

CLASS at Wisdom's Goldenrod, Hector, NY
with Anthony Damiani (AD)
August 3, 1984
BUDDHISM; MADHYAMIKA

TOPIC: Buddhism

SUBJECT: Madhyamika

SUBSUBJECTS: PB, "Birth of the Universe," Vedanta, Two Kinds of Consciousness, Cosmology, Epistemology, Non-duality

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BOOKS READ FROM OR REFERENCED:

- Paul Brunton, *The Hidden Teaching Beyond Yoga*
- Paul Brunton, *The Wisdom of the Overself*
- Paul Brunton, *Notebooks*
- Jeffrey Hopkins, Elizabeth Napper (ed.), *Meditation on Emptiness*
- His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Jeffery Hopkins (tr.), Lati Rinpoche (tr.), *The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way*
- His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Jeffery Hopkins (tr., ed.), Elizabeth Napper (ed.), *Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*

DIAGRAMS referred to (not with this transcript version) [Transcriber note: [diagram] means the speaker is referencing a diagram as he or she is speaking. If someone is drawing or writing, with audible sounds of chalk on a blackboard, I indicate this by [drawing] or [writing].]

NOTES:

- Anthony Damiani and WG group met with His Holiness the Dalai Lama Sept. 29, 1984, and therefore many WG classes in Aug-Sept. 1984 had at least a semi-focus on Buddhism.
- Partial transcript (Scan File 1984 0803C1-15R01.PDF) exists.
- This is a Friday evening class.

TRANSCRIBED Verbatim by IT 2019; reformatted by JRM & JF 2019-2020, with TOC/Subheads by JRM. In 2023, IT updates prefatory matter, footer, and audio file name, alters V code, Topic, Subject, and Subsubjects to make more accurate, removes grey and green highlights and hashtags (not a V14), alters Subhead style, alters Subheads to make more accurate, fixes typos and minor errors. **Archival verbatim transcript – V12a.**

AUDIO FILES: 1984 0803a, 1984 0803b. [Note: “Tape” and “Side” refer to original audio cassette tapes that were later digitized into .MP3 Audio Files.]

1984 08/03 at Wisdom's Goldenrod Buddhism; Madhyamika

FOUR SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

[Audio File 1984 0803a Begins]

AH: --and, even though it's in translation and even though the language is difficult and ev-- and even though we've been over some of these ideas several times, I thought we might try once again *with* a bit of a creative possibility, that we come to passages or reasonings that are obstinate or difficult or-- or impenetrable or misunderstood or whatever, I thought we might be able to go to the *Hidden Teaching* or selected passages and quotes to help to understand. Those of us who have been working together on Thursday nights are fairly well convinced that there's a very similar theme to PB's *Hidden Teaching Beyond Yoga* and the Dalai Lama's presentation in this little book. That's not to say they're identical idea patterns, but there's certainly similarities. And, I just mention a couple of general things in that regard before I take up a introductory sort of discussion. I think it's possible in many cases to equate the notion that PB uses of matter in the *Hidden Teaching* with the Dalai Lama's expression of-- let's see, what term should we choose?

S: (Choose/Use) inherent existence.

S (simultaneously, faint): Inherent existence.

AH: Yeah, inherent existence of objects. Remember we-- we remember that word 'inherent existence'. Then there's like a-- there's a possible equation of meaning there that would be very helpful. (I/T'll) just mention an even more amorphous possibility, not connected to PB directly but perhaps more connected to Platonic studies. There's a way of understanding the Prasangika exposition of emptiness as being equatable with the Platonic notion of Being. We're not going to take that up as introduction, but I would hope that whatever this class is would lead to that possible conclusion, that we'd be able to draw that conclusion. Ok? So, maybe we talk just a little bit in terms of an introduction about this topic before we go to the Dalai Lama's book directly.

I think most of us are aware of, if we're going to study Tibetan Buddhism, and I think perhaps we should start with that, out of respect for sort of the impending visit with His Holiness, we have to talk a little bit about the four schools in Tibetan Buddhism. Now I don't want to go into any details but the discipline in that tradition was for a student or a monk or a practitioner to traverse in the four schools. And those four schools are, I'll just mention them, Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika. And within Madhyamika there's two de-- two divisions, [someone drawing/writing on board] the Sautrantika [AH means: Svatantrika] and Prasangika are both views within Madhyamika. Another word for Chittamatra is Yogacara or Mind-Only. There's four basic systems of thought. It is possible to understand those four systems in a hierarchical sense. The student typically would start with what is referred to as the lower schools. And please don't attach connotative associations with what we might mean by lower. We would have to-- we have to decide later what that might mean. Traverse the four schools. The Prasangika's considered the highest view. The Dalai Lama's personal philosophical perspective would be from the point of view of Prasangika when he answered questions. His training was

in Prasangika, after having traversed that system. Now, that's specific and perhaps unique to the Tibetan method.

Now I could say some things about Buddhism generally to help us understand the hierarchical relationship of those four schools. This all leads to the point of, there's a peculiar kind of glance necessary in order to make sense of the Prasangika analysis. You have to have a feeling for what their method is in order for it to connect. And I hope to-- I hope to speak to that in just a minute. So, Buddhism generally, you would say, these four schools, let's-- they would have-- all talk about two truths. That's typical to Mahayana Buddhism. A conventional truth and an-- and an ultimate truth, they all speak that way. All four schools would speak of selflessness or emptiness. But, they all mean very different things by the term selflessness and emptiness. In every school they would posit an ultimate truth as emptiness. In each school something different is meant.

Now, frequently Buddhism is accused of or considered as a *negative* expression of philosophy, sometimes even considered atheistic in its approach. Frequently looked at as [short pause] I'll just say generally a kind of negative expression of what might better be expressed in positive way. And that-- that accusation usually boils down to accusation of nihilism or annihilation. For instance, if you analyze what your s-- the self or the world and discover that it's a moment-by-moment presentation and you're not able in that analysis to posit a soul or an abiding principle that-- a substrate for that, it is possible to see that as a-- as a-- a nihilistic-- nihilistic expression.

Now each of the four schools of Buddhism will avoid the extreme of nihilism. They have ways in their dialectic to *avoid* that accu-- to *reply* to that accusation. Prasangika's of-- reply to the accusation of nihilism is unique to the rest of the Buddhist schools. Therein, in-- in my estimation, lies the insight to what they're doing. Therein is the key to the middle way. They avoid the extreme of annihilation or nihilism in an-- in a unique way to the rest of the Buddhist schools. For instance, when the other schools posit the empty nature of self or phenomena, they have to reply to nihilistic accusation by establishing some ontic basis in one way or another. To use the example, Yogacara will posit the basis of mind. And the Prasangika dialectic, the extreme of nihilism is avoided by the use of emptiness. What is connotatively associated with the term 'emptiness' is a kind of a nothingness or a kind of annihilation-- annihilation. In the Prasangika view, that extreme is avoided by their *use* of the term 'emptiness'. That's a real important thing to grasp when we take up the Dalai Lama's view, his discussion of the Prasangika view. [9 second pause] Someone else like to add to that or questions or comments?

CDA: Well I would-- I have a question. I mean it's very-- it's probably really obvious but, if you-- you started out saying that you wanted to reach the conclusion that the emptiness of Madhyamika's was equatable to Platonic Being. And--

AH: I-- Carol, forgive me for interrupting, I wouldn't say equatable. But I think-- I think it-- there's a meaning content that's similar.

JL: On the side-- [CDA simultaneously: Ok.] on the side of phenomena.

PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKA: TWO TRUTHS, EMPTINESS, DEPENDENT-ARISING

CDA: I just wonder why you would-- do you feel that the example you just made with Chittamatrins is-- their ontic basis of mind is any different than what the Madhyamikas mean as emptiness.

AH: It's both different and not different, they-- It's different in terms of conceptual formulation, not different in terms of truth factor. [short pause] See, one of the most difficult and obstinate problems with trying to talk about Prasangika is their denial of ontic categories. That rubs against the grain of-- [short pause] that rubs, you know? (bit of laughter) I think it's-- I think it's possible, I think it's possible to understand their method in a way that doesn't-- that doesn't rub quite so roughly. I would like not to get hung up with their denial of ontic status for things at this point. I think it would-- it would not be productive at this point. Yes?

LC: You said that the Prasangika is *not* a nihi-- *avoids* the nihilistic criticism by its explanation of emptiness.

AH: Yes.

LC: What is that explanation?

AH: It's-- it's intellectually very simple. It's emotionally very difficult. Every time I do it I have to force my-- to do it again. But I think I can force myself to do it again. Alright. You want to do it right now or you want to--

LC: Sure.

S: [couple words inaudible]

LC (simultaneously): Oh I do, I don't know.

AH: Yeah. (laughter)

S (amidst laughter, faint): [few words inaudible]

MW: You got to take it.

AH: Very simple little reasoning but it-- obstinate emotional reluctance to follow it, for myself. You say-- you take a phenomena. Let's take a cup or a book or-- [student assents, faint] a cup is a good thing to take. Let me see. And in this view, going to talk about-- First of all, phenomenon for them are objects that are suitable to be taken to the mind. So, a cup, a thought, a deity, (a/uh) World-Idea, a-- are all phenomena. But we'll take a cup. You say we'll analyze it and you say there's two natures. And the cup has two modes of existence. And these two modes of existence are equatable to the two truths that we use.

LC (simultaneously): Conventional and ultimate truth.

AH (simultaneously): Conventional and ultimate. So the cup has a conventional mode of existence.

LC: And that's that it can hold water or coffee.

AH: Yes it-- that's true. And it-- it al-- it al-- at that level of appearance, at the conventional mode of appearance, it has an apparent-- it's presented as having an inherent-- inherent existence. It seems to have existence from its own side, it seems to have a self-standing kind of existence. Alright. Now-- Upon analysis, you know, it doesn't have to be one of their reasonings but we can just do it the way we often do in terms of a scientific analysis or [S: *The Hidden Teaching.*] *Hidden Teaching* analysis which we're going to get to very soon.

S: Do it.

AH: The cup appears to be in-- in a state of absolute independence. It has independence from other phenomena. [S, faint: Uh-hm.] But it also seems to be independent from the perceiver. So there's two levels of dependence-- independence that it seems to have. It seems to have independence from other things. And it seems to be independent from a knowing mind. Now, through analysis it's discovered that it really *isn't* dependent [AH means: independent] in either of those ways. We're not so much interested in the first way, we're interested in the second way. The only cup appropriately spoken of is a known cup. It's in a relationship of *dependence* to a mind, to a knower. And they say that because it's-- this is the part where you have to-- [S: (Right.)] because it's not independent but dependent, it lacks independence. It is therefore empty of independence or inherent existence.

LC: It's empty of inherent existence.

AH: It's empty of--

LC: Ok.

AH: It's empty of independence.

LC: Can't be known without a knowing mind.

AH: It's-- it lacks that independence that it seems to have in appearance. [LC assents, very faint] It's empty of that. You say it's-- and once you're able to ma-- go that far with it and you say because it depends on other causes and conditions, be they mental or otherwise, you say it's a dependent arising in their language. And the Prasangika view, that existent dependently-arisen thing is absolutely equatable with the meaning of emptiness. It's *because* of the emptiness, it's *due* to the emptiness that there is phenomena. It's not that the emptiness is *canceling* the phenomena. But the phenomenon--

LC: Because there's emptiness there-- there is phenomena?

JL: It's its *raison d'être*.

AH: The important connection is to connect dependent arising with the notion of emptiness. Do you want to go through it again?

LC: Yeah.

S: Uh-hm.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AH: You do it Sid.

SP: Hm.

[short pause]

AH: It lacks *independence*.

LC: Right.

AH: It is therefore *empty* of independence.

LC: Right.

AH: Then it's possible to see the dependent arising as emptiness.

LC (faint): Hm.

RG: Go over that, I don't follow that language.

AH: Because-- now it appears to have independence. [RG: Right.] Upon analysis it's discovered that it actually is dependent.

RG (simultaneously): Dependent on others.

AH: So it lacks independence.

RG: Right.

AH: The lack of independence is the emptiness of independence or the emptiness of inherent existence.

RG: Uh-hm.

AH: Then it's possible to conclude that the dependent arising is equatable to the emptiness.

RG: They do not equate.

JL (simultaneously): But it's convertible though.

BS (very faint): Yeah.

JL: That's what they mean by emptiness is the dependent arising.

AH: Yes.

RG: It's the "due to" I have a trouble-- I have trouble. I could see how it's empty of inherent existence. But I don't see how you say that emptiness-- that the dependent arising is *due* to emptiness. In other words, how do you establish that causal connection?

AH (simultaneously): They're the same thing.

RG: So but then it's not "due to".

AH: I'm sorry, I misspoke.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

RG: They're just interchangeable terms.

AH: Interchangeable terms.

RG: Ok.

AH: It's very-- this--

SC (simultaneously): Is that what you're saying, that [AH simultaneously: Yes.] it is an interchangeable term, that emptiness is defined as dependent arising and dependent arising--

AH (simultaneously): Yes, the meaning is seen as the same. So therefore you avoid the extreme of nihilism in Prasangika by emptiness.

SC: How is that?

AH: Because the dependently arisen thing is the same as emptiness.

SC: I don't get how that avoids nihilism.

LC (simultaneously): Oh sin-- since it doesn't exist independently and it is dependent, um--

AH: It's hard, isn't it? [LC simultaneously: I had it the second--] 'Cause it's unnatural-- it's unnatural to think this way, it really is unnatural.

LC: Since it doesn't-- doesn't exist independently, [student assents] and it is a dependent arising, that lacking of independence [S, faint, possibly part of background: Because--] makes it--

AH: Empty of independence.

SP: Yeah. Well actually of inherent--

LC (simultaneously): No. But I want you-- I wanted the--

S (faint): Empty of what?

AS (simultaneously, faint): That's just his smile.

SP (simultaneously): Let me-- let me read a quote about [LC: Yeah.] dependent arising. There are various presentations of dependent origination. I'm going to read one version.

[Transcriber note: I am using *Meditation on Emptiness* by Jeffrey Hopkins, assistant editor Elizabeth Napper, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 1996.]

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 167, SP reading]: "... 'dependent-existence' ..."

SP: It's sometimes called dependent existence.

LR (simultaneously): Sidney speak up please.

SP: Sometimes called dependent existence. There's like-- arising through meeting is one of the explanations of dependent arising. Existing in reliance is one explanation of dependent arising. And dependent existence is the third explanation of dependent arising, this is the one I'm going to read.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 167-168, SP reading]: "[*Pratityasamutpada*], 'dependent-existence', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is the designation of all phenomena in dependence on the thought that designates them. Without thought to designate the existence of phenomena, the arising of phenomena does not occur. However, phenomena undeniably appear to common beings as if they exist in and of themselves, appearing from the object's side toward [SP reads: towards] the subject rather than appearing to be imputed by the subject toward [SP reads: towards] the

object. 'Existing in dependence on a designating consciousness' is the special meaning of dependent-arising in the Prasangika system. The other two meanings are also wholeheartedly accepted by the Prasangikas, but their own special interpretation is to take *pratityasamutpada* [SP reads: dependent-arising] as referring to the designation of phenomena dependent not just on their parts or bases of designation but also on the thought that designates them.

"When Chandrakirti says that dependent-arising is the arising of things dependent on causes and conditions, the words 'causes and conditions' do not refer just to the usual causes and conditions such as seeds or ignorance [SP reads: such as seeds, karmic seeds, ignorance, so forth]. 'Causes and conditions' also refer to the parts of an [SP reads: the] object--an object's basis of designation--and to the thought that designates the existence of an object. The word 'arising' means not just 'production' but also 'existence' and 'establishment'; all phenomena are dependent existents or relative existents."

SP: I think in that kind of quote or description of dependent arising you might find meeting points in which to discuss similarities and differences with the presentation of the *Hidden Teachings* and mentalism. When-- he talked about several factors, one being the basis of designation. You talk-- seems to be talking about some kind of objective fact. Something is-- something objective is given in experience and on the basis of this something objective given in experience the mind formulates it as existent. And we have colors and sounds and names and so forth. So there's the conjunction of this given fact with this subjective functioning. And the meeting of the subjective functioning and the given fact is the line of reasoning that would take away the notion of the object existing inherently or materially as a self-sufficient entity. And I think the removal of this materiality-- oh-- materiality in the sense that PB uses the word, gives the object a-- a *revelatory* quality. You know, something is empty of this matter, of this sort of deadness-- this non-spiritual nature. And, because there *is* something that's empty of that material-- that material outlook, it has an existent as a re-- as a revealed object. So--

VM (simultaneously, faint): Can you do the last again, Sid, just the last piece, do it. Last sentence from all of this.

SP: Oh ok.

VM: I didn't follow. Everything up to there was fine. The business about revelation.

SP: Yeah. You have a meeting of a s-- of a subjective functioning individual [someone drawing/writing] or thought and a given fact. They coalesce in a way. And this is the opposite, this is like a spiritual outlook, this is the opposite of a material outlook which has the object resting in its place coming towards the subject. That's what it's empty of, it's empty of sitting in its place materially coming towards the subject. So this is removed by the kind of reasoning that-- that deals with imputation on a basis. And, when the materiality is removed, I-- I was calling it revelation because it's a meeting of something more than the individual with the function-- the fabricatory nature of a-- of the individual to produce a revealed object.

JL: Sidney, what's the--

SP: And-- I think this like abusing the object of this materiality--

VM: Disabusing you mean?

SP: Yeah, of the materiality, that materiality is what's being attacked, that's what's empty, I mean when you say-- it's not that's what's empty, it's the-- when you say the ob-- the phen-- the phenomena is empty of that materiality, there is a phenomena empty of that materiality. So the very emptiness of the phenomena establishes the phenomena as existing.

AH: The exi--

LC (simultaneously): But as a dependent arising.

AH: The existence--

SP (simultaneously): Well as existing.

LC (simultaneously): This--

AH: The *existence* [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with AH] of the phenomena is not being denied but a mode of appearance of the phenomena is being denied.

LR: And in fact, doesn't it take on a great deal more by saying that it is a dependent arising than it had when it was an independent existent.

AH: I think that's what--

SP (simultaneously): Well that's [LR simultaneously: I'm just trying to find--] what I think-- that's what I mean by-- [someone drawing/writing] by the revelation, [LR: Right.] because it gives it something deeper, there's something-- something more than a-- than something that accidentally happens to be sitting there. Yeah.

RC: I wonder if-- if in that context like-- if-- say in-- in-- instead of saying materiality, it-- if you said non-mental, alright. Normally you take the-- the mental and the material but [SP assents] to think of the mental and the non-mental. But if the non-mental were really non-mental, it could never be known.

AH: That's right. That's a good point. [SP assents] If it *was* such-- if there *were* such a thing as non-mental, there never has been, according to the doctrine. You would never know it. How could it-- [S: Yeah.] how could it exist?

