just spoke about the mind synthesizing the sensations.

RC: Having imposed that-- that unity on the sensations then it becomes reflective and conscious of what it's done.

AD: But then that means that through the imagination it has to become self-reflectively conscious of what it did.

RC: Ok, now is that through the imagination [AD simultaneously: Yeah.] or is that on *top* of the imagination?

AD: No, that's *through* the imagination, which is *another* faculty of the mind.

AH: You said via the imagination or *through* the imagination. Is that like-- is it *within* the imagination or-- Could you be a little more specific please? You say [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): You want a guided tour?

AH: What?

AD: You want a guided tour?

AH: Yes. [slight pause] It's *through* the imagination as if it was outside.

AD (simultaneously): If you-- if the mind makes the sensation, alright, [AH: Yeah.] and makes-- makes a unified sensation of it, this in itself is still not what you're conscious of.

AH: That's right.

AD: Ok? We refer to this as unconscious process. Now how can it become conscious of that?

AH: Become self-reflectively aware.

AD: Uh-huh.

AH (simultaneously): Yeah. Now, is that-- is that becoming aware--

AD: Well how can it become reflectively aware?

[12¼ second pause]

AH: It means the reflectively is the--

AD: Well, it would have to put it in some kind of medium.

AH: A medium.

AD: Yeah, [AH simultaneously: Yes.] the imagination. [short pause] I mean if you have just the thought, alright, which is still unconscious, you want to become conscious of this thought, that thought has to be spread out in the imagination. Then there has to be faculties *in* the imagination which help you become aware of this unconscious thought. But once you become conscious *of* the thought which is *in* the imagination, it has become *phenomenalized*.

[short pause]

LH: Does the-- the physical and physiological models that we speak of, do they in any way reflect those structures in the imagination, are they totally (irrelevant)?

AD: It's totally irrelevant to what we're talking about because that's how you become aware of your so-called physiology. That's-- that's now a [LH simultaneously: The imagination you mean?] phenomenal object. When you say you're aware of your body, that's a phenomenalized object, an object that has been brought into self-consciousness through these unconscious processes which all, each and every one of them, is some kind of functioning of the mind.

[short pause]

LH: So it is totally specious, there's no-- there's no connection there whatsoever.

AD: Connection with what?

LH: Between the way the actual-- the body, the eye, physiology and that whole process is structured and the way the imagination channelizes the mind's creation.

LR (simultaneously): Thought. Yeah, but the body is one of (those/them).

[short pause]

LH: Right, the body is one of those thoughts so you would think that if it is one of those thoughts that the structures in the body would reflect that imaginal-- the way that imaginal function work(s).

AH: I thought we said that the imaginal process reflected *is* the body; that the process of-- the imaginal process in reflection phenomenalizes the body. I thought that was the point.

AD: Yeah.

AH: That that process of reflection creates the body.

AD: Phenomenalizes it, makes it an object that now you can say is in your experience.

AH: So to talk-- so to talk from the point of view of that body-- to talk from the point of the body is to talk much after the fact of--

AD: Absolutely.

AH: Yeah.

AD: Absolutely.

LR: But, it's not that there's no connection. I mean the body in fact *is* a very good representation of what those faculties in the imagination (could) be. It'd have-- it'd have to. I mean how could it have *no* connection? Isn't that what you're asking Larry, in what way is the body a re--

LH (simultaneously): Yeah, on the other hand, you know, when you-- when we talked about the dream, you know, we certainly don't run into elaborate analysis of the dream to come up with a dream table.

LR: Well, isn't the dream like the body?

S (very faint): (Which is?)

LR: In other words, isn't the structure of the dream a co-- and a reification of the processes that are--

LH (simultaneously): Well there's certainly sights, there's-- there seems to be sights in the dream.

[student assents, very faint]

[short pause]

LR: I lost your question.

LH: Well I just jumped-- so I jumped to the other side of it. When you look at the dream it really does seem that all those-- all that detailed process of functioning that you describe really does seem-- seem specious, totally irrelevant to-- (to what) [PD simultaneously: To knowledge.] the mind creates. But, from the point view of real bodies and-- that see things, it seems very relevant, that it would *have* to re-- reflect the way body recreates what's imagined.

S: So what would happen-- well I don't know, that's why I asked the question, I don't know what--

DB: Well see I think the point is that the body is an effect, it's a content within the imagination, it's the imagination which is acting as the reflective medium. And, you know, if you're going to make a distinction in this realm I think the idea was spoken of that the body we're familiar with is pictorialized within the imagination, phenomenalized. And so reflecting, whether it's done on the body or on some

scientific theory or whatever, is something that takes place within the imagination, but the body would be the consequence of that imaginal activity. One of-- one of the consequences of it.

[short pause]

THE BODY IS AN ITEM IN KNOWLEDGE, A RESULT OF THE PROCESS OF KNOWLEDGE, SO IT CAN'T BE ONE OF THE CONDITIONS THAT MAKE KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE

AD: Well let me put it this way, maybe I follow you. If we are discussing the conditions that make knowledge possible, and you bring in the notion of the body, it's absolutely irrelevant because what you're discussing and what you're analyzing is the way the mind functions so that you can speak about-- talk or speak about this brain that's in front of you. But what you're asking is how and what are the conditions by which this comes into *being*. And then you ask me, "Well isn't the body the means of getting this knowledge?" And you missed the whole point I think.

S: I don't think that's what he said.

AD: No, wait, wait. I-- we can talk to each other.

[short pause]

LH: I realize that when you-- after the fact you come up with this body model, that that's all--

AD: You come up with an item *in knowledge*.

LH: Right, [AD simultaneously: Yeah.] it's all conceptual.

AD (intensely): Now you ask me, "Now how is this involved *in* the process of knowledge?" And I'm telling you, it's the *result* of the process of knowledge. [short pause] You first have to understand what conditions are the presuppositions of knowledge, knowledge of this, for instance. If I'm discussing the presuppositions of knowledge to bring in a body is irrelevant.

LH (simultaneously): But these-- those ver-- those very preconceptions or preconditions that you have are going to be described in the way you analyze-- the way you-- you see that-- they describe that process.

AD: I'm sorry?

LH: Aren't they?

AD: Well, I didn't follow you.

LH: Those very preconceptions that are going to go into forming that conceptual image you have of that whole physiology or whatever, the way-- the very way those concepts are-- are formed--

AD: No, the way you understand that conceptual analysis will lead you into realizing why the body *can* be an item *in* knowledge. You're not going to get to these processes, in other words, what we mean when we say mental formation or [LH simultaneously: Yeah.] mental construction, by talking about the body. [intensely] You're talking about *mental* processes. The mind has to make a sensation for you. Now what in the world is that? Is it something you're going to find in the body? The body is already a sensation. It's

already some-- it's already an item *in* knowledge. So how can you bring the body in a discussion of what the presuppositions of knowledge are? You better get another quote. Because what you people want me to do is what I told *you* people to do last week for yourselves.

**# THE SENSATIONS THAT THE MIND MAKES FOR ITSELF ARE NOT FIXED
QUALITIES OF THE OBJECT, UNLIKE THE QUALITIES OF THE PHENOMENAL
OBJECT**

RC: Would you be willing to just say a little bit more about what you mean about a sensation at that level?

[student assents, faint]

AD: When the mind receives--

RC (simultaneously): For the mind to form a sensation of something which previously was not spatial or temporal.

AD: Well when the mind makes-- makes a sensation for itself, alright, like in the act of receiving an object, now generally when you say sensation, you look at that blackboard and you say, "Well the size of that blackboard, alright, is 4 x 12. That's the size of the sensation, because it's 4 x 12, it's black, 4 feet across and 12 feet long." That's not sensation. That's the phenomenal object. [student assents] Sensation-- when the mind makes a sensation for itself of that object, it *has* no dimensions--it's a *thought*.

RC: Ok. So, then you mean some type of-- by sensation there you mean some type of spatialized thought.

[short pause with very faint background student talking]

AD: Alright.

[short pause]

PD: Sensation [couple/three inaudible RC words simultaneous with PD] as the content of thought or spatialization, [AD, whisper: Yeah.] sense.

RC: Say that again?

PD: Sensation is the content of any spatialization.

RC: That's what I was thinking.

S: [couple/three words inaudible]

AD: Do you get the feeling that [S: I--] the way I speak about sensation is something that's floating, a floating adjective, it's not a fixed quality that belongs to that object, it's something that the mind makes for itself? That would be a sensation. That's what we mean when we say that the mind has a faculty of making a representation for itself. It doesn't mean that it has a fixed object.

S: Anthony, you spoke about it last week as, what was it, the energizing of the mind in this situation. But-- but it's-- that isn't particular.

AD: Same thing.

S: But the energizing it seems like would always-- the actual energizing would-- is the process. Is that what you mean? I mean the actual content of knowledge given by the World-Mind is very particular but the actual energizing of the mind seems to be a function of the mind, seems to be a process.

AD: Well, let's say it's the mind working, alright. So the mind works, it does something. What is it doing? It's making a sensation for itself. What is this sensation like? If you think of it in any way, like you think of sensations as we ordinarily-- as you ordinarily speak, this-- "I got a sensation of white, I got a sensation of green," that's not what we're talking.

S: No, I can't-- I can't get that at all. I can't-- I can't put any qualities on the way that-- that definition of sensation.

AD: I'm sorry (Marie/Mary), I'm lost.

S: I mean it seems-- Like what you're saying is it's almost like the bridge, the-- it's almost the bridge between the World-Mind's-- the World-Mind's knowledge and--

AD (simultaneously): Well-- well don't think about the World-Mind, just think about the individual mind. Ignore the World-Mind for now, the World-Idea.

S: No, I just mean the real object. In order for the real object to be known by the individual mind, it seems like the way you're desc-- describing the sensation, it-- it's hard for me to-- to get particularity. But it does-- it *doesn't* seem to be spatialized, it *does* seem to be an active--

AD: Well maybe a good way to look at it is think of yourself at night when the blankets are choking you, alright, and your mind makes a sensation, a representation, for itself. In this case a boa constrictor's wrapped around you instead of just a blanket. [S: But--] The mind makes a *sensation*.

S: Yeah, but [S simultaneously: Yeah but it--] it seems like it activates the imagination, [couple/three inaudible student words] that--

S: Go ahead.

RG: Go ahead.

S (simultaneously): It seems-- it seems like the way you're talking about it is that what happens is that there's like this-- there's like movement and that that in turn [AD simultaneously: Yes.] stimulates the imagination.

THE MENTAL PROCESSES THAT BEGIN WITH THE MIND'S RECEPTION OF THE WORLD-IDEA AND END WITH OUR EXPERIENCE OF THE PHENOMENAL OBJECT

AD: No, no, I'm not [S simultaneously: Alright, ok.] talking about the ima-- I'm talking about the mind. The imagination is going to be a much lower faculty of the mind. It's the mind that we said got the Idea, [student assents, very faint] received the Idea, alright. Go from there.

S: Yeah, that it receives the Idea and then it has to-- it has to know about it, it has to become aware of it.

AD: Ok. Fine.

S: But then what it seems like is that that requires some kind of translation process.

AD: Yeah, a whole process has got to be set in motion.

S: And is that what you're calling sensation is this--

AD: Well the first step is the sensation. The first thing that the mind does, receive it.

S (simultaneously): The actual reception.

AD: Yeah. The first thing it does, that's sensation.

S: Ok, but that doesn't-- that seems to be true no matter what the object is.

