

**CLASS at Wisdom's Goldenrod, Hector, NY
with Anthony Damiani (AD)
August 31a, 1984
BUDDHISM; YOGACARA**

TOPIC: Buddhism
SUBJECT: Yogacara

SUBSUBJECTS: Epistemology, Mentalism, Vedanta, *Meditation on Emptiness* (Hopkins)

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Don't be a parrot when reading and trying to understand, be creative and original

AD: there are gems in *The Wisdom of the Overself* that will make your hair tingle and sparkle; parts have to be rewritten

BOOKS READ FROM OR REFERENCED:

- Jeffrey Hopkins, Elizabeth Napper (ed.), *Meditation on Emptiness*
- Paul Brunton, *Notebooks*
- Maharishi Valmiki, *Yogavasistha-Ramayana*
- John F. Avedon, *An Interview with the Dalai Lama*
- John F. Avedon, *In Exile from the Land of Snows*
- Buddha, *Dhammapada*
- Paul Brunton, *The Wisdom of the Overself*

DIAGRAMS referred to (not with this transcript version) [Transcriber note: [diagram] means the speaker is referencing a diagram as he or she is speaking.]

NOTES:

- This is **1983 08/31a, Buddhism; Yogacara Class, and the first entry associated with this date. 1983 08/31b = Plotinus Seminar from earlier in the day**, for which we have no audio, just JF notes.
- Partial transcript (Scan File 1984 0831 BUD 53p.PDF) exists.

- Archives/Events Master spelling style = Yogacara, though spelled “Yogachara” by Hopkins.
- See WG Classes 1984 0907 and 0914, which are also on Buddhism, Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*. This class is also related to PB, *Wisdom of the Overself*, “Birth of the Universe” classes Aug.-Sept. 1984.

TRANSCRIBED Verbatim by IT 2019; prefatory matter and footer by JF 2019. This is **V12a** (2023) and has: updated prefatory matter, footer, and audio file name; Booklist and TOC completed; Subsubjects slightly altered for accuracy; new notes within transcript. **Archival verbatim transcript – V12a.**

AUDIO FILES: 1984 0831a, 1984 0831b. [Note: “Tape” and “Side” refer to original audio cassette tapes that were later digitized into .MP3 Audio Files.]

1984 08/31a at Wisdom's Goldenrod Buddhism; Yogacara

[Audio File 1984 0831a Begins]

DB: --Buddhism.

AH: Buddhism. [S, whisper: Yeah.] [S, faint: Uh-hm.] I'm going to just read some things from this Hopkins book, *Meditations on Emptiness*. And we're going to start with the Chittamatra view, which is also spoken of as Yogacara. This is a-- I'm not going to read everything but I'm going to read selected passages and we're going to try to see if we can understand what's being conveyed. [short pause] Let's just see if we have a sense of meaning that's coming from these passages. If I can I'll offer some explanation as we read it, or if there's other terms that I'm not familiar with maybe Sid or maybe someone could fill in those spaces. [VM assents, faint] I say a little bit about this book. We all-- we all remember Jeffrey Hopkins. This is pretty much a consequence of his adult life's activity, this book, and it's spoken of as being his Ph.E.-- Ph.D. thesis. But, I don't think that's an entirely appropriate description. He spent a whole lot of time with these geshe [VM assents, faint] and these people all over the world; an awful lot of time with the Dalai Lama personally, received [VM assents, faint] personal instruction from him. I would guess that we could have some confidence that there's at least a sincere effort to convey their view. Ok? Ok, we talk about Chittamatra, [S, faint: Yeah.] Mind-Only.

[Transcriber note: I am using *Meditation on Emptiness* by Jeffrey Hopkins, assistant editor Elizabeth Napper, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 1996.]

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 365, AH reading]: "The Chittamatrins (Mind-Only-ists) [AH reads: They] are so called because they assert [that] all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind. ... This is not the same as asserting that all phenomena are mind because minds are observers of objects, and if all phenomena were minds, stones and so forth would absurdly have objects of observation. Rather, just as dream objects are not the mind that perceives them but also not separate entities from the mind, so the objects of the world are not the consciousnesses that perceive them but also not separate entities from those consciousnesses."

AH: Now this fairly difficult idea to start with. Would you like me to do it again?