RC (simultaneously, faint): (Uh-hm), uh-hm.

SP: But there's also [couple/three inaudible RC words simultaneous with SP] a psychological connotation with materialism and that if something exists materially, it's a basis for emotional response, you know, it serves, you know, for a heightened attraction or repulsion or-- or whatever, you know, if it just happens to be there and you happen to like it or not like it. But the opposite I think of a material-- of a view of materialism would be a s-- a sacred or a spiritual outlook. I think they're just exactly opposite and I think what is trying to be established is this kind of outlook, the second outlook, that-- to sort of eat away at this notion that you could abuse and possess things, you know, to-- [RC simultaneously: Well it seems like--] to dwell more on their mode of subsistence.

S (faint): Yeah.

RC: It seems like [S simultaneously, faint: Right.] you're saying that because it's not material therefore it *can* exist, is that--

SP: Yeah.

AH: See they'll say in this--

SP: Yeah, and that's the sense in what you were saying, that's [students assent, very faint] non-mental, right.

S (very faint): (Uh-hm.)

AH: They'll say in this analysis, Randy, to make parallel to your comment, that inherent existence never *has* existed. [RC assents, very faint] Why go to all the trouble of proving that through analysis? Matter never has been dead of mentation or the tissue of mind. Why do we have to go through all the trouble to see that, you know.

JL: Because it's very difficult.

AH: Yes. Well that--

SP: You know, I think the closest, what people have found in looking at the *Hidden Teachings* is that the closest parallel with the quotes you find here in the Dalai Lama is in that "Downfall of Materialism" chapter, [student assents, faint] you know, and the descriptions have-- really have similarities.

AH: Did you have one of them?

DB (faint): Yeah, I left mine (at home).

AH: Yeah let's-- let's try one.

LR (simultaneously): You guys have to talk louder, we can't--

AH: We thought we might find a PB quote to--

AD: You know, if I might interject here, I'm not disagreeing about the use of PB. But I think you'll find the greatest meaningfulness or correlation in the chapter in the *Wisdom* where he speaks about the birth of the universe.

S: Right.

JL: Uh-hm.

AD: I think there is where you're going to find what you're looking for.

S: Yeah.

S (faint): [one/two words inaudible]

S (faint): Yeah, uh-hm.

S: Anybody got the book? (laughter)

LDS: I didn't bring one.

VM: Anyone find one book.

AD: Well--

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S (faint whisper, possibly part of background): That's--

LC: Sure we have some here.

JL: It's not-- (bit of laughter)

JB: You got it?

VM/S(?) (very faint, possibly part of background): Let me give you some.

AH: Well, we-- we kind of got our seven-league boots on in regards to the equation of dependent arising to emptiness. Would it be alright or would-- you think it would be well to start [DB simultaneously, possibly part of background: Oh (couple/three words inaudible)] with *The Key to the Middle Way* and work our way up through some of the discussion and try to make equations and connections?

JL: Jonathan's had his hand up for a while (now).

S (simultaneously): Yes, with the--

S: Yeah.

JB: I just wondered if in light of what happened since, we shouldn't reconsider your saying you misspoke when you said there was a causal connection between emptiness and dependent arising. It sounds now, if I understood the clarification made of Linda's remark, that it is the emptiness of inherent existence that allows things to have existence at all.

AH: See, what-- if-- the notion of a causal connection is-- will be negated by Prasangika. There's--

JB: You mean emptiness and dependent arising.

AH: Yeah because see all the terms of their discussion are on a horizontal level. This is very--

SP: Well also because they just-- in the early parts of the argument emptiness is described in terms of the absence of inherent existence and absence can't cause something. Because the thing wasn't there in the first place.

VM: Yeah. There's no entity there (to have) an effect.

SP (simultaneously): There's no entity of cause, yeah.

AH: They say that-- one of the phrases from the sutra was, "Phenomenon are not made empty by emptiness. They are themselves empty." Emptiness is not to be considered as some other existent thing or some mode of force that acts on phenomena or some solvent that changes phenomena. So the causal connection that--

S (faint): Somehow.

S: Well we [AS simultaneously, faint: Right.] got three. (laughter)

AS (amidst laughter): (Because) that was right.

AD (simultaneously): Well you see, what you just said for instance PB would say something like this in this third chapter.

[Transcriber note: I am using *The Wisdom of the Overself* by Paul Brunton, Rider and Company, London, 1943.]

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, “The Birth of the Universe,” pp. 26-27, AD reading]: “There is no moment when it will not continue to exist, either latently [or actively]. This is so because the world does not arise by a sudden act of creation but by a gradual process of manifestation. *For being a vast thought and not a vast thing*, [AD emphasis] it is brought into being by the World-Mind out of *itself*, out of its own mental “*substance*”, and not out of any extraneous stuff such as matter is supposed to be [AD emphasis] [by materialists]--whether they be scientific, religious or metaphysical materialists. The World-Mind does not have to put out metaphorical hands at some specific moment and begin to mould matter, like a potter moulding his clay into the shape of a cosmos.”

AD: So, right away you get the feeling here well, the very substance of the cosmic thinker or this-- whoever's producing this world, if this world is the manifestation of his *being*, his being has to be empty or devoid of let's say any rigidity, any fixity, any concretion. Otherwise it cannot become anything. [AH: Yeah.] I mean [student assents] it cannot become any specific thing. [JL assents] So immediately you're-- you're-- that's why I said, this is the chapter you want when you want to start talking about combined dependent origination, [SP assents] the emptiness of, you know, the world-appearance, [SP assents] empty in the sense that it isn't any stuff out there.

JL: Anthony could I-- could I rephrase what you're-- you're aiming at there? If what the Buddha says that the object or phenomena is empty, if what they mean by that is that there is no independent thing first of all, that all things-- causes and conditions are dependent, interdependent I should say, in PB's terms, on the World-Mind, the-- on the conventional level, the object does exist for us as an object of knowledge. It has a reality to us as a-- as-- as an object of knowledge. It's not denied. Its very existence is caused-- the very possibility of his existence is caused by this-- this wonderful quality of the mind to take the form of the object in such a way that it's not a static thing. And the object is never a static thing. The mind *has* this ability to take its form. And so if you look for a static thing where the object is you won't find it. [short pause] You-- you see what I mean? Alright so-- so by its very-- by-- by the analysis that the-- that the Prasangika comes up with, it basically restores the nature of the object as a conventional object to us and not-- doesn't negate the object. [AH simultaneously: Does-- doesn't--] I mean, you don't have annihilation there.

AH: It doesn't negate the object into-- existence isn't questioned. *Inherent* existence is questioned.

JL: Right. [short pause] What do you think they're doing Andrew?

AH: What do you think their method is or--

JL: Yeah, what do you think the method is aiming at when-- when it--

AH: I think it's a-- I don't think-- I think it's more description than it is an explanation of the creature's juxtaposition with metaphysical reality. It's a description of the innate creature's confrontation with the real.

LR: But Andrew, doesn't it-- in the grasping of this truth, doesn't it-- wouldn't it take you right to the epistemological subject rather than an ego subject?

AH (simultaneously): And then some, and then some.

LR: Well I'm saying, (yeah/yes).

AH: I would think it-- I w-- I think it's a description of the Sahaja.

S (faint): Yeah.

LR: To say that the objects one perceives are-- have causes and conditions, that they don't exist in their own right?

AH: You don't--

LR: (Well), I don't think I'd make the jump that quickly.

AH: Well, they say that these two truths, the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. Now if we go through this analysis and we probably will, according-- like I remember the Dalai Lama's expression was, he says these two truths of-- concerning phenomena are actually one entity and he used his hand, [S: (Right.)] and he says that one entity has two reverses. Now that entity is not the appearing cup. That entity that he spoke of as having two reverses is the form of the mind, on the one hand as ultimate, static, undifferentiated mind substance, and on the other hand as the moment-by-moment presentation of the World-Idea. And those two are resolved into one entity in this view. Now I don't think that's a [AS simultaneously: I--] descripti-- yeah--

LR: I-- well I was just trying to take it step-by-step, I mean--

AH: But we're actually talking--

LR (simultaneously): I don't want to jump to Sahaja, I wanted (you to--) (laughter) I mean I would like to but that's not what I-- I think the *immediate* effect of taking this argument to the point of seeing that anything perceived is mentally designated or, you know, mentally [AH assents] imputed, [AH assents] when you see that the whole world is a known (innate/ornate) world, [AH: Yes.] that immediately must take you to an epistemological subject. Now what you want to do from there, ok well--

AH: Well they describe-- I think you're right, Linda, they describe-- there's first a correct conceptual grasp of emptiness. That happens first. Then there's-- if that's pursued and the reasoning is done again and again and they talk about an inferential cognition of emptiness. And it's from the perspective of inferential cognition that direct cognition is possible. Direct cognition is spoken of as a non-conceptual wisdom.

JL: Can you explain that Andrew? I'm not sure if I understand that.

AH: See we're talking about the conclusions of this book rather than the beginning of it. If you-- if you want to go there we can. Avery?

AS: Well, I just-- there was just a statement you made I'd like to try and get clear, how you understood that statement about the two hands in relation to the quote from PB.

AH: Sure.

AS: Two sides of the hand. I guess-- I-- I will-- I thought it was a little different but I may be wrong, I-- You say-- you were juxtaposing the-- the fluxional or energy aspect of mind with the still quiescent aspect of mind is what you were [couple words inaudible] [students assent, faint] And I-- [AH: Yes.] I would follow that at a low-- at a different level, at the level of the apparent stability or whatever you-- the appearance of the world juxtaposed with the other side being this energetic activity of the mind. And at least in terms of the emptiness of the object I-- I could see like--

AH (simultaneously): Is the existence--

AS: It seems like you could--

AH: I could answer your reply. Is the existence of the phenomenon based on its appearance or its dependently arisen nature? Like if [AS simultaneously: I (understand) that.] one reverse, if one reverse is the appearing cup, [AS simultaneously: Yes, what would you say there?] or is that reverse the dependently arisen cup?

AS: Well, I guess [VM simultaneously: How do you distinguish them?] he was just talking about the cup that I see, [AH: That's--] the appearing cup, if I [AH simultaneously: That's not known.] take the reverse side and I see that as this manifest-- this continual putting forth, the movement of the mind, [AH simultaneously: But see, there's a real--] of mental-- of mental energy, then I [VM assents] could see those as two sides of the same thing. We normally see it as a cup, as an appearance and it seems to have some kind of [AH: Now if that-- if--] stability and so on.

AH: Yes, yes. If that-- if that appearance is one of the reverses, then your criticism is justifiable. If-- if that re--

AS (simultaneously): Well [one word inaudible] I was just asking.

AH: No I'm just doing a logical thing, I'm not involved with [AS, faint: Yeah.] anything else. If the appearing cup is one of the reverses as you have described it, then it's true what you say. But if one of the reverses is the dependently arisen cup, then it's a different level.

S (very faint): Yeah.

VM: Wait a minute, isn't this--

AS (simultaneously): Well, all I meant was that--

AH (simultaneously): The de-- the-- here's the point, the dependently arisen cup and the appearing cup, from our point of view, are different because the dependently arisen cup is empty.

VM: No, but so-- I can also argue I think--

AH: The appearing cup *appears* to have inherent existence.

S (faint): (No.)

VM: The fact that it appears though is due to dependent arising, so you could come at it from that angle and make a close connection [AH simultaneously: But the--] between appearance and dependent arising.

AH: But the-- yes, that's true, but the-- the issue-- the issue hinges on what is known about the phenomena. If it's taken as a inherently existent cup, is that one of the reverses of the one entity? Or is one of the reverses the dependently *arisen* cup? Now there are two different [VM: I'm sorry.] meaning contents there.

AS: I-- I guess-- I'm just going off, we talked about this seeing an object as this continual process of manifestation of the mind. And that's not the normal way we see the object.

AH: That's the point.

AS: Right? Now--

AH (simultaneously): There's a difference there.

AS: Yes, there is quite a difference.

AH: Now--

AS: Now I always looked at that, may be wrong, but that continued process of the mind's manifestation as being the very obverse side of the o-- of the appearing object that I experience.

AH: Yes Avery I-- [VM assents] I--

AS: And I-- I follow the other-- [VM/S assents, faint] the-- [AH simultaneously: Do you follow what I'm--] the other-- I follow the other complement-- the other--

VM: Pair of complementary descriptions, yeah.

AS (simultaneously): Pair of descriptions but it seems that that's a-- they are distinct, now I may be really--

AH (simultaneously): Do you follow my interpretation of it?

JL: It's the same.

S: No.

S (very faint): (Uh-uh.)

S: I don't follow it.

AH (simultaneously): Do-- do you fo-- let's say this. Is it-- do you-- do you agree that there's distinction between the appearance of the cup as inherently existent and the cup spoken of as a dependently arisen existent cup? See you don't posit the existence of the cup at the level of its *inherent* existence. You posit the cup's existence at the level of dependent origination.

LDS: But that allows for the appearance. It doesn't deny its appearance.

AH (simultaneously): That's the-- that's the moment-by-moment flow of the mind.

LDS: Yeah.

AS (simultaneously): That's fine and I--

AH (simultaneously): Now the other reverse, it must be the stillness.

VM: What's the stillness again Andrew, that's not-- I didn't follow how you were-- what (you're/your)
[one word inaudible]

LDS (simultaneously): I think you're going too far on that one.

AH: I know, I know. But I can't understand it otherwise [S: Well--] because-- When he said that there's two truths, and within conventionality-- See, you gotta-- you gotta find a way of establishing the existence of the cup.

DB: Andrew could I-- could I try something?

AH: Sure.

DB: I think what the problem is is that you're talking about conventional truth and ultimate truth here, and it is that which is spoken of as being an entity with two reverses. Conventional truth is not that a cup has a material existence and that the conventional truth of the cup is that it exists independently of all other things.

AH: Yes.

DB: That con-- the conventional tru-- that's the conventional falsehood which this dialectic is trying to overcome.

AH: That's right.

DB: So, you don't have one entity with two reverses half of which being [AH: False.] that which the whole thing is trying to undermine.

AH: Exactly the point. You don't have one reverse that's false and one reverse that's correct. Both reverses are correct.

AS/S(?) (very faint): (Yeah.)

JB (simultaneously): Say them again.

AH: You don't have one rev--

JB (simultaneously): No, no, no, say [LC simultaneously: Say what they are.] the two, say the two that are.

AS/RG(?) (simultaneously): Right.

AH: The first condition is a false one where you talk about the appearance of the cup.

JB: I (got/get) that one.

AH: The second one is a true one where you posit the *existence* of the cup as dependently arisen.

JB: And what are the [LC simultaneously: Ok.] two sides [AS simultaneously: Right.] of the true one?

AH: The true one is, for Prasangika, there's one entity-- the two truths are one entity with two reverses.

(Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1984 0803a Ends; Side 2 Begins)

AS: --saying, I-- well maybe we'll have to see what they're speaking-- you're speaking of-- [student assents, faint] he's speaking of the-- the same time dual and non-dual nature of mind, that it's both active and still, an ever-active mind within an ever-still mind.

AH: That's the way I've been approaching.

AS (simultaneously): And you're saying-- you're-- you're saying that the-- this ever-still mind, the pure-- the stillness of mind, is one side of the truth and the activity of mind is what we call dependent origination, the flux, the continual changing consciousness, you're saying that's the other aspect of mind.

AH: Yes.

AS: And you're saying that they're calling that stillness the emp-- that's what-- when they say the emptiness of the object or emptiness, you say they're referring to that stillness, and when they speak of combined dependent origination you say they're talking about the activity of that very same mind, and that mind has two natures. I follow that, that-- [AH: Ok.] I follow that that is a truth and I think that's so. I don't-- maybe I should leave out the question of whether that's what they're saying when they speak of the two sides of an object is really the stillness of mind. 'Cause it just seems to me that at some point (we could always say) that if you really-- *that* realization, that the activity of mind, mind as activity, is re-- recombinable or rejoined in the back with mind as stillness, [S: Uh-hm.] [JB, faint: He has done it.] to me that's, I mean-- that would be quite an ultimate position and quite different from realizing that the-- that the-- quite different from realizing the mentalness of an object [AH: Yes.] as being the-- the-- the result of this process, this energetic process of mind, whether it's individual or cosmic [few words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): And, you know Avery, [VM simultaneously: But there's two different truths.] I-- I'm even more con--

AS: There's two different--

AH: Yes, it's--

S: Two different truths.

AS (simultaneously): There are two-- those are to me distinct views, maybe-- maybe I'm mistaken.

AH (simultaneously): Maybe-- maybe there's a clue for us, you know, if it's more appropriate to take the point of view of the *Wisdom* as a parallel than the point of view of the *Hidden Teaching*.

AS: Well--

AH: Perhaps-- perhaps that's a way of having a clue that-- what their perspective is.

VM: No.

AS: Well I-- no I--

VM (simultaneously): I think the point of taking the *Wisdom* is that you've got the world-image that's being discussed in the chapter "The Birth of the Universe". [AS: Yeah.] And as [students assent] Anthony tried to point out Wednesday [AS simultaneously: Cosmic rather than--] night, this is a cosmological view where you're continuously [AS simultaneously, faint: (Well that's what--)] trying to analyze the-- the world-image.

AH: Now if you're going to juxtapose world-image against something, what would it be?

VM: Well, I'm not-- I don't think I'm going to do that [AS simultaneously: Say--] at all, I'm-- I don't understand your question.

AH: If we-- Maybe Avery could articulate again the two possibilities.

AS: No-- [AD simultaneously: (Acquainted--)] well ok, I could but I--

AD (simultaneously): You're acquainted with them from PB, the practical point of view and the ultimate point of view.

S: Uh-hm.

VM: But what I [AD simultaneously: The--] thought the discussion that these folks were having here-- I understand what you're saying Anthony, you say well the cup holds water, that's good, it al-- it-- and then the other point of view is ultimately it's empty of any inherent existence, it's a fabrication, an outpouring of the activity of mind. But I thought David's point, David Bulkley's point was that that's not the two truths, as he understands it anyway, because the two truths aren't that one view is the conventional one, the false one, the man in the street's view, and then the other is the correct view.

S: (Oh/Yeah), ok.

VM: But, that they're both correct and the only way you can have the apparent lower, I don't want to say lower, higher, one of the views still be a truth is that the appearance of the object *is* the functioning of dependent arising. Its apparent existence *is* this process known as dependent arising, as this outflowing of emptiness. And that's a little different I think than saying there's a practical truth to the object. Maybe I'm splitting hairs and it's not a-- a point.

AH (simultaneously): I would like-- I'd like to comment.

DB (simultaneously with VM and AH): I think that-- I think that, if I can just try to respond, I think that the-- what-- and the reason they distinguish this is that-- that the practical perspective is one that does not deny, you know, from PB's perspective, the practical perspective is one that does not deny the reality of the world-appearance but attempts to understand it *as* an appearance [student assents] rather than simply accepting it as--

VM: Self-existent.