AD: Well we said that the object is the World-Idea. So, the Idea's given to it, right? It has to make a sensation for itself. We know that the World-Idea is being constantly changed, like tomorrow things aren't the way they are today. Sometimes from moment-to-moment they [one/two words inaudible] alright. But generally, things are changing, the World-Idea's changing, so the mind is constantly making a representation for itself of that changing World-Idea. So naturally the mind will be having different sensations, one following upon the other. But you can't stop there, there's a whole train going on. Now, when we say a whole train or a sequence or a succession of operations, alright, we can isolate them and we can say "First this, then this, and then that," but you got to imagine this whole thing going very quickly. Maybe when we were very primitive amoebas it was one step at a time, alright, but now that we've (evolved/devolved) this whole process goes on very quickly. So first the mind has to make an idea for itself, sen-- sensation. This is what the Buddhists call pure sensation, [student assents] before you impose on it any kind of concepts. Ok?

S: Yeah, it just seems-- maybe I'm-- it just seems like every sensation in some way is the same as every other sensation.

RG(?): But--

AD: But no, the [RG(?) simultaneously: No.] World-Idea is constantly changing, how can it be the same as every-- all the sensations be the same?

S: The objects are different but the sensation, [student assents] the fact of sensation is the same, is what she's trying to--

AD: The fact of sensation is the same. But there would be many sensations. If the world is-- if the World-Idea is changing then the sensations are changing too, and [student assents] there will be many of them.

S: Ok, so when you talk about--

AD: Now wait a minute, [S simultaneously: Ok.] if there's many sensations, alright, that would be just a blooming, buzzing confusion. [S: Right, it has--] So something has to come in and organize them (some), alright. That's *another* faculty of the mind. What could we call that faculty? (We/You) can say the mind, you know, creates concepts, beliefs, alright, and with these here organizes and pervades those sensations. It's still in the realm of thought. It's a floating adjective you can say. There's no *world* here, this is all

mental. Then what will be the next step in the process, the next, and the next, until *you* finally say “I know this object”? And I told you, that’s what you have to do for yourself. Last week I said, “You do this for yourself,” and don’t try to hook me into doing it for you!

[student assents, faint]

LDS/S(?): Go ahead.

AD: Go ahead Louis.

LDS: Ok.

AD: You get the record back?

(Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1983 0330a Ends; Side 2 Begins)

LDS: It seems that a system of beliefs has to come into play, or system of beliefs and conditions, that end up finally precipitated in-- let’s say in the divided line in the realm of belief, where you have a subject and an object and the belief on the part of that subject of the extension, the independence of the objects and the dual ex-- the belief in the dual experience itself. Now the question is-- it seems that we’ve hinted before that that system of beliefs that goes with the very experience of the realm of belief is-- is inherent right in the very World-Mind’s or World-Soul’s-- cosmic soul’s production or presentation to the individual mind. Like could you say a little bit about(--) that system of beliefs--

AD (intensely): No, we’re saying-- we said *your mind* receives the Idea. [LDS simultaneously: Receives-- makes--] *Your mind* makes a representation for itself. *Your mind* pervades with the faculty of understanding those sensations, pervades them with concepts. *Your mind* does it!

AH: So the belief’s [LDS simultaneously: I thought it was--] outs-- outside the individual mind Louis, right?

LDS (simultaneously): They’re not outside it.

AH: You were suggesting that they were?

LDS (simultaneously): Yeah, I was suggesting that the beliefs were inherent in the very [one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously, intensely): Don’t bring in the other thing now, [LDS simultaneously: Ok.] don’t get confused [LDS simultaneously: Yeah.] with what we’re working on, alright, that’s much more advanced work.

LDS: Ok.

S: [three/few words inaudible] (laughter)

LDS (amidst laughter): So what you’re saying right now is that the individual mind has its own baggage or its own beliefs and conditions and powers.

AD (simultaneously): [very impassioned] It has its own faculty [AH simultaneously: Categories.] of understanding, yeah. [AH simultaneously: (For a subject.)] The individual mind is-- has its own faculty of

understanding, its own imagination, alright, [LDS: Right.] it's own reproductive memory, it has all these things! [LDS: Ok.] It shouldn't surprise you! You notice you can use memory once in a while? You can imagine once in a while? You can understand once in a while? All you have to do is organize all these faculties of the mind and see the way the Idea, when it is received by the World-- by the individual mind, can ultimately translate that into the experience that you're having right here and now. [short pause] I told you, General Smuts took the *Critique of Pure Reason* along with him while he was in battles. And every now and then between battles he would stop and read it. Every now and then have to stop and put it down because a battle was going on. [LDS: Well, ok, I wanted to say--] If you can get that interested in the problem, you might try to work it out.

LDS: Well, one thing like, some of the work in quantum mechanics has forced-- Ok, if this is off the point, it's--

AD: It's going to be off the point because first of all it's Vic's problem, let-- let him worry about it. (AD laughing, laughter)

LDS: It's not Vic's problem, it's everybody's problem.

[9 second pause with some background student talking]

LDS: I would like-- ok, let me say this. From what I can understand, some of the work and experiments have forced people who can appreciate what's-- what's happening to let go of some of the very conditioning or the very beliefs that they've worked with, you know, for thousands of years, that the mind has worked with, the belief in extension, the belief in the independence of the object, the believe in-- belief in causality and so on. So--

S (very faint, possibly part of background): That's ok.

AD: Has forced-- (laughter) it has forced them to let go of certain *opinions*.

LDS: Yeah. Now, ok, (some laughter) [RG simultaneously: What does that have to do with (one word inaudible)] those opinions that we live with every day and, you know, operate with all the time, have actually been undermined by a very vigorous application of reason to these experiments and this work.

AD: Yeah.

RG: And?

LDS: And I guess I was asking for the very-- the origin-- the origin of-- of those beliefs and I was hint-- you know, suggesting that it might be inherent in the very production of the Solar-- [AD/S(?), very faint: Solar?] Solar production of the world. But we're saying no, we don't have to go that way.

RC: Well Louis I think I got-- the next quote I think maybe give you some food. They're the same idea.

PB [V13, 21:3.69 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 21: Mentalism, #52, RC reading]: "The World-Mind is not a magnified man and the world-image is not "pushed" into our consciousness by its personal and persistent effort. The mere presence of this image in it is sufficient to produce a reflected image in all other minds although they will absorb only so much as their particular plane of space-time perception can absorb."

LDS: Uh-hm. So there he's throwing the-- [RC simultaneously: He's saying that--] the conditionality on the individual mind.

RC: I think he's saying that some of the beliefs that you operate with are part of your loka. And if you change [LDS assents] loka you'll have like-- the way that those beliefs operate will be a little different, you'll absorb the world-image either less adequately or more adequately. [LDS assents] But he does seem to be saying-- making some reference to lokas there.

AH: And Randy, [AD simultaneously: (half/one word inaudible) yeah.] apparently you're restraining your definition of loka to the individual mind.

RC: I-- yeah I would think that [RG assents] an individual mi-- to be confined to a loka would be a phenomena only possibly for the individual mind.

AH: An entity.

RC: Yeah.

NR: So in that [AD/BS(?) simultaneously: You see--] view you're supposed to just accept individuality as a given. I-- I'm having trouble seeing where--

RC (simultaneously): You don't have to accept it, I mean you are it.

NR (simultaneously): --individuality [S simultaneously: Occasionally.] comes in, how-- how it's brought into a discussion when you talk of [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): What do you mean "individuality"?

NR: Well, we're talking about--

AD: When he says *your* mind has to accept it? Is that it?

NR (simultaneously): Well, we're taking this analysis by saying the individual mind takes what's given and goes through this process of reflection in order to make it conscious. Now that individual mind has to be regarded as a given, as separate from other individual minds.

AD: Well don't you?

NR: Yeah. But how?

RG (simultaneously): The-- the other is an inference.

AD: What do you mean how?

NR: How do I know that this mind is [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Is your mind and not somebody else's?

NR: Right. (RG laughs, student words) I mean--

AD: Ask Dickie. (RG laughs, student words)

RG: I mean isn't everything else really a-- an inference at the moment? Isn't that the--

AD (simultaneously): Is your mind an inference?

RG: No, no, isn't the-- isn't-- (laughter)

AD (amidst laughter): I just wanted [few words inaudible] (laughter, student words) I know I'm giving you back your-- you know, your oppositions.

RG: I know. But--

NR: Well, the world I see is inferred.

RG: No, but isn't the inference that there are-- that your individual mind is the same as everyone else's inference and your experience is of yourself distinctly? If it isn't it'd be very interesting.

NR: Ok but then we're jumping to-- to experience.

RG: Well, we start with experience and-- and in-- I mean-- we start with experience and reflect on experience. That's how we start in philosophy.

NR (simultaneously): But it seems the discussion is not starting with experience, the discussion is starting with [one word inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): No but the individual mi-- your individual mind, your mi-- isn't that the only mind you know, as Randy kept beating us up with?

AD (simultaneously): Unless [NR simultaneously: Well yeah.] you're keeping secrets from us.

BS: Yes but last week's [VM simultaneously: Seems that--] model was using the Sun as the individual mind.

RG (simultaneously): Well forget about the Sun, aren't [one/two words inaudible]

BS (simultaneously): Well it happened all week, that's what threw me off.

RG: No associations Bert, come on now, (some laughter) individual mind here. [S: Alright.] Your [BS simultaneously: Who?] mi-- you know, Bert's mind.

RC: Yeah it seems [one/two words inaudible] you can't argue with.

BS (simultaneously): Well fine, but that was quite-- you know, quite a shift from what we spoke of when Anthony gave the example, when he went through the whole epistemology.

RG: When, last week?

BS: Yeah.

RG: This week?

BS: Well, this last five minutes but--

DB: No Bert-- it's not-- it's not a question of bringing in individuality. I mean, that never-- that's not brought in.

NR: How-- [DB simultaneously: I--] how is it *not* brought in? It seems to me--

DB (simultaneously): Because that's what you start with in any analysis of experience.

RC: That's the only thing you're sure of, I mean, apart [AD simultaneously: Are you--] from your individual consciousness.

PD: Well instead of saying "individual," say "known".

AD (simultaneously): Nancy, aren't you sure of that?

NR: Uh-uh.

PD: I mean--

AD: You're not sure that it's *your* individual mind?

NR (simultaneously): Well, day-to-day dealing with the world, sure, but when I-- when I get--

AD (simultaneously): Well how about when you're talking philosophy?

NR: No, it's [AD: No?] very confused issue for me.

AD: Oh, oh, I see. You're at that stage where trees [RG simultaneously: Trees aren't trees.] aren't trees and mountains aren't mountains. (AD laughing, laughter)

RG: Right.

NR/S(?) (faint): Yes [couple words inaudible]

AD: No, you can take that-- you can take that as axiomatic that it's *you* experiencing the world.

NR/S(?): Uh-hm.

AD: We don't want you to lose *all* your moorings. (AD laughs, laughter)

PD: Not all at once.

[5¾ seconds of background student talking/laughter]

S: Where's that quote from, Randy?

RC: Pardon?

S: Where's that quote from?

RC: That's volume 10, page 66, number 45, that's probably right at the end.

S: Yeah.

THE MIND MAKES SPACE AND TIME FOR ITSELF, AND THIS HAPPENS PRIOR TO THE OBJECT BEING RECONSTITUTED BY THE REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION

PB [V13, 21:3.69 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 21: Mentalism, #52, RC reading]: “The World-Mind is not a magnified man and the world-image is not “pushed” into our consciousness by its personal and persistent effort. The mere presence of this image in it is sufficient to produce a reflected image in all other minds although they will absorb only so much as their particular plane of space-time perception can absorb.”

