

**CLASS at Wisdom's Goldenrod, Hector, NY
with Anthony Damiani (AD)
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PB PARAS; INTELLECT**

TOPIC: PB Paras
SUBJECT: Intellect

SUBSUBJECTS: Metaphysics of Truth, Nonduality, Soul as a Unity

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BOOKS READ FROM OR REFERENCED:

- Paul Brunton, *Notebooks*
- Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*

NOTES:

- Pat Campbell transcript from 1983 exists (Scan File 1983 1102-29R04.PDF); other, earlier transcript versions may exist.

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1983 11/02 at Wisdom's Goldenrod
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[Audio File 1983 1102a Begins]

IMAGES MAKE CONCRETE THOUGHTS CLEAR WHEREAS WORDS MAKE ABSTRACT THOUGHTS CLEAR

RC: See what I mean? (student laughs)

[short pause with very faint background student talking]

PB [V5, 7:1.150, RC reading]: "No thought can assume a clear and distinct form in the mind of a man until he has pinned it to a picture if it be concrete, or to words if it be abstract."

S (very faint): Would you read that again Randy?

PB [V5, 7:1.150, RC rereading]: "No thought can assume a clear and distinct form in the mind of a man until he has pinned it to a picture if it be concrete, or to words if it be abstract."

[10½ second pause]

TS: What?

[15 second pause]

S (very faint): Can you read it one more time?

PB [V5, 7:1.150, RC rereading]: "No thought can assume a clear and distinct form in the mind of a man until he has pinned it to a picture if it be concrete, or to words if it be abstract."

DB: Randy? Would that [one word inaudible] is what he means by the mind of man there that thinks himself a mentality with real communication in words, and-- [HS, faint: Yeah.] He's not talking about the *meaning* of an idea there but just the form of it. Well, he's talking about the form of the idea [few words inaudible] or experiencing whatever. But the meaning-- I mean I'm-- I'm just trying to get what he means here by the mind of man because I think the thought in some sense seems to have a multiplicity of possible forms within-- within it, you know, it doesn't seem like you get to be calling it [one word inaudible] They represent quite a few different thoughts. But this mind of man he's talking about there seems like the imagination.

PD: I think it's very close to what we were speaking about last Friday, that the-- the two forms of the intellect, this abstract conceptual or inferential knowledge and perceptual or sensorial perception, images. And that those are the two forms of human cognition.

DB: [few words inaudible]

PD: The verbal aspect.

DB: Right.

PD: Perceptual or imaginal being is the other aspect.

S: The distinction is crucial.

S: Uh-hm.

PD: Verbal or-- Kant calls it perception and conception, those are the two forms of human knowledge in his exposition.

S: It's now (present)?

S: It's more than that.

DB: I mean there's twelve different forms to knowledge that take on to form an idea and that to some express the idea, but not-- not really the-- the idea itself but the [one/two words inaudible]

PD: Yeah, I think the word 'idea' can have much broader implications. [short pause] But do you-- when you express a meaning you got to do it in those two forms, use a picture or use words.

DB (simultaneously): Yes, right, even from the perspective of [few words inaudible] itself but the idea somehow is there present without guiding the impression to form and-- hopefully guiding the impression to formulate the process, alright?

PD: Yeah, I mean, the meaning is not formed enough to be the knowledge.

DB: Right.

PD: But the meaning is always certainly conjunct the form of human cognition or the mode of human cognition. Intuition is going to express itself in some mode or another.

[short pause]

LR: I don't understand that.

S: Me too. (bit of laughter)

LR: Isn't-- isn't there a bit of [one/two words inaudible]

PD: Verbal.

LR: Oh I-- I thought words were a form of image.

PD: What do you see when someone says 'truth'?

LR: But the question would be can you think of-- can you have a thought of truth without the word 'truth', without hearing the word 'truth'. And not some-- you know, and I would say yes. Because--

PD (simultaneously): No, the first thing is the picture. Picturing--

LR (simultaneously): No, that wasn't my question Paul. I thought the quote said no thought can be clear. Is that right, what did it say?

S: Can assume a clear and distinct form.

LR: Oh, ok, [few inaudible student words simultaneous with LR] so that's not to say that there couldn't be a *form* of thought. Right? So this is just talking about *formed* thoughts as opposed to formless thought(s)?

PD: Yeah. If you have a vague and inarticulate understanding of something.

AH: You don't know what words or what pictures to see because [couple/three words inaudible] that. But, [S: Yeah.] this quote is talking about the way human knowledge takes that view of things via image or the words. Let's say in the process of-- of gaining knowledge you must clearly articulate (an/with) image or a word.

PD: Well just like-- [S: Yeah.] just an artist or a poet can't formulate and put in meaning if he's not articulate within himself, into an articulate structure. [LR: Yeah.] Otherwise that meaning doesn't become explicit in his awareness.

[students assent]

[short pause]

AH: Well it seems like the notion of a formless thought or an idea of form can be [couple words inaudible] outside of knowledge in a sense. In the [one word inaudible] to knowledge there is conceptualizing in this quote.

PD: Well Hume encourage the imaginal as well as concept.

JL: I don't understand it like that. I think, I think with concepts you can be clear and precise. Thoughts that you're talking about being the thoughts that don't have that kind of-- Like an object doesn't have a [couple words inaudible] it doesn't keep track of (his sensations). Or the relationship before they-- they commit to non-thoughts, so to speak, (clearly) at the end of the-- or the non-clear thoughts [couple words inaudible] relationship.

S: That's what I thought.

JL: And that fit with this quote?

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

JL: And so I don't think all thinking is in touch with-- always has a clear and precise thought. [10½ second pause] And certainly he-- certainly he-- emphasis is on clear and precise statement.

AH: There can be varying degrees of clarity in [one word inaudible] thought, quote. Is it possible to posit thought without any clarity?

S: I think so. (laughter) But you're never going to call it into play.

S: I know (feminists) think--

AH: Thoughts that I definitely call (them) the way human knowledge works. But can I have a hazy idea though? But you can't have *no* idea [couple words inaudible] (bit of laughter)

[19¼ second pause]

DB: No but is it-- the point is when we get this clear and concise expression of a thought, is that what PB told (Freddy/Randy) when they saw a psychic?

[14½ second pause]

RC: You definitely know what it's about. You might have a-- might be a thought that you're *forming* a thought, or know that you're in the process of forming a thought. But it seems that until you've got it concretized, you're not really sure what thought you-- you're formulating.

S: That's right.

S (very faint): That's right.

JB: Yeah, I mean, put it in a form or give it an abstract thought, a word. I mean, I think-- I mean something else than understanding (through my--)

DB: Well, I'm not talking about the-- the understanding it has for you but [one/two words inaudible] studying this there's something called nouns try to present you concept on a-- you don't really understand it but [few words inaudible] come in, you're able to [few words inaudible] and (religiously), "Oh, well you understand."

S (very faint): It could manifest.

DB: What?

S: Well I consider it a special case of-- I mean, if (this) object or a word that could expand your understanding just in that--

PD: Even with a small "e".

S: I could not hear you, speak louder.

JB (simultaneously): No, I think prior to that was a common cause for understanding that [S simultaneously: Well--] exchange, something [few words inaudible]

DB: No, no, I'm talking about-- I'm talking about when you're-- when you've got an idea and its given clear and distinct existence is in your own mind, and so you just (get/give) back to some other (answer), more or less of your [one/two words inaudible] do other things with it. I'm just wondering if it's the point where it's actually articulated in the idea to [one/two words inaudible] be conceptualized, that point where ordinarily you say well, you know, a person understands (it/this).

RC: I think that process the reason went through [one/two words inaudible] prior to that whole-- how in response to the point-instants of stimulus or whatever, I'd say that's the moment that the thought enters the mind of man, at that moment [couple words inaudible] Then the next step would-- described it like a negation of everything that it wasn't and then a selection of the things that were specifically similar in nature, I think all he's really saying here is that those concepts that are being manipulated are pictures and words. And at one level when you make it concrete you-- you're working with a picture, and (it becoming/if you're coming) abstract then you're working with the words. They have those two levels of

the primordial and [couple words inaudible] The primordial image is what surrounds (itself/yourself) with the pictorial stage, I mean-- And, is that what you mean?

S (very faint): That's right.

S: That's what I thought.

S: Uh-hm.

RC: Uh--

S: Yeah.

RC: It's like the abstract overlay or the set of labels that you put on top of a pictorialized [one/two words inaudible] through it. And, it became (a state that you work), what we mean by human. And Tim and I were interested in doing exactly that.

AD: But where's Tim?

DB: So that's just the-- this product of the-- totally happens to create understanding, which is really mechanical and sort of--

RC: Yeah. It seems that having a thought and understanding a thought are two very different things and if they weren't we definitely wouldn't have to be doing what we're doing. We have plenty of thoughts, we have plenty to say. Doesn't seem to carry the-- the intensity of our understanding of--

DB: Well no, no, I'm making-- I'm making a distinction between-- take the example of reading a quote from some book that we just (picked up). And we memorized all the words to it but we-- you know, we don't know what the guy's talking about. That's not-- I don't think that's what PB means in that quote. He says that thought should be clear and distinct and vivid but that's-- that [one/two words inaudible] there is what I decided [S: In the book.] in the book, that was-- that's not expressing a thought and [three/few words inaudible]

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

AB: Put that--

DB (very faint): It's repetition [few words inaudible]

AB: David, what if you put the thought into your own words?

DB: Yeah, right.

S: Then it's understood.

DB: See that's what I'm trying to get at.

AB (simultaneously): Then it's understood.

DB: I just want to know if when you're able to do that is that understanding or is that just, you know, running your mouth?

AB: Well, according to this quote, then you have made the thought clear and distinct.

DB: Right, (we just) said.

AB (simultaneously): At least you could say that much.

DB: Ok.

LDS: It seems like that would have to be the *foundation* for understanding.

S: Right.

S: Right.

AH (simultaneously): And also, isn't--

LDS (simultaneously): If it isn't the total understanding at least you'd have to have an articulated formulation of the idea before the understanding can possibly fulfill itself.

PD: But if you can take an idea and rephrase it in different verbal ways, in different allusions and pictures and symbols, then you grasp the meaning of that idea. Or if you can't take an idea and express it in different formats and see it in different systems, in different contexts, you haven't grasped one-quarter of the idea.

AH: Yeah but-- but--

HS (simultaneously): Yeah but-- but you had to conceptually grasp the meaning before you can express it.

S: But-- but expressing it is not all of it.

PD: Well that's a theoretical stance you're taking. How would you ever know?

HS (simultaneously): I'm not taking any stance [one word inaudible]

PD: You're [S simultaneously: (Ok.)] only going to know when you do it.

HS: Huh?

PD: You're only going to know when and if you do it.

HS: So if guys like you (know that), how does it work? (some laughter)

PD: (Well), you're an (outcaster/outcaste Herb).

HS: Well you have a thought and you have images, and that's how you understand. And it appears that that's how we build up our understanding.

PD: So we use Buddhism and then to Platonism and then you could speak. You learn to think in different contexts.

HS: And you have like a lot of concepts running around.

PD: Yeah.

S: Uh-hm.

PD: Then [AD simultaneously: Can you start reading again?] [couple words inaudible] if the idea portrays it.

HS: Yeah (and) sometimes if you try it and [one word inaudible] and apply the concepts that you have in your mind.

PB [V5, 7:1.150, RC rereading]: “No thought can assume a clear and distinct form in the mind of a man until he has pinned it to a picture if it be concrete...”

HUMAN MENTALITY DEVELOPED FROM PICTORIAL REPRESENTATION TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATION

AD: Alright, let's stop there with what he said.

[short pause]

RC: Maybe something concrete is a-- a content of what we're going to call the real world and it has to take [one/two words inaudible]

[short pause]

S: Uh-hm.

PC: It would be impossible to take a [one word inaudible] concrete [few words inaudible] picture in your mind. [few words inaudible]

HS: What's a concrete thought?

S: Uh-hm.

PC: A thought about something tangible, a concrete (attachment).

HS (simultaneously): You mean like thing?

PC: What?

HS: A thing?

PC: What you'd call--

AD: Table, chair, house, mountain.

S: Yeah well that's--

AD: You have images for that, don't you? When you say table, chair, mountain, you have an image for that, don't you?

PC: [one word inaudible] I think of without that (and--)

AD: Alright. So now you have the image. And you can, so to speak, what? Have a thought? Then that means it's (of course) coming from the image, huh? Is this the way the mentality of humans developed?

AH: Occurring with thought but [one/two words inaudible] the ability to make an image.

AD: Well, alright, now that you've made the image-- I mean, you have a clear thought, what's the next thing you do?

AH: Connect it with other clear thoughts.

AD: Well-- yes, yeah. But if you go further to the next part of the sentence.

PB [V5, 7:1.150 cont., RC reading]: "...or to words if it be abstract."

[short pause]

S: I thought you said then you name it.

S (simultaneously, very faint): Can't think of anything.

AD: Yeah, and now the name is abstract, right?

S: Yeah.

AD: And you add a lot of them together and you have an abstract thought.

S: Yeah.

AD: You think he's referring to also that this is the way the human mentality develops, from a picture language to an abstract language?

AH: In fact the language itself is based on thinking in pictures.

AD: I can't hear you.

AH: Language itself, words and letters, has their origin in pictures and--

AD: Well, if you're speaking about hieroglyphics or ideograms, I'd agree with you.

AH: Well Chinese and--

AD: Yeah, but what about the English we speak?

AH: I think one of the ways of measuring civilization is in [one/two words inaudible]

AD: Well we're not interested in that right now.