DB: Right, ok, and it's-- and if-- if it were-- if this were to be-- and I think that's what conventional truth is, because [AH simultaneously: Yes.] conventional truth is not the way the guy in the street is going to work.

VM: Exactly, (uh-hm/yeah), that's--

AH (simultaneously): I'd like to read a short quote to speak to this discussion. And this is from page 62, the second paragraph.

VM: 62 what you said?

AH: Maybe this will help us. I'm not-- I'm not sure. I've just described the way that I've been approaching it. I'm not-- it's altogether possible that that's incorrect.

[Transcriber note: I am using *The Buddhism of Tibet*, combined volume, comprising *The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way* by Tenzin Gyatso, The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, and *The Precious Garland* and *The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses* by Nagarjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama, translated in the main by Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rinpoche, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1975.]

Dalai Lama XIV [*The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way*, p. 62, AH reading]: "Similarly, if phenomena [AH reads: phenomenon] had no deep mode of being other than their external or superficial mode of being, and if thus the way they appeared and the way they existed were in agreement, then it would be sufficient to hold that conventional modes of appearance are true just as they appear, and to place confidence in them. However, this is not so. Though phenomena appear as if true, most true, ultimately they are not true. Therefore, phenomena abide in the middle way, not truly or inherently existent and also not utterly non-existent. This view, or [AH adds: this] way of viewing--the knowledge of such a mode of being, just as it is--is called the view of the middle way."

JL: That's fine.

VM: That's good. What does it mean?

LDS: See--

JL: What does it mean?

LDS: I would like to--

AH: Sure.

LDS: Per the prior discussion and this quote, it seems like he's-- we're saying that the appearance of an object or the existence of an object is not in question.

AH: I'm sorry Louie.

LDS: The appearance or the existence of an object is not in question. It's--

AH (simultaneously): The appearance is questioned.

LDS: No but, let me follow-- let me say [AH simultaneously: What--] what I was going to say. There's-- but there's an added component in our typical experience of an appearance that is a-- that is an erroneous component, ok, and that is the belief in its substantiality, in its externality and independence.

AH: Yes.

LDS: Now once that error is corrected, if I correct my conception or my experience, the given experience as external and independent, if I correct that, it does no-- no damage to the appearance itself. It only-- in other words, the wise man relates to the world or to objects but he doesn't-- he does not associate with those things the error that most of us do, that is [S simultaneously: Sure.] the fact of their-- apparent fact of their independence and so on.

AH: Yes.

LDS: Now, his wisdom does no damage to the fact of their appearance. Now he has an appropriate relationship with the things of his appearance.

AH: That's right.

LDS: He does not take them to be what they aren't, but yet he still can use them in a practical way.

AH: That's the way I understood it. It's not existence that's being denied or questioned, but inherent existence that's being questioned.

LDS: Ok but, I was referring to your characterization of the-- of the two sides of-- of the true object, ok, as one-- you seem to be negating any appearance as true at all.

S: No, no, no.

SP (simultaneously): I think I--

VM: Yeah I think so.

SP (simultaneously): I would like to comment here, I think 'true' is used in a peculiar way [VM: Yes.] by the Prasangikas. When they say that the object doesn't have true existence--

VM: It's a synonym for 'inherent' isn't it?

SP: It's a [LDS simultaneously: Yeah, yeah, yeah.] synonym for 'inherent', it means complete in itself as it appears.

LDS: Ok, ok, so [VM simultaneously: Right.] we got--

SP: You know, and our use of 'truth' is quite-- quite different.

[students assent, very faint]

JL (faint): That's true.

VM (simultaneously): So that could easily throw you in a-- yeah.

AH (simultaneously): Well, as to the question of what their stance is or what their perspective is, I think Avery's question is an important one.

VM: Gee I think we jumped in the middle.

AH: But, I was [S simultaneously: Uh-hm.] just going to say, we've-- we've really got our seven-league boots on [VM laughing: Nice.] in terms of trying to answer [VM simultaneously, laughing: Nice.] these things. I would like to start at the beginning and follow the reasoning and then we could perhaps arrive at more confident conclusions about what they might be saying.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S (faint): Sure.

AH: Does that seem wise Anthony, or unnecessary?

FINDING BUDDHISM IN "THE BIRTH OF THE UNIVERSE"

AD: I think you'll get into a-- an unproductive, *boring* (some laughter) situation. I mean it, because all you'll be doing would be repeating what you read. [AS simultaneously: That's right.] Whereas what I'm asking you to do is something like this, alright. Maybe it won't work but it's worth a try. Get a hold of the *Wisdom*. Turn to the chapter on "The Birth of the Universe". And turn that into an exercise for your ingenuity. In other words, the very things that you understand of Buddhism you'll find right here. Make the correlations. You'll have a lot of-- you'll have a lot of enjoyment that way.

S: Uh-hm.

AH (simultaneously): Yes.

AD: Whereas if you keep it up, we're all going to go to sleep! [students assent, very faint] Well that's just my opinion.

S (faint): Yeah.

SP (laughing): Yeah.

AD: So for instance when he says-- if you-- if you open to the chapter on "The Birth of the Universe" and I just read *randomly*, [VM: Uh-hm.] you're going to hit Buddhism all the time. [VM or another student assents] But without the word 'Buddhism'.

AH: I agree that you hit Buddhism. I don't think you hit specifically Prasangika, I think you hit Yogacara Buddhism.

VM (faint): Uh-hm, right.

AD (simultaneously): Well, when we get to that point I'll be asking you for what the distinctions between the two are, the way *I* understand Yogacara and Prasangika and the way *you* understand it. [AH simultaneously: Obviously there's a-- yeah.] That distinction may be imaginary.

AH: Yes. I hasten to agree.

AD (simultaneously): Ok so, that's why I (say/saying). But even so, so much the better. If you could-- if you could take a book-- a chapter from this book, alright, and translate it into their terminology, [AH simultaneously: Anthony, here--] you'll have a lot of fun.

AH: Here's the question I have.

AD: I want you to *enjoy* it! (laughter)

AH (amidst laughter): Yes, I got (that part).

VM: We need his book.

AH (simultaneously): If-- if we do that, I agree it's a marvelously productive method, (bit of laughter) and we followed the-- the Yogacara interpretation, I think we should do Yogacara Buddhism. [S, faint: Yeah.] [VM simultaneously: Oh no, no, no, no.] I don't think we should try to call Prasangika--

RG (simultaneously): No, no, no.

VM: No, come on.

AH: No--

AD: I--

AH (simultaneously): Do-- do we--

AD: I--

S (simultaneously): Let's try it, just open the book and do it.

S (simultaneously): Let's-- yeah.

AD: I won't-- I'll back off.

SP: No, no, no.

S (faint): Let's-- [SP: Yeah. (laughter)] let's do it.

S (faint): Well let's do it.

S (simultaneously): Let's (do it).

AD (simultaneously): I got a way of working that demands that you use your head and not-- not your mouth, your tongue. You gotta use this here, you gotta be creative!

S: Let's hear a quote.

AD (simultaneously): I-- if you open randomly--

AS: I think that's a good way of doing it.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 29, AD reading (simultaneously with AS above)]: "Looked at from the outside, the universe comes forth out of nothingness and passes away into

nothingness. But looked at it from the inside, there has always been an eternal hidden reality in its background. This reality is Mind.”

AD: I mean emptiness. (laughter) Just read it that way! You won’t have no trouble translating this into a Buddhist terminology. This-- if anything, this *is* Buddhism!

AH: Yes I always thought so. Fifteen years ago I thought so. (bit of laughter)

SC: Now here’s (your/the) chance to prove it.

VM (simultaneously): Fifteen years ago you were in the [one word inaudible] (mind).

SP: Yeah.

VM: No.

AD: Well why don’t you try it?

JL: Let’s do it. Sam’s got [couple words inaudible]

SC: Aren’t you looking for that quote?

S (simultaneously, faint): That’s too soon.

EMPTINESS IS EQUIVALENT TO VOID MIND; BEING-CONSCIOUSNESS

AH: In other words, Anthony, it-- I won’t say anything more, I just want-- you don’t care to maintain distinction between Mind as ultimate truth and emptiness as ultimate truth, you want to combine those two?

AD: Sure.

AH: Ok.

AD: To me they’re the same. The other night didn’t you read a quote from PB where Nous or a Being and emp-- and the Void are the same thing?

[students assent, very faint]

AH: And we also read the quote--

AD (simultaneously, passionately): The Void Mind *is* Being, that’s all it’s-- that’s the only way I ever use Being.

AH: Ok. It’s fine, let’s do it.

S: Now you tell him.

SP (simultaneously): But when they talk about an individual mind, you wouldn’t equate an individual mind, and I-- I mean in an exalted sense, not a-- [VM: Imagination.] you know, imaginative mind or whatever. But, that pure knowing that’s the highest part of an individual, you wouldn’t equate that in scope with Being. Right?

AD: Well, if I understand you, and I have to unders-- try to understand, [student assents, faint] the highest or the ultimate essence of a person we would say is consciousness. [SP assents] Or Being?

SP: Yes. But that--

AD: To me they're indistinguishable. I mean I can't say consciousness without including isness and I can't say inclu-- say isness without including consciousness. I mean I just can-- don't know how to separate these two things. Ok? So if you say that--

SP: But one, I mean I'm just for the-- arguing for the sake of discussion here but-- but consciousness is like a knowing. Right?

AD: Yeah.

SP: But, you wouldn't necessarily equate isness with knowing.

AS: At the level of Nous you do, Sidney. [S simultaneously: You would?] Being-Consciousness. That's what they mean by the Nous.

VM: Knowing and Being [couple words inaudible] yes.

AD (simultaneously): That's why [couple/few inaudible AS words simultaneous with AD] they always identify Being and knowing as identical. It's-- [AS simultaneously: The nature--] how do they put it, a duality-in-unity.

AS: The nature of Being is to be self-knowing.

SP (simultaneously): Ok, a duality-in-unity, that-- [AS simultaneously: And the nature of consciousness--] that I could buy but nonetheless I don't see how you can equate the knowing aspect of an individual with this full scope of Being. I mean Being seems to be a much broader term than the apex of the individual.

NON-DUALITY

AD (simultaneously): Well you see, here again like, I would say something like this. Your premises are something like this. [SP: Mm.] You're speaking about knowing and it-- I'm inclined to believe that your analysis is coming from the epistemological subject, alright. And when you speak about Being it seems that you're falling back on let's say cosmology. So it's-- there's going to-- there's going to be a-- you know, like a cleft between the two. [SP assents] Now, this was the discussion we were-- I was trying to steer them into Wednesday. [VM and another student assent] You have to-- we have to try to understand that in one sense when we analyze experience for ourselves individually, [VM assents] alright, there's two possible ways to go, there's what they call the-- the way of-- what was it, I forgot.

RG: Subjective.

S: Yes.

VM (simultaneously): Subjective.

AS (simultaneously): The subjective, the epistemological [one word inaudible]

RC (simultaneously, faint): Epistemological [one word inaudible]

AD: Yeah. [AS/S(?), faint: Subjective.] And the other way was the way of cosmology. [VM and SP assent] So if we analyze or if we introvert into ourselves, we come up with the notion of Nirvikalpa samadhi or thoughtless consciousness. [SP assents] Now, on the other hand, if we try to understand the nature of the world, then we forget about the transcendental consciousness or the essence of, you know, the pure consciousness as the essence [SP assents] of the person and you go into an analysis of the Idea, the World-Idea. You analyze the Idea and ultimately you get to the substratum of the Idea which is, [HS/AS(?) assents, faint] let's say, the World-Mind. [SP assents] But when you say Mind, alright, you're speaking about that which also constituted your essence. So, here's the strange thing. If-- if this doesn't happen, in other words, if in the analysis of your subjectivity you don't come up with Mind, [SP assents] and if in the analysis of the World-Idea you don't come up with Mind, [SP assents] you won't come up with the notion of non-duality. In either case you gotta come up with the notion of Mind or Being so that you can come up with non-duality. [SP: I would--] Once you realize that in essence the person is pure consciousness, [SP assents] once you realize that the essence underlying the World-Idea is pure consciousness, non-duality appears.

AS (faint): So you have to do them both.

SP: I would have to agree with that and I'm not arguing with that point. I'm arguing with the fact that the-- the mind of the individual doesn't have the scope of the mind of the world system. I mean, although it's identical in essence--

AD: Absolutely, yes, of course.

S (faint): Yeah.

SP: --it-- it doesn't [S simultaneously, faint: Of course what?] seem identical in amplitude.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah but no. He calls-- he even call the Overself a *particle* of [AS simultaneously: Right.] World-Mind.

SP: Yeah. But that's the sense in which, if you say that the nature of-- of one's mind of clear light, if you, you know, use a Buddhist term, the mind of clear light itself is empty, if-- I always use that term that the mind of clear light itself is empty as meaning that it rests within a wider expanse of pure Mind, that its nature participates in something larger than itself and yet in a way is identical, has that nature of emptiness. [S, faint: Right.] In order to hold a distinction of amplitude so that you don't-- one doesn't think that one's self *is* the world [AS, very faint: Well--] I thought we have this--

AS (simultaneously, faint): Yeah, yeah, but-- but if you-- if-- but if Mind-- if-- [student assents, faint] but if you trace the essence of yourself and you trace the essence of the world appearance [SP assents] to the World-Idea, then you must get back to that same-- to the same essence, not-- again, as you said it was the same in essence, the Mind. We're not speaking of the scope.

SP: But then it seems like-- I mean on the one hand you may want to level out distinction because they are the same in essence. I mean Mind pervades everything down to the cup and whatever. But you still try to hold distinctions and you s-- and you still try to hold that the Mind, identical as it is in essence, has an

objective fact to it [AS, faint: And a subjective.] that's wider even than the Mind, even though the Mind is the ultimate in terms of the individual. Well, I don't know, I didn't really say that very well.

AS (simultaneously): So we're speaking of the Mind as also ultimate.

SP: Pardon?

AS (simultaneously): And we're speaking of Mind also as ultimate in terms of the world.

SP: Yeah.

AS (simultaneously): It's not just ultimate in terms of the individual but also in terms of the world.

SP: But it's not *your* mind that's ultimate in terms of the world although it is a-- identical in essence. And I--

AS: Mind, yeah.

SP: And I think the-- I might-- probably pushing this point too far, (SP laughs) [AS, faint: No it's (good/cool).] but--

AD (simultaneously): No, not at all.

SP: --I'm trying to s-- to-- to say that the reason that a con-- consciousness is empty is to hold a distinction that there's-- it's a dot within reality even though it is the nature of reality.

S (faint): Yeah.

AS: I think that's (true though).

PRASANGIKA AND CHITTAMATRA

MW (simultaneously): Do you want to contrast this with Chittamatra's position? I mean, it see--

AD (simultaneously): Listen, if I can speak up so can you.

MW: That's true. I was asking whether he made that statement to show-- to show why he thinks Chittamatra is saying something different than Madhyamika.

SP: I didn't-- no, I didn't say it for that reason although there's a quote here of the relation of Prasangika and Chittamatra. This quote says--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 375, SP reading]: "According to [SP adds: the] Prasangika, the mind is the principle creator of everything because sentient beings accumulate predisposing potencies through their actions, and these actions are directed by mental motivation. These potencies are what create not only their [SP reads: our] own lives but also the physical world about them."

AS: Yeah, vasanas, uh-hm.

SP: "All..." this is Prasangika.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 375, SP reading]: "All environments are formed by *karma* [SP reads: by these potencies], that is, actions and the potencies they establish. The wind, sun, earth, trees,

what is enjoyed, used, and suffered--all are produced from actions [SP reads: from these potencies]. Potencies on the mind of each person in combination with those of similar beings create the very substance of their world-system."

SP: So the-- [S, very faint: Yeah, right.] [AS, faint: Huh.] the Prasangikas accept basically the same position--

AS (simultaneously): So they-- so they accept the reason-principles that we spoke of as these [VM simultaneously: Right.] tropes or vasanas.

VM (simultaneously): Or we go to the karmic seeds chap-- part of this chapter here.

SP: Uh-hm.

AS: Yeah.

VM: Chapter three. (Ok.)

SP (simultaneously): They accept basically almost exactly-- in fact I had a quote where it says they--

VM (simultaneously): How does that differ from the alayavijnana of the Chittamatras?

SP: The difference is in terms of the description of emptiness which I guess is why I was pushing that-- [S, faint: Yes.] that point.

VM: Oh, yes, yes, yes, [SP simultaneously: The difference isn't in--] the emptiness isn't in mind and the object and all that business.

SP: Yeah.

VM: There *is* no difference.

AS: What?

LR: We can't hear you, [VM simultaneously: I'm sorry.] one more time.

AS/S(?) (simultaneously, faint): Yes [couple words inaudible]

S (simultaneously, faint): (Yes) [couple words inaudible]

AH: They [VM simultaneously: Yes.] have a different [S simultaneously: Go ahead.] definition of ultimate truth.

AS: Yeah. [S, faint: Yeah.] And--

AH: Chittamatra has-- ultimate truth for them is the emptiness of subject and object as being different entities. There's one bija seed. And they posit the mind-basis for all. They avoid the extreme of annihilation by positing the mind-basis. Prasangika has ultimate truth as emptiness of inherent existence, not emptiness of lack of distinction between subject and object. They avoid the extreme of annihilation by positing emptiness.

SP: They-- it says here--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 376, SP reading]: “Both Chittamatrins and Prasangikas accept roughly the same presentation of phenomena; they disagree on their nature.”

SP: Meaning their-- the-- the way in which the phenomena are empty. The Prasangikas want to hold something objective that stands outside of the individual. The Chittamatra, the usual presentation of Chittamatra, which may not be our interpretation of Chittamatra, but the usual one within the Buddhist system is that the objects are pulled back into the subject as being the nature of the subject. The Prasangikas say yes, they're in the nature of the-- of the-- the mind but they have an objective givenness that stands outside of an individual knowing.

LR: So that would be more those-- the Mind of the World-Idea you think?

SP: That's what I think because when they say that-- that the individual imputes the phenomena on the basis of designation and the basis of designation isn't found which is, you know, a common terminology, I think the reason the basis of designation isn't found is because whatever's presented to the individual the individual has to fabricate according to his own [LR simultaneously: (one word inaudible) uh-hm.] perceptual scale or whatever, you know. And so the object that-- outside of that individual experience is never to be found, even though it's the basis for that subjective experience. And I think that's what they want to hold in distinction to Chittamatra.

AS: But-- but you know, you just-- [S, faint: Yeah.] you just brought in-- we should-- maybe we should do some of these (quotes).

S (very faint): Oh yeah, sure.