[9½ second pause]

RC: So that-- it's in that context that I would like to ask again about the meaning of the word 'sensation'.

DB: Would it be something like that space-time form the individual mind is constrained to function within, that that added to that it-- the reflected image from the World-Idea--

AD: No, just that, just that. The space-time form--[DB simultaneously: The--] those are the two ultimate forms that the mind works with. [DB assents] On the one hand, it spatializes, alright, that's the representative act within it, and at the same time or alongside with that it does so successively one after another. [DB assents] These are the two ultimate forms that the mind has, alright, space and time.

DB: And-- and in--

PD (simultaneously): Or a third category is the content. Just-- sorry if I'm interrupting but, those three universal forms that PB spoke of being present in the individual mind or structuring the individual mind, space and time and the third one being content or sensation.

RC: So what?

PD: That's what-- [AD simultaneously: So--] that's what I was trying to lead to before.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah. But, Randy, you can also-- the word 'sensation' because of its usage today and the connotations it has, it might be wiser to say that the mind has a faculty of *representing* to itself, alright, instead of saying 'sensation'. Because sensation is always going to mean to you something that you have already *in*, so to speak, once the process has been culminated, alright, and knowledge-- now you can have an item *in* knowledge, you say “that sensation of blue”. So it has a connotation [RC assents] which is derived from our experienced world, whereas we're trying to understand what makes that experience possible. So when you say that the mind makes a representation for itself of the World-Idea, alright, it doesn't have the connotations that the word 'sensation' would have. So it makes a representation for itself of this World-Idea.

RC: You know, is this being-- like this World-Idea is being adapted to the space-time plane that I'm on or my particular loka. Is it that adaptation process that we're talking about as this very first sensation? So that if I said that this whole plane has like a certain common sensorium, say like all the possible sensations that can be formed on this stage go into the making of my mind. My body has--

AD (simultaneously): No, your body doesn't come in yet.

RC: Ok. Into the making of whatever it is that confines me to that plane.

AD: Yeah.

RC: If it was a different set of possibilities I'd be on a different plane. But whatever this *stuff* is of my being fixed on that plane, it seems to be is a certain-- certain potential variety and combinations of-- traces of other people's experience.

AD: Traces of other people's experience? No, at this level, at this level where the [few inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] mind-- you can say that the mind is capable of pure representation, there *is* no other people.

RC: Ok, what-- then what does-- what does it mean to be *on* a space-time plane?

AD: No, it isn't that you're *on* a space-time plane, it's that the space-time is within the mind, the mind *makes* for itself the space and insofar that it makes a series of successive representation, it makes time.

HS: You're talking about a series of successive representations of the original sensation?

AD: There wouldn't be an original sensation because the next one is already came-- came and went.

HS: So what is represented? It's always this-- the re-presenting of this-- the stimulus which you call the sensation? [S: Oh.] And is that what you're calling representation now?

AD: When you make a re-representation of the stimulus that was formerly, alright, you're in the realm of productive imagination-- reproductive imagination.

HS: Ok, and are you closer now to--

AD: No, at that level, at this primeval level, the mind, alright, has the shape of space. No form can be found within it. Number one, ok?

HS: Ok.

AD: It represents itself-- it represents to itself or makes for itself a representation of this World-Idea.

HS: Ok, that's not the sen--

AD (simultaneously): That means it must put it in space right away, right? What's the space here?

AH: The mind.

AD: The mind!

S (possibly part of background): [couple words inaudible]

HS: The reception of the sensation is the representation in mind, is a spatialized representation in mind.

AD (simultaneously): If the mind makes a representation for itself of this World-Idea, it does so by putting it in space!

HS: And the space at this point is the space of mind.

AD: It's your s-- it's your mind, yeah.

S (simultaneously): (Single.)

HS: Ok.

AD (intensely): So when you see the white on the cloud which is a hundred miles away, alright, that white is *in your mind*. Now what's the shape of your mind? It hasn't any!

HS: The-- when I see the-- when I see the white of the clouds or when I see the brown of the-- of the pole--

AD (simultaneously): Of the cow.

HS: --of the cow, now is this the reception, is this the reception of the sensation and its representation-- and its immediate representation in mind?

AD: In mind, yeah.

HS: This seeing--

AD (simultaneously): Now, now, you have to remember, Herbie, we're talking backward because the brown in the cow or the white on the cloud, alright, is something that happens at the very end of the process when you can speak about having an item of knowledge and you can talk about it. We're speaking about what happens before all this can-- is accessible to us. So we're saying that the mind makes this image for itself. Now, you know if the mind makes an image for itself it has to *spatialize*. It's given a figure, a shape, a form.

HS: Ok, now the spatialization there you're talking about is what we call physical space?

AD: No!

HS: Ok yeah, ok.

AD: That part alright?

HS: Ok, in-- in order to--

AH (simultaneously): I don't know-- I don't know why the answer is no.

HS (simultaneously): In order to see the object--

AD (intensely): In order to represent the object--you have to be accurate here.

HS: Ok. In order to represent the object, the mind has to place it in its space, its own space.

AD: Yeah, ok.

S (faint): Ok.

[student assents, very faint]

HS: Ok, now this is-- ok, this is still prior.

AD (simultaneously): If you say it makes an image for itself, then right away you know it's spatializing this object, whatever it is.

HS: And the space of the image is mind.

AD: It's your mind, yeah.

HS: Now this is not the experience of-- this is not the experience, so some--

AD (simultaneously): Not yet, no, not yet.

HS (simultaneously): --something necessary-- something else necessary has to be done.

AD: Yeah, other things have to happen. But, [HS assents] if we're-- if we're sticking to Randy's point, alright, and that [HS simultaneously: The recep--] was that space and time were the ultimate, let's say, forms that the mind has to operate with. The first form and an ultimate form that the mind must have is that of space. You can abstract everything that you want from the mind, the one thing you cannot abstract is the notion of extension from your mind.

HS: Ok, now that's its capacity to receive and represent each s-- each instant.

AD: Yeah, to itself, yeah; make an image for itself, correct.

HS: Ok, well, we're floating, I'll float with you. I don't see why that's other than the white that you so to so-called see outside.

AD: Because the white that you see outside is the product of your faculty of understanding here and now where you're working with reflective concepts.

[short pause]

HS: (Well/What)(-- this spatialized image that's in the mind that's *not* the white that I see outside, is-- does it have quality?

AD: I'm sorry, Herbert.

HS: The spatialized image in this-- in the mind that's not yet outside, as it were, you know, taken [AD simultaneously: Uh-huh.] outside, does-- does this have quality?

AD: Yes, it has qualities.

[students assent]

AD: Yes, otherwise what-- what representation would we be speaking about?

LH: Why did you throw out Randy's point about there being in that sensation-- how did you put it, indi-- every individual--

RC: Each loka having a certain potential and not another potential(s) there [couple/few words inaudible]

LH: But-- well, that each loka would-- I'm not sure what you mean by loka but that each-- for each individual, included in the sensation his mind receives would be something of the life of every being that he's eventually going to--

AD (simultaneously): Well naturally(,) the World-Idea would include all the other beings. The World-Idea that my mind is making a representation of includes you, just like *your* mind is going to make a representation of that World-Idea, alright, and it will include me.

LH: But at that level it's not--

AD: It's not an item--

LH (simultaneously): --my experiences or--

AD: It's not your experience yet.

LH (simultaneously): [couple/few words inaudible] this is actually the life.

AD: It's not your experience. It's what's going to [LH simultaneously: (The intentional/Existential) being or--] *end* or *result* in making possible your experience.

HS: Ok, but you still have to get to this--

LH (simultaneously): Is that what you call the life of that-- of-- of those beings or--

AD: I'm sorry, say it again?

LH: I'm just trying to find words [someone drawing/writing on blackboard] to describe what that would be in that sensation and the only one that I think fits is the life of those beings, the actual energy or power or--

AD: You saying that the World-Idea is a living Idea. Yeah, sure. It's a *real* Idea, sure. It's not a photographic copy, yeah. But that doesn't change the argument at all.

S: Oh(--/.)

RG: But Herb-- oh, Herbie's point, I mean, I didn't get your answer to Herbie's point. Herbie, you want-- you want to follow it up and just-- In the sen-- I mean-- there are now two spatialized clouds, the one you don't know and the one you know?

AD: The one that you know, alright, is different than this here because in the one that you know has to go through the whole process of being reconstituted by the reproductive imagination and identified by the faculty of understanding that you're working with consciously.

RG: Ok, so there's a-- there's a spatialized cloud that we don't know.

AD: A spatiali-- there's a *thought*, there's a representation that the mind makes to itself which you don't know, [RG simultaneously: Is this thought in--] because we just said that that's part of the unconscious process.

RG: Is this thought in space? Yes or no?

AD (simultaneously): Is this thought *in* space?

RG: Yes.

AD: Is it in your mind?

RG: I don't know yet. It's unknown if it's just my mind.

AD (simultaneously): Well if your mind made the representation of it, it has to be in space!

RG: No but you-- it's first unknown. It's in my mind but unknown.

PD: The ego.

AD (simultaneously): Alright, it's in your mind but unknown.

RG: Now when it's unknown, is it also-- is it a-- is it qualified by s-- a sp-- space and time referent at all?

AD: Yes it is, [RG simultaneously: But I don't know it.] if by space and time you mean here what we just spoke about.

RG: Which is?

AD: That is represented in the mind and that there's a series of-- of these.

RG: Right, but this is after the sensation. I mean, you went through three steps. The World-Idea hits the individual mind is the first step.

AD: Yeah.

RG: The individual mind pictures for itself a universe, that's the second step.

AD: Uh-hm.

RG: And the third step is where the-- the ego or some-- the individual mind somehow comes to know this within its own reflective consciousness. And I don't--

AD (simultaneously): The-- I'm sorry? The--

RG: The third step was where the ego somehow gets to know-- is self-reflectively aware of knowing that [one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Well wouldn't you say that this mind now which has made this representation for itself has to work through the ego which represents it so that it-- this ego can become the-- I'm sorry, that the mind which made this representation can become aware self-reflectively of what it did.

RG: I don't see why the mind doesn't know it already in the second step and needs the third step to know it.

AD (intensely): Well it does know it in the first step. That would be *pure perception*. [RG simultaneously: In the se--] *And you don't know that.*

RG: In the-- but in the second step--

AD (intensely): In the second step, you *do* know. (bit of laughter)

RG: Right.

AD (intensely): That's no longer pure perception or pure sensation, right?

RG: You have three s-- First step is the pure sensation, right, [AD simultaneously: Uh-hm.] mind-- World-Idea hits the mind. Second step, the individual mind pictures forth this sensation into a-- a uni-- a space-time universe.

AD: Yeah.

RG: But still a seamless universe, there's no distinction, felt distinction yet between its subjectivity and objectivity.

AD (simultaneously): That is, no part of it is being [RG assents] reified into an object, yeah.

RG (simultaneously): Right, now doesn't the mind know it at that level?

AD: Yes, the mind [RG simultaneously: It can't not know it.] knows it at that level.

RG: Right.

AD: And I told you, that will be the knowledge of the Saint.

RG: Ok.

PD: But the ego doesn't.

RG: Right, the ego w--

AD (simultaneously): The ego doesn't, no.