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AH: They say--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 365, AH reading]: "The Chittamatrins [AH reads: Chittamatra]...are so called because they assert that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind."

AH: Now he's going to explain what they mean by the nature or entity of the mind. It's *not* the same thing, they *don't* mean to assert--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 365, AH reading]: "...that all phenomena *are* [AH emphasis] mind because minds are observers of objects, and if all phenomena were minds, stones and so forth would absurdly have objects of observation."

RG: Uh-hm. But I-- I don't-- I don't get the criticism.

VM: I think he--

AH: The his--

VM: All things are of the *substance* of mind but they are not [S simultaneously, faint: (Mind/Yeah).] mind. Right?

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

RG: I understand the sentence, I didn't understand their criticism.

HS: There's no-- there's no criticism, (he's introducing) a new subject.

AD (simultaneously): You didn't follow-- you don't understand *because*--

S (very faint): Right.

RG: Because--

AD: I-- I didn't understand it either.

AH: Let's read it once more. I'm not sure I understand.

SP (simultaneously): I think he's using 'mind' as consciousness and not as like a functioning [student assents] mind here, like a consciousness which cognizes.

S: Right.

RG: But his reasoning was he-- because it would be absurd to believe that rocks and stones [S simultaneously: Are observers.] would have objects of consciousness.

AB: Are observers.

VM: Are observers.

RG (simultaneously): Right.

LDS: See--

RG: Now I don't think that-- I don't think one, in reasoning, could establish whether rocks and stones (would) learn [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): I think the point is, he said that it--

VM: I know, you always like that.

AH: I think the point is as follows.

S: Yeah.

AH: (If you say/He said) it's the nature [one inaudible student word simultaneous with AH] or entity of mind as distinct from phenomena *as* mind. Phenomena are of the nature or of the entity of mind rather than this more simple--

SP (simultaneously): Well that's because they describe mind as that which is clear and knowing, [student assents] yes, but they're not talking about the functioning other than a knowing function.

AD: So, Sidney, are you saying that they're speaking about mind as the knowing function?

SP/S(?): Right.

AD: That's ok.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 365, AH reading]: "Rather..."

LR: Could you read it again now Andrew?

AH (simultaneously): Ok. This--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 365, AH reading]: "...they assert [AH: their tenet is] that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind. ... This is not the same as asserting that all phenomena are mind because minds are observers of objects, and if all phenomena were minds, stones and so forth would absurdly have objects of observation. Rather, just as dream objects are not the mind that perceives them but also not separate entities from the mind, so the objects of the world are not the consciousnesses that perceive them [S, faint: Right.] but also not separate entities from those consciousnesses."

AH: So they want to-- I think the point here is they want to hold a distinction that allows for a theory of cognition among other things.

S (very faint): Yeah.

LDS: I thi-- I think a lot of what Sidney was bringing out is the distinction-- they're talking about two-- two aspects of the mind here, mind as knower or cognizer and mind as a substance.

S (very faint): Uh-huh.

AH: Yes.

LDS: And objects that are of the entity of mind would be substantially the same as mind but not in function equivalent to mind.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

AH: Do we need more commentary, [VM/S(?), faint: No.] more discussion? There's probably an important point, it's the-- it's their tenet, their main tenet.

RG (simultaneously): Yes, one more time the first sentence, [AH: Yeah.] I'm sorry.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 365, AH reading]: “The Chittamatrins [(Mind-Only-ists)] are so called because they assert that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind. ... This is not the same as asserting that all phenomena are mind because minds are observers of objects, and if all phenomena were minds, stones and so forth would absurdly have objects of observation.”

AH: They’re denying the quality of consciousness to stones and other objects.

RG (simultaneously): But yet they’re of the nature of mind.

AH: They’re of the *nature* of mind.

RG: Now what’s that subtle little distinction?

AH: Well, I think if you took the more general view of some of their other-- other descriptions where they say their notion of ultimate truth is mind, their notion of emptiness is as follows. Emptiness is emptiness of distinction or the lack of distinction between subject and object. Subject and object are included in one bija seed. This whole process is of the nature of mind. So it’s against that backdrop.

S: Ok.