AS: But, I tho-- I thought what you were just saying Sidney was exactly what [VM assents] I would-- I mean, the words sound different at first but then-- When you said that the Madhyamika doesn't want to accept that it's the subject, the essence of the subject which is the basis or puts forth the object, they want to go to some World-Mind as it were [SP: Uh-hm.] as the basis for the object, which in turn is also-- that emptiness of the World-Mind is also the basis for the subject.

SP: Yeah.

AS: Well, I-- I don't-- and then again I don't see how that differs from the point of view of cosmic mentalism, the way that PB's putting it forth right here [SP simultaneously: Yeah, that--] saying [S simultaneously: Well--] that the substance of the-- substance of the object--

SP (simultaneously): Well that may be because we're-- we interpret Chittamatra a little different than the presentation [AS simultaneously: Yeah.] that they're arguing with.

AS (simultaneously): So you're interpreting Chittamatra as saying well you get to this essence of the Mind as the subject end and that that a-- and then you label that as subject and say that that's responsible for projecting a world. But if that-- in fact that subject, the essence of that subject, is not different from Mind--

SP (simultaneously): Well, the Prasangika's are saying that that individual-- individuality is projecting the world but they say there's a-- a-- a wider basis for that projection of the world.

AS (simultaneously): Yes, the World-Mind or the World-Idea.

SP (simultaneously): Which-- yeah, which, you know, we probably wouldn't disagree in terms of our-- the way we do Chittamatra.

DB (simultaneously): But it sounds like-- doesn't it sound like this-- the distinction that exists between *The Hidden Teaching Beyond Yoga* and *The Wisdom of the Overself*, wherein in *The Wisdom of the Overself*, PB introduces the notion of the World-Mind as being the contri-- as contributing an objective reality [SP: Uh-hm.] to the individual so that one doesn't have to deal with a solipsistic situation any longer.

SP: Yeah.

DB: I mean, it almost sounds as if we-- well when say Chittamatra or Yogacara, we say well that's mentalism and by that it's supposed to be the entirety of what PB's presented, whereas it's only part of it. I mean [student assents] the Chittamatra is the first part of what PB's presented in terms of an analysis [HS assents, faint] of experience.

SP: Yeah I-- I think this brings up, you know, mine, maybe yours, everybody's shortcomings in understanding *The Hidden Teachings* because, if you take, oh, this notion that the object is not different from the subject, it is and it isn't, I mean even in a practical-- in a practical everyday sense and that the object is a-- is a mental content. But, you can't change the locomotive into the mountain and so forth and I think the Prasangikas are trying to-- to throw an emphasis that reinforces that-- [LR simultaneously: It doesn't also put--] [AS simultaneously with LR and SP: Yeah but that--] that objectivity, yeah.

LR (simultaneously): It doesn't knock them into one homogenous substance.

SP (simultaneously): Yeah.

AH: Yes I--

SP: But the Prasangikas are trying to hold both, they're trying to say it's mentally fabricated, to hold that position, and they're trying to say that it's-- that it has an objective basis--

LR (simultaneously): Has its own reason.

SP: Has its own reasoning separate from a-- from the individual fabrication. [AH simultaneously: A point that they would--] I think they're trying to have [student assents, faint] both together.

S: Right.

VM (simultaneously): Why can't you say the same about the bija seeds, you would say that that is why the locomotive can't be changed into a mountain, because there's a certain collocation of reason-principles, karmic forces, [SP assents] bija seeds, I don't care what you call them, [SP assents] that are responsible for the nature of that appearance.

AH: There-- there's a-- a difference that they discuss and perhaps it's not an important one. They say in the case of the Chittamatra ultimate analysis, this the-- the distinction between subject and object is erased in the mind-basis. In the case of the Prasangika description they say upon ultimate analysis, let's say

there's a cognition of emptiness, they say that well, it's something like that but it's a little different, they say they take-- that the relationship of the subject to the object is like pouring water into water. But they still hold the thread of a distinction between subject and object under ultimate analysis.

SP: Yeah, and I think that's the emptiness of the-- [VM simultaneously: It's hard for me to see it.] of the Mind. The emptiness of the Mind is the nature-- is indistinguishable from the Mind because--

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

AH: They don't want to-- they don't want to resolve subject and object into mind-basis by way of getting rid of that distinction. They want to describe that occurrence by way of a mystical insight with the distinction of the subject and the object. So their epistemology and their discussion is formulated in *that* way, you know.

VM: I don't know if this is the place we'd want to do it by I certainly never felt comfortable about the distinction between the Chittamatra or the Yogacara and the Prasangika and, maybe it's more appropriate to go towards some of these quotes in [SP assents] the third chapter of the *Wisdom*. [LDS simultaneously in background: (Hey), I think I got a good quote.] But somewhere along the line I would like [S simultaneously: Oh, Louie's got a quote.] to-- if there is a distinction I want to see it, if there isn't I want to see that too.

AD (simultaneously): Well the most fruitful approach would be to use the comparative method.

VM: Yeah.

SP (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

PRASANGIKA WANTS TO MAINTAIN A BASIS OF IMPUTATION; COMPARING THIS NOTION WITH PASSAGES FROM "BIRTH OF THE UNIVERSE"

AD: And there's one or two good texts that I think you have there in your possession and you have the *Wisdom*, alright. Now for instance, we just made the point about the Prasangikas want to retain something of objectivity in the perceived world that we're going to deal with. [VM: Yeah.] Now it's easy to see that PB tries to do the same thing when he speaks about the birth of individuals, [SP assents] alright, in terms of the cosmic setting. In other words, as the cosmic mind arises, individual minds arise with it and the individu-- the cosmic mind works through the individual mind and the individual mind has an experience of the world. [SP assents] Now, if you could take a thought like that, one of the ideas let's say like that, and put it together with the Buddhist notion, alright, in a sense of comparing the two and try to see the similarities and dissimilarities, [student assents] you're forced, alright, to become a little creative. And, maybe even-- you know, you might even get aroused. (bit of laughter)

JL: We'll try.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S: (Go ahead.)

LDS (simultaneously): Could I try a quote from the *Wisdom* and see if--

AD: Yeah.

LDS: Ok. Along the lines about this-- Sidney's discussion of the need to maintain some objectivity [SP assents] and also the scale of perception of the individual providing the form and intelligibility of experience. I think this quote addresses that, he says--

PB [The Wisdom of the Overself, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "Each [LDS adds: person] experiences the world-idea in its own unique way and adjusts it to the form of its own intellect."

AD: Alright, you got the point, didn't you!? Well why don't you do it like that!?

S (faint): Yeah. (bit of laughter)

S: [one/two words inaudible]

LDS (simultaneously): But, he says further.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "[Hence] the char..."

AD (simultaneously, passionately): I know what he says further!! (laughter) Why don't you *do* it like that, why don't you [LDS simultaneously: I'm trying to!] get together and have a-- have a meeting where you can put your heads together. Oh, now you're getting the point, ah? (bit of laughter) Instead of just getting up there and talking.

LDS: But Anthony, you know we use the *Hidden Teaching* some and I think there are quotes in there too that address specific--

AD (simultaneously, passionately): Yes there's quotes in there but "The Birth of the Universe" will be more than you can handle. That'll keep you busy for the next six months. The correlations between "The Birth of the"-- that's a Buddhist chapter! I accused him of being a crypto-Buddhist. (some laughter)

RG: What-- what did he say?

AH: We did what you said but we used the wrong book.

SP: Yes. (laughter)

AD: The understanding is there, all you have to do is work.

CDA (simultaneously): You always use the [S simultaneously: Right.] wrong book, you've got to put that into the-- to the (crux), you've got to-- (CDA laughing, bit of laughter)

S (faint): Yeah.

AH: You know, I thought it was quite a-- quite a daring--

AD (simultaneously): I'm not interested in the two truths! We know that! Right? PB keeps hammering on-- on you all the time. There's the non-dual truth and you can get a metaphysician to teach you, alright, and we won't because philosophy isn't concerned with that, and there's the practical truth. And we gotta work with the two all the time, we know all that. We don't have to go through that. But, to try to be comparative, to take this-- this vast teaching in "The Birth of the Universe", which by the way needs a

commentary. That chapter needs a commentary. Take that and then-- and compare with what the Buddhists are saying and I think the correlation will just make your hair stand. But you gotta do the work.

AH: I'd love to.

LR: What did you mean philosophy isn't concerned with that?

VM: Exclusively.

AD (simultaneously): Well, how can I be concerned with non-dual over here? I gotta talk to you, don't I? If I was-- if I was really bel-- if I really believed in non-dual I wouldn't bother saying hello. (laughter)

[few seconds of laughter, background student talking]

LR: No, so [AH simultaneously: Well--] what are you concerned with?

S (faint): I mean-- so if you say--

AH (simultaneously): One thing-- one thing is very clear. We're not-- we're not prepared to [VM: Well let's just--] do it with the *Hidden Teaching*-- or do it with the *Wisdom* unless we do it spontaneously [S simultaneously: (Right.)] now, so let's do it.

LC (simultaneously): Let's do it, yeah, (bit of laughter) Louie's got a quote, let's do--

AH: Louie's got a quote.

LC: Let's do his quote.

RG/S(?) (simultaneously): Yeah Louie, you want to reread that one? (RG/S(?) laughs a bit)

LC: That was so [S simultaneously, faint: (He really means it.)] fabulous he got it.

VM: I know that quote Louie.

LDS: You know that quote?

S (simultaneously, faint): Yeah. Pretty good.

LC (simultaneously): Yeah so read it.

S (simultaneously): Yeah it's a good idea. (bit of laughter)

TS (faint): That makes sense.

VM (simultaneously): Let's get another one.

S (faint): Another one.

LDS: You want another one? (some laughter, student words)

LC (amidst laughter): No, read that-- read that (quote).

S (simultaneously): No, read that-- give them that quote, come on.

VM (simultaneously): Oh, let's hear it.

S: (Slow) down kid.

LDS: Ok.

S: Yeah.

S (simultaneously): It's ok. (bit of laughter)

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "Each experiences the world-idea in its own unique way and adjusts it to the form of its own intellect. It supplies its own space-time characteristics and consequently conceives its own experienced world."

LDS: But I like the rest of this.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "Hence the character of our creative power is only a semi-independent one. World-Mind thinks its ideas *into* our mind. It is the thinking of the World-Mind that is *primarily* responsible for the world. We share the ideas, participate in the sense-images thus evoked, it is true, but we do not project their original stimulus. There is a cosmic activity within ourselves. The world is originally the product of World-Mind, and only secondarily by reflection the product of our mind."

AH: And I think that's a perfect connection to the quote that I recently read, I'd like to do it again but I'll just paraphrase it.

VM: Well read it again.

LR/S(?): Read it.

AH: It said--

VM: Read it again, (go ahead).

Dalai Lama XIV [*The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way*, p. 62, AH reading]: "Similarly, if phenomena had no deep mode of being other than their external or superficial mode of being, and if thus the way they appeared and the way they existed were in agreement, then it would be sufficient to hold that conventional modes of appearance are true just as they appear, and to place confidence in them. However, this is not so."

AH: And this was the phrase I was thinking of.

Dalai Lama XIV [*The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way*, p. 62, AH reading]: "Though phenomena appear as if true, most true, ultimately they are not true. Therefore, phenomena abide in the middle way..."

S (faint): What's that?

AH: Would you do that quote again Louie?

RG: How would you say that quote relates to [one/two words inaudible]

LDS (simultaneously): Yeah, I'm not sure [one/two words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): I don't see how it connects.

SP (simultaneously): Yeah I don't see that either.

AH: I saw it very clearly when you read it. (laughter) But now I forgot, do it again please. (laughter)

RG: I don't see that the quote Louie read had anything [SP/S(?) simultaneously: Well--] to do--

LC (simultaneously): Well let Andrew say how he (heard) it.

AH (simultaneously): Yeah let me try.

LDS: Ok. Which part, the first part or--

AH (simultaneously): No the whole thing.

LDS (simultaneously): Oh. Read the whole thing?

AS (simultaneously, faint): [three/few words inaudible]

S (simultaneously): Well, do either part.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "Each experiences the world-idea in its own unique way and adjusts it to the form of its own intellect. It supplies its own space-time characteristics and consequently conceives its own experienced world."

AH: Ok, that's the external or superficial mode of being.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "Hence the character of our creative power is only [a] semi-independent [one]."

JL: Yeah.

AH: That appearing phenomenal world is only-- what's his phrase?

VM: Semi-independent.

AH: *Semi*-independent, although--

LDS: The one *I* provide for myself.

AH (simultaneously): Yes. It appears to have total independence but it's really only independent insofar as I am a individual-- insofar as I believe in my individuality. Go ahead.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "World-Mind thinks its ideas *into* our mind."

AH: That's the deep mode of being.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "It is the thinking of the World-Mind that is *primarily* responsible for the world."

AH: That's the ultimate truth of phenomena.

SP: But I think here [VM simultaneously: No.] he's talking about the content that's being projected through, I don't think he's talking about the nature of the World-Mind as Mind.

AH: Well, then-- yeah.

AD (simultaneously): Repeat.

SP: Well, the quote that Louie was reading, maybe you could read a sentence or two of your quote again.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "[Hence] the char..."

LDS: Ok.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "Hence the character of our creative power is only a semi-independent one. World-Mind thinks its ideas *into* our mind. It is the thinking of the World-Mind that is *primarily* responsible for the world."

S (very faint): Yeah.

SP: Yeah.

LDS (simultaneously): More?

AH(?) (simultaneously): Yes.

VM: Go ahead.

SP: Andrew was talking about the deep mode of being as being the-- the World-Mind aspect. But I think here emptiness wouldn't be equated with the World-Mind as it's described here 'cause it's talking about it in a-- in an active nature and not as its nature as Mind essence.

AH: That's why I said this is more Yogacara.

AS (simultaneously): That plays back to that discussion that we had just before that I had [student assents] with Andrew, that this is talking of the relation between the appearance as given form by an individual and the pulsating nature [LDS simultaneously: Right.] of the World-Mind [SP simultaneously: Right.] and not between the pulsating nature of the World-Mind and the still nature.

LDS: Yes.

MW (faint): Right.

SP: Like--

LDS (simultaneously): And--

AH (simultaneously): There ain't no static here yet.

VM (simultaneously): I thought this quote of Louie's related to the whole notion of there's a basis of [AS simultaneously: An objective basis.] imputation which [LDS simultaneously: Yeah.] goes on [AS simultaneously: Exactly.] and I thought that was connecting [LDS simultaneously: That's what-- that's

what I was trying to (say).] to-- [AS simultaneously: Exactly.] to Sidney's point that the Prasangika like to try and maintain some sort of givenness of phenomena upon which the individual has an opportunity [AS assents] to elaborate and bring out [student assents] his own psychology unfortunately.

S (simultaneously): Right.

LR (simultaneously with VM and S): Is the basis [AS simultaneously: The objective basis is the World-Mind.] of imputation the same as the individual mind?

VM: No.

AS (simultaneously): No, it's [SP simultaneously: No.] the World-Mind.

VM (simultaneously): No, no, no.

S: No.

AS: The World-Mind's World-Idea that it provides us.

LDS (simultaneously): Is the basis.

SP (simultaneously with AS and LDS): I think that's the [AS simultaneously: I thought that was Tim's (one word inaudible)] basis for the imputation that's taking place by the individual.

VM: Right.

AS: Right.

TWO KINDS OF CONSCIOUSNESS; BUDDHISM VS. VEDANTA

SP: And here where he say-- here's a question.

S (faint): Yeah.

[Transcriber note: I am using *Kindness, Clarity, and Insight* by The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, translated and edited by Jeffrey Hopkins and co-edited by Elizabeth Napper, Snow Lion Publications, Ithaca, New York, 1984.]

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 73, SP reading]: “[*Question:*] Within the Buddhist system, they speak of different levels of cognition for which there are appropriate objects. On each level, who is the knower of these different modes of cognition?

“*Answer:* There are many levels of consciousness, having different modes of perceiving objects, but they are all the same in being of a continuum of luminosity and knowing and in the fact that the mere I which is designated in dependence on the continuum of consciousness is what knows them. ...

“Among the various Buddhist systems, some posit types of consciousness as the I itself. However, in the highest, most profound system, the Middle Way Consequence School (*Prasangika-Madhyamika*), that which is posited as the I is the mere I which is designated in dependence upon the continuum of consciousness.”

SP: Now this continuum of consciousness contains uh-- uh-- Oh. Ok. This continuum of consciousness is the basis upon which is imputed the “I” of the individual which knows, and it's-- and this basis of the

continuum of consciousness contains these seeds. So I think these seeds are fed through this individual knowing, and much the same way that Louie was presenting this quote. Would-- would you read your quote again?

LDS: Oh, you-- I think you were addressing this one, he says--

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 41, LDS reading]: "Each experiences the world-idea in its own unique way and adjusts it to the form of its own intellect."

[students assent, very faint]

AH: You're talking about--

LDS (simultaneously): Now that would be according or parallel to the notion of the mere "I" which arises on this consc--

SP (simultaneously): Continuum of consciousness.

LDS: Con-- ok.

SP: And I'm equating the continuum of consciousness with this larger objective basis.

AD: Which is ontological.

SP: Yeah.

LDS: Yeah.

AD: You see now, the question would come up from a Vedantic point of view: No. That the continuum of consciousness which is always what it is [SP: Uh-hm.] would have to be the pure I AM principle of the individual, alright.

RG: (Uh-hm/Right).

AD: That--

SP: But--

AD: Well--

SP: Ok.

AD: I-- look, I'm only bringing this out for the purposes of showing how *exciting* this could become, alright.

SP: I'm just trying to argue to be (exciting/excited)! (SP laughs, laughter)

AD: I don't care about who's right or wrong here, the point [student assents] is to see the intricacies and the subtleties of the doctrine you're speaking about. They're speaking about this continuum of consciousness which has an ontological basis [SP assents] as the, let's say, ground from which the knowledge of the individual is going to arise. Now, what a Vedantist would say is, no. The individual consciousness, alright, which is al-- unobjectifiable, always abiding, always is what it is, [SP assents] that

is the ground within which the World-Idea is going to arise, alright. And so between one thought and another thought, sensory or any way you want to look at it, [SP assents] that consciousness is its ground! Let me try again. [SP: Well--] The individual consciousness, what we call the I AM principle, [SP assents] your authentic intellectual being, is the continuum of consciousness. Within that arises the World-Idea which is a moment-to-moment affair.

S (very faint): Yeah.

SP: Uh-hm.

AD: Alright. Now, where is the content of knowledge coming from? We say the World-Idea. Who knows it?

VM (faint): Yeah.

JL (faint): The individual consciousness.

SP: The-- the individual "I" knows it. Is it-- isn't [RG/S(?) simultaneously: No.] that what you're--

RG: No, but the individual "I" not in the sense of the mere "I" from what we just read--

SP: But that's what I think it is, the mere "I" in what I just read.