AH: You know like English for instance is the language that allows for a certain kind of abstraction. It's not found in pictures.

JB: The words (make) a sound on it, on like a [one word inaudible]

S (very faint): Like a natural (spark).

AD: Well you think that the human mentality took that road, from pictorial representation to abstract representation?

AH: That would be a general sensible civilization, evolution.

S: Yeah.

RG: Also [one word inaudible] in-- in a-- in an epistemological sense isn't it also saying that for there-- for there to be any distinctions within thought itself there must-- it must either be verbal or pictorial distinction or temporal [one word inaudible] Is-- isn't it speaking about the spatial (arguments--) aspects of the mind that takes thought and portrays it in the imagination?

AD: I think you people are giving it a much profounder meaning than that sentence call for. He's not speaking about the processes of unconscious mentation. In other words, you know, epistemological presuppositions (there/David).

RG/S(?): Uh-hm.

AD: I don't think so.

S: But--

RC: I guess I was thinking in terms of like maybe this could be (the--) the way Santayana says we live in pictorial space. I was thinking picture at that level. Do you think that's [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Well I'm sorry Randy, you have to explain.

RC: Well you know how Santayana did that that thing, that there is a realm of matter out there. Well not "out there", all around us. Well, what we live (in) is the pictorial space where we reconstruct pictures for ourself.

AD: Yeah but I can't follow you because what I see out there is not-- is not the realm of matter, what I see out there is images.

RC: Yeah right, that's what I'm saying.

AD: Well-- yeah, so then why don't we argue on that way instead of Santayana's way. Because I don't see a realm of matter.

RC: Right.

AD: I see images.

RC: Uh-huh.

AD: All the time.

RC: Yeah, those images are what I was saying he was calling pictorial space.

AD: Pictorial?

RC: Pictorial space.

AD: Space?

RC: Remember that section that we live in pictorial space and sentimental time, we have no contact with the cosmos [one/two words inaudible]

AD: (Well/No) I don't remember that (one). But--

PD (simultaneously): I think we're trying-- what you just said was that this sentence was pertaining to the form and manner in which the human intelligence becomes conscious, and it doesn't [AD simultaneously: Evolves, yes.] pertain to the epistemological problem.

AD: Yes, this is not concerned with the epistemological problem. Isn't that the point--

PD (simultaneously): It's a manner in which you become self-conscious.

AD: Yeah. So if you notice, we would have a picture of a chair in your mind. And then you'll associate a word with that picture. And then you forget about the picture and you just use the word. And you've gone from a concrete pictorial kind of thinking to an abstract kind of thinking. [student assents, very faint] You're only going to use names now, alright? But prior to that you were dependent on pictures. We are not speaking about thinking.

S (very faint): What?

AD: I don't think he speaks about thinking there.

S (very faint): What about (progress) [three words inaudible]

AD: Well, I can see your point of view because if you were-- for instance, you were an analytical psychologist you would ask us to return back to mythological thought and think in terms of pictures. And, there's some validity in that. But after twelve years old I stopped doing that. (laughter, student words)

RG: But Anthony, I don't see (what) this sentence to him means much to-- means anything in that interpretation, I mean what--

AD: Well it means a lot to me.

RG: I know, I know, well try-- what's the import of it? [couple faint inaudible student words] Just that we have to name things and hold-- hold concrete images of things in order to [one/two words inaudible]

AD: Well I think he's pointing out that we-- in fact when we write something, we can get a lot of help if we try to keep in mind that in order to make an idea very clear to ourselves we have to use an image. But then it gets a little more difficult because we no longer use those images but we use the *name* that we've associated with that image. Now the name is disassociated from the image and we communicate through the use of this abstract language which is no longer tied to images. Now the possibility of error has increased, you know, a hundred-fold.

[student(s) assenting, faint]

RC: So when you say image you mean the phantom, like when I daydream I know I'm daydreaming rather than the images that I [couple/three words inaudible]

AD: I'm sorry?

RC: I'm trying to see exactly how you're using 'image' when you say that we have to work on--

AD: Well, very simply. If I say 'chair' I-- I-- I imagine chair, and then I describe it. [RC simultaneously: Ok but you--] I say 'tree', 'mountain'--

RC: You wouldn't think you could sit on that chair that you imagine though. You're not talking about the chair that you would sit on.

AD: No.

RC: Ok. [short pause] I don't know why I need that. I don't know why [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Why you need what?

S (faint): Yeah.

RC: In order to see a chair.

AD: Well, what do you do when I get into a really abstract discussion? What do half of the people want right away? They want an image, a picture, something that they could put their teeth into. I get abstract and they-- they get uncomfortable. So I back up and I start using images. But, most of us will benefit by recognizing the fact that we could make our ideas much clearer if you use an image, and then if, you know, we don't want to be led astray when we start using abstract language, and language is abstract because it is an image of our thought. You have the development of the picture, and then you have the development of thought. Now this is not thinking, alright, this is not thinking in the sense that we want to know what makes for the possibility of manifestation, what are the unconscious processes involved, we're not-- I'm not referring to that. I'm referring to the kind of thinking that we're all acquainted with. And if you look into your, you know, storehouse, when you write something, always you would be falling back on images and pictures all the time. That's what our language is derived from.

Then the-- the point that I'm making here is that from the picture there develops the thought and from the thought develops the language. Now the language in comparison to the pictorial representation which is, you know, provided, is very abstract. Language could be an image of abstract thought in a way that-- in a way that thought can't do, it can't do that. Because thought, if I have a thought of a chair, if I have a thought of a mountain, in other words there's a reflex image all the time in our mind of any object we experience, alright, any object you experience. And by the time you're three or four or five you've accumulated all the necessary images by which you can relate to the world with. Now from these images, we're saying, you're going to associate an abstract word. Usually the children start out with nouns right away, everything is a noun, alright. Now, a word is very abstract compared to the image. And yet when we communicate with each other we're using these very abstract words which are far removed from the images. Right?

S: Right.

AD: Alright so, you can see the development of the mentality that's taking place.

RC: You're talking about the psychological thinking.

AD: Yeah, reflective thinking.

S: Is that the process (that we had)?

S (possibly same S as above): At least we had it.

S (very faint): [three/few words inaudible]

S: Is it-- are we continuing from that place or in a sense are we still talking about thinking?

RC: Yeah. Yeah we're going to try to read the rest of the ones that we would all [couple words inaudible] then trying to understand the intellect as [three/few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): And we just-- we just had a good start.

S (very faint, possibly part of background): [couple/three words inaudible]

S (very faint): That's right. What--

S: (Yeah), then you too.

RC (simultaneously): I guess I think then maybe you would put it on that level now. (AD laughs a bit)

AD: I know, that's why I tell you, people became very profound. (laughter)

S: [few words inaudible]

RC (simultaneously): Yeah. If you do put it on that level to begin with, we started with a quote where he says that-- Remember that quote where he sets his whole thing up, that it wasn't merely an intellectual function but-- [students assent, very faint] [short pause] (This) again.

RC/S(?): Go ahead.

"FACT-FED THINKING—HARD, DEEP, RATIONAL, AND THOROUGH—IS WHAT CONVERTS VAGUE SURMISE INTO UNBREAKABLE CERTAINTY"

PB [V5, 7:2.1, TS reading]: "The cultivation of intelligence is one of the supreme duties of man. Fact-fed thinking--hard, deep, rational, and thorough--is what converts vague surmise into unbreakable certainty, blind belief or tormenting doubt into irrefutable knowledge, and native error into new truth."

[11½ second pause]

TS: Second one.

PB [V5, 7:1.126, TS reading]: "When you are going through the intellectual analysis you must think as sharply as possible. You have to hack your way through these woods by the sharpness of your thinking. This is where the clarity of thoughts and their formulation into exact phraseology is so necessary. You must not be vague and hazy about ideas; you must penetrate them with clear understanding. It is only later when you have reached the meditation stage that this activity is put into abeyance, because then the effort is to still thought."

[9½ second pause]

S: In the discussion what-- what [few words inaudible] Describe the--

S (faint): Conviction?

S: [couple/three words inaudible]

TS: Fact-fed thinking. Well he said that--

PB [V5, 7:2.1, TS reading]: "Fact-fed thinking--[hard], deep, rational, and thorough--is what converts vague surmise into unbreakable certainty..."

PD/S(?): (Seems that your own positive--)

TS (very faint): Seems unbreakable first of all.

S: Yeah but he pretty much [couple/few words inaudible]

TS: Let's (read) [one/two words inaudible] (some laughter)

PB [V5, 7:7.39, RC reading]: "But if it is only ordinary metaphysics, then it cannot bring the student to such an experience, although it can give him [RC adds: a] good intellectual exercise and logical discipline if he wants these things. Ordinary metaphysical thinking is a kind of mental groping about in the dark, whereas that used in [RC adds: the] metaphysics of truth is like walking along a well-made road direct to a goal. This is so because the system itself is built up after and upon the mystic experience. Metaphysical self-debate for merely logical purposes is not meant here."

[15¼ second pause]

JL: That's great 'cause one he says mystical experience is a prerequisite for metaphysics and in the other one he says that fact is a prerequisite first.

RC: Yeah. [few words inaudible]

S (very faint): In that example, that's a general statement.

JL: Well, my understanding of fact has [few words inaudible]

RC: Then that would be an interesting point to prove. I find it very inferior to what people think is fact, you know like I've been--

S: Yeah.

RC/S(?): [couple words inaudible]

S (simultaneously): Johnny, what was the question?

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

JL: Hm?

S: What was the question?

RC: Wasn't there a disagreement, a kind of disagreement about it?

JL: Well if-- on the one hand he says that metaphysics, true metaphysics presupposes mystical experience. And the-- and the expression that Tim read said that. Certainly with certain people who come from knowledge let's say [couple words inaudible]

S: Because that's true.

S (faint): [three/few words inaudible]

PD (simultaneously): What he calls the true metaphysics though is the-- for him teaching the hidden wisdom that he's expounding, I think, (where) this system of metaphysics is to be employed and I think is based on his insight, on direct immediate insight, and then formulated and re-- you know, and put forth.

JL: I (can) look at it.

PD: Pardon?

TS: There's one here that [couple words inaudible]

AD: You must try to stick to one at a time, I got a very tiny brain and it gets so tired and so quickly.

S: Yeah.

S: Yeah.

AD: But you know do one-- do one at a time.

TS: Which one?

HS: Go back to the fact one?

AD: I happen to share in PB's way of looking at things, one thought at a time is plenty.

[short pause]

AH: I would like to comment on Johnny's question.

S: What else do you want?

AD (simultaneously): But I first want to hear on what!

S: One quote.

S (simultaneously): [one/two words inaudible]

AH: On the regards [S simultaneously: Yeah.] to the two quotes, one dealing with facts (bit of laughter) and certainty and another one dealing with the (metaphysics) of truth.

AD (simultaneously): Let's-- let's hear it and then we'll have Johnny do the question and then your response.

AH: Alright.

AD: Let's hear the-- let's hear the quote. I'm going to buy a parrot. (bit of laughter)

S (very faint): You got a parrot--Avery.

S: You got a (present). (laughter, student words)

S (amidst laughter): Yeah right. Avery, right.

AD: (Yeah/Here).

S: Yeah.

S: Avery (just--) (bit more laughter)

AD: Tim, let's have it, huh?

PB [V5, 7:2.1, TS reading]: "The cultivation of intelligence..."

AD: Nice and clear and loud!

LDS: I can't hear you.

TS: I'm not reading. (laughter)

A LESSON FROM THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION: RECOGNIZE FACTS FOR WHAT THEY ARE

PB [V5, 7:2.1, TS reading]: "The cultivation of intelligence is one of the supreme duties of man. Fact-fed thinking--hard, deep, rational, and thorough--is what converts vague surmise into unbreakable certainty, blind belief or tormenting doubt into irrefutable knowledge, and native error into new truth."

[9½ second pause]

AD: End of quote?

TS: Yep.

AD: Well-- John?

JL: What does he mean by fact?

AD: What do you mean by fact?

JL: I'm not sure.

AD: I'm quite sure you both mean the same thing. The world is round, that's a fact. Or pear-shaped. (laughter, student words)

S: Did he mean-- do you mean some--

AD: That the Sun does not rise. It did at one time. (laughter) But now we have factual information that it does not rise. (RG laughs)

RC: But that it appears to rise.

AD: That it *appears* to rise. You take an error and convert it and straighten it out, alright. Now how about this for a fact: there is no such thing as a fact except relationship.

JL: Well that's [couple/three words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): That's a fact too, right?

JL: Yeah, that's the problem, that it-- [S, very faint: Yeah.] it merges from a concrete into the abstract and (rarely) can classify the abstract process.

AD: There's no-- there's no disagreement there. You can only come to the notion that a fact is a web of relationships after you've accumulated a sufficient number of these facts. And they have to be rock-like in-- they can't be destroyed. You can only base your thinking on that if you are to arrive at any certainty.

HS: Could you throw out a couple of those facts, you know, that--

AD: Two plus two is four!

HS: That's a fact. Ok. And that's a-- and that's the beginning--

AD (intensely): Mt. Himalaya is 29, 872 feet high, [HS: Right.] from sea level.

HS: That's a fact.

AD (intensely): These are facts, aren't they?

HS: Right.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S: Very good. (bit of laughter)

AD (intensely): You're five eight, and a half.

HS: That's a--

AD: That's a fact. (laughter) You got two eyes, a nose, and a mouth. [HS simultaneously: Those are facts.] Those are facts, right?

HS: Go on. (laughter)

AD (amidst laughter): Why don't you-- why don't you buy yourself a world almanac! (laughter, student words)

HS: Like (what's) the almanac, I have to read it just as much as--

S: Just-- just look.