RG (simultaneously): Ego doesn't exist-- right. Ego doesn't know it yet, right. The third level is somehow the individual mind identifies with the ego in order to reflectively become aware of the perception.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah. And you have to keep in mind the distortions that will take place because [students assent] of that identification *with* the ego.

RG: Right. But, I think the question Herbie was getting to, in fact between the second and the third level, isn't-- I mean it's not a different thing that it knows, I mean the-- the ego may know the--

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, yeah.

RG: The ego may know the cloud in a-- in a distorted way.

AD: Yeah you're up there. No, they're not two different things. They're not two different things. It's the same cloud you know, but in the first case it's known as pure perception and that kind of knowledge is not available to us because that's the knowledge of the thought really, [RG assents] alright, and the second kind is the way the ego has reified that into a phenomenal object about which it sepa-- it-- from which it separates itself and becomes through the images that are aroused in itself into a notion that it has an inner sense and this inner sense is what reflects on that outer object *and now thinks itself to be a subject*.

RG: Right. And that's all conceptual. Now if we could cut off that conception, we would then be at the second level, directly, right?

AD: Yeah. And that's why they refer to the two kinds of knowledge, right, direct and indirect. It doesn't matter that they take the indirect and classify it into three, four different levels, authority, you know, this and that. The point is these are the two basic kinds of knowledge, direct experience and indirect experience; indirect means that it has to go through this whole process before I become conscious of it.

HS: Now that second thing you describe when the ego takes the image and then concretizes it and re-- and you said reifies it, is *that* re-- my experience of an object?

AD: That's your experience of the object, yeah.

HS: That's the one, ok.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah.

HS: So when I--

AD (simultaneously): That's the object you know.

HS: Ok, and that's the object I know. Is thi-- is this-- well, does the process you describe, is this actually temporal or logically, you know, only logically?

AD: No, it's temporal too, although it moves so fast that we're not aware of it. But it's temporal, it h-- it has to follow a certain sequence.

THE MIND'S THOUGHT-FORM IS AN ALOGICAL WHOLE THAT INCLUDES ALL THE FEATURES THAT OUR REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS IS GOING TO SINGLE OUT AND PHENOMENALIZE FOR US

S: Anthony, is that level of pure perception the primal image?

[student assents, faint]

AD: I don't know what you mean by primal image, tell me what you mean by primal image and I'll--

S: It-- Ok, I'm just trying to get a sense of-- that this is-- it's not a different thing from what the ego sees but it's without any of the conceptualization or separation of subject and object. They're--

AD: Yeah, it's the thought-form.

S: It's the total (thought)?

AD (simultaneously): It's the *thought-form*.

S: Ok. So the *form* there would be-- it's actually the same form in terms of qualities that the ego has but it doesn't have any of the conceptualization.

AD: Not that the ego has.

RG: No, the mind.

AD: Because that thought-form is going to *include* the ego.

[student assents, faint]

S: But the forms that are [RG simultaneously: Yeah.] pres-- the *forms* that are present are the same.

AD: The forms? [RG assents] Yeah. In other words, this alogical whole, alright, includes all the features that our reflective consciousness is going to single out and phenomenalize for us.

S: Ok.

AD: It's got to all be there, [S: Ok.] if we're talking about it.

AH: Anthony, at the first level where that thought includes the ego--

AD: Where the thought--

AH: You see, you-- we've-- we've decided that the form is the same at both levels, it's the same form. But from the point of the view of the first level--

AD: Not that the form is the same, the form prior to a superimposition of the belief-- the system of beliefs and vasanas that you operate with.

AH: Yeah. I'm sorry, I--

AD: The thought-form is prior to and it is superimposed upon by the system of beliefs and vasanas that your ego operates with.

AH: Yes, that that part is clear but the part that's unclear to me is, and I thought I heard it affirmed, that the form is the same.

AD: The content really, [RG simultaneously: It's the content.] the content. In other words, the content of your perception here and now, [AH simultaneously: Yes.] alright, is there in that alogical whole.

AH: But in that whole I am included as-- as well.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, you have to. Sure, the ego is part of that-- that whole.

AH: I see, alright.

[student assents, faint]

S: But that's (why/what) I would [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): And that's-- the point here is that the ego too becomes a phenomenalized object.

[student assents, faint]

AH: In the second level.

S: That's right.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah. In other words, it becomes one of the items of knowledge. But prior to it becoming an item of knowledge, alright, it too has to be included as the content of that received World-Idea.

AH: Now can-- the ego can have indirect knowledge, is that so?

AD: The ego only *has* indirect [RG assents] knowledge.

S: That's the third level [one/two words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): It couldn't have the other kind.

AD: It wouldn't be the ego.

AH: Yes. Well--

CDA: When you [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Freddy, I need another treatment. (some laughter) Let's go on. (AD laughing) Go ahead, yeah.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PURE SYNTHESIS, OR THE PURE FACULTY OF UNDERSTANDING, AND IMPURE SYNTHESIS, OR THE IMPURE FACULTY OF UNDERSTANDING

CDA (simultaneously): Could I ask a question? You made a distinction between the faculty of understanding that we work with consciously and the faculty of understanding that you're (including/putting) as the system of beliefs. And last week you were speaking about how [AD simultaneously: The question.] that sys-- that faculty of understanding or the Witness is actually present here right now. And, I wanted to understand the distinction between those two faculties of the under-- understanding because I don't really believe that--

AD (simultaneously): Well let's say one is pure synthesis and the other is impure synthesis. One is the [CDA simultaneously: Ok.] pure faculty of understanding, the other is an impure faculty of understanding.

CDA (simultaneously): Is the impure faculty of understanding that when we are mistaking the categories for the actual categories of the imagination?

AD (simultaneously): You could u-- you could use them any way you want. You could use them in any way you want. You can call that impure or you can call it pure, doesn't matter.

CDA: No, what I want--

AD (simultaneously): The thing is to understand the distinction between what we might call synthesis going on at the level where the mind receives the Idea and the synthesis going on when the ego, alright, reifies the [CDA: Ok.] object.

CDA: Is that synthesis that goes on when the mind receives the Idea available to us here?

AD: Available to us here?

CDA (simultaneously): Yeah. Is it available [AD simultaneously: Is it available--] to my experience--

AD: Is it available to the--

CDA (simultaneously): --in trying to understand?

AD: But we just said it was formative *of* your experience, and that you'll only get to it through transcendental reflection or thinking about it.

[short pause]

AH: The notion of available to us here, our being here is after that fact, isn't that so?

CDA: Well yeah, I under-- I understand--

RG (simultaneously): No, I disagree with that, not only. The part of your being that's here is here but there's also a part of your being here that knows the thing directly all the time.

AH: Oh I don't know about that part but--

CDA: Well--

RG: We don't know about any of that yet [AH simultaneously: Oh, ok.] part but we can understand it to be so if we want to.

CDA: What do you mean by transcendental reflection upon it?

AD: Intense hard thinking.

CDA: I suspected that. (laughter, student words) And so when there is a moment of understanding, when you say "I've got it", when you s-- when that moment of "I've got it" is [TS whispering in background: You lost it.] the actual understanding of that-- at that level.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, but you'll have to check [CDA simultaneously: It's not-- it's--] it out. When you say you got it, it's one thing, and then you got to check it out and make sure you got it.

CDA: [simultaneously] So-- (laughter)

[couple students at once, few words inaudible in background]

CDA (simultaneously): It's kind-- it's what-- what at this-- at this level we would call "Oh, I've got an intuition," you know, is that--

AD: Yeah, it's fine, you could say you have the intuition but then you have to work the intuition [CDA assents] out so that you bring out every-- all the content of that intuition and make it available to your understanding.

CDA: Yeah.

S: Go ahead, what?

WHEN PEOPLE SAY THAT THE OBJECT IS GIVEN WHAT THEY MEAN IS THAT THE WORLD IS GIVEN: THE WHOLE WORLD IS GIVEN OR NOTHING IS

HS: Could I ask more? You said-- What about this content now, is-- the totality of possible contents is given in sensation, the repres-- the representation is-- it's spatialized into image and then it's-- the e-- the ego superimposes its own conceptual--

AD: Apparatus.

HS (simultaneously): --framework on it [AD: Yeah.] and then-- and then-- Now, this is no-- no joke. When I sit here and look at this stain on this pillow, (bit of laughter) in the very real sense then, the whole of the world-image had been given to me, but because of my vast potentialities (laughter) I choose to con-- I choose to see this stain as stain? I'm-- I'm being--

AD: Can you exclude the rest of the environment from that stain?

HS: Can I exclude the rest of the-- No, so--

AD: So--

HS: So that would permit the inference that the whole thing is given.

AD (simultaneously, intensely): So when people-- when people say that the object is given what they mean is that the *world* is given. No object is given to you alone in a little vacuum tube. The whole world is given or *nothing*. [HS simultaneously: That's so.] Now that stain that you're looking at, alright, there's you right there, your head's--

HS: Right at it.

AD: --right at it, (some laughter) there's a floor, alright, there's an atmosphere, there's all this given at the same time. So why speak about this little item? [HS simultaneously: Ok, the world--] You're speaking about the World-Idea is given to you.

HS: Well no, I know, I know but-- Ok.

S (simultaneously): But isn't the ego part of that given?

AD: Yes! Of course.

S: Then how can that image be seen without the ego?

S: [one/two words inaudible]

DB: But isn't that--

AD (simultaneously): How can the image--

S: Oh no, 'cause before-- alright, never mind.

AD: What was your point Herbie, before I--

YOUR EYES DON'T SEE THE OBJECT, YOUR MIND SEES THE OBJECT

HS: I-- see, I have to say it. I think that objects are out there. And, (bit of laughter) I have this big problem with this analysis.

AD: You mean that they're spatially related to your body.

HS: I would say yes.

AD: They're not outside of your mind, right?

HS: No, I wouldn't say that they're outside of my mind, I would say there's a actual spatial relationship to my mind, to the form of my perception--

AD (simultaneously): Wait, wait, wait, wait.

[simultaneously] [couple students at once telling HS to wait]

RG: Body.

S: To the body.

HS: Excuse me--

LR: No, he really (mean it).

S (simultaneously): Wow.

HS: Well--

AD: There's an actual spatial relationship to your *mind*?

HS: Objects are spatially related to my body. Before [AD simultaneously: Ok.] my experience, I sit inside this thing here and I look at objects. Ok?

AD: But we just pointed out that the "I" isn't sitting down.

HS: [to himself] We just pointed out-- (bit of laughter) No I-- yeah, no, I followed that, I follow(ed) that point, yeah. I just don't believe it. (laughter)

AD (amidst laughter): Well I know you don't believe it, that's what I said to begin with!

HS: I know, I just [few words inaudible]

AD: You insist on saying that you see with your eyes!

HS: Yes, yes.

AD: I know that. (some laughter) [intensely] That's like the dream character in a dream saying that he sees the objects with his eyes.

S: He does.

RG (faint): He does, right.

S (simultaneously, very faint): Yeah, guess so.

DB: Well he *says* he does.

HS: I don't see the fault to the mentalistic doctrine to say that you see through the eyes. If it's an-- if you admit--

AD (simultaneously): Because the fact is that when you went through the analysis of physiology, alright, you cannot explain how's that's possible.

HS: But, if you say that the whole world is given, is a mental given, is a mental object, then why can't you see objects? You get-- you-- a mental object gets into your eyes--

AD (simultaneously): Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. Wait, wait, I-- you've got to go slower, I didn't follow your logic.