VM: No, no, for the Vedanta.

RG (simultaneously): I (know for them) but the Vedantic [MW simultaneously: That's why he's--] position would be that there is a per-- the knower is the consciousness [VM: (Katusha.)] that is the substrate of the co-- of the seeds that are constantly being activated through the World-Idea, and when you take that point of view you're saying consciousness knows its object and that's the subjective side look-- [student assents] looking at reality. When you take the objective view or what Anthony's calling the cosmological view, [student assents] then you give preference to the flux of idea and then you're taking the view that the World-Idea is constantly instantiating itself [student assents] and adjusting itself to the form of every individual's own intellect [student assents] which seems from that point of view to be *within* the World-Idea.

AD: You see how-- how intricate it is?

SP: Yes.

AD: Now here's the interesting thing, a Buddhist, alright, [SP: Uh-hm.] if you ask a Buddhist well then how do you explain my "I", my memory, he doesn't *need* an individual consciousness.

VM: No, no.

AD (simultaneously): He's-- with him the World-Idea's enough. Within the World-Idea which is generating this individual [S: Yeah.] is going to be all the means-- all the material he needs to explain the-- [student assents] the identity of that individual, even his *memory* he could explain in terms of that World-Idea, [S: Yeah.] alright, whereas the Vedantist won't allow that.

SP: But you have an “I”-- an individual “I” we were just talking about in this argument. There are many individual I’s, we all have an individual “I”. Now they all rest on the basis of this continuum of consciousness.

S: Uh-hm.

AD: Well, couldn’t they--

SP (simultaneously): I mean they have to have some-- some foundation.

AD: You’re-- [AS simultaneously, faint: Well, but what’s the continuum of consciousness?] all these-- all-- all Overselves, alright, or [SP simultaneously: Yeah.] all souls, alright, we could say they’re one or many. [S, faint: Right, yeah.] To speak about them resting on anything would be an impertinence because then they wouldn’t be soul. They don’t *rest* on anything.

SP (simultaneously): Well but you don’t want to just have one individual soul. I mean you want to be able to account for many individual souls. So in that sense, it seems necessary to have a-- a basis for all, a-- that emphasize the--

AD (simultaneously): Yeah but, you see what I’m trying to say, Sidney, is that you’re trying to quantify Being. I refuse. Being is Being. When I speak about my Being, the soul-- my soul, [SP simultaneously: Yeah.] alright, and when you speak about your soul, alright, I’m not going to say there’s two or three or four. [SP: Right.] I mean it-- it’s meaningless. Being-- Being is-- can’t be quantified. So I don’t think that way. And I don’t call it a continuum because that’s just, you know, an elaborated notion of quantity too.

SP: Well--

AH (simultaneously): But in relation-- in relation to an individual phenomenon or person, you-- there’s a mode of speaking of the Being aspect of that individual, is there not?

AD: I didn’t understand you.

AH: Like, you said you didn’t want to quantify Being. And certainly that’s true, you (don’t/wouldn’t) want to do that. But you have to find a way of speaking of that unquantified Being in-- from the perspective of an individual.

AD: Individual what?

AH: Person, thing.

AD: You mean from the point of view of an ego.

S (faint): What’d he say?

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

AH: Yes.

AD: That’s the whole point. You could only bring in quantity when you bring in the ego.

RG: Right, which is-- seems to [S simultaneously: Uh-hm.] be why you would relate the mere I-ness [S: Uh-hm.] as your knower in that-- in that chapter you just read to the ego [AH simultaneously: Yes, uh-hm.] which is resting on-- within the World-Idea which would [student assents] seem to be--

SP: Well, when you said it's resting within the World-Idea, [RG: Yeah.] the--

VM: But-- but that's legal cosmologically, ontologically it's impermissible.

RG: It's not resting at all but [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Well, you see-- [AS simultaneously: There's a distinction there.] you see the problem here?

SP: Well we haven't--

AD (simultaneously): If you take the World-Idea, alright? [S simultaneously: Yeah.] You say that we're going to understand things from the point of view of the World-Idea. [SP assents] The World-Idea is what evolves the various vehicles that a soul's gotta operate with. [SP assents] Now insofar that these-- this-- the vehicles are the product of the World-Soul or the cosmic thinker or whatever we want to call it, [SP assents] alright, we have these-- this supplied to us, this vehicle which, if a soul inhabits, can experience various levels of consciousness, [SP assents] dream, sleep, etc, ok? [students assent] It could also experience prajna. Or it could experience Nirvikalpa, close everything off, eliminate everything, throw everything out and you just remain in the I AM. [SP assents] But, if it gets involved in the question of, you know, "What am I?" besides "Who am I?", then this enormous problem comes up. Because now you could take that, you say "I am this here," alright. [SP assents] You could examine that and analyze it and that will be the product of the World-Soul. Because here, in this body-mind combination, [SP assents] you can have an ego which has a memory of things that happened to it, alright. [SP assents] Now soon as you say memory, alright, the Vedantist would say well without an unchanging consciousness memory would be meaningless. [SP assents] But from the point of view of the World-Idea, no, it's quite meaningful to say that this moment is the sum of all the moments that went before it and will explain all that went before it, just like all that went before it will explain this moment. [SP assents] So they don't need no abiding consciousness to explain that ego, [SP assents] alright, the memory that an ego can op--

[Audio File 1984 0803a Ends]

[Audio File 1984 0803b Begins]

AH: Like I've always understood it as being both sides that you've just described, the Vedantic position as well as the moment-by-moment.

AD: Get me quotes!

AH: The whole discussion of the two truths--

AD (passionately): No, no, no, no, that doesn't prove anything, two truths don't prove this discussion. (bit of laughter)

LDS: Anthony--

RG: Your (pulling) quotes--

AD (simultaneously): It's the same thing like Guenon, alright. [AH simultaneously: Alright.] Whitall Perry told-- told him that "It's in there, it's in the book!"

AH: How about this here.

AD: I ask for quotes but I don't get any!

AH: Anthony let me try. I-- the-- I (could) quote the Dalai Lama. He said, when analyzed, reality is *in* the phenomena; when not analyzed it isn't. The notion that we used earlier tonight, the one entity--

AD (simultaneously, passionately): But how does that relate to the two principles that we're speaking about? [AH simultaneously: Well--] Psychological subjectivity, alright, and metaphysical infinity? How-- how-- how will you relate that? In other words [AH simultaneously: Well I--] if I say I can analyze inwardly and come up into Nirvikalpa, in other words only my subjectivity. And it is a miraculous thing, alright, I'm not going to deny that from-- for the Vedantist, alright. And then there's the other point of view which takes that psychological subjectivity and understands the nature of the World-Idea and the consciousness that is *behind* that World-Idea which leads it to realize that it's the same nature as it itself is so that you come to non-dualism, alright. What's that got to do with the quote you just gave me?

RG: So Anthony, are you saying that--

AH (simultaneously): But, I was using the notion you're--

SP (simultaneously): But I think the emptiness is--

S (faint): Yeah, right.

GA/S(?): [couple/three words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): I was using the notion of pouring water into water, that idea.

AD: I don't like that!!

RG: Right. (bit of laughter)

AH: You don't like any of it!

AD (simultaneously): How? Don't they--

RG (simultaneously): They take [AD simultaneously: Come on.] [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): Whatever I read you don't like!

S: Yeah. (S laughs)

RG (simultaneously): Wait a minute. (bit of laughter)

SP: But the nondualism that's established in Prasangika is established as they s-- as they said the emptiness of phenomena and the emptiness of the consciousness itself. They're trying to take these two points of view I think, they're trying to take--

AS: No, they're not *those* points of view though Sid, I think that's what the original argument I was having [SP simultaneously: Ok, let's-- but let's get it again then that--] with Andrew, that the two points of-- There's two ways to reconcile things and [JL simultaneously: Ok.] one is a much-- I think is a much higher point of view.

RG: Right, but if we--

DB (simultaneously): Unless it's [SP simultaneously: Well let's hear it.] [couple/three words inaudible]

RG: If we could find a [SP simultaneously: Let's hear it.] Prasangika where the emptiness of consciousness related to Nirvikalpa samadhi would you-- would-- would that reveal the other point of view?

AD (simultaneously): Well that-- that'd be fine, sure, if we could find some of these quotations and start putting together what they're saying.

RG: I [S simultaneously, faint: Yeah.] think that's what Anthony's [one/two inaudible student words simultaneous with RG] looking for.

SP (simultaneously): Well let me-- I--

LDS (simultaneously): But the quote that Sidney used I thought where the continuum of consciousness is the basis upon which this "I" arises, you were taking that consciousness to be the consciousness provided by the World-Idea and *not*--

AD: In other words, the consciousness that the ego operates with is what is being provided by that continuum.

RG: Right, uh-hm, yeah.

LDS (simultaneously): Ok, that's all I was--

RG: Right, and you have to find quotes that deal with the pure--

VM: Unmoving, right, right, right.

AD (simultaneously, possibly part of background): Ha ha. (bit of laughter)

S (amidst laughter): Then I-- (SP laughs)

SP: I'll go away. (SP laughs, laughter)

RG: Unmo--

AS (simultaneously): Then Richard, but what is (it/that)?

RG (simultaneously): Unmoving aspect of consciousness.

AS: Well that's a question too.

RG: Why?

VM (part of background): Arrivederci, thank you.

AS (simultaneously): See, that's (not/what)--

S (possibly part of background): Oh.

RG: It seems [VM simultaneously, part of background: Thank you.] that's what Anthony [S simultaneously, part of background: Thank you.] is posing.

VM (part of background): Thank you, I hope your air conditioner works well.

AS (simultaneously): I don't-- I don't think that's quite the [one word inaudible]

AD (yelling from the back, part of background): Now open the door and go in!

RG (simultaneously): Well that's what he said.

VM (part of background): (It's) gotta be kicked in sometimes! (laughter)

S (amidst laughter, possibly part of background): [couple/three words inaudible] (VM laughs)

SP: What do you need so I could find this quote? (student laughs)

RG: I would be happy--

AS (simultaneously): I don't-- I wouldn't-- I wouldn't care.

LDS (simultaneously): How would you interpret the quote you had?

S (faint): I wouldn't-- I don't think that that would be the--

SP (simultaneously, possibly part of background): Why would I find out what they need though?

RG (simultaneously): Why not? Anthony kept saying one ends in Nirvikalpa samadhi and the un-- other ends--

AS (simultaneously): The subjective ends.

RG: Yeah, and the other ends in the constant investigation of the World-Idea.

AS: But-- [VM, faint: Uh-hm.] but look.

TS (simultaneously): So you'd need a kind of--

AS (simultaneously): But it would take--

AS (faint): Yeah.

TS/S(?) (very faint): Yeah.

AS: Ok go on, (go on/yeah), go on.

S (faint): Yeah.

SP: What do you need?

DB: Gentlemen [one word inaudible]

S (very faint): Just do it right now, do it.

RG: Go ahead.

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

AS: Ok, I'll do it.

S (faint, part of background): Actually I think I read that wrong.

AS: Um-- If-- if you end up in Nirvikalpa though through the subjective end, you don't realize necessarily the nature of the World-Idea.

RG: Right, exactly.

AS: And tracing the-- whatever, the objective side, if you say you end up there in pure Mind, that does not give you necessarily a realization of your own self [RG simultaneously: Exactly.] as Overself.

RG: Right.

AS: So, that's why I made the point that, even if the Buddhists have in their doctrine a notion that tracing the ultimate nature of that reality of World-Idea to Mind, even if they have that, that still is not the complete view of tracing the ultimate reality of [RG simultaneously: Right. So that's--] the individual.

RG: That's what I asking, if we could fi-- and [possibly one word inaudible]

SP (simultaneously): But that's why--

S (simultaneously): I didn't think it was [S simultaneously: (What/Why)?] [few words inaudible]

SP (simultaneously): Wait a minute.

CDA: Let Sidney speak, somebody [S simultaneously: Yeah.] let Sidney speak.

SP: That's why I was trying to say that the "I" is imputed--

RG (simultaneously, faint): I thought we were having a conversation.

AS: Yeah.

S (faint): Speak.

S: Go ahead.

VM (simultaneously): Speak up Sidney.

AS (simultaneously): Yeah I know but you gotta let--

S (simultaneously): Yeah but the class is--

S: Not fair.

SP (simultaneously): But that's why I was trying to say that the "I" is imputed upon the continuum of consciousness. Because the "I" is like the essence of individuality, but its nature is-- *is* a pure consciousness. And I think--

RC (simultaneously): That's totally different. You're on one side and he's on the other with that word 'consciousness'.

VM: Yeah, yeah, and I-- [SP simultaneously: Yeah.] I just want to say that I think that when they say the mere "I", I don't think that's the "I" the way the Vedantists would use the words, that sounds much more like [AD simultaneously: Kind of like we use the *vasanas*.] the way PB would use the word 'ego'.

S: Yeah. (laughter, clapping)

S (amidst laughter, faint): (I knew, there we go.)

SP: I don't think so because--

VM (simultaneously): Well, well, maybe--

S (faint): What would you say?

VM: Alright, go ahead.

SP: I don't think so because the mere "I" is called "mere" because it's only I-ness. [S: Yeah.] It's not emotionality, it's not willing, it's not secondary factors [S, faint: It's pure egoity.] that go to constitute a psychological subjectivity, [VM simultaneously: No but wait.] it's merely [LDS simultaneously: Yeah.] I-ness, that's why it's called mere "I".

VM: But when we use the word ego these days, we've been using it after a lot of work. [SP assents] And I think that you do-- you shouldn't-- I don't mean it to be just at a very psychological level. [SP assents] We can speak about the egos in some kinds of discussions here about just the *force* of the soul towards manifestation. [SP assents] And in that sense, I--

SP (simultaneously): But I remember you talked about the ego in terms of like a pure consciousness.

VM: Pure consciousness?

SP: A-- well--

S: Yeah.

SP: By [S simultaneously: (Yeah.)] pure-- I mean I'm using the term funny here, I haven't finished [VM simultaneously: Oh.] my thought. But this consciousness is conjoined with certain subjective functions.

RC (faint): Ideas.

VM: Yeah.

RC: Consciousness could generate idea(s).

SP: Yeah.

VM: That's ego.

SP: But the Buddhists are very analytical and they're separating out all of these subjective functions [VM assents] and they're holding that consciousness as the mere "I".

VM: Well I thought that was the basis upon which the mere "I" was imputed.

SP: No, see, *it* rests on a-- on a thoroughly objective [student assents, faint] consciousness [AD simultaneously, faint, possibly part of background: No!] which is wider [VM simultaneously: What's the "it"?] than the individual consciousness.

LR (simultaneously): So you're saying the mere "I" is almost like the I AM principle that's wedded to these Ideas?

AS (simultaneously, faint): [one/two words inaudible]

SP: But that's what I think, I mean I don't know but-- [LR: Oh.] but that's what I think.

VM (simultaneously): Oh, oh.

S: Right.

S (simultaneously): Right.

S: But (repeat) [couple words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously): And then what would you mean by saying that that mere "I", it's the I AM, has as its basis-- [VM simultaneously: Pure consciousness.] the continuum of its basis is objective, what do you mean by that?

SP: Because it's pure consciousness, it's consciousness wider than the individual--

AS: And that's neither [one/two inaudible student words simultaneous with AS] objective or subjective but you mean not-- [SP simultaneously: Yeah.] you mean by that Mind. You're saying--

SP (simultaneously): Yeah I mean Mind. Yeah.

AS: You're saying that they trace-- you're claiming that they trace both the basis of the I AM into Mind and also the basis [S simultaneously: Oh phenomena.] of the fluctuating World-Idea to Mind.

AH: Yes.

S (simultaneously, faint): Yeah [one word inaudible]

SP: Right.

S (faint): Yeah.

AH (simultaneously): That ab-- exact(ly).

SP (simultaneously): Yeah.

AS: If they did both, then of course they would obviously have the com-- you know, non-dual complete thing.

AH (simultaneously): They do exactly that non-dual.

AS: And the claim is that the Vedantists only trace the one side [AH/S(?): Yeah.] to the Mind, to the principle of Mind, [SP: Uh-hm.] and claim that the fluxional nature of the appearance is just pure appearance.

SP (simultaneously): Well that's what the Prasangikas accuse the Chittamatrins of doing.

AS: Yeah, it's something like that, yeah.

SP (simultaneously): Of tracing--

RC: Yeah one of the points I thought [AS simultaneously: But--] is a key thing [AS: Yeah.] is that when you distinguish the individual mind from the World-Mind in terms of its extensiveness, [SP: Uh-hm.] it seemed to be-- there you can say that the individual mind does not entertain the totality of the World-Idea. I mean you can make some sort of quantitative or extensiveness distinction between the World-Mind which *does* continually entertain the entirety of the World-Idea and the individual mind which does not. And on that side you can come up with a distinction. I think when Anthony says that-- when he talks in terms of Being, that you can't quantify that or make that distinction, [SP: But this isn't--] that's when he's talking on the other side.

SP: But this is an analytical discussion.

AS: Right.

RC: Right, and we're just trying to clarify the two sides because I don't think that's really clear yet, [student assents] [AH simultaneously: See--] that the word 'consciousness' [S simultaneously: Yeah.] used on the side of the World-Idea [SP: Like--] is usually different--

AH (simultaneously): Well there's many ways-- there's many ways of-- excuse me.

RC (simultaneously): --implication.

SP: The "who"-- "who"--

AH (simultaneously): Excuse me Sidney, there's many [SP simultaneously: Ok.] ways-- I reply to Randy, there's many ways of describing the two sides. They have the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. That's one way. [student assents, very faint] Now-- They say well, for analytical conceptual purposes where you do the analysis but like what's the actual insight resulting from this analysis if properly done? [RC, faint: Uh-hm.] They say well, is-- if you meditate on phenomena and analyze phenomena to discover direct cognition of its emptiness, see at that moment, if you want to describe it, at that moment, the emptiness of the subject is also realized. [student assents, faint] Like you can't realize the emptiness of a phen-- of a phenomenal object without at once realizing the emptiness of the subject. [AS, faint: No but--] If on the other hand you analyze from the point of view of selfless-- selflessness of subject [S, faint: Right.] and you have insight to that truth, the world is [student assents, faint] known as empty as well.

RC: Right, and all [couple faint inaudible AS words simultaneous with RC] I was saying is that that subject-object relationship [S simultaneously: Is (what)?] is only created within [TS assents, faint] the World-Idea.

AS: Exactly.

VM: Right.

AS: Exactly Randy, (and/now) that--

RC (simultaneously): That's just not--

AS: (Go ahead/Ok).

RC: That's not the subject which is brought into relation with the World-Idea originally.

AS: That's not the I AM.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah but you gotta make sure that Andrew understands this [AS simultaneously: He got-- he got--] here, alright. Because otherwise it--

AH (simultaneously): I understand what's being said but if--

AD (simultaneously): You follow what they're saying here?