VM: Aren’t they saying something relatively simple? I mean let’s use the dream example since they seem to like it too. You have a dream pole [AH: Yeah.] that appears in the dream. That dream is of the substance, is of the nature of mind. It is a, if you like, an unfoldment, a concretization of mind. On the other hand, you don’t attribute the knowing function of mind to the pole. [RG assents] So it’s of the nature of mind, the substance of mind, but it is not a mind as a-- an observer or as a knower on its own right.

RG: But that’s [one word inaudible] if you put--

AD (simultaneously): Vic, wouldn’t you say that among the texts in the Yogacara, especially Asanga, [S: Uh-hm.] that he would say something like this, behind every particle of dust is Mind? [Note: See PB, *Notebooks*, V13, 21:4.271: “*Yoga Vasistha*: “There is a mind behind every particle of dust.””]

VM: I don’t know the texts of the Yogacara well enough Anthony to-- to say. Now I’m just trying to go in this passage.

RG: But even from this passage--

AH (simultaneously): But he wou-- but he wouldn’t say the particle of dust *is* Mind.

AD: Behind every particle of dust there’s Mind.

AH: That’s to say I think(--/?)

AD: Yeah, so that’s like saying, even the pole is a subject.

VM: But that’s not what here s-- being said here though, we agree?

AD (simultaneously): No, that’s not what’s being said here.

VM: Ok. I don’t-- as I say, I don’t know the texts, I’m just trying to go with this (text).

AD (simultaneously): So, what-- that's what we want to do, we want to [AH simultaneously: Right.] understand what is being said there.

VM: Right.

GA: But is the mind the same--

AD (simultaneously): Well, I'm going to-- I'm going to assume that, what he said, that Hopkins knows what he's talking about. He revised this, he's worked a lot with these people, he knows what he's talking about. So I'm just going to assume that he's correct. So he's saying that there is [S, faint: Yeah.] such a thing in mind as, you know, you can make a bifurcation, that there is what you might call cognitive knowing or cognitive-ness, alright, which is n-- non-objective and then objects.

S: Right.

AD: Everything else would be object.

S (very faint): Yeah.

VM: Uh-hm.

AH: But see in their-- I-- I'm not sure it's appropriate to try this kind of explanation until we get into it a ways but-- See, their view is the lack of distinction between subject of-- and object within the matrix of mind. So the distinction between a knowing and a known is within the matrix of mind. You-- are you suggesting that this view is other than that?

AD: Well, I'm suggesting that there may be another interpretation of the Yogacara school which would not accept that, alright. But I-- I just, [AH simultaneously: Ok.] you know, want to bring that out because that's what I think Richard is referring to and we'll go back to the way he's interpreting it, that there is such a thing as Louis pointed out, function and substance. Function would be a cogniti-- cognitive knower, alright, substance wouldn't be. It would be like the objective, that which is known. Now what-- that which is known has to be of the nature of mind, otherwise it can't be known by a mind. So, I'll take, I'll take the meaning to be what you're saying now, [AH simultaneously: He said it's--] what Sid just said.

AH: It's of the nature of mind but it could-- you can't say it *is* mind.

RG: See, that's what I [S simultaneously: Yeah.] don't understand, even in the dream example. The dream thought, the dream im-- dream-- dream image is-- we all agree it's of the nature of mind but I don't see how you could say it is not mind. If it's of the nature of mind and it's only known through the mind and thought is a product of the mind, how could it be anything other but the mind, that--

VM (simultaneously): That doesn't-- (this isn't--)

AD (simultaneously): Yeah but Richard, I think the point that we have to try to grasp here, and I'm with you in what you're saying, is that they're trying to bifurcate mind into subjects, alright, and non-subject, [VM: Yeah.] and that's all they [RG simultaneously: Ok.] want to do there.

AH: Yes.

RG: That's good.

AD (simultaneously): So [AH simultaneously: Yes.] they'll say like the pole is of the nature of mind, alright, but it is not a cognizer.

TS: Right.

VM: That's all. Right?

RG (simultaneously): But as long as they--

AD (simultaneously): I could accept that, fine.

RG (simultaneously): As long as they mean by mind a cognizer, then that's ok.

AH: Yes.

VM (simultaneously): They talk about mind elsewhere as a mere luminosity and knowing, and I think [student assents, faint] when they use it from that point of view that's what they want to deny the pole having.