HS: Those are facts. Are you talking--

AD (simultaneously): Those are facts, yeah.

HS: Are you talking about-- now you talk about the use of the word 'intelligence' was used and what was the other word there?

LR: Supreme duty.

HS: The supreme duty. Now, those are the kind [few inaudible LR words simultaneous with HS] of facts that I need?

S: I think you could go.

AD: You don't need them?

HS: Ok, [S: Yes.] ok.

AD: Do you want to-- you want to remain a medieval monk?

HS: Who me? Was I ever? (laughter)

AD: Well don't you understand the whole point he's bringing out-- he's bringing out is the scientific revolution. Recognize facts for what they are!

HS: So facts for what they are would be the [one word inaudible] of one reason-- do there-- you have to apply your intelligence to the net, to the-- and web of interrelationships to find it. That would be what you-- what you're calling a fact.

AD: Uh-hm.

HS: On the other hand--

AD (simultaneously): In other words, in other words, if I perform an experiment, and I come up with certain conclusions, this experiment could be performed any part of the world by anybody else who will come up with the same conclusion. That's a fact!

HS: Now, in the context, would fact take, you would say, like personal and mental experiments, like what we call yogic things, are those facts too?

AD: Yes, they would be facts.

HS: They would be facts too.

AD: Everyone who has introverted his consciousness, his-- his thinking sufficiently intensely has become aware of the fact that he can exist without the body, that's a fact. [short pause] [students assent, very faint] The scientists have been publishing and building up so many facts in the past two hundred years they call it a popula-- a knowledge explosion.

S: Information.

S: Info--

AD: Information explosion.

S (simultaneously): [one/two words inaudible]

JL: Anthony, there's a problem with the-- that whole thing though. I mean many people accept what they call facts in a conventional sense, you know. I mean things are facts to them conventionally because everyone else believes it but doesn't necessarily mean that's the-- that's the truth about the thing. It doesn't necessarily--

AD (simultaneously): That wouldn't be a fact, would it?

JL: Huh?

AD: That wouldn't be a fact.

JL: Well, that--

AD (simultaneously): Like brain-- like the brain is consciousness, that's not a *fact*. That's a *hypothesis*.

S: Uh-hm.

JL: Alright then-- then you're really getting into interpretation and-- and the reality of a thing.

AD: Well how could I get into an interpretation? Either by my own experience or by the experience of others they have sh-- they have come to conclusion and the realization that mind is distinct from the brain. If I-- if I survey the knowledge, the field of knowledge, I will come across that fact, which has been stated over and over again in various civilizations and traditions and in-- in different languages. This is a *fact*, this is one of the facts that comes from human experience. So, if I was a scientist in the true sense of the word, I wouldn't base myself on just what a *little part* of the human population has discovered, and *claims* to have discovered, that the brain is mind. That wouldn't be a fact.

PD: But you want to just exclude the other half of the statement there where they research into a thought and [one word inaudible] deep about it to it-- to its conclusion. They take it as-- they take a fact as a thing or reality in itself and stop there.

JL: That's my impression.

S: Yeah but that (isn't so).

JL (simultaneously): Yeah, the fact-- the fact itself will not provide the certainty, the-- It's the process of relating it to full manifold that--

AD: Of other facts.

S: Yeah.

AD: Yeah.

AB: Of course it's fact-fed thinking. It doesn't say just *accumulation* of facts converts surmise into certainty, it's fact-fed thinking, so--

S: Also, yeah.

S (simultaneously): Yeah, thinking.

AB: Like you have to use those facts to think about it.

S: He's talking about this cultivation of intelligence in this quote that's here. If he's using 'intelligence' here the way it's used in [one/two words inaudible] he's talking about a-- a blending of reason and intuition *to* the facts to come about-- you know, you still haven't even applied the facts. So it's not the same old you just take facts and use them and just say you get them but to-- to integrate them and use the reason.

S (very faint): Yeah.

[34½ second pause]

S: Randy, read another one.

THE METAPHYSICS OF TRUTH IS BASED ON THE VERY NATURE OF THE THINKING PRINCIPLE ITSELF AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THAT PRINCIPLE

PB [*Persp.*, Ch. 7 #32, RC reading]: "Most systems of metaphysics being really systems of *speculation*, often involving much logical hair-splitting, it must be reiterated that the system of "metaphysics of truth" [alone] seeks to direct the movement of thinking along the lines which it *must* take [RC: "Must" underlined. "...which it must take] if it is to attain truth and not, like most other systems, along the lines which it wishes to take. The truth of a metaphysical system must be guaranteed by the mystic experience out of which it is born. No other assurance can offer the same certitude and the same satisfaction in the end. Whereas every man may hold whatever metaphysical opinion pleases him, this alone holds him to face up to the inescapable necessities imposed by the severe facts brought to light by the highest mystic experience. This alone is impersonally constructed in conformity with the *hidden* pattern of life, whereas speculative metaphysics is constructed in conformity with the limited experience and personal bias of its builders. It may tersely be said that metaphysics is based on logic whereas the "metaphysics of truth" is based on life."

S: Do you think the mystical experience we were talking about is that you're looking, would that-- You know how we define--

S (simultaneously): No.

S: No.

PD: It seems to me that would be insight that is [one word inaudible] I don't see how you could say anything else. This is-- is knowledge of truth.

S (very faint): Right.

S: What?

S: Yeah.

S: He's not talking about a lower kind of [S: (No.)] (spiritual--)

[short pause]

S (very faint): [few words inaudible]

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S (very faint): Ok.

S (very faint): I think it's better to read it.

[students assent, very faint]

S: We can't hear anything (back/right) here. Linda, got to be loud.

S: Well, I thought-- well didn't you mention about like a moment of opening to a--

(Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1983 1102a Ends; Side 2 Begins)

AB: Yeah it was that the light coming into the mind but what it lights up are these etchings in the cave of your mind and that's what he's talked about as-- So intuition wouldn't necessarily exclude it.

S (faint): Can you read the quote again?

PB [*Persp.*, Ch. 7 #32, RC rereading]: "Most systems of metaphysics being really systems of *speculation*, often involving much logical hair-splitting, it must be reiterated that the system of "metaphysics of truth" alone seeks to direct the movement of thinking along the lines which it *must* take if it is to attain truth and not, like most other systems, along the lines which it wishes to take. The truth of a metaphysical system must be guaranteed by the mystic experience out of which it is born. No other assurance can offer the same certitude and the same satisfaction in the end. Whereas every man may hold whatever metaphysical opinion pleases him, this alone holds him to face up to the inescapable necessities imposed by the severe facts brought to light by the highest mystic experience. This alone is impersonally constructed in conformity with the *hidden* pattern of life, whereas speculative metaphysics is constructed in conformity with the limited experience and personal bias of its builders. It may tersely be said that metaphysics is based on logic whereas the "metaphysics of truth" is based on life."

S (very faint): Repeat that again.

S (very faint): [one/two words inaudible] (some laughter)

S (very faint): [few words inaudible]

PB [*Persp.*, Ch. 7 #32, RC reading]: "It may tersely be said that metaphysics is based on logic whereas the "metaphysics of truth" is based on life."

PB [*Persp.*, Ch. 7 #32, RC reading]: "This alone is impersonally constructed in conformity with the *hidden* pattern of life, whereas speculative metaphysics is constructed in conformity with the limited experience and personal bias of its builders."

[short pause]

S: Well so certainly (we are/when you're) working off concepts involved in that system of metaphysics would have to be brought about and followed through [couple words inaudible] would have to be understood by insight as well. Ultimately that habits were-- what I was thinking before is that clearly the

breaking down of misconceptions through intuitions along the way (is/if) you don't really get to that state (of--) [student assents] And then we become [one word inaudible]

S: That's true.

S: It's because don't we think of insight as (like) the ultimate [couple words inaudible]

AS: There were three different insights, the three insights.

S: Yeah.

S (very faint): Yeah.

[short pause]

AH: I would like to ask, in regards to metaphysical facts you have to [one word inaudible] them. Like take one for instance, the thought that I say is true as metaphysical fact(s).

RC: Right, now the person that could recognize that as a fact would have to be residing [one word inaudible] know what he meant by thought.

S (very faint): You just said that.

AH: Say that again Randy?

RC: The person who knew that was a fact would have to be residing somewhere from which he could make the observation that what he meant by thought couldn't come [one/two words inaudible]

AH: I thought that the person who would accept that metaphysical fact would [few words inaudible] but then fact-fed thinking [few words inaudible] through logic.

RC: I think that would be the one based on logic.

AH: Well, are metaphysical facts dealt with differently than facts about mountains and trees and--

PD: Well that's-- see I don't know how you can call that a fact, Andrew, because by that statement you've implied a meaning to thought which implies a meaning to reality when you said they're distinct.

AH: I'm sorry Paul, you--

PD: By your statement that thought cannot comprehend reality, you've implied a distinct meaning to thought as being other than reality. And now you-- and then you're saying that that's a fact. And that's a fact only from within the system of metaphysics *you're* operating from.

AH: No I was-- I was pursuing the hope of this man when he describes a metaphysics of truth and that (reveals) itself through--

S: Right (again) through--

PD: Yeah but still, I mean in terms of-- you can't-- how could you call that a statement of fact is what I'm trying to say.

AH: One thing Alan might think right now. [S: Uh-hm.] Let's not take [couple/three words inaudible]

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S: Can you think of another one?

HS: Let's take a-- let's take a [one word inaudible] let's say if the world is real and-- and in the real there's a possibility for a metaphysics of truth. In other words you can-- you could actually see the reality and unfold the reality of the world. If I was to get my-- (the) attentive-- You see, I-- I'm trying to get after the word meta-- metaphysics of truth rather than speculative metaphysics. And then the facts indicate let's say that the world really is real and you have like a metaphysics based on the reality of the world, and I think that's a fact that can be [one word inaudible]

PD: Or there might be some cause by which you can pursue into the ultimate nature of the world and experience.

HS: But I think the quote just pointed out in the last couple of lines there he's talking through life, you know, through life and (experience).

AH: Isn't it-- isn't it also the case like metaphysical fact isn't afraid to empower experience?

RC: No, it seems it's one of the metaphysical facts.

S: Let's go.

S (very faint): Herbert, you thought about [one/two words inaudible] huh?

HS: Not that I [one/two words inaudible] (laughter) But can-- can still we say we get a metaphysics of truth and a speculative kind of metaphysics?

AH: Well that's a matter-- that's a matter of purpose and commitment and belief.

HS: Ok, in our case, but I think in PB it was pointing out that it's not really that, that-- that there really is a metaphysics of truth.

AH: Well I think [possibly one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): What would it be based on, Herbie?

HS: I would say it would be based on a close reasoning upon the object, i.e. the-- the real world [one/two words inaudible]

AD: You think that [S simultaneously: No.] would give you a metaphysics of truth?

HS: I would say a close reasoning and its unfoldment in language would, yes.

S: Yeah.

S: Uh-hm.

S: What about--

HS: And concept.

S: How would you know that's truth?

HS: How am *I* going to know?

S: Yeah.

HS: Well--

S: But how do you know your reasoning is truth?

HS: Well I think that he points out it's verified by mystical experience.

S: Well that's a different thing though.

HS: I don't-- *what's* a different--

S: Well, you just said that the metaphysics of truth was by reasoning upon--

HS: Close reasoning upon the object of vision.

S: Objective vision.

HS: Object of vision.

S: Vision. And if the object of vision-- what is the object of vision?

HS: Continuous--

AD: Tentative.

S: What do you mean (I don't talk)? (some laughter)

AD (amidst laughter): (I said) tentative.

HS: Anything that's real, if it's the metaphysics of truth.

AD: Now why do you object to that? Go ahead.

S: Because-- well--

AD: How about when you're sleeping?

S: Wait, what does sleeping have to do?

S: Yeah.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

PD: You mean--

S: What if [couple words inaudible]

PD (simultaneously): But that's a fact that has to be replicated.

AD (simultaneously): You would be able to reason closely about your object?

S (very faint): No.

S (very faint): No.

S (very faint): No.

AD: Well then it doesn't hold.

S: What is that?

AD: Yeah.

RG: Repeat that Anthony?

AD: When you're sleeping, [RG: Yeah.] you're not reasoning obviously.

RG: Yeah.

AD: Does the truth hold?

RG: I hope so.

RG: But, I just don't know what you mean.

LR (simultaneously): But no one's saying the truth [S simultaneously: PB said it's a--] is based on your thinking about it.

RG: Yeah, right, if it's truth it *isn't* based, I mean--

LR (simultaneously): Nobody's saying that, nobody's saying that truth depends on your thinking about it.

PD/S(?): [couple words inaudible] the objective.

S: (What?)

LR (simultaneously): Herbert, were you saying that truth was based on *your* thinking about it?

HS: *My* thinking? No, I would never say that. (laughter) A close reasoning (on) the reality of the world in this discussion.

AD: You're going to prove the reality of the world by a very close reasoning on the object. And I says how about when you're sleeping.

S: Well then-- then you're not engaged in that process.

AD: But then what happened to the truth Dave?

RG: If it's true it is-- it *is* [one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): It stopped being true then.

S: Not to me.

RG: If it's true it's still independent of your thinking.

S (very faint): Well [couple/three words inaudible]

RG: Herbie wouldn't deny that. By saying that the world is real [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with RG] it would allow that. (laughter) Well he's allowing that reason to try-- to try to get to what's true, not that his reasoning *is* what was true.

LDS: I thought Herbie [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): No, no, now-- now let's [RG simultaneously: Ok.] get this straight, [S simultaneously, faint: No.] Herbie said that truth is this close reasoning on the object of vision.