AH: What-- where is that-- where is that--

AS: Like level, what's the [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): What level of subject and object are we talking about?

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, right.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, exactly.

AH (simultaneously): Are we talk--

AS (simultaneously): You got the point. That's a good point.

AH (simultaneously): Are we talking about ontic subject and object?

AD (simultaneously): That's what you got to-- that's what you got to make sure you understand.

AS (simultaneously): That's what you'll have to decide because Andrew, your statement that realizing the emptiness of the subject implies immediately that you also know the emptiness of the object, you must be taking subject and object there to be empirical [VM simultaneously, faint: Cosmological, yeah.] because they're both thought-forms and therefore you know that the nature of the apparent or the empirical subject and object [student assents] are both imputed. But that's not what the Vedantists are talking about as the Self or Atma, [SP assents] or the I AM of the Platonists or [SP assents] whatever. You're-- you-- both of those that we talked about [AD simultaneously: Or of PB.] the subject and object-- or of PB-- [SP assents] that subject and object is empirical, are both based on the fluxional nature of the World-Idea. [AH: But you see--] They're both on the objective or vehicle side, right, [student assents] I mean, [AH: Yes.] [SP

assents] [AH simultaneously: I don't know--] in the diagram. [SP assents] [AH simultaneously: That's--] You've only gotten back to one level of uniting two forms of thought and saying hey, both of these sides of what I thought were separate are both thought-forms. [AH simultaneously: But Avery--] Very good, but what [AH simultaneously: That's true.] about the *awareness* of those thought-forms?

AH (simultaneously): I understand-- I understand your criticism.

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, yeah.

SP: But he says that--

AH (simultaneously): But what if the analysis is done on a horizontal level instead of a vertical one?

VM: Then he's--

AS: I thought that *was*-- I thought you *were* doing it [SP simultaneously, laughing: Yeah.] in a horizontal-- (AS laughing)

S (simultaneously): Me too.

AH: I am.

VM: But he is, he is.

AH (simultaneously): But what if Prasangika chooses to analyze this whole issue [AS, faint: Yeah.] at the level of absolute relational relativity between all the terms of the discussion? There's not going to be a ver-- vertical hierarchy of ontic categories from which the world emanates.

VM: But that substantiates [S simultaneously: That's the point of view of the world-image.] their position [S simultaneously: Yeah exactly.] that they're trying to maintain Andrew, that it's done within the world-image.

AH: Then you're taking your ontic presuppositions as being *the* reality instead of presuppositions *about* reality.

RC: No, I think they're [VM simultaneously: No, no, no, no.] taking Nirvikalpa as their test of reality.

JL/S(?) (faint): Who?

RC: The Vedantists I mean take that [JL/S(?) simultaneously: Oh.] position.

AH: There's a-- there's-- there is a point here. And if you want to pursue it I'm happy to.

S: Oh no [AS simultaneously: Yeah.] we have to.

S: Yeah.

AS (laughing): [couple words inaudible]

S (laughing): No choice.

AH: Like--

SP: Well when you're analyzing-- let me back up for a second. When you were analyzing the emptiness of phenomena and the emptiness of the person, the person is *not* the subjective factors that you can delineate, that's [AS simultaneously: Right.] the emptiness of phenomena.

AS: Good, what *is* the person?

RG: What *is* the emptiness?

SP: The person is this "I".

AS: And what-- yeah, now that's--

AH: When they say "mere", they don't mean "mere" in the sense of a diminutive. They mean "mere" in the sense of bareness [VM simultaneously: And sheer (one word inaudible)] or pureness or sheerness.

AS (simultaneously): Well you're going to have-- yeah, you'd have to [SP simultaneously: Uh-hm.] show me where-- you-- or me-- you have to show where they say that that mere "I" is pure consciousness.

AH (simultaneously) Because every other-- every other way of speaking about the "I" is phenomena and *not* "I".

LR: Hm.

S (very faint): Right.

SP: Well--

AH: Anything that-- any attribute of what you *think* to be "I" is immediately understood as being on the side of phenomena.

AS (faint): Right.

VM (faint): Uh-hm.

AH: So when you posit the mere "I", you're not positing any possible attribute.

AS: But they certainly wouldn't describe a mere "I" as a eternal self-subsistent pure consciousness. You really think the Buddhi-- I mean that's what the [AH simultaneously: Of course, of course.] Vedantists say. [SP simultaneously: They also say--] To think that "I", the essence of that-- of the "I" or self is going to be this pure unchanging eternal [SP: Uh-hm.] [S, faint: I see.] [AH: But they're--] (missing) awareness?

AH: They're wholly--

SP (simultaneously): They posit this mere "I" as the basis for-- now we wouldn't agree with this but I'm just trying to show [S simultaneously, faint: Well, yeah.] their thing up. [AS simultaneously, faint: I don't-- (yeah).] They say that the-- that the mere "I" is the basis for the notion of repeated incarnation.

VM: Uh-hm.

SP: Yeah.

AS (simultaneously): I know, the sixth consciousness continues from--

RC: Uh-hm.

SP: Ok.

RC: We agree.

AS (faint): Life to life.

SP (simultaneously): Now, when he said--

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 73, SP reading]: "...who is the knower of [these] different modes of cognition?

“[*Answer:*] There are many levels of consciousness...”

SP: Ok, so you're not just talking about sensory consciousness or--

AS: Many levels of the World-Idea.

SP: Ok.

S (faint): Yeah.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 73, SP reading]: "...[SP adds: all] having different modes of perceiving...”

SP: So forth. There are-- and this goes up to these like different consciousnesses they talk about in Tantra, [AS assents, faint] you know.

AS: Yeah.

SP: Ok.

AS (faint): And even those are on the side of (the World-Idea).

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 73, SP reading]: "...they are all the same in being of a continuum of luminosity and knowing and in the fact that the mere I which is designated in dependence on [SP reads: upon] the continuum of consciousness is what knows them.”

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

SP: So this “I” is knowing up to the highest [S: Right.] [AH simultaneously: It knows--] level of consciousness.

AH: It knows the deities.

S: Uh-hm.

AH: It's a [AD/S(?) simultaneously: Fine.] subj-- it's spoken of as subjective wisdom-consciousness.

RC (simultaneously): Yeah, any-- anything other than this pure stillness is a manifestation of the ego.

AH: Yes.

S (faint): That's a lot of ego.

AH: Absolutely. So when you talk about this analysis occurring at some psychological level of subject and object, it just doesn't-- it just doesn't make any sense to me, I mean you should read the material.

TS: But even in the sentence--

RG (simultaneously): But no, no, no, I don't think we have. Even in--

S (simultaneously, faint): That's what I'm thinking.

S: No.

RG: Even in--

TS: That's not the objection--

VM (simultaneously): I think there's good communication (Andrew).

TS (simultaneously): --the objection is that no matter that-- when-- however far off you push the analysis, it seems as though that the reluctance to grant to that mere "I" a self-existent consciousness that does not rest on some other basis.

AH: That's exactly the point Tim [student assents, faint] because in Vedanta they have one presupposition that they'll hold to: the reality of that consciousness.

S (faint): Uh-huh.

TS: Right.

AS: Right.

AH: Madhyamika is not going to hold that presupposition.

TS (simultaneously): Right.

AS: Exactly, that's the point!

TS (simultaneously): And therefore I think the Madhyamika is putting--

RG: Well, Madhyamika--

SP (simultaneously): No. [VM simultaneously: No, no.] Madhyamika wants to have an objective consciousness. [TS simultaneously: Right.] And they want to have a subjective consciousness. [TS simultaneously: Right, so the (one word inaudible) is that--] They don't want to say they're the same, so they say they're same in both being of an empty nature.

TS: But the claim is [couple words inaudible]

SP (simultaneously): So they unify them in that fashion.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

S (faint): I think (it's pretty) simple.

S (simultaneously): Very good.

AH (simultaneously with S and S): They're talking-- Because [S simultaneously, faint: (couple words inaudible) (some--)] you posit the consciousness as being the ultimate reality and you perceived your epistemology after having *made* that presupposition, does not negate the Prasangika's *description* of the way things actually are.

AS/S(?): I'm not.

JB/S(?): You sound like (a Buddhist).

S (simultaneously): That makes--

MW (faint): This is [one word inaudible]

S (simultaneously): But-- but there's a form--

AH (simultaneously): Or selves.

VM: No, but these selves that you're speaking about are vehicles. In the last analysis [S: Uh-hm.] they're not the pure subject, and in the words of this thing, the "I" is-- the mere "I" is imputed upon the [student assents] basis of consciousness. [student assents] It's *not* a fundamental ontic reality. [AH: You know--] Right?

RC: [couple words inaudible]

SP (simultaneously): Well I think it's given-- it's giving--

TS: That's [SP simultaneously: Imputed.] the point which has to be attacked is [SP simultaneously: Ok.] right there as it were. [S simultaneously: Right.] Is that mere "I" the-- in-- does there-- is there a basis or a foundation upon which that mere "I" rests?

AH: Yes.

SP: That's their consciousness that they've been--

TS (simultaneously): And if there is, then it's-- then it's on the side of analyzing things as part of the World-Idea, which is not incorrect, it's only-- but it is saying that it's not a-- a complete analysis.

DB: Could I take issue with that?

AH (simultaneously): You want to hear how that-- [S simultaneously: Uh-hm.] do you want to hear how they state that? They say-- in Prasangika the definition of thought is defined as kalpani. Ok? [student assents, very faint] For them, thought is kalpani which means imagination. [student assents, faint] Alright. They say--

[Transcriber note: I do not know where AH is reading from; quote needs to be sourced.]

[AH reading]: “Thought imputes upon a basis of designation.”

AH: They say well, what is-- what is the basis? They say that's thought too. [student assents, faint] They're not going to say thought imputes on a basis of thought that has an ontic status. Thought imputes upon a basis that is also thought. [student assents, faint] And there's no ontic presupposition. In Vedanta there is. Now that doesn't seem [TS simultaneously: Well--] to me an ex-- excruciatingly difficult point to-- to recognize.

AD: What's the presupposition?

AS (simultaneously): Yeah but the point--

AH: What?

AD: What's the presupposition in Vedanta?

AH: They want to construct an epistemology where they have a subject and a object and they can relate them.

AS: Well--

S (faint): [one/two words inaudible] Uh-uh.

AS (simultaneously): That's not [TS simultaneously: Where?] the basis [S simultaneously: Right.] of their analysis at all.

PC (simultaneously): They want [LDS simultaneously: Ok.] an “I” that's not dependent [AS simultaneously: Just not at all.] on any kind of continuum and that's--

AH (simultaneously): Ok, well they want the-- they want the--

AS (simultaneously): There's no-- there-- they say in fact that there is no justification for that-- that's *exactly* their point, there is no justification for that distinction.

S (faint): Why not?

SP: Yeah but what-- for which distinction?

DB (simultaneously): Yes, PB-- PB call-- PB himself calls them to account for that.

AS: Yes. We're-- David, I-- [S: Yeah.] the point is not that-- the point we're trying to (put) is that exactly the Vedanta is hitting only the one side, that's true, [S: Except--] and the claim is that the Buddhists do not hit the side that the Vedantists do. [AH: But (put/look)--] That may be shown to be wrong. [AH simultaneously: Could I-- Let--] Maybe it's a straw man but it's--

SP: But experientially--

AH (simultaneously): Would the quality-- would the quality of that basis be different if we called it pure consciousness or if we called it the basis of designation?

AS (simultaneously): That-- well that--

AH: Is the q-- qualitatively speaking, in terms of your own existential stream, what you call that, what you name that, does that change its fundamental nature?

AS: But don't we-- as we pointed out and Sidney said in our discussions of ego for example and all the way up, there are two-- there are-- I'm just saying-- there are-- well don't hope to say what he'd begun, [SP simultaneously: You're cheating.] but on the-- on all the way up there are these two sides that we're analyzing of person, we're bringing in. One we'd call this pure ray of consciousness which remains such and (as/has) its own and the other side is this changing levels all the way up of the World-Idea, ok, [AH: Yes.] whatever you want to [student assents] call it.

S: Huh?

AH: So, they say well why would [few inaudible student words simultaneous with AH] they-- why would they want to proceed with this discussion without making these basis. And we read a quote Wednesday night from PB concerning Atman, [VM assents, faint] and how that-- the necessity of not conceiving of Atman in a way that would reinforce the sense of "I" which is the very thing the doctrine attempts to mitigate. [Note: See PB, *Notebooks*, V10, 15:2.277 & *Persp.*, Ch. 15, #56.] If-- it imbues the "I" with a-- with a-- with a more concrete sense of its own reality if it's misperceived.

AS: Yeah.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AH: This literature will say again and again, we want to divest phenomenon of inherent existence. Let's not make ontic presuppositions for things, either phenomenon or selves, that will imbue those things with a sense of inherence that's even worse than the one you were born with. Let's do the analysis without making those presuppositions. That's the method of it, you see?

S: [one/two words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously): No I know, but--

S (simultaneously): But I think what PB was saying in that quote is you don't want--

AH (simultaneously): Let's read it.

S: Yeah, sure.

AH: Where's the book?

AS (simultaneously): Well he's got-- Vic has-- go ahead [couple words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): I had one here that-- this is from the DL's-- this is the one *after* Sidney read. When I asked him why he didn't read this because it seemed to be right to the point. And the reason is it's a bit long. But I-- (student laughs) I believe that our interests may be aroused enough we could go through it.

S (faint): What page?

AD (simultaneously): No, let's read it, sure.

VM: You want to do it?

S (simultaneously): What page really?

VARIOUS WAYS THE “I” APPEARS

VM: Yeah this is a-- no this is not a book that you have, this is esoteric writings that Sidney has not [S simultaneously: Oh.] published yet. [MW: Uh-huh.] Ok? But anyway, in that-- in that [AS simultaneously, faint: Go ahead.] book, it's--

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 73, VM reading]: “[*Question:*] What is the distinction between consciousness and the I?”

VM: Seems like an interesting question, right? Now it's a little long and I'll-- we'll see.

AS (faint): [few words inaudible]

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “[*Answer:*] There are many different ways in which the I appears. One is for the I to appear to be factually different from the aggregates of mind and body and to be permanent, unitary, and under its own power.”

S (faint): I missed it all.

VM: Yeah.

S (faint): Why don't you start over.

VM: Alright, I'll start over.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “[*Answer:*] There are many different ways in which the I appears. One is for the I [to appear] to be factually different from the aggregates of mind and body and to be permanent, unitary, and under its own power.”

VM: Ok, that's one position.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “Another is for the I, within not appearing to be factually other than the aggregates, to appear to be the bearer of the burden of the aggregates or the master of them--a substantially existent or self-sufficient I.”

VM: It's another position. Now--

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “Then, another way is for the I to appear to be not posited through [VM reads: though] appearing...”

VM: Sorry.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “[Then], another way is for the I to appear to be not posited through appearing to an awareness but to be established from the side of its own uncommon mode of subsistence.”

VM: Let me push on.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “Then, another is for the I to appear to be inherently existent or existent in its own right, not seeming to exist through the force of nominality.

Then, there is another in which, even though the I *appears* to exist in its own right, a mere I is all that is conceived. The conception of this last one is the only valid cognition among these.”

VM: And therefore I’ll read it over to you again. Ok? [S simultaneously, faint: Ok.] Obviously it’s his Prasangika position. And--

AS: Does this-- this goes on more though.

VM: Oh yeah, there’s more [AS/S(?) simultaneously: Go ahead.] to it, but I-- I thought this one paragraph we should get.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “Then, there is another...”

VM: This is the last one which he says is the only valid one, alright?

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “Then, there is another in which even though the I *appears*, [VM: The word “appears” is italicized. “...even though the I *appears*] to exist in its own right, a mere I is all that is conceived. The conception of this last one is the only valid cognition among these.”

VM: Now-- I don’t know if we should-- maybe we should just try--

AD (simultaneously): We should try to make sense out of it, yeah.

VM (simultaneously): Should we stop there? There’s a lot more to the quote but we could stop there.

AD (simultaneously): Well let’s try to make some sense out of these different I’s [VM simultaneously: Ok.] that they’re speaking about.

VM: I would almost go back to the beginning, you want to try and do them one at a time?

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, do them all.

AD (simultaneously): Go ahead, yeah.

SP (simultaneously): What’s your-- what’s your point in reading?

VM (simultaneously): I don’t want to make a point, I had one but I’ll try and just be a reader.

SP: Oh but I want to hear your point there.

VM: I don’t want to keep you in suspense for my wisdom is so profound. (laughter)

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “There are many different ways in which the I appears.”

VM: Well, this is an answer, remember, to the question, what is the difference between “I” and consciousness.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, pp. 73-74, VM reading]: “*Question*: What is the distinction between consciousness and the I?

“*Answer*: There are many different ways in which the I appears. One is for the I to appear to be factually different from the aggregates of mind and body and to be permanent, unitary, and under its own power.”

VM: I would speculate that’s very similar to let’s say the Vedantic position or [student assents] when we speak of the “I” as the I AM.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AD (simultaneously): The “I” as transcendental?

VM: Right, [AD simultaneously: Ok.] right, it sounds-- to me anyway.

AH: Yeah, it seems that the “I”-- I think-- I think it’s different than that ’cause he talks about the “I” would *appear*. He aint’ talking about non-Buddhist schools.

VM: Maybe.

LDS: Yeah.

VM (simultaneously): You’re saying if he’s using the word ‘appear’, that [AH simultaneously: That was--] might be a real different--

S: Yeah.

AH (simultaneously): It’s almost a materialistic view.

[students assent, very faint]

SP (simultaneously): I think it can also be just the way you understand something, the way it appears [VM: Yeah.] in your understanding.

VM (simultaneously): Ok. The words like different from all the aggregates, permanent, unitary, under its own [AS simultaneously: Sounds like Atman.] power, to me that really sounded like the Vedanta. But when you say, it only *appears* that way, and that’s [AS simultaneously: Well--] the kind of “I” he’s talking about, then I’m thrown off now.

AS (simultaneously): Well he says appears because he wants to claim that that’s not--

VM: That’s not the case.

AS: The case.

VM: Ok, ok, that’s another way of saying [SP: Uh-hm.] he’s a Buddhist after all. I’m not-- I’m sorry, that would seem like a-- a unkind statement, I didn’t mean it that way.

AS: But that’s what--

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “Another is for the I, within not appearing to be factually other than the aggregates, to appear to be the bearer of the burden of the aggregates or the master of them--a substantially existent or self-sufficient I.”

AS: Yeah entelechy, that sounds like that notion that it's not completely separate from the aggregates yet it's a master of them and appearing within them.

VM: Yeah.

AS: So it's not a separate pure consciousness [VM assents] but it still is like the ruler, the reason (of this thing).

VM (simultaneously): It's like a psychological "I", Jung's Self even.