AH: Alright.

RG (simultaneously): But it seems you can't have it both ways, I mean either you take a material viewpoint and say that the thing is other than the mind and it has an existence and then-- or you say it is of the nature of mind and then it-- the mind includes more than the cognitive aspect, like he was saying, the substantive aspect.

AH: See I was just going to suggest that their view of what is ultimate is the lack of distinction between cognizer and cognized, [VM simultaneously: Good.] [RG: Right.] but for the purpose of de-- evolving a theory of cognition, for the purpose of this kind of discussion, they make this distinction within mind.

RG: Well would you say that's their conventional truth then, this level, I mean--

AH: Yes.

RG: Ok.

DB: Wasn't-- isn't this-- doesn't this bear some similarity to the quote in the *Wisdom* where he speaks of reality being continuous with its appearance? He makes a distinction between the appearances that take place and yet maintains the reality or the reality of mind is in some respects continuous with that?

AH: That--

RG: But I think in that quote he would say the appearance *is* mind, it isn't other than it. I mean they could--

DB (simultaneously): Well see the real--

RG: No, but the--

DB (simultaneously): He doesn't-- he doesn't-- he doesn't [one word inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): The line after that is there is only the one.

AH: You know, I think we've s-- I think we've struck on one of their real-- one of their real [SP: Well they--] important issues. Later, if we pursue this, it had the two views within Yogacara, they're called the true aspect and a false aspect Yogacarins, and it has to do with what the nature of that objective content is. So that'll get-- I'm sure we'll get into it, yeah.

AD (simultaneously): Alright, let's go a little further then.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 365, AH reading]: "Another name for Chittama..."

AD (simultaneously): (Hey), just one thing I want to remark, to us the Yogacara school is very important. I mean that's-- that's the only subjective idealistic school that cropped up in Asia. It's the only school that I know of that I could say "This is a mentalistic position." Now I don't know, maybe you know of other schools in Asia. But it's the only one that I know of.

[students assent, very faint]

SP: Well-- I think the Tantra is the idealistic. Well, (just) Mind-Only.

AD: Mind-Only? Alright.

SP (simultaneously): Yeah, but-- of the Hindu schools, yeah.

AD: Let's plunge, let's go.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 365-366, AH reading]: "Another name for Chittamatrins [AH reads: Chittamatra] is Yogacharins [AH reads: Yogachara], (Practitioners of Yoga), because they arrange the practices of the path from the viewpoint of yoga. This, however, is just an etymology and not a definition because all Buddhist tenets are presented for the sake of yogic practice.

"The Chittamatrins are divided, like the Sautrantikas, into Followers of Scripture and [AH adds: Followers of] Reasoning. ... According to him [AH reads: According Asanga, according to him], some Hearers only realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity and never realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities."

AS: (Slow down.)

AH: Ok, so this-- [S, faint: Yeah.] this is the same point that we started.

S: Where are we reading?

AH (simultaneously): Let me-- let me back up a little, I'm [S simultaneously, faint: I have no idea.] at page 366, about the middle of the second paragraph. This a distinction-- this is a-- in the context of a distinction between the followers of scripture and the followers of reasoning, the two views within Yogacara.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "Though, in general, the term 'Chittamatrin' refers to the Followers of Scripture, that is, of Asanga, the Followers of Reasoning are said to be the more advanced of the two groups. This is because Asanga teaches that there are three final vehicles, meaning that some sentient beings never achieve Buddhahood because their vehicle is

completed at a lower stage on which they remain forever. According to him, some Hearers [AH: Some students.] only realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity and never realize that objects [AH reads: object] and subjects are empty of being separate entities.”

AH: Now there’s two levels of realizati-- realization that is-- that’s being discussed. In the first case the realization is at the grade of a person being-- not being self-sufficient entity. In the second case, it’s the realization that subject and object are empty of being separate entities. Subject and object are one. Yes--

VM (simultaneously): Andrew, this may be a bit far out but I just want to try this.

AH (faint): Yeah.

VM: You know, we’ve spoken before about the-- one of the important goals along the philosophic quest is the attainment of Nirvikalpa samadhi, an appreciation of the subjective being of the individual. Then after that is achieved that consciousness is brought back into the world where you then have to have a full-blown understanding of mentalism in order to understand the production of the world-image. Ok? Now, [AH: Yes.] this may be going too far but I wonder if he means here, when he says--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, VM reading]: “According to him, some Hearers [VM: or some students] only realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity...”