RG: Well, I thought he meant to say that the object of vision--

AD: Well-- I'm not interested in what you *thought* he meant to say. I'm interested in what he *said*.

RG: Herbie would you repeat everything?

S: There you go. (laughter)

HS: What? In relation to what?

RG: What is truth.

HS (simultaneously): Seems to be that the import of the quote would have to do with the distinction between what's the metaphysics of truth.

AD: Yeah.

HS: I offer as a tentative definition of the metaphysics of truth a close reasoning upon the object of vision. The object of vision in this discussion will be the real nature of the world. The metaphysics is fulfilled by its expression in the-- in concepts and language which does not in any way (try) the metaphysical [couple words inaudible]

AD: And I said when you're sleeping, you're not thinking, you're not reasoning, what happened to your truth.

HS: When I'm sleeping and I'm not thinking or reasoning, there's nothing happened to my truth. (bit of laughter)

PD: What has-- what has lapsed has been the metaphysics.

RG: Right, that's true.

LR (simultaneously): (Now tie that/Not talking) to metaphysics.

AD: What's the difference?

PD: Truth is the immediate knowledge, metaphysics is the exposition through reason of that immediate insight.

AD: Well then would that be a metaphysics of truth you're speaking of?

PD: As a system of metaphysics that would be-- yes. A system of metaphysics was the exposition through reasoning otherwise--

S (very faint): [couple words inaudible] known [one/two words inaudible] regardless.

HS: No you would know the object of truth in various ways that one knows the object of truth. Someone point out that it's important to know what truth is.

S: But the metaphysics of truth would then be [couple/three words inaudible]

HS: Well [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): No, the point here is that it's only applicable to one state of consciousness and not to any others.

HS: You mean waking, conceptual.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah! And you're basing the metaphysics of truth on partial data.

HS: Well I didn't-- The formulation in concepts I would suspect one would hope takes place in the waking consciousness.

AD (simultaneously): What kind of truth is that!? Would that make you happy?

HS: Refer to it?

AD: Yeah.

HS: No.

AD: What kind of truth is it? (laughter)

S: [couple words inaudible]

S: [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): So suppose I tell you "Mind is ultimate, that's the truth."

HS: That's a metaphysical truth, say. Ok.

S (simultaneously): (Oh/Good). (bit of laughter)

PD: Total formulation of immediate-- of an immediate experience.

HS: Yet it's communicated through the words.

AD (simultaneously): Will that be a metaphysics of truth?

HS: Would that be a metaphysics of truth? Well if you want to hold that the metaphysics of truth is the very life of soul unfolded I don't-- there-- there's not much to talk about there.

AD: No, there is something to talk about Herbie, the point here is to recognize the distinction that the metaphysics of truth would make in this kind of a situation and you'd have to point out that the state-- the concept "Mind is ultimate", alright, is not metaphysics of truth unless you bring out that that has to be experienced in the consciousness and not as a concept.

HS: Yeah, ok I see that-- I see that now. Ok. But a meta-- it's always-- the metaphysics of truth to be true has to be born out of experience.

AD: Yes, out of life itself. You're not going to get it out of thinking.

HS: I did not think that I was saying that but I agree with that statement.

AD: Well that's what I thought you were saying when you were speaking about a close reasoning upon the object of vision, alright, and even assuming, even assuming(,) giving you this-- the-- the-- let's say that the object that you're referring to is Mind itself. That still would not give you the experience of truth or the metaphysics of truth. [HS: Because they--] It will only give you-- it will only give you the conceptual system. [LR: Can I--] [one/two inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] This is not something that comes or is born out of life itself.

HS: The conceptual-- a true conceptual system does not-- does not arise out of-- you're saying does not arise out of life itself.

AD: No. PB points out that a realization of that truth arises out of life.

HS: Ok but the realization so to say of the realization had to do-- you have to have an insight into the life as it's unfolded, right? In that sense you're seeing the life, so to say.

AD: Well you will see [one word inaudible] yeah.

HS: You live it.

AD: You live it, yeah.

HS: Would you-- would you take that to be (the phrase) insight that way, I mean--

AD: Yes, I'd accepted that.

HS: And that's the source then of knowledge of metaphysical truth.

AD: Yeah.

HS: In fact.

S: Uh-hm.

RG: And what causes-- what's the import of the word 'metaphysical' there? What does the metaphysics mean [three/few words inaudible]

AD: Well he does make two very distinct classes, alright, [S: Yeah.] a metaphysics which was based on logic and a metaphysics which is based on truth. [LR: Right.] Now the metaphysics that is based on logic you're acquainted with, whether it's a system by Hobbs or Berkeley or whoever you choose, alright. That's a system that's based on logic. Basically, more or less, comes down to what you *think*. [student assents, faint] Metaphysics of truth would have to be based on the very nature of the thinking principle itself and the experience of that thinking principle so that you can say "My system of metaphysics is grounded on truth and *not* on what I think." [student assents, faint] So, (did you get) [one/two words inaudible]

RG: And that metaphysics then would be the unfoldment through thinking of that entity.

THERE ARE LIMITATIONS TO THE THINKING THAT THE THINKING ITSELF CANNOT TRANSCEND

AD: Yes. Or we could say that the thinking would have to very closely try to correlate or find a proper expression of that truth. But it cannot give you that truth.

S: Yeah.

WY: So metaphysical fact would be based upon experience of life (of) soul.

AD (simultaneously): I don't know what they mean by metaphysical facts.

WY: Ok, for instance, the one that Andrew read [three words inaudible] necessary to declare Mind is the ultimate Mind, you can't think of its existence because you're not [one word inaudible] You know that's a metaphysical fact but it's not a fact for--

AD: I'm sorry, I'm sorry Bill, try again.

WY: Ok. Thought cannot know the thought of Mind would be a metaphysical fact. But it's not a fact for me because Randy yesterday said it was a-- it's not a fact for me really because until I experience Being and from Being I then have that ultimate perspective of the limitation of thought and see that (we/I) can't-- (we/I) should *never*, you know-- [AD simultaneously: Yeah. Uh-hm.] which I can do-- when I have, you know-- if I have that [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): From the perspective of Being, alright, you can see that all statements made about it are outside.

WY: Yeah. So a metaphysical fact is not merely a statement that someone made to acknowledge the truth but it's something that they had to acknowledge from their own experience.

AD: Yeah. Again the last sentence.

WY: I-- I would say that a fact isn't a fact, a metaphysical fact is not a fact to a person until it's something that they can see the truth of from their own experience and not just accepting it because it just sounds very (truthful).

[short pause]

AH: Bill, are you asking for the fact to have a criteria of truth?

WY: Yes.

AH: Truth outside of the perceptual process that yields it say?

WY: Yes. It has to do with the criterion of metaphysical fact wherein that person has to be based on the experience of that and not just being able to articulate it [couple words inaudible] (it's been confirmed last week).

AB: From this quote (if it's) a verification based on there's some kind of mystical experience.

WY: Yeah.

AB: That's probably what you said.

AH: Well, the process is through like thinking about like a metaphysics of truth.

AD/S(?): Uh-hm.

AH: So-- And we deal with those facts and accept as true until you experience that-- that wall of reality that--

S: Yeah.

AH: Take the fact at its own level, you don't have to have a mystical experience to posit thought's limitation.

[short pause]

JB: Well, it's why you should posit it but you can't tell us.

S: Right, you can't.

RC (simultaneously): But without the experience you wouldn't be doing that as much as self-adulation and [one word inaudible] It doesn't--

AH: Yeah but nobody-- thought doesn't believe in any of it from the point of view of the *truth* of it.

S (very faint): Yeah.

S: Right.

RC: Yeah the context is-- is important if it would suppose I don't have to. But over and over again [few words inaudible] Sunday night, he makes the point that for all the things he said about mysticism that are [one word inaudible] mysticism is a higher path than any kind of separative metaphysics (is). And this metaphysics of truth is coming out of the-- is a reflection or an expression in the (reading) of the experiences that the person has had, and there's a level of experiences which are beyond ordinary intellectual and verbal sort of thinking.

AH: Yes Randy, that's the expression, the point of view that would say (if) you had a mystical insight and you decided [couple/few words inaudible] you were going to talk about it. But, from *our* point of view where we approach that system, if you-- let's say you take the facts and if you meant it and you make thinking follow this very particular [couple/three words inaudible] that can lead to truth via the experience, let's say, being (prescribed/described). Because your faith-- because your faith bases its system on a certitude of an insight, can the truth be expressive through that a priori [JB: I don't know.] in the model?

RC: No I wouldn't-- I don't-- I don't think so. I mean, that would be too hard to deal with met--

AD (simultaneously): A good student can.

AH: You have to deal with metaphysical facts in the same way you deal with the facts about the--

AD (simultaneously): No, a good student could recognize that there's limitations to the thinking that the thinking itself cannot transcend. And one reading of Kant's *Critique* will prove that to you.

RC: Well the question that I think Andrew would ask would be, could the student recognize that without having at least one--

AD: I just said, yes. Go through the *Critique* and you'll be convinced that you can't get out of the vicious circle of thinking to get to reality itself. That's exactly the task, for instance, Kant sets himself.

S (very faint): Ok.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

RC: Well maybe it was belief. And you think Kant arrived at that from thinking or do you think thinking was the result of this--

AD: No, I think he arrived at that through thinking because from what I know of Kant, he had never had a mystical experience.

RC: What do you think would (help make the) distinction?

AD: He worked it out in his *Critique* and I suggest that you read it. (some laughter)

RC (amidst laughter): But I mean, what would--

S (amidst laughter): Yeah you should Randy.

S: Yeah.

AD: In the-- in the discussions that were going on in his time where they were speaking a great deal about Being per se, alright, he realized that that couldn't be, that there couldn't be a discussion of what's beyond sense-perception or human thinking and he went about trying to understand why that was so and he worked it out in his *Critique*.

HS: But you said it was a task he set for himself. Isn't that sort of a-- everybody's task is to get to where thinking gets you to or can get you to or can get the reason-- no, in a real eternal way, can't-- isn't everyone's task to try and think their way towards reality [few words inaudible] Or is it that there's special (chemistry)?

AD: I don't know that anyone would have to go that way. Some people are more fortunate than others, they don't have to put themselves through that-- through that grueling discipline.

RC: But unfortunately, I mean, wouldn't you admit it, I mean isn't there something at some point along the way they put [couple words inaudible] with that (discipline)?

S (very faint): Right, (right).

S: (Uh-uh.)

S: That's real--

AD (simultaneously): Well, I can't get into a discussion of his karma, Randy, all I can say is that everything that I know about Kant, and some of the other thinkers, forced them to the conclusion that we're stuck. We're inside the Dragon and we can't know what's outside the Dragon. Now I know that there are many people, and Hegel and Fichte point-- pointed out that Kant refused to deal with the intelligible aspect of the world. But Kant was too honest. He couldn't claim to have any knowledge of what is outside thinking because he never had any experience *of* that.

RG: And if-- if he had had one experience of it he never would have come to the conclusion that it-- that reality is unexperienceable, which was his conclusion.

RC: Yeah but what do you think he meant by the moral (ground) [one/two words inaudible]

RG: (Came/He) close to it from the idea of action, not from the idea of any internal mystical experience.

ME (very faint): Right. But that's--

RC: What window--

S (very faint): We already [couple words inaudible]

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

PD: No, this is very complicated and you really can't decide it in five minutes what he's talking about.

S: Yeah.

S (very faint): He establishes [possibly one word inaudible]

RC (very faint): It's not in terms of (knowledge/knowing).

S (very faint): That's right.

PD: I've spent six months on the *Critique* and there's-- I-- many passages still (are) [one word inaudible]

RC (simultaneously): Ok, well maybe this quote will actually help to bring some more out of the second one.

THE WHOLE OF THE SOUL MUST REALIZE THE DOCTRINE OF NONDUALITY, NOT JUST A PART, WHETHER THAT PART IS THE RATIONALITY, THE WILL, THE AESTHETIC, OR ORGANIC SENSATIONS

PB [V5, 7:1.168 & *Persp.*, Ch. 7 #36, RC reading]: "The conclusions to which reason comes can only have obligatory force upon the reason itself, not necessarily upon the whole integral being of man. We are finally to decide the problems of life by the integration of [all] our human nature and not merely by the judgement of a particular part of it. To make life a matter only of rational concepts about it is to reduce it, is to make a cold abstraction from it, and thus to fall into the fallacy of taking the part for the whole. Metaphysical concepts may fully satisfy the demands of reason but this does not mean that they will therefore satisfy the demands of the totality of our being. They satisfy reason because they are the products of reason itself. But man is more than a reasoning being. His integral structure demands the feeling and the fact as well as the thought. Hence it demands the experience of nonduality as well as the

concept of it, [RC rereads: Hence it demands the *experience* of nonduality as well as the concept of it] the feeling as well as the idea of it. So long as he knows [it] only with a limited part of his being, only as empty of emotional content and divorced from physical experience, so long will it remain incompletely known, half-seized as it were. It is at this crucial point that the seeker must realize the limitations of metaphysics and be ready to put aside as having fulfilled its particular purpose that which he has hitherto valued as a truth-path.”

S: (Yeah.)

S (very faint): Yeah.

S: (Yeah), would you repeat the first sentence again?

RC: First one.

S: I wouldn't mind hearing the whole thing [one/two words inaudible] (bit of laughter)

AD: Hey, what a para.