HS: I admit, as in the dream, the whole-- the totality of the world is mental. I admit that. I cannot give up the idea that I'm experiencing through my body. So, I'd use a certain logic, I say well the whole thing's mental, even *body* is mental.

AD (simultaneously, intensely): I didn't say that you're not experiencing your body, I say you [HS simultaneously: No.] don't see *through* the body. It's not your eyes that sees the object! [student assents] It's your *mind* that sees the object.

RG: Right. But, if we-- if-- Herbie, if I-- if we put it in a logic-- in a-- in a-- in a form maybe that you could argue with. The fact that you could say the mind works through its organs of sense to see a world, like you said before, and the senses are those mental organs, once you've established that all of phy-- the physical world is mental, there shouldn't be any greater problem to say that just because the-- those thoughts happen to be concretized a little more vividly and are part of the physical world that they too are mental organs and they too have organs and they too can see, once you've established the-- the mentalism of it-- of it. I think that's what Herbie's trying to say.

HS: Yeah, but I-- [PD/S(?): Yeah.] I-- I find problem with-- and I don't want to-- I don't want to devolve the-- your-- The particularity of experience, you seem to be able to explain everything except the experience by mentalism. You get-- you know, you hover right-- like you hover right above or-- It's good. (bit of laughter, student words)

RC: Why is that Herb, I--

S (simultaneously): By experience don't you mean the interpretation?

HS (simultaneously): I'm trying to figure out what I mean, I'm trying to figure out.

AD: Yeah.

S: But that whole-- and that's--

S: Do you mean while you were focused on--

HS: No, (an--) You s--

S (simultaneously): Do you mean-- do you mean what wou-- what-- what is it that makes you focus on a particular [one/two words inaudible]

HS (simultaneously): No.

S: No?

HS: No, I'm talking about the nature of the experience. Is it mental or not?

AD: Well, why don't you just ask yourself the simple, very simple question: how do you see? Do you see with your eyes or do you see with your mind? Ask yourself that question in all sincerity. [intensely] And then, whatever the answer, follow its consequences.

LR: How do you see *what*?

AD: Anything!

LR: Anything?

[short pause]

AD (intensely): Is it the corporeal eyes that sees or is it your *mind* that sees? Ask yourself the question. Whatever the answer, follow the consequences and see if they come to an impasse, if they're self-contradictory. If they are, then you gotta back off whether you like it or not.

HS: Ok, now wait a minute, when you say the eyes see, you want to have-- you're saying that if I say that I see with my eyes, then the knowledge is in the seeing with the eyes as eyes, and that-- ok. Even I would say that--

AD: That you don't see with your eyes.

HS: You can't see with your eyes that way.

LR: You don't see without them either.

HS: No, you don't. (bit of laughter) No, I don't want that too, that's--

AD: Boy.

HS: That's too easy.

LR: I'm sorry.

AD (simultaneously): We go-- we're going to go through tho-- that all over again.

RG: (Uh-hm.)

LR (simultaneously): No I'm sorry Herbert, please keep going.

S (simultaneously with RG and LR): [couple words inaudible] can I ask-- could I ask a question here?

LR: It's not an either-or thing.

AD: Would you read the quote you read before?

RC: Yeah.

PB [V13, 21:3.69 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 21: Mentalism, #52, RC reading]: "The World-Mind is not a magnified man and the world-image is not..."

AD: No, the one before that Randy.

LR: First quote.

AD: I think it was the very first one.

RC: Very first one.

LR: "The physical senses do not [RC simultaneously: Oh, that one.] provide the picture and-- to the mind..."

PB [V13, 21:2.33, RC reading]: "The physical senses do *not* provide a picture of the object to the mind for the simple reason that all objects, including the senses themselves, are held in the mind."

AD (intensely): How do you interpret that, that you see with your physical eyes? Aren't the eyes themselves something you see?

LR: Right this minute? No.

AD: I'll get you a mirror.

LR: Then yes. You don't walk around with a mirror. [HS: Ok--] Unless you're the Witness.

HS: What's seen then is the seeing of the object, is that what you're saying, when you say that the eyes are held?

AD: The eyes are an object like the object that you claim that they see.

HS: Ok, and in a seeing, you're just going to-- in s-- what's seen is this-- the eye seeing the object. That's-- that's the, so to say, the proper object?

AD (simultaneously): No, no, seeing would be the mind, and at either end you have the eye and the object.

HS: (No, no/No go).

AH: Because the eyes are somehow involved, that, you know, so-- because the eyes are somehow involved in most cases with the visual sense--

AD: They're associated with that, sure.

AH (simultaneously): They're associated, but that doesn't put them in a-- put them in any position of prominence in terms of the experience.

AD: That doesn't make them the knower.

AH: That's right.

[student assents, faint]

RG: Uh-hm.

[short pause]

AD: What else is that first remark saying?

RG: Nothing.

AD (intensely): What he said in the *Hidden Teaching*, alright, you get all that paraphernalia, you get it up to the optic nerve, it goes to the brain, now you say you see something, and the whole point is: what are you talking about? You made a-- you made a leap here, you made a magical leap from jiggling in the nerves, now you see an object. So that the mol-- molecular activity of the brain is the same as the perceived object. Well what's-- you know, why stop there?

HS: Yes, why stop there, that's-- I like that. The mind is everywhere present. The to-- the-- the total image [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously, intensely): Isn't the molecular activity of the brain as much an object of perception to the mind as everything else?

HS: Yes, so why can't that--

AD (intensely): So why single that out and say that that's what does it?

HS: No, no, you're not singling it out, there's a process going on. So you say, there's a reception--

AD: Wait a minute, there's a process going on?

HS: Yeah, you say--

AD (simultaneously): Tell me what the process is.

HS (simultaneously): --there's a reception of the-- a World-Idea by the mind. It-- it's received as a sensation, there's an immediate rep-- re-presentation. Yes?

AD: There is a *presentation*, not [HS assents] a re-presentation.

S: Ok.

HS: Ok, there's a presentation. The-- this is worked over into totality of sensations and it's-- it-- the ego grasps it with its conceptual framework. Yes?

AD: Yeah.

[short pause]

HS: Why-- now-- I hate to do this.

LR: Do it.

HS: This sounds just like the physical process. What this thing that you're talking about, of the grasping of the World-Idea, now this might be a mirroring, (I/ok)--

AD (simultaneously): What's physical about it?

HS: Well, no I'm talking about the-- what-- no, seeing the object out there and jiggling of the nerves, the reception in the optic, the upside down image, and then the ego grasping it with its conceptual-- with its conceptual bag.

AD (simultaneously, intensely): All this is in the realm of thought, none of it ever entered the physical world, what are you talking about?

HS: "All this" now, this and this?

AD (simultaneously, intensely): Everything that you've said, every step in this process [HS: The--] was in the world of thought.

HS: The jiggling of the nerves--

AD: Everything, yeah, everything.

HS: That's all in the world of thought.

AD: In other words, mind.

S: Yeah.

AD: Would you read that again please Randy, once more?

PB [V13, 21:2.33, RC reading]: "The physical senses do *not* provide a picture of the object to the mind for the simple reason that all objects, including the senses themselves, are held in the mind."

HS: Are what?

RC: "...are held in the mind."

AD: Now take it from there.

RG: That this is pos--

HS (simultaneously): So what does that mean?

RG: This is position two. This is the position where the mind is the Witness of a-- of all possi-- of all sense-objects, it's not our position. We have such difficulty with it 'cause it's, I mean, that's not our experience.

S: No but, he--

RG (simultaneously): That position--

AD (very impassioned): But it is your experience Dickie!!!

RG: It is too!

S (faint): Nice. (laughter, student words)

AD (very impassioned): It's always your experience, [RG simultaneously: Ok!] it's *you as mind* that's always experiencing this!! [RG: Good.] And if the mind insists on bel-- having these wrong beliefs, you're going to say it's not my experience!

RG: (Right/Sure). No doubt. Sure.

AD: Thank you for the pro-- providing the occasion. Because that's the point, isn't it?

RG: Yes.

AD: As long as the mind goes on reasoning this way, it says, "No, I don't-- I don't see the world that way." [RG: That's a (one word inaudible)] [impassioned] And yet, the most obvious thing of all is that your immediate experience is nothing but your mind, [RG assents] [AD banging on something for emphasis] the hardness, the color, the sound, anything you want to say, it's always the mind! That's what you're experiencing. Put yourself in a dream, alright, and you say "I'm really experiencing this bear that's hugging me to death." You wake up, you say, "Oh, that was just a thought." Well why not believe it while you're *in* the dream!?

[RG assents]

HS: So you put yourself in waking life, and you say "It's--" you're doing this-- you do an analysis, you say "It's all thought." So-- so it's a question then of switching the belief system?

AD (intensely): No, it's a question of bringing that understanding into your *dream* life.

HS: No, no, wait a minute.

AD (intensely): It's a question of bringing the correct understanding into what you call your *wakeful* life.

HS: Right. Now it's m-- but it's more-- well, not more.

AD: That's why they-- that's why they call us sleepwalkers.

[short pause]

HS: So the understanding--

[Audio File 1983 0330a Ends]

[Audio File 1983 0330b Begins]

AD: You know how m-- how long this has been going on? Right? Ten years? It'll go on another ten years.

DB: Fourteen.

AD: Fourteen? Fourteen years.

S: Si-- only six more years.

RG (simultaneously): In another fourteen we'll have a Saturn [S simultaneously: Yeah.] return [couple words inaudible] (laughter, student words)

S: Randy, would you read that quote again about the physical senses? Just one more time.

PB [V13, 21:2.33, RC reading]: “The physical senses do *not* provide a picture [S: Yeah.] of the object to the mind for the simple reason that all objects, including the senses themselves, are held in the mind.”

S: Thank you.

S: Read it again.

[14¼ second pause]

PB [V13, 21:2.33, RC reading]: “The physical senses do *not* provide a picture of the object to the mind for the simple reason that all objects, including the senses themselves, are held in the mind.”

[12¼ second pause]

RC: Can I-- can we do--

AD: Let's do a few so I get a chance to catch my breath.

RC: Can we come back later and talk more about what it means for my individual mind to absorb the world-image according to its plane of consciousness?

AD: That really amounts to Ishvara gives to each individual mind the picture of the world, the Idea of the world, and each mind has to make an image for itself of that world, that Idea.

DON'T TRY TO PRACTICE RENUNCIATION BEFORE YOU'RE READY FOR IT

PB [V12, 18:4.51, RC reading]: “To cast our ultimate reliance on [RC reads: upon] the universal mind which, supporting all things as it does, can well support us, is a rule that works unfailingly. Only it must not be practiced prematurely, for then the man will have the mere show of the thing instead of the real thing itself. He must first prepare [RC adds: himself] for such a relation by developing himself sufficiently.”

S (very faint): Would you read that again?

PB [V12, 18:4.51, RC reading]: “To cast our ultimate reliance on [RC reads: upon] the universal mind which, supporting all things as it does, can well support us, is a rule that works unfailingly [RC adds: too]. Only it must not be practiced prematurely, for then the man will have the mere show of the thing instead of the real thing itself. He must first prepare for such a relation by developing himself sufficiently.”

AH: I don't-- I don't understand, what would be the mere show of the thing, or how could it--

AD: Don't try to practice renunciation before you're ready for it.

AH: What happens if you do?

AD: It'll be a sham. You can't say I'm going to throw myself and abandon myself to the mercy of God until you're ready.