AH: I think that’s his way of just--

VM (simultaneously): If you take that far [students assent, faint] enough that maybe you can realize emp--

AD (simultaneously): But what would that-- what does that mean to you Vic?

AH: That mea--

VM: Well, I’m trying to take it far.

AD (simultaneously): I mean-- well, we’re-- [AH: That means--] we want to understand what this means, alright. What does it mean to you, what would it mean to you? I-- I [VM simultaneously: (But--)] have an idea what it would mean for me.

VM: When a person is not a self-sufficient entity.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah.

VM: I would say that any vehicle, any sense of subjectivity that a person might have, is some production within the world-image, if you like, is so--

AD (simultaneously): Gee, can’t you say simply the realization that the ego is illusory?

VM: Ok, a [AH simultaneously: Yes.] voidness of the ego.

AH: Yes. I was--

VM (simultaneously): That’s a much cleaner way to say it.

AD: Alright so, [VM: Ok.] that’s the first realization. The second realization?

VM: Well the second realization would be an appreciation of mentalism, how the subject and object are both creations within-- within mind.

AH: Yes. If I might try, I think that there's a reference in PB, not in the chapter we're working with but he talks about the yogi's first thing is to stop individual mind. That's one realization. The second realization is at the level of World-Mind and I think that's what this distinction is.

AD: Well, again, could I suggest that the first realization is the illusory nature of the ego is [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] brought to your attention. The second realization, which is really the first realization, alright, and this is the second realization, but really the first realization is the unitary nature of the ego and its functioning. [AH and another student assent] In other words, the first realization or the first thing that you realize in a mys-- in a glimpse is the fact that the subject and object are unified, that there isn't any division between these two. That realization automatically r-- brings about the recognition that the ego is illusory.

AH: You're reversing this.

AD: Yeah, I'm reversing now. I'm saying you first have the glimpse, alright, and the glimpse means that your subject-object relationship is denied. Ok? That's the first thing. Automatically and concomitant *with* that is the realization that the ego is illusory.

S: Uh-hm.

S (very faint): Yeah.

AD: Now that's the way *I* would say it and I wouldn't say it the way he says it because the order first of all is-- is reversed, and it's-- he certainly makes it sound very complicated.

JL: Could you say though [S simultaneously, very faint: Well, true.] it's from the point of view of practice for one who *hasn't* had the glimpse, that--

AD: I don't know what you're saying.

JL: That-- that to take the subject and object as being-- as being dichotomous would be-- in-- in practice it would be jumping too far, that you [VM assents] really have to-- you have to find the-- the unreality of the ego first?

AD: No, you can't go out and find the unreality of the ego. What you do find, alright, is the Overself or your soul.

JL: Yeah.

AH: Yes.

AD: That has-- that-- concomitant with that is the unreality of the ego.

JL: Yeah.

AD: But, as-- if you don't have that, the ego will always be very real, and even when you have that, a moment later the glimpse is over, the ego claims you for its own again. But at that-- at that time, you will

have the experience that the subject and the object are *not*-- there isn't a triple relationship that exists between them but it's one thing, [AH: Yes.] it's an undivided mind. Then, and only then, do you feel, "Well, the ego is illusory," and you know it. That's over. That's what I think he's referring to there when he says the first realization, the second realization.

AH: There's a little more explanation I should read.

AD (simultaneously): Sure.

AH: Yeah. So, [S, faint: Read it.] there's two-- these two things that-- the one, Hearer realizes that a person is not a self-sufficient entity, and the other is that subjects and objects are empty of being separate entities.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "These Hearers [AH: The first ones.] aim only toward a solitary peace."

AH: Those that realize the emptiness of subject.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "The Chittamatrin followers of Dharmakirti, however, point to the impermanence of fetters and to the skill of the Buddha in teaching and thereby show that all eventually cognize both selflessnesses and attain the highest enlightenment. Thus for them there is only one final vehicle and all sentient beings eventually attain Buddhahood."

S (faint): Yeah.

RG: Isn't what they're always saying, you first ask "Who am I" and then-- and then "What am I"?