PB [V5, 7:1.168 & *Persp.*, Ch. 7 #36, RC rereading]: “The conclusions to which reason comes can only have obligatory force upon the reason itself, not necessarily upon the whole integral being of man. We are finally to decide the problems of life by the integration of all our human nature and not merely by the judgement of a particular part of it. To make life a matter only of rational concepts about it is to reduce it, is to make a cold abstraction from it, and thus to fall into the fallacy of taking the part for the whole. Metaphysical concepts may fully satisfy the demands of reason but this does not mean that they will therefore satisfy the demands of the totality of our being. They satisfy reason because they are the products of reason itself. But man is more than a reasoning being. His integral structure demands the feeling and the fact as well as the thought. Hence it demands the experience of nonduality as well as the concept of it, the feeling as well as the idea of it. So long as he knows [it] only with a limited part of his being, only as empty of emotional content and divorced from physical experience, so long will it remain incompletely known, half-seized as it were. It is at this crucial point that the seeker must realize the limitations of metaphysics and be ready to put aside as having fulfilled its particular purpose that which he has hitherto valued as a truth-path.”

[short pause]

S: (Go to/Good) reason?

S: Yeah.

DB: Can I--

RC: Sure, I mean--

DB (very faint): There was one particular phrase in there that [few words inaudible] Is-- is that (forbidden)?

S (very faint): Sure.

S (very faint): Yeah.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S (very faint): Yeah.

DB: (You're reduplicating them.) Does that mean that the order--

RC: (Did/'Cause) you get [one word inaudible]

DB: Right.

PB [V5, 7:1.168 & *Persp.*, Ch. 7 #36, RC reading]: "Hence it demands the experience of nonduality as well as the concept of it... [DB: Right.] So long as he knows it only [RC reads: he only knows it] with a limited part of his being, [only as] empty of emotional content and divorced from physical experience, so long will it [RC: Again, nonduality.] remain incompletely known, half-seized as it were."

RC: He would say that what you really like about [few words inaudible] formulated the doctrine of nonduality [couple words inaudible] who had immediately formulated it in--

AD: But why not say it this way? Formulate the doctrine of nonduality for the soul, for *all* the parts of the soul: for the organic sensation, for the intellect, alright, the aesthetic sense, and that-- and the moral sentiment. And that if you try to satisfy the doc-- if you try to satisfy yourself, the *whole* of the soul must be involved. If it's only a part of the soul it will *always* feel insufficient. Again, it's the whole of the soul that has to realize the doctrine of nonduality and not just any part of it, whether that part is the rational, or the will, or the aesthetic or the organic sensations.

S (very faint): Yeah, (uh-hm).

ME: [few words inaudible] not true. I mean you could say that reason can respond to (something) that brings out the awareness which let's say reform-- you can't demonstrate that as just like subjective experience.

AD: Well no, reason-- reason would be objective, it can be demonstrated.

ME: Right, right. But the other areas that we--

AD: The other area, if it's not felt, what value is it? You're not going to live it.

RC: I would say that within reason you have developed a system of logic but then if someone chooses to follow you at that level you have the [couple words inaudible] Whether or not these students follow you seems to be determined by what [couple words inaudible] (are/or) pure reflection even though his rational-- his reasoning might say yes, this is real to him [few words inaudible] But insofar as his thinking about it really convinces him, it has to be right, and it's got to be [few words inaudible] And I don't believe it if the reasoning is very (ugly). Because you're saying that it's a bigger part of the person that has to do or align itself with the reasoning of (true/truth) [one word inaudible]

ME: [few words inaudible] then for the metaphysics of truth. And there's a reason [couple/three words inaudible] besides the reason. So you're saying you have to have a leap of faith, is that required?

RC: Yeah, I think it's not a-- I don't think it's unusual to talk in terms of a leap of faith [couple/few words inaudible] *constantly* try to (accept). And the person just skips let's say from one presupposition to another.

PD: Oh I disagree, I don't think it's got anything to do with faith. It is the (huge) sensitivity *you* operate with will, by the extension of that sensitivity to other forms of life, to other people, to an openness that will take in others, I mean that's not a leap of faith, that's immediate experience.

RC: I would-- that's what I mean by faith. I don't mean like religious-- acceptance of some religious doctrine where you blindly follow (a Seer). I mean like when-- to quote Bhattacharyya would be fact according to belief. And (physics) and philosophy would get in touch with that part and I don't [three/few words inaudible] The fundamental thing is beyond what you would then rationally explicate to yourself and that's exactly that your own faith [couple/three words inaudible] The movement from presupposition to presupposition is to be primarily a movement of faith that leads to life.

PD: The other aspect of your being has nothing to do with presuppositions, that's a concept you're dealing with Randy, this is its own thing, the organic part of your being itself has to be reformulated. Your very diet!

RC: I don't think you do. [S, very faint: Right.] It's a part of your being that I think [couple words inaudible] But I think that if you don't talk about your being [one/two words inaudible] in person you define it more by the level of [couple words inaudible] you would have to (deal) with, in other words the animal life. He knows that he's operating and [few words inaudible] there's no kind of [one/two words inaudible] in terms of follow through.

S: Even what level of your being could go into your diet.

RC: Yeah, exactly. So do a good job. [few words inaudible] regardless of whether *you* buy it there's something that you have faith in in (the same/a certain) way [few words inaudible]

S: Uh-hm, um-- Maybe I don't understand what you mean by presupposition [few words inaudible] Was it thinking?

RC: Well I'm saying that (I've been so unclear). You have faith in the-- the factuality of the world. You take it that the world [one/two words inaudible] has always been there, never know if it hasn't been there. And I could take that as a fundamental article of faith. [few words inaudible] if reason could happen and for a moment the imagination gets (a chance). Memory, those images constantly appear, you might not [one/two words inaudible]

S: Well then what-- how do I know [few words inaudible]

S: Yeah but do those presuppositions [few words inaudible] in touch with reality.

RC: Ok, I would say that you (lose/use) [one word inaudible]

PD: But the [few words inaudible] the conceptual framework and you're not talking about the other parts of your being.

RC: I don't know why you say that.

PD: I don't think you--

RC (simultaneously): Because I would rather say it rather than [couple/three words inaudible]

PD (simultaneously): When you get struck by a beautiful piece of music that knocks you off your feet, if that doesn't produce a little wonder and awe in you-- in your heart, you don't-- can't talk of [one word inaudible] manipulating presuppositions of the music to get to the (feeling/view).

RC: Ok, that wonder and awe that you're talking about clearly [few words inaudible]

PD (simultaneously): Well, excuse me Randy, and by extending that, by extending that atmosphere [one word inaudible] the loving into the environment, into others, that's another part of your being that you're-- the conceptual mind can do nothing but (take) doubt.

S: Uh-hm.

RC: I don't (always agree) with that, I just [couple words inaudible] the mind can develop its own expression of it and what we're calling the metaphysics of truth. And we *can* come up with it and then formulate it on that-- that-- that basic experience you're talking about that does make those connections. You could say that it is reasonable [one/two words inaudible]

S (very faint): [couple words inaudible]

AH: It still seems to use the conceptual model of describing the other points of view. [short pause] Like it has to be-- because that's the one we have to work with, the-- the (imaginative) describes the parts of being other than the like [one word inaudible] with that model, that does seem to be pertinent [couple/three words inaudible]

THE METAPHYSICS OF TRUTH IS BASED ON THE COMPLETE FUNCTIONING OF ALL THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL

AD: Well let's stick with [one word inaudible] huh? Good, because I get confused. (bit of laughter) The metaphysics of truth is based on the functioning of the soul as a tota-- totality, which includes the eye of the Intellect, the highest part, all the way down to the lowest, the organic sensation. Now in order for the metaphysics of truth to be based on something that is true, you start with the highest or you start with the lowest, and you'll see that in order-- that the very nature of nonduality would require that the highest portion of the soul, the Intellect (of/in) your soul, knows of nonduality and it is lived all the way down at the level of the organic sensation. If any part of the soul's faculties are left out, the metaphysics of truth is warped.

S: Is what?

AD: Is warped. It's not complete. So you not only have to will-- Let me-- let me just do it this way. There's not only a question of intelligible and intellectual perception, but there are the organic sensations that you are perceiving that are tied in closely with that. They're not excluded in that intellectual perception. So that the soul, alright, if it realizes nonduality, does so right down to its fingertips, all the way up to the Intellect. That's what the metaphysics of truth is based on the complete functioning of all the faculties of the soul. Leave one out and to that extent it is incomplete. [short pause] So the-- the-- let's

say the Sage who has achieved nonduality, stage of nonduality, insofar that he cannot rationally communicate it to others and explain it to himself, to that extent the realization is incomplete. To the extent that he can, to that extent it is complete. Alright? Now, if you take the case of one man like Kant, alright, where he worked with the rational intellect, and came to a certain realization, that realization would be incomplete because he did not see it also let's say from a point of view *beyond* the Dragon where he can see the truth of what he was saying but he can only see the truth of what he was saying *within* that truth and not si-- not *outside* of it. So you could say well only that faculty of the soul completely understood. The higher part wasn't functioning; didn't come in. Well that's very straightforward and down to earth, right? [students assent, very faint] All the faculties of the soul, alright, will *expound* this doctrine if they know it. (bit of laughter)

S (amidst laughter): I mean [few words inaudible]

S: Uh-hm, yeah.

HS (simultaneously): Ok, now the context in the quote, [S: Kant.] we look at it--

AD (simultaneously): What the metaphysics of truth is based on.

HS: Right. And it would say that you could reason to a point when the reason is established-- the rea-- the reason do-- in PB's context, is reason establishing anywhere or just reason gets the [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Within the framework of reasoning, alright, it can establish itself.

HS: It can establish a formulation of the metaphysics of truth.

AD: Yeah. But only within the realm of reason.

HS: Yeah. To integrate it into the-- what is called the rest of the person it has to, I would say, feel it [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Then you would have to experience that truth. And the truth here would be that he would have to experience that the mind itself is what fundamentally formulates through an unconscious process the world that it perceives and then lives in. You have to go from the top to the bottom. You'd have to see the mind as it is in itself, alright, or [HS assents] soul as it is in itself. You'd have to see soul as functioning through reasoning bringing about the existence of the world in which-- which he inhabits and then which is reflected and the thinking that takes place is based on those reflected images. You'd have to go all the way down and all the way up. Would you say a man is enlightened if he didn't practice these moral-- the morality that this metaphysics of truth entails?

HS: No.

AD: Well--

[short pause]

**# A PHILOSOPHER HAS EXPERIENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRUTH,
WHEREAS A METAPHYSICIAN HAS ONLY A CONCEPTUAL GRASP OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF TRUTH**

TS (very faint): How-- how would it be a pure metaphysics of truth if you're knowing a full application of the faculties of the soul from its highest function to knowing of things, phenomena in terms of the mind.

AD: Yes?

TS (very faint): How is that-- how is that in PB's definition of philosophy to distinguish from his definition of the metaphysics of truth?

AD: Well that *is* the-- Tim, that *is* the philosophy of truth. [short pause] The metaphysics of truth-- in other words for him it's the philosophy of truth, for us it would be a metaphysics of truth. Try again.

LR: For him it would be the truth?

S (very faint): Yeah.

AD (simultaneously): For him it's the philosophy of truth. For us it's a metaphysics of truth. We can only grasp it conceptually. He has achieved it or any-- any such person has experienced the truth of what the metaphysics of truth is talking about. So for him it would be the philosophy of truth.

TS (very faint): So the metaphysics of truth would be a-- an affirmation by the reasoning mind of, well-- it's not--

AD: In his term, a philosopher is only one who has experienced this in his consciousness.

TS (very faint): I think (now--)

AD: A metaphysician has *not* experienced this in his consciousness.

[short pause]

TS (very faint): But you have-- you have a clear image of it in reasoning?

AD: Yeah.

LD: But also in that we spoke from-- the metaphysics we're speaking of there, isn't that what the metaphysics that's built up on a logical basis and not the metaphysics of truth, which would seem to be synonymous with that of a (philosopher/philosophy). Because it would seem like--

AD (simultaneously): It *is* synonymous with that of a philosophy. If you call it the metaphysics of truth it is [LD simultaneously: Oh.] synonymous [LD: Ok.] with the metaphysics of truth, [LD simultaneously: Ok.] I mean the philosophy of truth.

[short pause]

AH: Even if it hasn't been experienced?

AD: Yes. It's called the metaphysics of truth. [student assents, faint] Now, if he calls it the metaphysics-- if he calls it the philosophy--

[Audio File 1983 1102a Ends]

[Audio File 1983 1102b Begins]

AD: [Pat C. partial transcript includes: If you haven't experienced those other states of consciousness, like turiya and prajna, you're not a philosopher.] Make no *bones* about that. [students assent] [RC simultaneously: There seems to be--] You're a theoretician, you're still in the metaphysics of truth, not in the philosophy of truth.

S: Yeah but--

RC: There seems to be another [three/few words inaudible] [S: Yeah.] more of a dimension to it than this. This metaphysics of truth seems to be something that person who has *had* some mystical experience and applied to his understanding and his own experience realize that if his explanation doesn't accord with it, then his explanation doesn't accord with reason and maybe he could think more about the understanding he has of the experience of that. [students assent, very faint] In a sense that--

AD (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible] believe that.

RC: Yeah. The truth won't contradict reason and-- and he's-- he's [AD simultaneously: No.] not making statements that contradict reason, that he hasn't understood something about them.

[short pause]

LR: But can I just ask about the first sentence of this quote, that the conclusions to which reason comes can only have obligatory force on the reason?

AD: That's like for instance if you're proving a theorem in geometry and it has an obligatory force, you *must* go through to the conclusion. You *do not* have to say "This is beautiful, I love it."