AH: I see.

AD: That's very-- It's like that person who told Ramana, "Alright, I surrendered, now what?" (laughter)

[18½ seconds of laughter, student words, some silence]

S (faint): Uh-oh.

HS: And what did Ramana say? (bit of laughter, student words)

RG (faint): Kicked him out of the ashram. (bit of laughter)

AD: I'm sorry, I was corrected, "Now what do I do?" was the [RG/S(?) simultaneously: Oh, that's even better.] correct response, yeah.

S (very faint, possibly part of background): And then?

AD: Ramana was a man of infinite patience.

[short pause]

RC: This is one that we were supposed to do last week and I forgot, so--

"THE WORLD-IDEA'S END IS FOREORDAINED FROM THE BEGINNING"

PB [V16, 26:4.115 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 26: World-Idea, #13, RC reading]: "The World-Idea's end is foreordained from the beginning. This leaves no ultimate personal choice. But there's [RC reads: there is] a measure of free will in a single direction..."

LR/S(?): True. (laughter, student words)

PB [V16, 26:4.115 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 26: World-Idea, #13, RC reading]: "...how soon or how late that divine end is accomplished. The time element has not been ordered, the direction has."

S: (Where's/What's) that from?

RC: That's--

S: I'm sorry.

RC: Gee where is that from, it's from number 13, the Middle Ideas, page 20.

LR: Randy I-- I got to hear that again please.

RC: Yeah, it's pretty--

AD: In other words, you're going to get enlightened, sooner or later is your business.

LR: Alright. Yeah, I got the gist of that too.

PB [V16, 26:4.115 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 26: World-Idea, #13, RC reading]: "The World-Idea's end is foreordained from the beginning. This leaves no ultimate personal choice. But there's [RC reads: there is] a measure of free will in a single direction--how soon or how late that divine end is accomplished. The time element has not been ordered, the direction has."

[short pause]

AD: That's why you're all taking your sweet time.

S (very faint): Exactly.

[short pause]

LR: So that direction would be something that-- the direction would be something held in the World-Idea, that the World-Idea would be beyond time and therefore could not predetermine temporality. Would that be correct?

AD: You could put it that way, sure.

LR: Well, say--

AD (simultaneously): No, yeah, you could put it that way. (bit of laughter)

RG: I thought an analogy was--

AD (simultaneously): I (can) [one/two words inaudible] is in your idea, I think you got the framework. (bit of laughter)

LR: If you could just say that in different words. (LR laughing, laughter)

AD (amidst laughter): No I'm being-- I'm being very sympathetic. (laughter, student words)

S: Yeah right. (RG laughing, laughter)

RG: I'm running out of pillows. (bit of laughter)

AD: You know how hard PB struggled to make sure that those things were precise, how many times they (had/have) to be revised? I think you can speak to them and ask them about it. But for him the formulation had to be very very precise and he kept going back to see if he can make it even more precise all the time. And I think he criticized Mahadevan for that, for not saying things *exactly*, you know(--/.). And he-- I think he made the remark, "He should *know* better."

RC: Uh-hm. Yeah, there are a number of notes about that, [student assents, faint] that specific point of not seeing the world.

[9¼ second pause]

IF THE WORLD-IDEA DOES NOT ENTER THE MIND, E.G., IN DEEP SLEEP, CAN YOU MAINTAIN YOUR CONSCIOUSNESS?

PB [V13, 21:2.113, RC reading]: "The only world we know, the only one we can ever know, is the one within our mind. The first proof of this is that when it leaves the mind in deep sleep, it has no existence for us at all; the second proof is that when it re-enters the mind on awakening, the sense-perceptions which tell us of its existence re-enter [it] also."

[short pause]

AD: Now the corollary of that would be interesting. If the-- if you-- if the World-Idea does not enter the mind, can you maintain your consciousness? Or do you usually lapse?

DB: Yeah, this has been a problem that [one/two words inaudible] get at for a long time. [student assents] No I mean, really. Because our consciousness seems to be maintained by the presence of that World-Idea.

AD: Your wakeful consciousness.

DB: Wakeful consciousness, right. But when that leaves, we go into deep sleep, we can no longer remain conscious. But for-- for the Sage, that's not the case. His self-consciousness remains what it is regardless of whether the World-Idea is presented to him or not.

AD (simultaneously): Whether he's plugged in or not.

DB: Right. And I've never-- I've-- You know, I stood on my head and I can't understand it.

AD: No, you have to try it.

DB: Try it, meaning--

AD: Try staying awake [DB: Yes.] when you're asleep.

LR: How about when you're meditating, [DB simultaneously: But--] it's the same thing. [DB simultaneously: Well--] You slow down the thoughts, doesn't-- you-- you have to-- you have to remain very vigilant, you have to [AD simultaneously: Yeah.] con-- you have to maintain that clarity of consciousness which is very hard to do. When you finally-- it seems, when you finally are successful at slowing down your thoughts then--

AD: Then [RG simultaneously: Yeah but--] this is one of the-- one of the hindrances on the path of Yoga. Exactly, because sleep will overcome you. And so if we practice the exercise at night where you try to fall asleep but hold on to that neutral point and let your body go to sleep and you remain, so to speak, conscious, alright. Now your-- the World-Idea is not plugged in and you're not going to see the world but you could still remain conscious.

[student assents, very faint]

LR: Then it-- then it would be utter self-consciousness you would say?

AD (simultaneously): Self-consciousness, yeah. [LR simultaneously: Of no objects?] (It would/It'll) be consciousness without thought. And you'll see that the exercises are based on the very logic of the metaphysics that he's propounding.

DB: Is the ability-- is, I mean that this is-- this ability to remain self-conscious without the presence of the World-Idea seems-- I mean it's very difficult. But, we're talking about the individual mind as a whole. I mean (this not) is-- [one/two words inaudible] doesn't seem to be in reference to the ego being awake there but something that is a-- in-- in a sense a state of evolution of the individual mind. Because if there's no thoughts the ego isn't any more present than the world is. So, it's something that the individual mind now is-- has become capable of doing. Now is it because of-- well, is it because of its history of assimilation of that World-Idea that it has learned to do this?

AD: It's learned to do what?

DB: Learned to stay awake, I mean, develop that-- that-- that ability, because of its assimilation of the World-Idea over many many years. Do-- do you see what I'm asking?

LR: Wait, say it again David.

DB: Well-- [RG simultaneously: It's the--] ok it--

S (simultaneously, faint): [couple/three words inaudible] (it's the consciousness).

RG (faint): It's assimilation, I don't understand why--

DB (simultaneously): No. No, I mean we-- the normal individual mind, regular guy, is dependent upon the presence of that World-Idea for its wakeful consciousness, ok. Now, at a certain stage, the individual mind is capable of remaining awake without the presence of that World-Idea. Now--

AD: Assuming practice and Grace, right?

DB (simultaneously): Yes right, ok. And the question I've-- I guess I'm asking is, can it do that now because of many many lifetimes of having been associated with that World-I--

AD (simultaneously): Can it do what?

DB: Remain conscious without the presence of the World-Idea.

AD: I told you, practice and Grace.

DB: Yes.

LR: Just-- ok.

DB (simultaneously): I-- I accept that and I understand-- well, I don't understand it but I can accept it, but what I'm-- the practice, ok, I mean-- [RG(?): (Does/Just)--] What is it that's changed in the individual mind?

RG: Isn't it the dis-identification with those contents [DB simultaneously: Well if--] rather than the assimilation of them?

DB: Well, alright, it's the dis-identification of the contents but it also seems to be something having to do with the assimilation of the quality of-- of-- or intensity of the-- the way that world-image is manifested to the individual mind. [couple words inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): I'm saying the world-image isn't there, it seems to have nothing to do with the world-image.

DB: No it doesn't, [RG assents] alright, but I mean if you look at the-- if you look at the sequence of events, you start out as this blob of protoplasm and, you know--

PD: Well, maybe-- maybe Dave is pointing at the fact that the world experience is teaching us wakeful consciousness, [DB: Yeah, that's--] and now we have to take that [student assents] wakeful consciousness back into our self [DB: Yeah.] and maintain-- bring the wakeful-- wakefulness to the interior states.

[student assents, very faint]

DB: Yeah.

PD: Is that what you're driving at?

DB (simultaneously): Right, that's-- I mean it's like my wakeful consciousness now, what there is of it, is dependent upon the World-Idea being presented to me. That stops, I go to sleep. Happens every night.

PD: You mean-- you mean to say that the-- our world of experience is trying to teach us just wakefulness, attention?

DB (simultaneously): Well, yeah, I guess so. I guess so.

LR: Well, you know, a further implication of that, or a-- not a further implication but, there seems to be something else here than that and although I don't know(--/.) We say that our consciousness identifies with the World-Idea. We become so identified that when the World-Idea begins to lapse the consciousness lapse(s) too. But is there another-- is it possible that part of what we call our waking consciousness is almost like a borrowed consciousness?

DB: Yeah, right I-- that's-- I mean that's always been my suspicion because--

HS (simultaneously): Like a what of consciousness?

S (very faint): Borrowed.

LR: Borrowed, that-- that-- that part of what we call our personal wakeful consciousness is really not-- doesn't have anything to do with our own power but by virtue of the power of the World-Idea are we conscious and that's why when the World-Idea begins to lapse-- I mean it's almost like developing self-consciousness is bringing in a whole 'nother mode by which to see or know.

DB: Right, and that's-- that's what I meant by the assimilation of something about the World-Idea, I mean not necessarily the contents but--

LR (simultaneously): Is that-- is that possible implication of that, Anthony?

S (very faint whisper): I don't know.

LR: C'mon.

AD: Uh-hm, yeah.

LR: This is no fun at all. (bit of laughter)

S (very faint): (Stop saying that.)

AD (simultaneously, faint): I agree.

LR: Oh.

AD: I agree.

LR: That it's actually a borrowed consciousness.

AD: The intensity that wakeful-- that the World-Idea brings into your consciousness?

LR: Is from the World-Idea, not from your ego-consciousness.

AD: Yeah.

PD: Until we-- until you reach a certain point of development of the [one/two words inaudible]

LR (simultaneously): Well right, no I'm-- yeah.

PD: (Right). [one word inaudible, possibly another student]

LR (simultaneously): I mean it seems like that's what you have to--

PD (simultaneously): I would say natural man, his wakeful consciousness is supported by Nature. [student assents, faint] But a yogi's-- a tech-- the technique of Yoga is to do that without being-- without the support of Nature.

LR: Well see Paul that's a very different explanation if you're saying that it's just by virtue of your own consciousness identifying with the World-Idea.

AH: Yeah but, which part of that consciousness?

LR (simultaneously): It's a different explanation. Because it's saying, it's not just that you're-- The consciousness you know here and love and call your own may not be-- have anything to do with your individual-- or very little, it may actually be a borrowed part of Nature in a way, that you actually have to develop the strength of your own mind in order to be able to maintain it when the others detach.

PD: Yeah, I just don't know what straw man you're referring to. You've said that--

LR (simultaneously): I'm referring to myself.

PD: Oh ok.

LR: Being [S simultaneously: Linda, what do you--] not highly developed.

S: What do you mean by when the other is detached? Under what circumstances does that happen?

LR: When you fall asleep or when you try to meditate and your thoughts really slow down.

S: So it's *your* withdrawal from the World-Mind, right? I wouldn't just-- I wouldn't want to (chuck) the World-Mind into (transforming) my mind.

LR: Well, we're talking about this process of thought, thinking.