AH: Yes, "who" and "what". That's the way I would have interpreted it.

AD: Well--

S (very faint): Yes, uh-hm.

VM: But Anthony's turning it around.

AD (simultaneously): Could I hear it again?

AS: All of it.

AH: Yeah.

AD: Could I hear it again?

AH: The whole thing Anthony?

AD: What you just read now.

S (simultaneously, very faint): Yeah.

AH: Yes. It made a distinction between the two levels of realization.

AD: Yeah.

AH: And the first one--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: “These Hearers aim only toward a solitary peace.”

AD: So, these here aim only at solitary peace. What i-- what is he saying there?

AH: Those are the one-- that’s the--

AD (simultaneously): Those two realizations. In other words, when I realize the nature of the undivided mind, alright, and the illusoriness of the ego, alright, right there and then what have I-- what is he saying?

S: No.

S: Not [one word inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): I don’t think he’s saying [RG simultaneously: That was too--] it that way, I--

AH: No.

RG: I thought you said the first one was just a--

VM (simultaneously): I think he’s saying it differently.

AD: Wait, just read it!

AH: Let me read the whole thing.

AD: No, just read that sentence!

AH: Well, the question is what does ‘These’ refer to.

AD: Yeah, what do ‘These’ refer to?

VM/S(?): [couple/three words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): It’s the first level or the second level or both.

AD (simultaneously, intensely): What do ‘These’ refer to and the next phrase is what?

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: “These Hearers aim only toward a solitary peace.”

AD: In other words, it’s a very private affair.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

AH: Yes.

RG: And isn’t that the first--

VM: That’s the first guys.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

AH: That's the level of--

AD (intensely): That realization is a very private affair, you're no Bodhisattva, you're no Buddha. You're just a mystic.

RG: Right.

S: Right.

AS: That's [VM simultaneously: Well, you just realize--] if you've had both of those things, that the illusoriness of the ego which follows upon seeing that the subject and object are only an apparent split, that's a-- that's a subjective realization [couple/three words inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): But that's not how the quote reads anyway.

VM (simultaneously): But wait a second, wait a second, the quote doesn't read that way, if I can--

RG (simultaneously): [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Well alright, [AS simultaneously: But that's the-- but--] read the quote, we'll try again.

S (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible]

AB: Just read the sentence before, gentlemen.

VM (simultaneously): Let me back up just a little bit, it says--

S (simultaneously, faint): That's a lot.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, VM reading]: "...some Hearers only realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity..."

AD: Some here--

VM: Some Hearers, some students, whatever--

AD (simultaneously): Some students, yeah.

VM (simultaneously): Only realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity, the [AD simultaneously: Alright.] ego's illusory.

AD: Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, VM reading]: "...and never realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities."

AD (simultaneously): In other words, there's no concern here with the objective.

VM: The outer [couple/three inaudible student words simultaneous with VM] world, they just [AD/S(?) simultaneously: Yeah.] never-- never make any sense out of it.

AD (simultaneously): So, what he's saying there is this is a very private affair. [S, very faint: Right.] This student simply realizes the illusoriness of his own ego, [VM simultaneously: Right.] alright, at the same time that the mind is undi-- can be and is undivided. [AH simultaneously: Right, yes.] You listen to what I'm saying before you criticize because I'm trying to make this available to us.

VM: I'm sorry Anthony.

AD (intensely): I gotta-- I gotta understand what this man is saying in English! I gotta put it in a terminology that I can handle.

AH: Yeah, I understand what my mistake was Anthony, I was positing two levels of realization.

AD (intensely): Yeah, and I'm saying no!

AH: Yeah, it's alright.

VM: Ok.

AD (intensely): You can't have the glimpse without the realization that the ego is illusory. I'm [AH simultaneously: Yes.] not saying that you keep it but you can't have it. [AH simultaneously: Yeah so--] You can't experience your soul and say my ego is real!

AH: There's-- I understand.

GA (simultaneously): Right, that's exactly what the-- the criticism of-- the followers of Dharmakirti would make that point, that there's only one vehicle, there's only one realization. The followers of Asanga would say no, there's different realizations. I think that's what the paragraph is about. It's from the point of view of Asanga they would say there's two-- two different realizations. From the point of view of Dharmakirti you would say no, there's only one realization, everybody eventually has that one realization.