S: Yeah.

LR: But I-- the way I've un--

AD: But if you have the experience of the higher, alright, you not only go through the reasoning but you also love it. [students assent, very faint] There has to be a welding together of all these different faculties of-- of the soul itself.

LR: But if I-- if I-- my understanding was that the reason-- to practice a path of reason was to actually *affect* things like the emotional life and other parts of your being. Otherwise, I don't think I'd be so interested in proving a theorem in geometry. I mean that wouldn't be totally satisfactory from--

AD: Well, yes, what you say is true but if you look around in the world of science, you would see that that's a pious hope.

S: Uh-hm. (bit of laughter)

LR: But I'm not interested-- I'm not a scientist. (laughter)

DB: Well, can't reason point out--

LR (simultaneously): I'm not talking about scientists, you know. I'm talking about what I'm doing here. And if I weren't convinced that there was some obligatory force released by the realization to which that reason comes, I don't think I'd be interested in the concept, in fact, I would try *not* to be interested in it.

AH: I thought the quote said reason's obligation is to reason. The obligatory force--

AD (simultaneously): Yes, but you'd like to have a little love for-- well, what do they say, beauty and goodness peppered in with that reason so that it'll carry some-- some conviction more than reason. And in-- in truth, I think that depends on the individual. Because for one scientist there may be a beauty, an elegance, a symmetry in the reasoning process which shows that he has an aesthetic sense developed. And another person may not see it.

LR: No Anthony, I'm not talking about the--

AD (simultaneously): But if you're aware, I mean if there's the other part of your soul, the aesthetic perception developed along with the reasoning ability, you *will* see something of beauty *in* that theorem.

LR: I'm not asking about the beauty or lack of beauty in the reasoning process itself. I'm talking about the power of reason to affect other parts of the being, [S: (Not) to these people.] such as the emotional part.

PD: That's more like [couple words inaudible] (laughter)

PC (faint): [couple/three words inaudible]

S (faint): [three words inaudible] (laughter)

PC: I don't think it would though.

S: What?

PC: I think-- no I think each one has to ha-- undergo its own particular kind of discipline. And then after you integrate it.

S: What?

LDS: What do they-- what do they mean by the rational life?

LR (simultaneously): Oh boy I'm getting a lot--

RC/PC(?): What?

LDS: What does it mean to live the rational life?

PC: Integrate the will (and the--)

LDS: And isn't it reason that points that out? Isn't it-- isn't it the reason--

PC (simultaneously): Points out to the reason but then the will has to go through its own process of developing itself that--

S (possibly part of background): What?

LDS: But, isn't there something unique about the power of reasoning, the human ability to reason, that in some way measures out or corrects other aspects of the being's functioning?

AB: Look at all these greedy people who are thinking.

PC (simultaneously): No I think corrects the reasoning [LR simultaneously: No I--] and that's presented to you.

LDS (simultaneously): I-- I'm not-- I wouldn't call those reasoning people.

RC (faint): What did you say [TS simultaneously, faint: Well--] Alan, I didn't--

AB: Look at all these greedy people who (were) [one word inaudible]

LDS (simultaneously): Their-- their reasoning is restricted [couple words inaudible]

AB: Like Chamberlain or a lot of these people you meet, in one-- one area of their life they reason clearly--

LDS (simultaneously): One area of their life, that's the point.

LR: But--

S (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): But they did *reason*.

LD: Did he define reason as a judgment made on all the available facts? And all the available facts, now you're saying that only-- you're only taking so many. It's a very [AB simultaneously: No, no. The question isn't--] partial judgment on a few facts.

AB: No, but we're saying that the-- the philosophic truth requires the full application of all the faculties of the soul. And the question now is whether or not reason would automatically subsume or bring into order those other faculties or whether--

S: [couple words inaudible]

LR (simultaneously): No. That wasn't my question.

AB: Sorry. Then state your question.

LR: I don't think it's automatic.

AB: Ok not automatic but--

LR (simultaneously): But I think PB's saying when he says the conclusions to which reason comes can only have obligatory force on the reason, and then it doesn't say not necessarily on the rest of his being? I mean I thought [S simultaneously: Yeah.] the point was it could [AB: But--] possi-- you *could* use that reason to achieve. [AB: Right.] That reason is (attained/obtained) into its one area.

AB: In other areas.

LR: *To* affect other areas but it's not necessarily the case that it *will* affect [students assent] any (other) areas.

S (faint): That's good now.

LR: That's the way I'm understanding the reason.

AD: Yeah but, you see now you're getting into the complexities of the human psyche. In one person it may affect other aspects of his life, in another person not at all.

LR: Ok but the point isn't that it cannot.

AD: No.

LR: The point is that it may or may not.

AD: It may or may not but there you would be dealing with something else. Some people have a habit of compartmentalizing their mind. And it would be very difficult to imagine that there'd be a spillover into other parts of their being, alright, just because they're reasoning about something.

LR: Right.

AD: Other people, that isn't so, they're open and receptive. And the reasoning process itself, alright, can and very often does influence other aspects of their psyche and they accept it and work with it. But I don't think this is the question we're interested in. The question that we're trying to understand is what is the nature of the metaphysics of truth, what is it based on, and that the correlation that could be made, that the totality of all the soul is involved in order to get a full and-- well, a full exposition of the doctrine. So a person can-- we're using PB as an example, had the variety-- in other words at any level that he functioned you could see that the doctrine was always operating as an integral unit. And that would mean whether he was cooking or whether he was cleaning something or whether he was writing a book or whether he was meditating, the whole of it was present in each one of those acts. You see what I mean? The whole of it was present right there and then. [short pause] And if it isn't like that it would not be a complete realization. We would *not* refer to the person-- well, according to this system, you would not refer to him as a Master yet.

AH: Anthony, why does it always seem that we have such a prejudice, well, to take the point of view of reason? Like the statement you just made that the whole of it was there in every possible aspect of his life. I know in my own case I have like a prejudice to understanding, and that prejudice is basically-- in fact that all of my communication and everything is verbal and conceptual, (wishes, hope). [student assents] Is that-- why is it hard-- so hard to see beyond that prejudicedly-- Is there something especially significant about the rational (part/power)?

AD: Well, it might be the peculiar stage that we're evolving. That's why before I refused to accept, you know, a mythological explanation. I said I stopped using pictures when I was twelve years old. In other words we're going through a conceptual development, and supposedly a mental rational development is taking place and the emphasis of progress and unfoldment seems to be placed at that level right now. But it certainly wouldn't have been so 500 years ago, it would have been on emotional faith and belief, not on reasoning. *That* part was being developed. And in the future some other part will be developed. But the

Sage is the person who has brought all these to the peak of their development and integrated them. And now he operates as one person, one soul, whether he's making tea or whether he's in the dynamics of the Void Mind.

AH: You've-- you've described the historical perspective of 500 years and now and I don't-- how about for us right now?

AD: I said for us right now that seemed to be a very important phase of our development, the development of the rational mentality. If you don't go through that you will still be leavin-- living in medieval times.

PD: Doesn't PB have a line something to the effect that teaching doesn't-- it transcends reason but doesn't contradict it.

AD: Yeah.

PD: Something like that.

AB: I thought it was a-- I think a reasoned revelation.

PD: Well also that it transcends reason but it does not contradict it.

[short pause]

AD: I don't know Michael, that help you any?

WHAT KIND OF CRITERIA DO THE SOUL FUNCTIONS BESIDES REASON HAVE FOR TRUTH OR APPROPRIATENESS?

ME: Well partially, well I think part of the question was like by what criteria-- you said deepening this reason so to say come to truth, let's say, in-- isn't [few words inaudible] you would say reason about these things. So it comes with like the feeling and organic perceptions that you should be a vegetarian, what criteria are being used to determine whether it's truth, like Paul said you have immediate sensitivity to the environment. But how do I know that this immediate sensitivity is a good thing for the-- for instance for the-- to the environment? I mean what kind of criteria do the other soul functions have that reason seems to have the specific-- let's say we can talk about it, we can [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Well they would have appropriate knowledges to accompany them. So the knowledge that will be appropriate to the Intellectual soul was a knowledge through identity. The knowledge that will be appropriate to a reasoning soul would be *dianoia* or, you know, the ability to connect thoughts lo-- reasonably, not logically, from the point of view of reason. Because reason will come in and correct logic. Reason is based on a much wider-- So what we're saying is that there would-- there would have to be a correlation between the faculty of the soul and the kind of knowledge they deal with. Now you don't bring in, and you can't bring in-- for instance, in the realm of organic sensation you can't bring in the identity knowledge that the soul operates with, the soul at that level operates with knowledge through identity, it is the thing that it knows. But in the realm of the intellect, where you and I let's say are situated, when I say "I love" or "I grieve", I've already separated myself from the grief and I am *not* the grief, I-- I *experience* the grief but I'm *not* the grief. So the identity is gone there. There's a--

there's an interval, there's a distinction. This is the knowledge that's appropriate to that level, the level of organic sensation. It is not a knowledge which would be appropriate at the level of intuition, intelligible intuition. So each phase of the soul has a knowledge which is appropriate to itself.

S (very faint): Interesting.

S: [one/two words inaudible]

ME: Yeah like, if each sphere-- so like in the-- on the-- let's say the organic sensation, the knowledge there that's appropriate is that the soul is distinct from that sensation.

AD: The knower is distinct from what he knows.

AS: Right.

S (simultaneously, faint): Uh-hm.

ME: But if there's a-- sensations themselves or this-- would *not* have that truth quality.

S: (No.)

AD (simultaneously): But they would! In other words at this-- at the level that I am functioning now, I taste sugar and it is sweet. That knowledge is appropriate at that level. Assuming, you know, that everything is the way it's supposed to be, that I'm not deformed, anything like that, alright. My taste buds would report accurately on what it finds. That knowledge [ME simultaneously: Ok.] is appropriate there. I would not use that knowledge to try to see if I'm sensitive to auras of people around me. [short pause] Go ahead.

ME (simultaneously): Well, part of the question would be, ok, there's the behavior let's say of making soup, doing certain everyday chores. Those would have an appropriate way of being done. Would there be an appropriate behavior as well as an appropriate response to the behaviors?

AD: Uh-hm. And it seems that only the Sage is sufficiently a completed enough man to be able to respond adequately to whatever-- whatever the situation calls for. We would have some hesitations about ourselves in this matter.

ME: Now is this then-- in terms of the communication of that intimate-- in other words how-- Seems to me like a very personal-- personal, maybe it's not, but it seems like there's a very personal type of [one word inaudible] behavior. And we talk about-- remember you used to say the whole soul involved in communicating that. Then that area seems at least-- Again, how would you use to judge for yourself what would be appropriate, I mean could somebody else communicate that to you, at least develop a-- I don't want to (say) [couple/three words inaudible] but-- Well the scientist would criticize anything except the rational demonstration by saying that, look, that's a personal experience, that's a subjective experience appropriate to you and would deny there's a metaphysics of a total truth by saying you can't demonstrate the-- the appropriateness of a certain behavior or a mystical experience. That it's like a subjective type of experience (so you) (essentially/potentially) had a development of academic philosophy and logical positivism deny the whole area of feeling, appropriate behaviors, and that (he) was saying no, there *is* an appropriate behavior, there's an appropriate diet, there's an appropriate way of doing things in the world.

And what I'm saying is, what criteria do we use to make that judgment, like [one/two words inaudible] there's immediate-- compassion is something that reveals all understanding the same way. I'm not talking about truth.

PD (simultaneously): You can experiment with your own states of consciousness, Michael.

ME: You can (experience/experiment).

PD: You can.

ME: Yeah, no, I-- that's fine.

PD (simultaneously): By-- experiment with-- even with your own diet, you can modify your own states-- your own consciousness.

ME: Right.

PD: That is more immediate than what any scientist is going to tell me.

ME: Well, but now is that-- is that appro--

PD (simultaneously): Well, that is direct experience Mike.

ME: No, is that appropriate for this view or is it appropriate for a metaphysics of truth?

PD: In terms of the organic functions of my-- of the center of consciousness of this individual, that is appropriate.

ME: Yeah, or that I'll-- that I don't have a question but--

PD (simultaneously): Well that-- that's at the level we're speaking in terms of the-- the diet. [AH, faint: So you're--] What level are you asking?

ME: (The level) I'm asking here is if there's like this point where the doctrine of let's say vegetar-- of certain kinds of diets that are appropriate, I want to say [couple/three words inaudible] or can you say that that's an appropriate diet for most pe-- you know, like for people who follow, again of-- if it's based on some kind of, you know, real thing.

AD (simultaneously): You're asking very complex questions and they're mixed up in a way. There are certain laws that are universal and they apply to everyone, alright. And the practice of morality, that is, you know, not to kill an animal, is one of those laws that would fall under a universal doctrine. In other words they're universal, they apply indiscriminately to everyone. But, the other question is much more difficult. If we associate let's say with a Sage and you watch his behavior, his behavior would be dictated to him by the soul operating as a total unit, not as a fragmented thing. In other words, he may or may not do something according to the karma that's involved. Whereas you and I would not operate under those-- under that kind of a situation, we would use the logical and rational faculties the best that we can and we don't say "Well according to my past karma I should *not* be doing (it/this). There's very specific reasons why I shouldn't talk to this person." You can't operate that way. So, there *are* aspects of these things that cannot be spoken of to anyone. And, each individual has to make the best decision that he can given, you

know, the circumstances and the capital he's operating with, you know, the stage of evolution that he's at. So it's not a question that could be answered really. But the other one can.