AS (simultaneously): Or the rea-- yeah, the reasoning principle which is at the unity of the-- that aggregate of mind and body.

VM (simultaneously): Right. Like the Self is the sum total of psychic processes and so on.

AH (simultaneously): I'd like to just proceed to hold to the other interpretation of this quote that, I think I could find it if I had time but I think this is a description not of possibilities for the "I" but a description of what is discovered upon analysis of the "I". This is different ways that you can look at your own "I" in meditation.

AS: Yeah. And--

VM (simultaneously): Ok.

AS: And in that sense they're all in some ways valid.

AH: As-- as a matter of fact this is part of a meditational practice.

VM: Well--

AD: Alright, in this-- in this one here we can think of the "I" as an entelechy.

VM: Alright.

AD: That's-- that's exactly what Aristotle do-- that's [AS simultaneously: Yeah.] the way Aristotle looks [VM simultaneously: Fine.] at the "I", as an entelechy. So the first one was that the "I" was a transcendental, in the second case it's a entelechy. What's the third one?

VM: Ok.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: "Then, another way is for the I to appear to be not posited through [VM reads: though] appearing to an awareness but to be established from the side of its own uncommon mode of subsistence."

VM: That's a [S simultaneously: Really?] tough one, I have to read that again.

S (simultaneously): [three/few words inaudible]

LR (simultaneously): I think it's "as though" maybe.

S (faint): Yeah, the "I".

LR: Or [S, faint: Right.] [one word inaudible]

VM: I'll try and read it carefully, I-- I mean that's all I can do.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: "Then, another way is for the I to appear to be not posited through [VM reads: though] appearing to an awareness but to be established from the side of its own uncommon mode of subsistence."

TS: Self-originating.

S (faint): Or a case of [one/two words inaudible]

AH: I think this is a description of the Witness.

VM: It appears [S simultaneously, faint: Maybe it's a--] to an awareness though it says here.

RC: Definitely as though and--

S (simultaneously, very faint): No, it doesn't.

JB: No, *though* appears as, not (through).

RC (simultaneously, faint): (Not) through.

LR (simultaneously with JB and RC): Through?

VM: Through appearing to an awareness it says.

S (simultaneously): Not posited to be appearing.

JB (simultaneously): But it's *not* posited through appearing to an awareness, doesn't that help you?

VM: Yeah you're right.

AS: Yeah read it again.

S: Read it again.

S (simultaneously): Read it again.

S (faint): Yeah.

VM: I'm sorry.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: "Then, another way is for the I to appear to be not posited through..."

MW (faint): It's not posited.

AS (simultaneously): Yeah. (some laughter)

MW (amidst laughter): It's not posited.

VM: I had a psychological block, forgive me.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, VM reading]: “Then, another way is for the I to appear to be not posited through [VM reads: though] appearing to [VM adds: be] an awareness...”

VM: Please. (laughter) It’s right there at that sentence.

AS: [couple words inaudible]

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, SP reading]: “Then, [SP reads: And then] another way is for the I to appear to be not posited through appearing to an awareness but to be established from the side of its own uncommon mode of subsistence.”

S (faint): Oh.

SP: Has its own mode of subsistence.

S (very faint): Yeah.

S (faint): Something like the KCB, yeah.

S (faint): Ok.

S (faint): Mind [couple/three words inaudible]

LR (faint): It’s not(--/.) Go ahead.

S (simultaneously, faint): Go ahead.

SP: Should I go ahead now?

S: Go on with that.

VM (simultaneously): I guess.

S: Uh-huh.

VM: Let me do it again.

RC (simultaneously, faint): It has a kind of being but is it necessarily conscious?

AS: Yeah.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, SP reading]: “Then, another way is for the I to appear to be *not* [SP emphasis] posited through appearing to an awareness but to be established from the side of its own uncommon mode of subsistence.”

AS: Oh I see, yeah, that’s the-- the m-- like a Nyaya position that the “I” is not a conscious thing but has a different kind of subsistence than awareness. [SP assents] So it too has-- it’s one of the factors like that body, [VM simultaneously: Oh right, right, right, right.] mind, mana-- it would be more like a manas point of view.

SP: Uh-hm.

VM: That might work.

AS (simultaneously): But when there's no-- consciousness is [SP simultaneously: Ok.] a quality of it which when you take away the consciousness it still has [VM simultaneously: Right, right.] its own [SP assents] uncommon mode of subsistence but not an awareness type of subsistence.

VM (simultaneously): And in that way it *doesn't* feel, yeah, uh-hm, ok.

S (faint): Yeah.

AS: It can have the quality of consciousness or not.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, SP reading]: "Then, another is for the I to appear to be inherently existent or existent in its own right, not seeming to exist through the force of nominality."

JB: How is that different from the first?

S (faint): Reread that.

LR: Why isn't [S simultaneously: Read it again.] that like the first one?

AS (faint): Yeah, read it again.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, SP reading]: "Then, another is for the I to appear to be inherently existent or existent in [SP reads: from] its own right, not seeming to exist through the force of nominality."

VM: I would [SP simultaneously: Not--] say that's much more of a psychological, in the *lowest* sense [students assent, very faint] of the term, type of understanding of the "I". The ego is a completely self-sufficient-- I mean when they use inherent existent I put that right down [students assent, very faint] at the-- [students assent] at the level of phenomena.

SP (simultaneously): I spread it all over, I don't-- I wouldn't put it there.

[student assents, very faint]

VM: Well whatever [S simultaneously: I think--] it is, it's not the right one. (laughter)

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, SP reading]: "Then, there is another in which, even though the I *appears* to exist in its own right, a mere I is all that is conceived."

S: Would you interpret [three/few inaudible AS words simultaneous with S] that whether that means-- that's all it means?

VM (simultaneously): Wait, just keep reading.

DR (faint): That's the end of it. [S, faint: Uh-hm.] That's--

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, SP reading]: "The conception of this last one is the only valid cognition among these."

AS: Well then read that one [S simultaneously: Yeah.] again, [S simultaneously: Yeah.] that sound-- [MW simultaneously, faint: (That sounded nice.)] that one sounded like [one word inaudible]

S (simultaneously, faint): Yeah.

SC: Yeah.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, SP reading]: “Then, there is another in which, even though the I *appears* to exist in its own right, a mere I is all that is conceived.”

AS: Yeah that--

S (faint): Uh-hm.

JB/S(?): (Well/But) that’s [AS simultaneously: So--] your “I”.

S (faint): Yeah.

S: Yeah.

JB: That’s a *fault* that the mere “I” is all that’s conceived or is it a truth that the mere--

SP (simultaneously): No, he says that’s the only valid one.

VM (simultaneously): Yeah. That’s the only reality it has is just as a *mere* “I”.

SP: It’s just an “I”.

VM: See, before you guys were claiming mere means *sheer* or [AS simultaneously: Yeah, I don’t think that now.] more profound. In [AS simultaneously: Yeah.] that statement it [AS simultaneously: Seems no.] seems quite the opposite.

SP: Well why would you [S simultaneously: No.] say it’s quite the opposite?

VM: Because a *mere* “I” is like a *purported* “I”, a *nominal* [AS simultaneously: No.] “I”.

SP: No, [S simultaneously: No.] no, no, no, no. [S: No.] Because right back here (laughter, student words) he said that mere “I” is what knows all phenomena.

LR: Right.

VM: That’s--

SP: So you got this--

AS: That’s in a previous quote.

SP (simultaneously): You’re having a hard--

VM: I am having a hard time.

SP: You’re having a hard time having [S simultaneously: (couple words inaudible) saying “mere”.] a-- a mere “I” which is the knower.

S: Right.

S (very faint): Well--

S: [one/two words inaudible]

S (simultaneously): Read it-- [AH simultaneously: But he-- he wrote--] read that last one again please.

SP: Ok.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 74, SP reading]: “Then, there is another in which, even though the I *appears* to exist in its own right, a mere I is all that is conceived.”

AS: So the first sentence says [S simultaneously: Oh I get it, uh-hm.] even though it appears to exist in its own right [CDA: It’s not.] means it *doesn’t* [students assent] exist in its own right.

RG: Right.

SP/S(?): Right.

CDA (simultaneously): On its own.

RG: That’s right.

AS (simultaneously): But that’s a-- that’s-- and-- so the correct [CDA simultaneously, faint: Yeah.] view is that this “I” which appears to exist in its own right doesn’t exist in its own right. [VM simultaneously: Only in the end situation.] It is only in the sense of being a me-- it is only a *mere* “I”. Now you have to--

S (simultaneously, faint): Which is [few words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): A relational “I”.

DB (simultaneously with S and VM): I think the-- I think the two go together.

LDS (simultaneously): Relational is right.

AS: Of course they do.

VM (simultaneously): Relational “I”. That’s why it exists [AS simultaneously: What--] relationally. [DB simultaneously: No I--] It doesn’t exist inherently.

DB: I think that the-- that-- that the first half and the second half of this last point of view [SP: Uh-hm.] go together.

AS: Yeah.

VM: Yeah.

DB (simultaneously): Because it’s this mere “I” which does appear as if it exists inherently.

SP: Right.

DB: Ok but, and the truth of it is seems to be that by that normally we mean what we normally mean. [S, faint: Right.] But-- (student laughs) I mean no. We mean it, it either exists inherently as-- as the “I” that’s associated with all the vehicles and there’s [student assents] no reflection whatsoever [student assents] taking place, so on and so forth. [student assents] He’s saying that that “I” that does appear as if it exists inherently [S, faint: Uh-hm.] is only a mere “I”.

S: (It is) only.

VM (simultaneously): Yes, yes.

AS: Now what do you mean by “mere”?

DB (simultaneously): What I-- what I mean [S simultaneously: Yeah.] only, what I mean only is that it's an individuated--

VM: Would you say relational?

DB: Well no, because it's only relational with respect to the rest of the-- the world-appearance. It in itself, ok, [student assents] is-- [S: Interesting.] See, it's the relation *it* has with the totality of being, alright, [student assents] that makes it a mere “I”. I mean I think that's what he's getting at.

SP: Let me ask a question.

VM: Far out.

SP: If you had-- if you had a Nirvikalpa samadhi, would you have an “I”, would you have a sense of “I”?

LDS (simultaneously): No.

VM: No.

LDS: No.

VM: Not at all.

AS (faint): Have none.

SP: Ok. So the sense of “I” arises [AS, faint: Yeah.] on the basis of this pure consciousness when looked at from outside.

VM: In phenomena. Right? That's--

S (simultaneously, very faint): Yeah.

AS (very faint): The second one.

LDS: He says it knows phenomena. This [SP assents] is what [VM simultaneously: Right.] knows phenomena. So it's relational.

VM (simultaneously): It's a relational “I”.

LDS: It's a relative “I” subject.

SP (simultaneously): Yeah but when knowing takes place, like-- ok, say you're in sa-- in Nirvikalpa there's no--

VM (simultaneously): No knowing there.

SP: No knowing as we know it.

LDS: Right.

SP: But if you come out of that then you have this pure consciousness coming through this mere “I” [student assents, faint] [LDS: Yeah.] and then the mere “I” performs the function of knowing all [student assents, faint] phenomena (that) therefore elaborated.

LDS: That’s because all phenomena require some-- [S: Right.] [VM simultaneously: Subjective pole.] some vehicle, some [AS simultaneously: So--] vehicle to manifest to, that is [VM: Right.] thr-- or-- yeah.

AH: That’s one pole of the imputation [AS simultaneously: So it--] of self.

SP: So that’s the sense in which the mere “I” is empty of its inherent existence because this mere “I” lapses in the face [VM simultaneously: Right.] of pure consciousness.

LDS: Exactly.

AS: Right.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

S: [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously with S and AH): It lapses in the sense that-- it [S simultaneously, faint: Yeah.] sounds like that idea of-- that-- of PB perhaps where he says that in relation to this vibrational movement, we call it human soul but paradoxically if *not* in relation we call it this divine so--

SP: Yeah. And that’s the way I was trying to hit this, [AS simultaneously: Is that the way you were trying to think of the--] I mean exactly what you said is the way I’m trying to hit this mere “I” [LR simultaneously: So that (S simultaneously, faint: Right.) *is* like the I AM.] in the continuum of consciousness.

S (simultaneously): Like the Witness.

S: Yeah.

AS: Or like the notion of a Witness it seems.

AH: Yeah. That’s what I thought-- I thought it was was a description of the Witness.

AS: That it’s called a-- it’s in-- Witness, meaning in relation to this vibratory activity which we spoke of as these [SP assents] vehicles you’d call it an “I”. Whereas if you say what is it in itself, remove all the vibratory activity--

SP: And when-- when P-- what’s PB talking about when he says the first of our thoughts is “I”? I mean I know we talk-- that’s a big one, it’s not just a little one but--

LDS (simultaneously): I think that’s the-- I think that’s the mere “I”.

SP: But, if it’s the first of our thoughts--

VM: It's the mere "I".

SP: And they say [AS simultaneously: (No.)] that the mere "I" is imputed--

AH: That's the subjective pole of [one/two words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously): Ah, but now, you see, you're going to--

IS THE MERE "I" TRACED BACK TO THE I AM OR THE WORLD-IDEA?

SP (simultaneously): Now you say, who does the [AS simultaneously: Ah.] imputation, that's what [AS simultaneously: Yeah.] you're going to ask, right?

AS: Yeah, right, (someone claps, laughs) now that's the question right, where are you going to trace [SP simultaneously: Ok.] that mere "I" to, [S simultaneously: How can you read it?] even if we assume what you say? This still exists (from here).

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 75, SP reading (simultaneously with AS above)]: "[You might ask], 'If the I and so forth exist through the power of conceptuality, [SP: He just means functioning of mind.] through whose conceptuality are these designated--mine, yours, one in the past, present, or whatever?'" This again is a case of analyzing to try to find the object designated, and you will not find such. Therefore, existence through the force of conceptuality itself exists only through the force of conceptuality."

S (very faint): Yeah.

AS: You got to read that again.

S: Could you read faster Sidney?

AH: That's how they-- (laughter)

AS: Would you read it again Sidney?

VM: You get one.

SP (simultaneously): I had to get it in before he--

AH: The--

AS: Well read it again 'cause--

S (faint): Uh-hm.

S (simultaneously, faint): [few words inaudible]

S (simultaneously, faint): It becomes a gamble.

AH: That was the point.

SP (simultaneously): He's saying nobody imputes this thought, thought imputes [S simultaneously: Oh right.] itself. [S: Yeah.] [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with SP] So he's saying that the thought is like this seed thing that--

AS (simultaneously): Well exactly.

LDS: Self-actuating.

VM (simultaneously): Self-actualizing.

SP (simultaneously): It's [AS simultaneously: Exactly the point, yeah.] self-actuating. So the first of our thoughts is a self-actuating thought "I".

AS: So they're not tracing the mere "I" to pure consciousness.

VM: It's the world-image.

S (simultaneously): Right.

AS (simultaneously with VM): Exactly the point.

LDS: It's within [S simultaneously: Right.] the World-Idea.

PC (simultaneously): And how could I--

RG (simultaneously): Right.

AS: But read it again.

PC (simultaneously): How could that kind of a mere "I" be a true knower? [S: What?] They're making that out to be the knower of all phenomena.

SP: Yeah, it's the knower of all [S simultaneously: But--] phenomena.

S (faint): That's what I'm--

VM: It just--

PC (simultaneously): But how could a-- an "I" that is itself a thought, is itself conceived by thought, how could that be the knower of phenomena?

LDS (simultaneously): Isn't that exactly [S simultaneously: Oh.] what PB says of the ego.

AH (simultaneously): It's the knower of phenomena but it's not the knower of emptiness.

PC (simultaneously): But the ego's not a knower.

AD: But where they're coming from?

LDS (simultaneously): It is a-- it is a relative knower.

AD (simultaneously): What-- what is their basic presupposition, what--

AH (simultaneously): The presupposition is that mind is defined as kalpani. (bit of laughter)

AD: Oh no, no.

AS (faint): No, not in this--

AH: It's all thought.

AD (simultaneously): The whole point I'm making here is the only way you can understand this is you gotta go back [AS simultaneously: The World-Idea.] *to what their presuppositions are.*

AS: And that--

SP: Well that's what we're trying to get here.

AS (simultaneously): Yeah.

S: [couple/three words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, I know that.

AS (simultaneously): Sid, could you read that again?

AH: I just tried to say what it is.

AS (simultaneously): Could you read the last bit again?

AH: That they're using a definition of mind as thought. And this is a big distinction within the Madhyamika itself.

AD (passionately): Look if you say that thought posits itself, I'm asking you, where are you coming from? [AS simultaneously: The World-Idea.] Which principle are you using?

AS: Not pure consciousness. It's the side of the World-Idea, it has to be.

SP: Yeah.

AS: The mere "I", if it's thought positing itself, [AH simultaneously: Yes.] it's the thought-- the World-Idea's thought, or it's on the side of this trans-- transitional-- [SP simultaneously: That's why--] (it's Nature) positing (itself).

SP: Ok, it's a-- [AH simultaneously: Well--] it's [few inaudible student words simultaneous with SP] from the point of view of the World-Idea, it's a thought manifesting itself. Right?

AS (faint): Yeah.

SP: As you would say. But, he says it rests on the ba-- in dependence on the-- the continuum of consciousness because it's like consciousness functioning through that thought--

RG: No, the World-So-- the World-Soul is not unconscious.

AS (simultaneously): That one-- but what if you say the continuum of the consciousness is the basis of the World-Idea, is the World-Idea itself is that-- providing the continuum for this mere "I".

LDS: That's what I [S simultaneously, faint: Yeah.] asked Avery earlier.

SP (simultaneously): Yes, it is in terms of its nature as the mere "I".

DB: Yeah but the issue is is does the World-I-- the World-- (laughter, student words) [S, amidst laughter: Yeah.] does the World-Idea think the "I" [AS simultaneously: Into existence.] into existence or [AS: Yes.] does the mere "I" think itself into existence?

AH: The mere "I" thinks itself.

SP (simultaneously): Well, it says the mere "I" thinks itself into existence.

DB (simultaneously): Alright, now, [AS: Yeah.] if the existence that the World-- that the mere "I" thinks itself into is the World-Idea, the basis of consciousness which the World-- the mere "I" rests on is not the World-Idea.

AS: No, but I would say that the-- it's a self-act-- the I-thought is-- (if it's) self-actuating within that World-Idea. That these thoughts are kind of self-actuating and they-- they-- the World-Idea provides that ground of consciousness as you're saying, [student assents] the ground or continuum consciousness in which these thoughts can perpetuate themselves and each I-- each I-thought has a continuum from life to life [DB simultaneously: But see--] as you say. And it wouldn't be able to have that continuum from life to life if it weren't for the World-Idea [SP: Right.] which contains the seeds of all these lives one after the other. And the mere "I" is the appearance of an "I" in each of these lives, and it's on the World-Idea.