AH: If-- I think we should finish this passage [AD simultaneously: Yes, please, sure.] because there's further explanation, further explanation.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "The Chittamatrin [AH reads: Chittamatra] followers of Dharmakirti, however, point to the impermanence of fetters and to the skill of the Buddha in teaching and thereby show that all eventually cognize both selflessnesses and attain the highest enlightenment. Thus for them there is only one final vehicle and all sentient beings eventually attain Buddhahood."

S (faint): Ah.

VM: So then Anthony's taking the Dharmakirti point of view and--

AH: Yes.

VM: I mean if we can say it that way.

GA: Yeah.

AH (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

VM: And that this few-- first few sentences are really from Asanga's view which [AH: Yes.] Anthony criticized before we even got to Dharmakirti because he [GA assents, faint] saw through that.

AH: Yes.

VM: Ok.

AH: Yes. Now they're going to mention the Sautrantikas for the purpose of making a point.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "The Sautrantikas [AH reads: Sautrantika] Following Reasoning [AH reads: Reason] in..."

S (simultaneously, very faint): Except they're following reason.

AH: Yes, are you?

AS (simultaneously, faint): Andrew, I didn't-- I didn't follow that last comment because I-- I didn't understand the distinction (you/they) made.

AH: I can't hear [AS simultaneously: I thought that the--] you Avery.

AS: Ok, I-- I--

AD (simultaneously): Let him go just a little further on because-- [AS, faint: Ok, yeah.] I see what you're getting at Avery but let him read a paragraph. (laughter)

AS: But I-- I followed what you said, I didn't follow-- I didn't-- I didn't follow what he--

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, I-- I don't either, I have some question.

LR (simultaneously): You guys are in [one word inaudible] (laughter)

AD: I have some question but I want to [AS simultaneously, faint: Ok.] hear the next paragraph.

AS (faint): I'm sorry.

AH: Alright.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "The Sautrantikas [AH: This is a different school.] Following Reasoning [AH reads: Reason] interpret Dharmakirti's teaching otherwise and accept three final vehicles but with only one type of realization of [AH reads: or] selflessness. This selflessness is the emptiness, or absence, of a self-sufficient person. In both Chittamatra schools, however, there are different types of selflessnesses which vary in difficulty of realization, it being more difficult to realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities than to realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity. Thus, there are two types of selflessness [AH reads: selflessnesses]: one of phenomena in general and one only of persons."

AH: That's the whole paragraph.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

VM (faint): Ok.

[short pause]

AD: Let's-- let's hit it again.

AH: Ok. [students assent, faint] We start with this As-- Asanga vi-- Asanga's view.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "...Asanga teaches that there are three [final] vehicles, meaning that some sentient beings never achieve Buddhahood because their vehicle is completed at a lower stage on which they remain forever. According to him, some Hearers [AH: some students] only realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity and never realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities. These Hearers aim only toward a solitary peace. The Chittamatrin [AH reads: Chittamatra] followers of Dharmakirti, however, point to the impermanence of fetters and to the skill of the Buddha [AH reads: Buddhas] in teaching and thereby show that all eventually cognize both selflessnesses and attain the highest enlightenment. Thus for them [AH: the followers of Dharmakirti] there is only one final vehicle and all sentient beings eventually attain Buddhahood."

AH: Further discussion via the Sautrantika view.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning [AH reads: Reason] interpret Dharmakirti's teachings [AH reads: teaching] otherwise [AH: than the one we just read] and accept three final vehicles but with only one type of realization of selflessness."

AH: Which seems like the Asanga view. The Sautrantika view--

AD: Wait, you finish reading it before [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] we start.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "This [AH reads: The] selflessness [AH: for Sa-- for this Sautrantika view] is the emptiness, or absence, of a self-sufficient person."

AH: Just like the Asanga interpretation of Yogacara.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "In both Chittamatra schools, however, there are different types of selflessness [AH reads: selflessnesses] which vary in difficulty of realization, it being more difficult to realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities than to realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity. Thus, there are two types of selflessness [AH reads: selflessnesses]: one of phenomena in general and one only of persons."