S: Yeah.

LR: Right?

S: So detachment from that, what, (can I ask)?

LR: Yeah. There's a-- there's-- there-- the point is to bring a intensification of consciousness such that if you were to fall asleep the self-consciousness would remain in an intense state. But in fact when you

begin practicing it, the result is quite the reverse. There's a de-- *dis*-intense-- de-intense?-- a *weakening* of the consciousness.

RG: Why do you say that Linda?

S: Yeah.

LR: Because that's been my experience.

RG: Well then, what do you-- I missed the point.

DB: What she's saying--

LR (simultaneously): Well, no one here falls asleep when they try to meditate right?

DB: I mean all-- all [LR simultaneously: We have to do this--] Linda is--

RG (simultaneously): What was the point, I don't know.

AD (simultaneously): It must be very hard.

S: It's very (hot/hard) in here.

DB (simultaneously): What Linda is saying is that when that [RG simultaneously: No, I don't.] disassociation with the World-Idea takes place, we fall asleep. Our-- the consciousness that-- you know, the intensity of consciousness that we have now she's saying is dependent upon the individual [LR simultaneously: Partly borrowed.] mind's association with the World-Idea.

LR: How would you explain it, Dickie?

RG: Right, well I just don't have that experience you just referred to. But, I mean I-- what--

LR: You've never fallen asleep when you tried to concentrate?

RG: It's not my-- I mean-- that-that's irrelevant. I mean what-- what was the point?

LR: Never mind.

RG: No, I understand that in reference to [LR simultaneously: I--] sleep Linda.

LR: Ok, let's talk about falling asleep. Now you're trying to remain conscious when you fall asleep.

RG (simultaneously): Right, and you can't do it, you fall asleep.

LR: Why?

RG: 'Cause we're identified-- 'cause we're not free of-- 'cause our consciousness is totally identified with the ego. If it wasn't then we could remain awake.

LR: What does that mean, totally i-- your consciousness is totally identifi--

RG (simultaneously): My consciousness takes itself to be completely the ego and the World-Idea.

LR: But if that were true Dickie then would-- I mean-- when you *dis*-identified with the ego, your consciousness would even be brighter.

RG: No but I-- I can't because my consciousness is so-- it would if I could, that's right.

LR: That-- (bit of laughter)

RG: That's exactly right.

LR: But I'm saying that explanation isn't quite enough because when the ego lapsed you'd find that the consciousness was in fact brighter.

RG: But in fact you would if you weren't identified with it. Because we have never developed that separation, it escapes us. We can't do it.

NR (simultaneously): Well it seems in that case that-- that the thoughts--

LR (simultaneously): The ego is part of the World-Idea.

RG: Right, yeah.

NR (simultaneously): The thoughts are withdrawn from the World-Idea but the consciousness, if you're staying awake, is going *towards* the World-Idea, the consciousness is somehow uniting itself with the World-Idea's Idea [one/two words inaudible]

DB (simultaneously): No that's what that-- that is described as-- in the-- in a Hindu tradition as nescience, you know, there's no object there for the mind to be aware of in deep sleep, ok. So from our point of view it's blank.

AH: So you say when we go to sleep the World-Idea lapses, [DB simultaneously: Well--] and we-- we can't stay conscious of that.

DB: Yes.

NR (simultaneously): Right, but if we could stay conscious of it then we would be in the [DB simultaneously: No. If we could--] thought-free state but conscious. [DB simultaneously: If we could stay conscious of ourselves--] And if we fell asleep we'd be in the thought-free state unconscious.

DB: If we could-- no, but the issue here is, say the World-Mind-- we're not plugged into the World-Idea, alright. Now, what we remain conscious of is ourselves. We're conscious of ourselves in a limited way now because we're associated with the World-Idea. When that World-Idea lapses, our consciousness of ourselves, limited as, even though, you know, let-- when we go to sleep we have no self-awareness, it stops, ok.

NR: Yeah.

AH: It stops with the World-Idea.

DB: It stops when the World-Mind's-- the intensity of the World-Mind's Idea is removed from the individual mind. We lose self-- what self-consciousness we've got.

RG/S(?): Right.

AH: So it's hard to stay awake while you're sleeping. (bit of laughter) That's the hard part.

DB: That's the hard part. It's-- but it's not-- it's not impossible.

[student assents]

[short pause]

AH: See, is that staying awake part, is that the part borrowed from-- I mean, like now?

DB: Yeah. That's the way I would see it. I mean, that's--

AH (simultaneously): The-- the borrowed part has no association with objects?

DB: Well, yeah--

AH: There's an association but it can't be objectified.

DB: Well the borrowed part is something-- it's like the World-Mind's got a lot of power and the intensity of that World-Idea as it's assimilated by the individual mind provides the individual mind with the possibility of some self-awareness. Somehow.

AH (simultaneously): I-- I was really curious about the borrowed part, Linda's comment, you know. Is it possible to discriminate or isolate that borrowed part from the point of view of waking consciousness?

HS: I think-- I think what Linda-- well, I think it seems very difficult and I think it's pointed out that that's why you go into sleep, because you *can't* do that.

AH: When you try to discriminate that you go to sleep.

HS: Well, you just go to sleep.

AH: Yeah.

BS: Ok, we're trying to imagine what are the contents of this state that the mind is in if it would be conscious during deep sleep.

S: No content.

DB (simultaneously): Right, no contents [S simultaneously: No content(s).] but there will [BS simultaneously: Well I don't know.] be self-awareness.

BS: Well I don't know if there's no content, I'll-- well, you say self-awareness. Let's [DB simultaneously: Right.] consider that a content, maybe we get something understood about it, I don't know. [one/two inaudible student words simultaneous with BS] Would that be an approach?

S (faint): Who knows?

AH: I think-- I think it [S simultaneously: Yeah.] would be appropriate to speak of that in-- in a s-- of a non-dual consciousness. There's no content in the sense of an object that it knows.

BS: Ok, so that if it has a content it's not in the sense of an object [AH: Yeah.] that it-- that it knows as an ego.

AH: I think-- I think that much would be a safe-- safe thing to say, yeah.

BS (simultaneously): But, are we ruling out content? Is it the individual mind as it's receiving, we've been calling it the World-Idea for the individual mind kind of in an empirical sense, the whole-- it carries through to the-- to the ultimate, to the phenomena. [AH: (couple words inaudible) but--] But if you take this individual mind before it makes its presentation or representation, would that be it?

AH: Well, I don't know if you'd say "would that be it" but there's a principle of aware--

AD (simultaneously): Would that be what?

BS: Would that be the state of consciousness undisturbed by what we normally call deep sleep.

AD: Yeah, that would be practicing inhibition of the mind's modifications and then you would be in a thought-free state.

BS: And that is the consciousness that we try and grasp?

AD: No, that-- you can't grasp that, you would be that.

BS (simultaneously): I understand.

AD: So, don't know what you were going around but, can we go on to the next one?

[short pause]

THE WORLD-MIND IS THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF THE WORLD-IDEA THAT IS THOUGHT BY THE INDIVIDUAL MIND

PB [V13, 21:3.96, RC reading]: "The world-idea is *thought* by the individual mind and, in the process, inevitably shaped according to its limitations. But the first cause and ultimate source of that idea cannot be this mind. For the idea is "given" to it. It must be sought for in that wherefrom the individual mind derives its own existence. It must be sought, therefore, in the World-Mind."

HS: What must be sought in the World-Mind now?

RC: The ultimate source-- the first cause and ultimate source of the idea which is thought by the individual mind and shaped according to its limitation(s).

[short pause]

AH: Could you read the quote again please?

PB [V13, 21:3.96, RC reading]: "The world-idea is *thought* by the individual mind and, in the process, inevitably shaped according to its limitations. But the first cause and ultimate source of that idea cannot be this mind. For the idea is "given" to it. It must be sought for in that wherefrom the individual mind derives its own existence. It must be sought, therefore, in the World-Mind."

AH: That's an interesting slant on the discussions when you say *because* the individual mind in some way interprets that or limits that or does something to that, [student assents] that it's hard then to not see it as its own creation, that--

S: What Andrew?

[student assents]

AH: The individual mind does something to that-- the individual mind *thinks* that World-Idea into existence. You know, like it's got-- it's part of that process. And because it *is* part of that pro-- process it's hard then to see it as other than that individual mind, as prior to it as its own principle. I thought that was-- that was one thing that came out of this for me.

LR: I-- can I hear the quote once more?

S: Yeah.

PB [V13, 21:3.96, RC reading]: "The world-idea is *thought* by the individual mind [RC: "Thought" is underlined.] and, in the process, inevitably shaped according to its limitations."

AH: The individual mind's limitations.

S: Uh-hm. Like the lo-- like what you were talking about lokas.

S: Right.

PB [V13, 21:3.96, RC reading]: "But the first cause and ultimate source of that idea cannot be this mind."

HS: The individual mind?

S: Right.

S (simultaneously): Individual mind, [student assents] right.

PB [V13, 21:3.96, RC reading]: "For the idea is "given" to it. It must be sought for [RC reads: therefore] in that wherefrom the individual mind derives its own existence."

LR: What must be sought, the World-Idea?

AD (very faint in background): No.

S (very faint): It's only just the [LR simultaneously: Ok.] [couple/few words inaudible]

HS/S(?): Yeah.

LC: Of the Idea presented to the individual mind.

AH: What does it mean that the individual mind thinks the World-Idea [short pause] according to its limitation?

RC: Well to me I guess it means that whole process that Anthony was speaking about it-- spatializing, temporalizing, and reflecting upon it.

LC: Then we don't have two minds at all in this quote. We're back to one mind in this-- right?

BS: Yeah it's been confusing to me all night which side of the individual mind the World-Idea is on.

[student assents, very faint]

PD: Right side Bert.

S: (Both sides.) (laughter)

AH: Port side.

S: [few words inaudible]

BS (simultaneously): Flash those one-liners. (laughter)

[28 second pause with laughter, student words, followed by silence]

PB [V13, 19:4.6, RC reading]: "Through the limitations set up by time, space, and sensation, the perceptions [RC reads: perception] [of forms and the experience] of events by the personal ego become possible. [That is, its own existence becomes possible.] Therefore any change in these limitations would bring about a change in its existence. The world which it knows here would vanish and another would take its place."

[19½ second pause]

S: What?

AD: Read a couple more while you got a chance. (laughter)

RC (amidst laughter): (Will do.)

PB [V13, 21:3.98, RC reading]: "It is on account of this union existing between the individual mind and the World-Mind that we are forced to give our attention to the world-idea."

[short pause]

S: Read it again.

PB [V13, 21:3.98, RC reading]: "It is on account of this union existing between the individual mind and the World-Mind that we are forced to give our attention to the world-idea."

[22 second pause]

AH: Forced in a sense that you can't make the tree disappear.

RC: You can't disappear-- you can't make it disappear without you yourself disappearing as well.

[short pause]

THE EGO IS A REPRESENTATION OF THE OVERSELF WITHIN THE WORLD-IDEA, AND ANY STATE THE EGO IS IN, AWAKE, ASLEEP, OR DREAMING, IS A CHANGING ASPECT OF THAT WORLD-THOUGHT

PB [V13, 21:5.203, RC reading]: “The world-thought holds [RC adds: us] in a kind of spell; every possible state of consciousness short of the Overself is still an *idea* in the human mind.”

[18 second pause]

AH: I mean, what’s human Randy? Synonymous with individual?