Many of the laws that have been formulated that guide, well, let's say the evolution of the human birth-- race are laws that are based on principles that govern the universe. Those cannot be denied without impunity, I mean, you will pay for that if you do. So, those things we can take for granted. It isn't that virtue needs to be rewarded, virtue *is* its own reward, and it's immediate. You don't have to wait till you go to heaven. Just like vice is its own reward. It's immediate. Most people can't see that. They think that the-- the-- what is it, "the wicked prosper and the good go without"? Well it depends on what you mean, you know, what do you mean, what do you think is good? Do you think the person who's practicing vice is getting better and better? You answer those questions.

S: Uh-hm.

ME: (I feel) like you're saying a doctrine of ahimsa (would not demand--) In what way does [couple words inaudible] that [S: (Uh-hm..)] it's just something he doesn't believe in. I mean we'd say you have to only experience it (in part), could the reason (do--) I think that's what Randy was telling [couple words inaudible] Could that be the reason [one/two words inaudible] universal knowing, (willing). Or if it'll have to be, let's say, you have to look at reason and say like this is what happens if you follow this course. And there really isn't a-- a rational explanation for-- for this.

RC: Can I tell you what I was thinking?

ME: Yeah I think I could rest now, uh-hm.

RC (simultaneously): Yeah but, it seems like in-- if the person could do just the reverse, just for a minute, what we were talking about in a whole lifespan, it seems the person could just possibly be, for example, take those presuppositions, taking that to be (presupposition), follow it out, see if it makes sense and if you believe in that. And the person could be [few words inaudible] (very meaningful). I think the part of the (game) is what we will accept as essential, as something different than-- And then the extent to which the reasoning will have control over it, there's going to be a sense in which he himself envisions different levels that let's say are reacting as (put-- as vitalizing kind of faith in the reasoning that you once had it at a different level of experience. But I think that-- I-- I can't see the-- the whole person that we're talking about in that quote as necessarily having to (come) backwards [one/two words inaudible] There seems to be something going on in accepting or rejecting the presuppositions that is in itself to be equivalent to-- to certainly the fact of just being able to reason.

S: Yeah.

AB: Yeah, Randy? Could we say it this way, that just as the whole person with all the faculties must be developed, to the extent that certain faculties are *not* developed, that will limit the corresponding development of other faculties. So for instance, some people you wouldn't tell them to be vegetarian, even though they should be, because it wouldn't work for them, they're not, you know, evolved enough or--

RC (simultaneously): (Can we--) you look at the other side of it too that some people actually physically would have a very hard time with it.

AB (simultaneously): Right. So you have to take into account the total person and their situation as much as possible. And it would be very individual [one/two words inaudible] the relationship between the reason and the other parts of the being.

RC: Because, just in terms of trying to put my thinking [one word inaudible] (we/you) just did with these contrasting states of (reading), I don't think they're opposed but then at a certain [one word inaudible] in the individual's development, it actually starts to have some to you and it didn't have that. And it has this (proof) that if you have faith in reason, delivers a whole level of development that was unavailable before. And that only after a certain amount of that has gone on is it possible to then go beyond that, and that on the basis of [one word inaudible] something beyond the reason reflect that into the reason.

[short pause]

S: And the reason here is [inaudible]

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

RC: 'Cause reason's what's being developed and at a certain stage we develop an eyeball.

S: Ok.

[students assent]

PD: [few words inaudible]

S (very faint): Yeah.

S: It wasn't that. (laughter)

S (very faint): So?

[21 second pause]

JB: [inaudible] right? I mean [RC simultaneously: Yeah.] that is what [one word inaudible]

RC: Well I think these quotes that we read where he says-- where he says there that in a speculative metaphysics-- that one that we read that said in that speculative metaphysics a person could believe anything he wants. But the metaphysics of truth forces him to follow the (truth). Uh--

S (very faint): That's right.

[short pause]

JB/S(?): I guess you had it right Avery, it's still right [few words inaudible] But even in that explanation saying if it's a [couple/three words inaudible] relation, causal from the side of reason, which is what [one/two words inaudible] what you're saying.

RC: Yeah but, let's say that the whole-- the whole of the person, or let's say that there's a whole level of the person (that evolved), or the rational soul, that can be the dominant, and they're also trying to talk to you about the soul at that level or the dominant level is where-- where the soul is identified with. But there is this person that's reaching to the point where the rational soul is more and more being dominant

[couple/three words inaudible] Then is this-- the whole of his life would lead to some [couple/three words inaudible] from the rational soul. And, the process of doing that is not an arbitrary. Let's say that maybe for-- maybe twenty years he's developing that [couple words inaudible] He's actually articulating [one word inaudible] the rational soul (just) as he is, whereas for us at a lower level who have some contact with the rational soul and a lot of contact with lower aspect, so what we decide to articulate and actual [couple words inaudible] that's not going to [one/two words inaudible]

JB: And that would work.

RC: Yeah, (ultimately).

JB: So it's application to the extent of the right one. Or is that--

RC: Yeah, maybe that's the word, like when he's about-- when he meditates he's transcendent. Then he has to see how the rational soul works. And that then he can see how the rational soul works. Then that's why the things that he's standing on eventually are going to be [one/two words inaudible] Because eventually he's going to have to recognize that [couple/three words inaudible] [short pause] So that-- like that thing Anthony kept saying over and over again about how it's an entirely different thing to say that you have knowledge and not opinion than to say that the problem of knowledge is (relative). [29 second pause] Like one person might say well because everything's relative then I can [one/two words inaudible] as I want. The other person would say no, because everything *is* relative there are specific relations that are productive [three/few words inaudible]

AB: Actually that's a good example of what has happened in our century, that through the development of reason and the awareness of relativity culturally at a-- etc, some people have detached that from morality and said that therefore you can do anything now. [RC assents] It *is* all relative.

[9¾ second pause]

AH: So is that-- the way to decide from the perspective of relativity about what is going to be efficacious is by way of [couple/three words inaudible] agree?

RC: Well there's one quote he would-- there's-- that this desire for higher knowledge comes as a prompting from the Overself, not something ego does. I guess what I'm thinking of is this awakening these days to that is a response from within the person to that process. He doesn't [one word inaudible] to that but he does respond to that process. Then he responds to that (process) in this way (that becomes) knowledge.

[11 second pause]

LD: Can I-- can I ask a question maybe [one/two words inaudible] concerning reason? When-- when we say something to the effect of, I'm going to make a decision not to eat meat or-- and-- now I could go through an intellectual-- you know, analyze it intellectually, check my feelings out about the matter, you know, my sensitivity about animals and, you know, that they're living and all. And now is it reason or not what takes all these faculties and makes a judgment upon them, you know-- is it that which takes all these different aspects into view and then makes judgment or is it what-- reason what just takes the intellectual

or the-- the-- you know, the metaphysical point of view and then feeling does something else-- And if this is the case then I have to understand the difference between intellect and reason.

HS: It kind of seems like reason is just like intellect.

LD: Yeah, and I'm getting very confused and maybe it's not--

RC: Yeah, I was thinking that that example with Michael was actually not a good example. (I mean--)

LD (simultaneously): Well, I could take it with anything, I take [S simultaneously: (couple words inaudible) right.] any [one word inaudible] any-- anything that-- any decision that's based on, you know, feeling, action, thought, all these different aspects of my person. Now when I make a decision all those aspects are usually in there in different proportions. And that's what the decision is made upon, not one faculty alone. Now, is reason only to do with the intellect? [short pause] Well, I'm just very--

HS: I think in this (vision) reason was, so to say, along the line of intellect you would say, the arbiter of intellect, you know, mode and--

RC: It seems that what we're using-- (and/in) using reason rather than inte-- the term intellect would be that you actually *would* consider all the facts (of experience).

LD: Yeah, aren't my feelings a fact though?

RC: Yeah.

LD: My feeling doesn't matter, you know. Like this animal is alive, you know, or-- let's not use vegetarianism, let's use something else. I don't know.

S: Ok.

S: I got a (pet). (laughter)

HS: No you (can/can't) imagine [one word inaudible] (laughter, student words) You (can/can't) imagine [one word inaudible] vegetarian that's not good for your health.

S: It would be very hard to argue. (laughter)

S: [few words inaudible]

HS (simultaneously): But I know who he really wants, but--

LD: No. (some laughter)

HS: Making that argument that it's not good for your health [couple words inaudible] you know, once you experience it. Now, which is [one/two words inaudible] is it rational, the argument? No, die [few words inaudible] (bit of laughter)

S: But doesn't that prove it's the pulling from a lot of areas so that you don't use meat and you don't act [couple/three words inaudible]

HS (simultaneously): Well, I'm-- and I'm-- no I'm not saying that. I-- where is the rea-- would-- you'd say the reason here would be what actually employs(-- (would be) the conscious mode is based on reasoning or is the reasoning the gathering of the data, making a conclusion, those were--

LR: No, you could have the reason, that's a-- well that's a good example of how the reason does not have any obligatory effect on the rest of the being. (laughter)

S (amidst laughter): [couple words inaudible]

HS: Ok, so then how is it different from intellect?

RC: It seems that if it does the reason just follows the path, that the ego might want to keep on talking and want to come up with some way to make it seem reasonable. (bit of laughter) And you have to admit that it's not mine [possibly one/two words inaudible] (laughter, student words)

AB: I'd like to propose that-- [HS: Yeah but thi--] that part of the-- part of the problem is because reasoning is a process but it also is variable in its scope. And reasoning could be limited to the intellect and be very-- really reasoning accurately or it could be applied to all of your being and there's a variable scope in the reasoning process that has to be taken into account and not try and define reasoning only by the *process* of reasoning. Because something could be very reasonable but it could-- it could be [one word inaudible] maybe it's just like Louis said it *doesn't* take into account your feelings which is a that-- a mode of knowledge.

HS: Ok, now I think that would point to the context of the quote, that [student assents] reasoning is that kind of reasoning and in order to get the full experience of truth the reasoning has so to say brought you to be able to consider possible, you actually move into other areas after that one, the understanding (could include all the) [one word inaudible]

PD/S(?) (faint): The reasoning can't take the-- most of the (person) into consideration, (actively do this).

HS: In this one-- in this kind of reasoning, I-- you-- you could postulate-- if you-- if you hold that it belongs to the thinking, you could say yeah, I have feelings, you know, I have emotions. But it's not the emotions, it's not the feelings.

AH: So what if that feeling is totally irrational then? Like-- [S simultaneously, very faint: It still (couple words inaudible)] like all I--

AB: How do you-- what makes you say that? I mean, on what basis are you able to say that feeling *is* irrational? Or is that basis-- on the basis of feeling or--

AH (faint): Let's say that I just want to go on and go back there and smoke a cigarette. (laughter)

AB: You like that example.

S (faint): Uh-hm, uh-hm. (bit of laughter)

PD: What was that first quote we started out that made the metaphysics? (laughter)

CDA: I don't think-- I don't think Louis's question has been answered yet. I don't think it was answered.

S (very faint): Yeah.

JB: Well-- well reasoning isn't only variable in its scope, like how much weight would this feeling have [few words inaudible] to the body and so on, it's also variable where-- where it is situated, [S: What?] (in perspective).

CDA (simultaneously): But, I think that would be--

S: What?

CDA: But I thought that both of them said that reasoning *is* the feeling. That the feeling [three/few words inaudible] of-- of the-- well I-- in--

RC: [few words inaudible]

CDA (simultaneously): And yet it seems like you're supposing that reason is something isolated from, you know, [JB simultaneously, faint: Well (couple words inaudible)] and I don't think that's the case at all.

HS: Well it depends on the reason. I mean one way [couple words inaudible] was that, you know, intuition of the thinking function was the reason.

CDA: That what?

HS: I think that. Well I think that's the actual test if you're a reasonable person or not, [student assents] that you can reason and you [three/few words inaudible]

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S: Yeah.

AB: We get the point Herb.

HS: What's the point, Alan?

AB: No, never mind, I was--

S: Quit smoking. (bit of laughter)

HS: Alan doesn't smoke.

AH: But Louis's question is one that I've had--

S (simultaneously): Give it to Herbert.

AH: --for-- for a [one/two words inaudible] you know, is that we keep talking about intellect and reason. And, I don't know if it's been definitely stated that they're two different functions, but it seems to be that the mind is (enlightened giver). But I'm not yet [one/two words inaudible] articulated in any way what the difference is. But every time it comes out it's something real hazy and mysterious and [couple/few words inaudible] Maybe others understand better, if they did I wish they would explain it. It sounds as if there is a clear distinction between the reason, the higher function.

RC: Well the one-- the one distinction is [few words inaudible] Or use the word 'intellect', that's like you could almost get all what [one word inaudible] to the ego's (specialty). And that means automatically then you got to conclude that that-- certain things that facts (demand) were the things that it demand if-- if you're going to bring in the function of reason because he doesn't have to no longer be tied in to the ego's personal interests but has to try to go beyond them.

CDA: Isn't it-- isn't it then beyond the functioning of the psychosomatic organism by definition?

RC: Yeah it would seem like-- it just seems like ego separates me out from the universal life and the reason is a step towards getting integrated back into it. It doesn't take me (there) but it seems like [couple words inaudible] a first step in (those--)

S (very faint): Right.

S: Right.

HS: Would you say reason is a function that's producing? That's why metaphysics of truth referred to it?

RC: Well the way that PB said it was that after the stage had passed where he developed the ego, after he had had the higher mystical experiences, then through the reason he [one word inaudible] expressed the experiences which he had.

HS: Like a person through his reason come up with-- you know, with the right understanding?

S: Must be.

TS: [couple/three words inaudible] and that a person through the development of the reason could come to the point of appreciating the objective reality that there is such a doctrine and the fact that it's the truth.