SP (simultaneously): Now if you trace the subject-- if you trace the subjectivity to the mere "I"--

AS: And you trace the mere "I" to the World-Idea.

SP: And you trace-- yeah. Well you have-- I'm not going to (think/speak) of it.

AS: Wait, wait, you did-- (AS laughing) why are you-- you were almost going to agree with that.

SP: Well, in the analysis of phenomena and persons you're tracing the person to the mere "I" and you're tracing phenomena in a different-- in a different direction.

VM: But Sidney how can you say [SP simultaneously: Yeah.] that when you say, like Andrew said before, maybe you don't agree with that statement, but realizing the emptiness of the phenomena you also must appreciate the emptiness of the "I" and vice versa.

SP: Right.

VM: That again lands you back in this relational world-image view.

SP: Yeah. I wouldn't argue, I'm just--

AH (simultaneously): And does it land you in the image of the world-view or the conscious principle of the world-view?

VM: I don't see how it matters that much, I really don't.

SP (simultaneously): He just says it assists. I mean if you see that-- that a tree-- that one thing is mental it's quite easy to see that something else is mental.

AS: Right. So--

SP: I mean I think that's all that that's talking about.

AS (simultaneously): That's right, that's all [VM simultaneously: That's fine.] it is so that's-- so--

S (very faint): Right.

LDS: But how about Sidney's question of-- in comparison with PB's notion of the first of our thoughts is "I". Would we say-- would we say that that thought is on the side of the World-Idea?

VM: I think so.

LDS: Or can we say-- can we speak of the Overself as having put forth this "I"?

RG: They *do* speak of the Overself as putting forth the "I".

LDS: That's what I thought, so, there we can't--

VM (simultaneously): You know, also-- Oh I'm sorry.

RC: But isn't that "I" nonetheless a-- a-- a result of the interaction of the Overself and the World-Idea?

S: Yeah.

RC: That when we speak of the Overself as in no way descending, as in no way getting involved in [RG simultaneously: Right.] [one/two words inaudible] [S simultaneously: The end (one/two words inaudible)] that's one way. [S, faint: Yeah.] But when we speak of it as giving birth to an I-thought then we speak of this relationship.

RG: Uh-hm.

SP: But behind this-- [LDS: Yeah.] behind this mere "I" you have a consciousness that is just pure luminosity and knowing. [AS simultaneously: Oh well that's--] And it never becomes anything other than pure luminosity and knowing, [AS simultaneously: Well that ju--] in fact it doesn't become a sense of I-ness.

VM: Yes.

RC (simultaneously, faint): Uh-hm, ok.

AS: But that's what you have to show, I mean if-- [RG simultaneously: Yeah, how we do that, right.] if they have such a thing of this pure luminosity unchanging, eternal consciousness which is back of this mere "I", well that's-- that's gotta be the same as the Vedanta [one word inaudible]

SP (simultaneously): The mind of clear light is that which is clear and knowing. I mean that's its full definition, that which is clear and knowing.

S: Does it have an object Sidney?

SP (simultaneously): Ok, now, we s-- ok, let's see. Um--

S: Hm.

AS (very faint, possibly part of background): But isn't [three/few words inaudible]

VM (very faint, possibly part of background): Hold it, yeah.

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, pp. 75-76, SP reading]: “[*Question*:] From where does consciousness arise?

“[*Answer*:] We say that consciousness is produced from consciousness. Consciousness must be produced from consciousness because it cannot be produced with matter as its substantial cause [SP reads: cannot be produced from matter or any other kind of substantial cause].”

SP: It just what it says it is, this pure entity of luminosity and knowing.

AS: But-- but you know-- Is this part of this thing you-- this thing you-- the-- the beginning you sort of distinguish(ed) “I” from consciousness.

SP: Yeah.

AS: Right, and he did a [S simultaneously: Yeah.] lot on “I” there but [SP simultaneously: Yeah.] now is this the part that’s dealing with what is the consciousness as distinct from that?

SP (simultaneously): Yeah, because “I” is a form. I mean [AS simultaneously: Yeah.] that’s why I was saying like-- [S, very faint: Yeah.] oh--

S: That’s not pure thought.

AS (simultaneously): Now what is consciousness?

SP: “I” as this-- I mean you’re only talking about “I” when you’re talking about some knowing experience and you have a relation of a subject and an object and a sense of “I”. If you’re talking consciousness itself, then you’re not--

AS (very faint): Well, yeah.

RG: Sid-- Sidney, does this clear light consciousness always have an object or not? Or do they ever conceive of it--

SP: They say, you see, they say its object can be its own emptiness.

RG: It could be.

SP: It could be its own emptiness.

VM (simultaneously, faint): Sounds pretty good.

RG: Well if it [one word inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): That sounds pretty good, Sid.

S (simultaneously with RG and VM, faint): Right. That’s interesting.

S (very faint): Yeah.

SP: I mean the ob--

S (simultaneously): But would that be like entering the Void?

AD (simultaneously): Wouldn't that be the same as saying it's self-cognizing?

VM: Yes.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

SP: Yeah.

GA: Yeah.

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

AS (faint): Self-cognizing [one/two words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): Then it's not in-- not-- this doesn't sound like a mere "I" though.

SP: No, (this/just)--

AS (simultaneously): No but he's [MW simultaneously: No.] distinguishing the meaning of "I".

SP (simultaneously): This mind of clear-- of clear light [couple inaudible AS words simultaneous with SP] when it knows emptiness, that's the water in the water that Andrew was talking about, this mind of clear light that knows emptiness is knowing its own unfindability, its own like infinitude of knowing. [AS simultaneously, faint: Oh that's (one word inaudible)] I mean that's the way I-- I see it.

S (simultaneously, faint): Uh-hm.

LR: Wouldn't that be the Void?

CDA: Self-knowledge.

S: Right.

S (very faint): Not really.

S: What--

VM: Well--

RG: Do you have a quote on that Sid?

SP: Uh, let's see, where to find it. (SP laughs a bit)

S: Right.

AH: What topic did he want a quote on?

SP: He wants--

VM: The nature of pure consciousness.

RC (simultaneously, faint): The [one word inaudible] of the clear light knowing itself in some way.

S: So, so--

SP (simultaneously): Well, mind knowing-- consciousness [three/few inaudible AS words simultaneous with SP] knowing emptiness I think.

AH: Yeah let's see.

AS: Mind of clear light.

SP: I can find quotes but it [AS simultaneously, faint: Ok that (one word inaudible)] would take me [one/two words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): Anna.

AP: But-- but could I just-- I didn't understand again, consciou-- the "I", is that-- as they speak of it is it what-- is it what we speak of as consciousness? I mean if we-- if you distinguish between mind and consciousness, mind is more pure consciousness-- consciousness is with the-- with a-- a con-- some content, consciousness with a content?

AH: I'm sorry Anna, I'm-- You're making distinction between consciousness and mind.

S (faint): Yeah.

AP: Yeah.

AP: And you want to know if they do. Is that your question?

AP (simultaneously): Well-- yeah when they speak of "I", is that what they mean, what you say consciousness, when there is a content to the consciousness?

AH: I don't know.

S (faint): She had a question [couple/three words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously): Well yeah, I-- yeah.

AH (simultaneously): I don't know.

AP: Because my question was if-- if they say that it's on the side of the World-Idea, how-- does that mean that-- we have talked about this, the thing and then the soul or the content of soul that it was understanding, that they would place that on the side of the World-Idea or thinking and make, um--

AH: Yes, fundamentally--

AP: That it grows out of the World-Idea.

AH: Perhaps this is too--

AD (simultaneously): I don't think that that explanation was finished, the consciousness and the "I", I [S, faint: Right.] [AS simultaneously: No, it's not finished.] mean it's not finished. [AS simultaneously: In fact that last paragraph--] Well, you got little pieces of it, but, the thing ha-- the whole thing has to be given, otherwise we'll be discussing in a vacuum.

AS: Yeah.

VM: So read it out Sid. [AS simultaneously: Sidney, could you read--] Is it worth reading the rest?

AS (simultaneously): You know the last paragraph you read which discussed the last view, I didn't hear-- can you read that again? You were going to read it again, you only read it once.

SP (simultaneously): Which-- which part?

AS: From the one that-- [RG simultaneously: That consciousness produced consciousness.] the thing on consciousness versus the "I". What's the-- can you-- the-- you-- you read [SP simultaneously: (What?)] the last [VM simultaneously: Was this paragraph too?] view and the Dalai Lama says that's the view we hold. [S: Right.] And then you read the [SP simultaneously: Ok.] following paragraph but you only read it once. Could you read that again, [SP: Uh--] where he explains his-- why that's the view [couple words inaudible]

S (simultaneously): Let's see.

AH: It's about thought imputes thought (and--)

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 75, SP reading]: "Therefore, [AS simultaneously: Yeah about thought (imputes).] it is said that the I is designated through the power of nominality in dependence upon the beginningless and endless continuum of consciousness which is the main basis of designation. The I..."

(Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1984 0803b Ends; Side 2 Begins)

Dalai Lama XIV [*Kindness, Clarity, and Insight*, p. 75, SP reading]: "[This lack of establishment in the object's own right is the meaning of] selflessness.

"[SP adds: Well] You might ask, "If the I and so forth exist through the power of conceptuality, through whose conceptuality are these designated--mine, yours, one in the past, present, or whatever?" This is again a case of analyzing to try to find the object designated, and you will not find such [SP reads: find the designator]. Therefore, existence through the force of conceptuality itself exists only through the force of conceptuality."

S (faint): (Uh-hm.)

SP: Ok. And then he asks where consciousness arises, he just says it arises from itself.

S: [couple words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously): See, the original question [SP simultaneously: It's--] was on the distinction of consciousness and "I".

VM: And "I", right.

SP: Yeah.

AS (simultaneously): And the way I've heard him always-- well, in the one-- the case (of/in) things and so on, [SP: Uh-hm.] consciousness, when he talks about the sixth consciousness continuing, it's like-- [SP simultaneously: Uh-hm.] it's not consciousness, that word 'consciousness' (or it) would totally translate that as consciousness, [SP: Uh-hm.] don't-- usually that is what we'd call the pure awareness. [SP: Uh-

hm.] If-- you usually is just the way you have it there, that the “I” is imputed by thought, is re-- or is imputed on the basis of this consciousness, [SP: Uh-hm.] and it usually sounds like again the consciousness refers to this continuum which is provided by the World-Idea we would say, it’s still not-- you’re not talking about that consciousness as the pure awareness or the mind of clear light or anything yet.

SP: I think the Prasangikas hesitate to talk about the mind of clear light, you know, because they say the sixth consciousness has many levels.

AS: Right. That again, many levels.

SP (simultaneously): The ultimate level is the mind of clear light [AS simultaneously: See that’s the--] which is the pure-- [AS: Right.] pure aspect of that (sixth).

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, that continuum. He talks about that as the continuum too, that-- [SP assents] [VM simultaneously: I think that--] that the sixth consciousness is the continuum but it has a defiled aspect and another-- and the a-- and tries to see through the--

SP (simultaneously): Yeah, one aspect is never defiled. One aspect is never defiled. And that’s its aspect of pure knowing. (Um--)

AS: And another aspect is as the continuum from life to life, the historical continuity between lives, [students assent, faint] thread. [S, faint: (Definitely.)] [SP: Uh-hm.] Is that right Sidney, I mean [VM simultaneously, faint: I think so.] is that the way they use that sixth consciousness, that historical continuity between life to life like the thread, [SP: Uh-hm.] one aspect of that sixth mind?

SP: Well there’s a descent [AS simultaneously: It’s (like) conscious--] like through-- if they describe death, they describe, you know, the separation of the consciousness from the body and the dissolution back through these, you know, white, red, black, and so forth. Then they talk about a projection through the vehicles, of consciousness through the vehicles once again. But there’s one part that never-- it never is associated with the vehicles which is this mere luminosity and knowing, that’s the mind of clear light.

VM: Uh-hm.

SP: But that’s not really discussed in the Prasangika, they sort of leave it open, they just say consciousness is--

AS (simultaneously): But see, that sounds so-- that-- what *you* [S simultaneously, faint: Uh-hm, uh-hm.] just said, if you could *find* things that say that, I mean that sounds exactly like when PB says this divine Overself remains always [SP assents] pure awareness. [VM assents] And then [student assents] there’s the aspect that is associated with the changing World-Idea and associated with [student assents] vari-- all-- whatever levels [VM assents] you want within that World-Idea. [student assents] But if you trace--

SP (simultaneously): Well there are quotes and I could find them, it would just be [AS simultaneously: If you trace back--] hard to find them right now, there are quotes even in these [AS simultaneously: Yeah.] books that I--

AS: I mean if you trace back that ray or light or whatever that's [student assents] associated with all those vehicles and cut off all of the vibratory activity and just get to [SP assents] that clear light which always is what it is without any trace of objectivity, it's very hard to distinguish [VM simultaneously: That from the pure soul, sure.] that from our description of Nirvikalpa or--

RC (faint): There's no sense [VM simultaneously: That's good.] of "I" there and it's good.

MAKING BUDDHIST CLASSES CREATIVE AND INVIGORATING

AD: Well you're ready to tackle it now?

S (faint): [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): I could try, sure.

AD: No, to-- to make this into something, you know, creative, artistic and--

S (faint): Yeah.

AH: Is it-- is this last discussion that we've had, are we trying to-- are we trying to establish that their method is only on the side of the World-Idea and not including the side of the consciousness?

S (very faint): Uh-hm, yeah.

S (simultaneously): That's not clear.

AH: Are we trying-- what--

AD (simultaneously): Well that's-- I mean that would be the position that *I* would be taking, alright. And, you could agree or disagree, it doesn't matter, the point-- the point that we want to get to is something like this. You want to make the discussion or-- you want to have classes on Buddhism that are going to be invigorating, that are [student assents] going to bring people *into* the argument, alright, and maybe even go back and read a book. [S simultaneously: Yeah, uh-hm.] That might happen.

SP: Well maybe--

S (faint): You see that's--

S: [one/two words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): I just didn't understand what it was we were discussing last.

AD (simultaneously): But if-- the other point is don't get-- don't get sucked into the-- you know, the little details which we're not ready for, let's get [student assents] a general broad picture of what they're saying before we start attacking the minor details.

AH: This-- this last issue--

SP (simultaneously): Well maybe certain people should work on this "Birth of the Universe" chapter and come prepared, you know, leading [student assents, faint] off with those quotes and then just see if we can sort of work out a relation of those two.

AD: If-- if you [S simultaneously: Right.] feel that you're, [S, faint: Yeah.] you know, sufficiently acquainted with their doctrine, that'll be ideal, you know, [student assents] to go through the chapter on the birth of the universe and read sections, you know, [SP assents] and you try to pull out from your own, you know, understanding of their doctrine, correlations.

SP: Uh-hm. Ok.

AD: Yeah, yeah why don't you--

SP (simultaneously): Yeah we can-- we can try to find--

AD: Maybe an example would be the best one, ok? [SP or another student assents] You were speaking about the desire on the-- on the part of the Prasangikas to keep something of objectivity in this emptiness even though they speak about it as emptiness, alright. [student assents] And if-- [9¾ second pause, flipping of pages] Well, (why don't you keep) [one word inaudible] [short pause] Something like this maybe might help-- help us.

PB [*The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," p. 33, AD reading]: "It is thus out of these stored memories, [AD: They're on page 54.] that is imaginations of innumerable forms, that the World-Mind recalls, constructs and evolves everything. The seed-memories of the world-idea, retained and transmitted since an earlier cycle, revive, reappear and develop through the mysterious memorizing and imaginative powers of [AD adds: the] World-Mind."

AD: This gives you a feeling that there's something objective, alright, in the knowledge situation that we are confronted with.

VM: Uh-hm.

SP (simultaneously): Yeah.

AD: Not only objective in the sense that it's, you know, not illusion, [SP assents] but that the Plato tradition, you know, [SP assents] that the Ideas or these essences or manifested essences [SP assents] are basically what are going to be recapitulated [SP assents] throughout cycles of time.

SP: I can't see how they're not talking about, I mean, big numinous religious concept but I can't see how they're *not* talking about the experience of the instantiation of Ideas.

AD: Yeah, fine. And that why I say, as we read these paragraphs, alright, or sentence at a time, [SP: Yeah.] those that are sufficiently acquainted with the Buddhist doctrine should-- could try to correlate [SP assents] (flow of) meaning with these sentences and after a while you begin to acquire the-- a flexible and a sufficient terminology, alright, to avoid being fascinated by any of the clichés that they might use. [students assent] We have to be careful to avoid being fascinated or hypnotized by any-- [student assents] any, you know, *set* phrases.

SP: Uh-hm.

S: Like?

SP: Yeah.

AD: Like, if-- we say combined dependent origination, alright, it's [SP assents] a cliché. Could you give it to me in a different way? And right away--

S (faint): [one/two words inaudible]

SP (simultaneously): Yeah I could--

AD: Well otherwise your mind is in a groove!

[students assent, faint]

AH: I think that's exactly what that-- their method attempts to do to the mind is to put it in a groove--

AD: Oh no, oh no. (SP laughs) I want my mind free, I want a free mind.

AH (simultaneously): No I'm not-- I'm not talking about your mind, I'm talking about what (bit of laughter) their method is.

AD: I want a free mind.

AH: You won't let me (speak).

AD (simultaneously): You say s-- you say combined dependent origination, I think of the interrelationship of all, you know, causal factors. [student assents, faint] [AH simultaneously: Anthony the--] I think more scientifically let's say, I'll bring [SP assents] in a scientific concept.

AH: Their reasoning is so close and so terse that they want you to put your mind in this groove.

AD: Yeah we're-- [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] I think-- I think we have some familiarity with that, [AH: Yeah.] I mean in Plotinus.

S (very faint, possibly part of background): Let me know.

AH: And--

AD: But--

AH: They say you gotta not only do it-- put it in a groove once but you gotta do it over and over and over again.

MW (faint): Right. (MW laughs a bit)

AD: And let me add, and maybe for a few lifetimes.

AH: Yeah.

S (faint): Do it.

S (faint): Yeah.

AD: So, it's up to you to make it interesting and, you know, invigorating and that people should get angry with one another, throw pillows and fight. Otherwise it's not a real class yet. (bit of laughter)

RC (faint): [few words inaudible]

AD: Look at him, [S simultaneously: Uh-hm.] he's sleeping.

TS: Yeah [one word inaudible] (that's alright).

AD (simultaneously): Look at them, they're sleeping, look. See?

S (possibly part of background): From the esoteric [one/two words inaudible]

AS (faint): No, that's his wakeful self [couple words inaudible] (laughter)

AD (amidst laughter): That's wakeful consciousness! (more laughter)

[couple seconds of background student talking]

LDS/S(?) (faint): That's when I feel good.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

[Audio File 1984 0803b Ends]