RC: Well (it’s/it was) pretty much the way we are last time. (laughter)

BS (amidst laughter): That wasn’t the question.

S: Speak for yourself. (laughter)

AD (amidst laughter): I see. (AD laughing a bit)

AH: I was just curious if human there would be a reference to individual mind the way we’ve been speaking of that? Like could you exchange a word for it? Or just try to.

RC: I think we got to at least go as far as he’s saying that for us the humanness of it is part of the limitations that are imposed [student assents] by the individual mind.

[short pause]

SD: Randy, can you maybe speak at all about the two parts of that quote, two juxtaposed and I don’t understand the relationship between them.

PB [V13, 21:5.203, RC reading]: “The world-thought holds in a kind of spell; [SD: Yeah.] every possible state of consciousness short of the Overself is still an *idea* in the human mind.”

[short pause]

SD: Like each of those by itself makes sense but I don’t see how they get juxtaposed.

S: Can you read it again, Randy?

PB [V13, 21:5.203, RC reading]: “The world-thought holds in a kind of spell; every possible state of consciousness short of the Overself is still an *idea* in the human mind.”

SD: Is he implying that it’s the intensity of the world-thought’s thinking through us that makes us believe that these contents are not an idea?

AD: That this sleep is one state of consciousness, that dream is another state of consciousness, right?

SD: Uh-hm.

[short pause]

AD: (Well wouldn’t you?)

SD: So that ok, that’s what he means then by saying it’s a kind of spell, that it-- that [AD simultaneously: Sure.] the thinking is so intense that we’re led to believe that [AD simultaneously: When you sleep, there’s one--] what are objects of mind are actually--

AD: Yeah. It's like, you know-- whereas obvi-- it should be obvious that sleep is a thought. Dream is another thought. Wakeful consciousness is another thought. All these thoughts are held for us or by the World-Mind for us.

[short pause]

PB [V16, 27:3.27 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 27: World-Mind, #2, RC reading]: "In all these studies the principal concept should be returned to again and again: the entire universe, everything--objects and creatures--is in Mind. I hold all the objects of my experience in *my* consciousness but I myself am held, along with them, in an incredibly greater consciousness, the World-Mind's."

[short pause]

HS: And this being held in the incredibly greater consciousness is the spell that you just spoke of, in the previous quote?

RC: I don't know, I-- I'm tending to think when he says "world-thought," that it's like in the context of that sequence, the first of our thoughts is "I" and this immediately associated with the body-thought and the world-thought follows.

HS: Yeah.

RC: That that givenness of the world as other than me, other than-- other than mine, I guess that's the way I'm sort of interpreting "world-thought".

[short pause]

HS: And the force of the givenness is by the fact that the World-Mind is giving something to the individual mind at that point?

RC: Well I'm not satisfied with the way that's been talked about yet. [student assents, faint] I would like to talk about that a lot more, that particular part.

HS: Let's [RC simultaneously: Well--] say not in-- when you go to sleep, right, there's the World-Mind's con-- contribution to your existence is-- something's happening to that, would you say? I'm just talking about going to sleep.

RC: I get-- I really have difficulty thinking that I go somehow out of the World-Mind. I could see the-- the World-Idea no longer being active within my mind, but I-- I don't-- I can't conceive of myself going outside the World-Mind somehow.

HS: So the World-Idea is no longer active in-- within *your* mind and your body starts to rest? Is that what you're saying, that the-- there's no projection outward of the thought experience? There's a retraction to-- to wherever it could rest within it?

RC: Confused about that. I don't know-- toy with the possibility of having my-- my periods of sleep and wakefulness also being part of the World-Idea but--

PD: Could you read the quote again, the one you just read?

PB [V16, 27:3.27 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 27: World-Mind, #2, RC reading]: “In all these studies the principal concept should be returned to again and again: the entire universe, everything--objects and creatures--is in Mind. I hold all the objects of my experience in *my* consciousness [RC: The “my” is underlined.] but I myself am held, along with them, in an incredibly greater consciousness, the World-Mind’s.”

PD: So the reference there doesn’t seem to be the World-Idea but the World-Mind’s consciousness is what supports the individual’s consciousness, [RC: Yeah.] that the individual consciousness, whatever that may imply, exists in and through a relationship to the World-Idea and both of them have as a substratum the World-Mind.

RC: You say the individual’s consciousness exists through and by a relation to the World-Idea.

PD: Exists in a relationship to the World-Mind, but its substratum or its base is the World-Mind’s consciousness.

RC: Ok now that-- I would have one question on that. Really being technical, I’m really being [PD simultaneously: Yeah, that’s what I’m trying to be.] [couple words inaudible] responsible. Wouldn’t you say that your-- that your consciousness is dependent upon the states which it has in relation to the World-Mind?

PD: The states it has in relation to what?

RC: To the World-Idea given.

PD: It would depend on how we want to use the term ‘consciousness’. [RC assents] It’s gotten-- it gets used both ways, as the symbolic images or as the element of pure observing, of pure awareness. And in the latter category I would say no, its reference *isn’t* to the World-Idea. And if--

HS (simultaneously): It’s what, Paul?

PD: And the category of pure observing or pure knowing, its referent is *not* the World-Idea.

AH: It doesn’t depend on it, right?

HS (simultaneously): But yet when the body goes to sleep it-- there’s no longer consciousness, wouldn’t you say?

PD: Consciousness doesn’t go or come anywhere, Herb.

HS: Yes, but when you go to sleep you’re no longer conscious.

PD: The body lapses from being a content of knowledge.

HS: So what happened to that consciousness which neither came nor went?

PD: The-- nothing happened to the consciousness, Herb.

S: But--

HS: But you [one word inaudible] you went-- you went to sleep. So you’re not that consciousness.

S: [couple words inaudible]

CDA: Very true. (CDA laughs)

PD (simultaneously): That's the content of knowledge, Herb.

HS: Excuse me?

PD: That's the *content* of knowledge.

LR: What is?

S: The "you".

S (simultaneously, faint): [couple words inaudible]

PD: The "you".

S: Well yeah, you--

LR (simultaneously): So you are a content of knowledge, [PD: Exactly.] and you are not the consciousness.

PD (simultaneously): The "you" that goes and comes is a content of knowledge, is not that pure knowing.

LR (simultaneously): So then you're saying you're not the consciousness.

PD: Pardon, Linda?

LR: Then you're not the consciousness.

S: Different level. He said that.

PD (simultaneously): The "you" that you know is not the knowing. The pure knowing [LR simultaneously: Where are you going to put yourself?] is the pure soul. It's the same-- it's nothing new, the pure knowing, the pure [LR simultaneously, very faint: That's right.] cognitive-ness *is* that pure soul consciousness which is supported by the World-Mind's consciousness and is not part of Nature or Prakriti or the World-Idea.

LR: Yeah but the idea is to get in touch with that. I mean I know, you're right, it's not new, we've been hearing it for a long time. But the idea is to get in touch with that, right?

AH: What do you mean Linda, "in touch with that"? I don't know.

HS: When you go to sleep you want to be aware, that's it.

LR (simultaneously): Well if you're-- Go on, Herbert.

HS: That's-- just that's it. [LR: Well--] Just what you said before.

AH: Well if we go to sleep the contents of-- of your existence or my existence lapses but my existence doesn't.

HS: Ok, now-- ok, now what does that mean? That's good.

AH: Just-- there's no other way to say it, you know. The contents are gone.

HS: But the existence remains.

AH (simultaneously): I mean, if somebody hits you in the head with an axe, what's left, you know?

[student assents, faint]

S: And?

HS: Let's say now. (HS laughs a bit)

AD: Read the quote again, Randy.

PB [V16, 27:3.27 and *Perspectives*, Chapter 27: World-Mind, #2, RC reading]: "In all these studies the principal concept should be returned to again and again: the entire universe, everything--objects and creatures--is in Mind. I hold all the objects of my experience in *my* consciousness but I myself am held, along with them, in an incredibly greater consciousness, the World-Mind's."

AD: What's the problem? [short pause] The World-Mind gives the World-Idea to the Overself, the Overself projects that World-Idea and includes representation of itself in that Idea. And if the ego is asleep or awake there would be just a modification of that Idea.

RC: Ok that-- that's the way I was trying to take it, yeah.

AD (simultaneously): Then what was the problem?

RC: That I-- that's a little different than the way we've been talking about it so far, the ego as being asleep or awake. Before we've talked about it somehow being out of phase with that Idea.

[students assent, very faint]

AD: Well, if we speak about asleep, I mean I assume that you're talking about the ego.

LR: Isn't that part of the World-Idea?

RC: That's the way I'd like to interpret it.

S: It's not that the way we say it.

S (faint): Yeah but I--

BS: Could that be [DB simultaneously: I think the distincti--] recapitulated please, what you said Anthony?

AD: What is that?

BS: Could-- would you mind recapitulating what you have answered to Randy?

AD: Yeah it's nothing you haven't heard before.

BS: Well I just didn't hear it please.

AD: The World-Mind gives to the Overself the World-Idea. The Overself projects that World-Idea and within that World-Idea there is a representation of it in that world, your ego. Now, any state that the ego is in, awake, asleep, or dreaming, is simply a change or the changing aspects of that world-thought.

[short pause]

DB: But An-- Anthony, then from-- see, it would seem that from a point of view of waking consciousness you can speak of an ego and from the point of view of dreaming consciousness you can speak of an ego. But from the point of deep sleep, the ego is as absent from that state as any of the other objects that constitute the universe for-- for the individual mind. Ok? I mean, isn't that right so far?

AD: Yeah.

DB: Ok but-- I think-- um--

AD: So when you're speaking about modifications within the World-Idea or different thoughts.

DB: Different thoughts. Well, yes, but I don't know if it's-- this is proper to bring this in but, you know, he speaks of-- he speaks of like the-- in some instances the dream, the dreams an individual might have, like the one where he's being strangled by the blanket and he hears the door slam and he thinks it's a cannon going off or whatever, there's a-- seems like there's a progressive disassociation from a-- the unfoldment of that World-Idea from the ego's point of view, ok, and it would seem that from a point of view of the World-Idea-- well, this is-- this is the part I don't-- I don't get, is that from the-- is the deep sleep state as much a part of the World-Idea as wakeful-- wakeful consciousness?

AD: Yeah.

AH: It's hard to say much about deep sleep, you know.

DB: Well, ok, now, there are no concepts there.

AD: If you s-- if you say that it's the World-Idea changing, when you're awake and when you're asleep, alright, then you simply saying wakefulness is a thought and sleep is another thought.

S: (Right.)

DB: Well it would seem-- but Anthony I think the problem I have is that-- that it would be from the point of view of the World-Mind that you could say that sleep is a thought and-- I mean that dream-- that wake is a thought and sleep is a thought, but from the point of view of the individual mind I don't-- I don't know how I can speak of that as a thought.

HS: How you can speak of which?

DB: The deep-- the sleep state.

AD (simultaneously): From the point of view of what?

DB: Of-- from the point of view of the individual mind, ok--

AD (simultaneously): The individual Overself?

DB: Yeah. I don't-- I don't understand in what-- what sense that's a thought because it--

AD: In what sense *what* is a thought?

DB: The sleep state. Deep sleep.

AD (simultaneously): Can't you imagine when you're sleeping and having a dream that you put yourself to sleep in the dream, [DB: Wait a minute.] the dream character sleeping?

[Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1983 0330b Ends. It sounds like there is talking on Side 2 but it is completely muffled and inaudible. Therefore, this is the end of class.]