S: But--

HS: Ok, and then?

TS: And then it would require intuition to-- and mystical affirmation to assimilate that perspective.

HS: I don't-- and in this way it appreciates the reality of the doctrine of the metaphysics of truth?

S (faint): Yeah.

HS: What do you mean by-- what do you mean by that?

TS: Well, we read a couple of quotes here, we read that reason, in applying itself to itself, comes to the point of realizing that there is inevitably a divine intelligence, and that that divine intelligence could be understood but not by himself. You know, that (certainly) there's some doctrine, that it could be that-- that reason itself guided by intuition could-- or guided by insight, could give form or an image of that truth. So what reason I guess would help you-- so reason would (assert) that were it guided by insight it would be (into the) truth. To recognize [couple/three words inaudible] it *is* satisfying [couple words inaudible]

HS: And could it be an actual image of truth prior to the guidance of your insight? Can reason go that far, you think it *actually* knows the truth? Or would it have to wait for the insight to say, “Hey, far out, I *wasn’t* interested [one/two words inaudible] Hey, I *wasn’t* interested.”

S (very faint): Yeah.

TS: I think that’s where he says that equivalent but maybe (I) just got it from the [one/two words inaudible]

AB: It has to be verified.

LD: But you know like last week we talked [TS simultaneously, faint: Believe me, I tried that.] about-- we talked about St. Paul having this vision and then the intuition was there but the reason wasn’t. [Note: See WG Class 1983 1026 PB Paras; Intellect.]

TS: Yeah well that-- yeah that’s I was trying--

AD (simultaneously): The reason is there.

LD: The reason is there?

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S (very faint): Yeah.

S (faint): To some degree.

S (very faith): Uh-hm, yeah.

THE SOUL IS A UNITY: DON’T SEPARATE SENSATION FROM INTELLECT, INTELLECT FROM REASON, REASON FROM MORAL SENTIMENT, MORAL SENTIMENT FROM THE INTELLECTUAL EYE IN THE SOUL

AD: Again, try to-- try to keep in mind what I told you because I’m not going to repeat it, that the soul is a unit. And it includes organic sensation, you know, the bodily effects and their causes and function, and it includes you might say intellect, and it includes the rational part, it includes an Intellectual part. Now, you could have an organic sensation of a daffodil and you could see beauty in that daffodil. And (you have/you’re having) the highest experience of the soul in that organic perception. The whole-- right then and there you have a glimpse of beauty. Now, if that is so, then you have to think of what I just said, that all these different parts of the soul are an organic unity. You asked the question like am I reasoning about all these facts that I have, you know, the example you (gave). It would depend upon the organic unity of the soul how it’s functioning, where the dominance is, what is relatively emphasized, what isn’t, alright. It’s not anything static, it’s always in the process of flux. You have to look at the problems in that way. Because, what you keep doing is separating organic sensation from the intellect, the intellect from the reason, the reason from the moral sentiment, the moral sentiment from the Intellectual eye in the soul. You keep separating them as though they’re different parts of the soul, each one distinct from all the others.

LD: I do but I mean you're the one who's pounded into my head distinguish and divide to better understand and that's what I'm trying to do.

AD (simultaneously): The better to *unite*.

LD: Yeah but I can't-- if you don't let me divide and distinguish, (some laughter) I can't unite it like you want me to do here.

AD: But you didn't unite it, you divided and distinguished but you didn't unite.

LD (simultaneously): I haven't distinguished, I don't know [S simultaneously: It's ok.] what the distinguishment is.

AD: In the example you just used, alright, you said that you went around collecting all the data, alright, and the reasoning included feelings about it, alright.

LD: Go ahead.

AD: Alright? Now what did you mean by feelings? Do you mean the emotions that the ego will bring up to support its thesis? Or did you mean the moral sentiments, the higher ethical feelings, what did you mean by that?

LD: Well, obviously I would put--

S (faint): [three/few words inaudible] (laughter)

LD: Prefer to choose the latter but--

S: Right.

AD: Alright. (Experiencing) reflection. But as long as you keep having this distinction which is really, you know, restricts you from-- in other words, you're thinking analytically but at the same time you're not accompanying the synthetic thinking with it, they-- you're going to be-- you're going to go around all the time seeing them as insoluble problems.

LD: But, ok, I think I follow but what I want to do with the-- the synthetic understanding you talk about is to put that in the faculty of reason, if that's what synthesizes on all--

AD: But don't you see I just said you can't do that. It's a question of a relative predominance of the soul, if its presence is more so to speak in the rational part or the organic sensation, [student assents] or what is the mixture of these five different things in one perception.

(Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1983 1102b Ends; Side 2 Begins)

ST. PAUL'S INTERPRETATION OF HIS VISION OF THE CRUCIFIED CHRIST AS BEING ABOUT THE RESURRECTION CAME FROM THE EGO'S DESIRE FOR ITS OWN IMMORTALITY

AD: Alright, go back to St. Paul, what happened there?

LD: I don't (know).

AD (simultaneously): He was a learned man, evidently. He knew Greek, he was well-- well-versed in his own tradition as well as the Greek, alright. What happened?

LD: I would say he took a partial look at this vision, and insofar it was partial that it was an intellectual interpretation of what happened. And it *wasn't* impartial insofar as he didn't look at his own presuppositions, the (fact)-- the (fact), you know, that-- that *he* was [one/two words inaudible]

S: Cindy says she was just reading through that, one of his critics. (bit of laughter)

AD: He was (perfectly existent/perfect in existence).

LD: And he didn't look at his own motive. And so he applied it, you know, wrongly. [S: But--] But it wasn't reasonable insofar that it *didn't* take into account and didn't stop to check his own motive out. In other words, uh--

AD: (No./Well--)

LD (simultaneously): You know, and again I see where I'm compart-- you know, dividing these faculties very strongly.

AH: Also from a point of view of being outside the experience we (sense) a prejudice that it would be one to one that we-- Like this part of the soul through a division [few words inaudible] present life-stream. You can't really step outside of that ego and say that someone was (weak) or not. That's not fair. There's a certain (societal perception).

LD: Well, so the--

AD (simultaneously): But Louis, if-- if we return to this now. You have the vision of the Christ crucified, you know. And in this vision Christ [couple words inaudible] After the experience and the ecstasy was over, you went around preaching the doctrine of the crucified Christ. And basically, you know, that-- that you believed in the resurrection and that-- well, all that followed after that. And, if you were to analyze, alright, if you were to analyze the experience, alright, you say well-- assuming, assuming that what we understood has some validity. We reasoned about it and we says well this is what the doctrine is about, I have to believe in the crucified Christ. Now, would you say about-- would you say that he reasoned about it-- he got an intuition, alright. Like the light went down and illuminated the crucified Christ and he interpreted that to mean that the doctrine of the resurrection, you know-- [S: Right.] What in a person would make him believe in the resurrection? [short pause] What in you for instance would want to believe that it's going to live forever?

LD: My ego.

AD: Well then do you think that the ego had something to say about how to interpret this vision?

LD: Very much so, yeah.

AD: Then do you think that people from then on went on believing that their ego should be immortalized, that it could come back on Judgment Day, resume its former identity; in other words actually to live with this ego, the way it is, forever and ever? [S: Yeah.] Well do you think it was reason that interpreted it, or

do you think it was his ego that interpreted it? Now here's a man that's very advanced spiritually, very enlightened.

LD: Obviously I would say it was his ego interpreted it.

AD: Especially if you consider, alright, that he-- he was versed in the Greek mysteries and the Jewish mysteries, he understood something about religion and philosophy, and as I said, he knew Greek, which meant that he was part of the culture of the Hellenic world, right? And yet nonetheless he comes out with this doctrine of the immortality of the ego. [short pause] Now it would be obvious-- one would say that it should be very easy to reason out what the vision means, I mean especially for a man of his caliber. But evidently it isn't reason. Not at all. What to do, the correct thing to do, is not something that you could turn to the back of the book and find the answer.

[students assent, very faint]

LD: Yeah.

S: But isn't this--

AD: If we said that among all the faculties of the soul, alright, there was organic sensation, perception, the intellect, the memory of the-- the recording of all these things that happened to a person, and then the reasoning above that and then the moral sentiments and then the Intellectual, alright, if we looked at the soul in this huge way of having all these different aspects, what part won out?

LD: The-- the lower, yeah.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

[AD taps on board to indicate something]

S (faint): Right.

LD: So-- so reasoning is thinking that is not attached to the ego. Right? And--

AD: Well, there's--

LD (simultaneously): And that's very difficult to see.

AD: Yeah. It's very hard.

LD: I mean my ego, I've watched it a little bit, enough--

AD: (No/You know), we were speaking, for instance, about smoking, alright, and you right away saw that there's no sense arguing there, because you know who's going to win. (bit of laughter) Imagine the man who believed that the world was flat. Do you think you could argue with that belief?

LD: And I could feel it. (some laughter)

AD: You remember the story I told you, Galileo showed those people that there was moons revolving around the Earth. And they looked and they said, "I see, but I don't believe." What was stronger in them? The beliefs? The ego? The way it grew up, all the beliefs it accepted which it incorporated into its

memory bank and this is the way it was going to function. What chance does reason have in this situation?

AH: Is reason always correct?

AD: If it's reason.

AH: It can never be wrong.

AD: If it's reason.

LD: Does reason happen within the sphere of the ego? Is the-- the ego wasn't reason--

S: Well, yeah but--

AD (simultaneously): Well, I don't want to get into the technical question of how the reason-principles exist, whether they exist in themselves or whether they exist as reflection. We don't have to get into that. It's a little too complicated right now. But there are-- there are, let's say, reflections in our minds of reason-principles, alright. So for instance you know about the law of addition, multiplication, subtraction, alright. They're reflections in our-- our minds of these reason-principles which maybe are beyond it. So what was the point? I-- could they be wrong? Could reason-principles-- Could you add and come up with a subtraction?

AH: That helps a little, that the main question that's referred to (a conclusion), they question what (will) we be sure if we're not reasoning. But that function of intellect(--/.) It seems that reason has its own verification and its own (certainty/certitude). It's always correct, not to be contradicted.

AD: Yeah, but insofar that we're speaking about a person and we recognize the complexity that's involved, alright, we're just not going to come up with a nice clear answer. Was it reason that was all-powerful or was it the ego, was it the intellect, was it the moral sentiments? There could be any kind of a mixture. It's going to take a Sage to give us the proportion.

LD: Anthony, there's no clear-cut distinguishing.

AD: Oh it's the-- if you think of knowledge as immaterial and you try to apply quantitative modes to it, you're going to have a lot of trouble.

[short pause]

LD: So, I would have to conclude in most acts that there's a-- it's still [one/two words inaudible]

AD: All-- all of those [LD simultaneously: Ok.] things are going on all the time. It's the very nature of the soul to be *productive*. It's always producing. And every perception that occurs is going to be a mixture of all these things in it.

LD: But, I'm not conscious of this.

AD: No, you won't be conscious of it.

LD: And-- and--

AD: That is completely, you won't be conscious, but you'll be able to notice certain parts of it. They're very clearly-- Like you recognize, well, I won't pick up the argument for smoking because you know that the ego control all the powerful emotions in favor of continuing. [S, faint: (Yes it does.)) You can recognize certain parts of the perception but not everything. But try to keep this conception of the soul as an organic unity that has a variety of functions, and that these functions-- it isn't that A goes in and B has got to go out, A and B and C could all be there. And like I pointed out you could be looking at a daffodil and the eye of the Intellect could be open(ed) and you could perceive beauty in an instant. And the next instant it's not there. So if you get this feeling of the organic unity of the soul I think you'd be able to answer some of the questions better, not all of them, few of (the--)

LD: And insofar as you're speaking of soul, can we say one function is inclusive of others?

AD: One is inclusive? You mean it could be more dominant than others? Stronger than others? Yeah, I would think so.

LD: Well I didn't get [couple words inaudible] I don't think it-- I was thinking-- like I think of aesthetic perception, ok. Now in-- insofar as I'm speaking of that as a function, is the function of intellect included, you know-- I mean there's not these tight compartments within the soul. One function--

AD: But if you could see-- if you [LD simultaneously: But there I--] could see that-- if you could see that perception is the melting of the soul's will, alright, then you could see how impossible it is to ask that question.

LD/S(?) (faint): Yeah it's (ridiculous) question.

S: What?

S (faint): [three/few words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): Perception is the melting of the soul's will?

AD: Or something like that, I-- (laughter)

PC: It's beautiful.

S: Yeah I agree.

AD: I probably stole it somewhere and I can't think of who but when I do I'll give you the page. [S: Right.] But basically all I'm trying to say is that in perception the totality of the soul's functioning is included and not just parts of it. [short pause] So our campaign, if you try to, you know, isolate reason from moral sentiments and from perception and all that, can become, you know, very muddled. [student assents] We speak-- we speak with metaphor. Don't-- don't think we ever get beyond that.

Remember what we started out with? You live in the world where certain images are brought inwardly. In other words, you look at an object and there's immediate reflection of that object. That's an image. Then through that image, as our mentality grows, we attach a word, any word. But now the word is very, very abstract compared to the image. The word 'chair' and the actual image of a throne, alright, can show you the discrepancy. Now you're reasoning with words. Could they be ever anything else but metaphors? So the point I'm getting at is this here: when I talk to you, follow my words and try to

understand as well as you can. But then after awhile you ignore my words and you try to follow my ideas, alright? Then after awhile you throw away the ideas and just try to follow me. [short pause] Sorry to keep you so long.

[bell rung]

[short pause]

HS: Where you going now? (laughter)

[Audio File 1983 1102b Ends]