AD: Alright, this is going to be a lulu, let's start. One sentence at a time.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "The Chittamatrins are divided, like the Sautrantikas, into Followers of Scripture and [AH adds: Followers of] Reasoning. The former [AH: the Followers of Scripture] are [followers] mainly of Asanga's Five Treatises on the Levels [AH reads: Asanga's version], and the latter of Dignaga's [*Compendium of Valid Cognition*] and Dharmakirti's [Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition]."

AH: Are the followers of reasoning, so that's clear. Asanga's on the scripture side, Dharmakirti and Dignaga are on the reasoning side, and that's the basic split in Chittamatra itself.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: “Though, in general, the term ‘Chittamatrin’ refers to the Followers of Scripture, that is, of Asanga, the Followers of Reasoning are said to be the more advanced of the two groups. This is because Asanga teaches that there are three final vehicles, meaning that some sentient beings never achieve Buddhahood because their vehicle is completed at a lower stage at which they remain forever.”

AD (simultaneously): What would the three vehicles be that they’re referring to?

CDA (faint): There wasn’t one.

VM: I guess it would be the-- the Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya and those-- the subtle-- [student assents, faint] what is it, causal-- causal, subtle, and gross.

S (simultaneously, very faint): Uh-hm [couple/three words inaudible]

AH: Yes. Nirmanakaya, [VM: Right.] Sambhogakaya--

VM (simultaneously): Samkaya, and what-- the Tharm-- [S simultaneously: Dharma.] Dharmakaya or--

S (simultaneously): Dharmakaya.

AH (simultaneously): Dharmakaya.

VM: Right.

AH: And I think that would be-- that would be my guess, yeah.

VM/S(?) (faint): Yeah.

LR: But, how does that fit in with those-- to the sentence here?

AB: The sentence is just about the first of those two, right?

LR: His teaching is that there’s three vehicles and some-- some [SP simultaneously: I don’t think he--] people are completely--

AD (simultaneously): I thought it was the Pratyeka Buddhas and the--

VM: Oh, [S simultaneously, faint: Uh-hm.] those Solitary Realizers, those guys?

SP (simultaneously): Yeah, I don’t think he means the kayas.

S: No, [AD simultaneously: Huh?] [S simultaneously: No.] he doesn’t mean the kayas, no.

S (very faint): Yeah.

SP (simultaneously): I agree, I don’t think he means the kayas.

AD (simultaneously): You think he means the Hearer, you know, the Pratyeka Buddha?

S: Yeah.

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

AS (simultaneously): The Solitary Realizer and the Bodhisattva.

AD (simultaneously): And the Bodhisattva?

VM: Right.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

AH: Yes, yes.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

SP: I think he just means stopping points where people--

AD: Uh-huh.

AH: That's the Hinayana-Mahayana distinction.

S (very faint): [couple words inaudible]

VM: Oh I see, final vehicles not in the [S simultaneously, faint: Yeah.] sense of vehicles like we use it but [S, faint: Right.] levels of attainment that--

AD: Yeah. In other words, a Pratyeka Buddha, alright, is a certain level of attainment. What was the next one, you remember? There's three of them.

S (faint): The Solitary?

VM: No, the [few inaudible AS words simultaneous with VM] Pratyek Buddha, that *is* the Solitary Realizer.

AH: That's the Lone Rhinoceros.

AD: Yeah.

S: Yeah.

AH: The Bodhisattva's a third, [student assents, faint] [AD: Yeah.] but I don't remember the middle one.

AD: That's-- I know, that's the one I'm having trouble.

S: Uh-hm.

SP (simultaneously): Me too.

AD: But there (are) three of them. They are-- there are those kind of realizations. In other words, there are Buddhas that you would say are like lone rhinoceroses, they're not interested in anyone else. They seek their own peace and they go their own way, alright. That's a level of an attainment and that's a permanent vehicle. And there was another one, I can't [RG simultaneously: The--] think of it, the [RG: He has Sravak.] second. The third one we know is the Bodhisattva, is the way of the Mahayana Buddhist, [S simultaneously: Isn't it Sravaka?] and that's an eternal vehicle too.

AH: That's the-- that's where one's vow is to the-- to the benefit of all sentient beings, yes.

AD (simultaneously): All sentient creatures, yes.

LDS (simultaneously, part of background conversation): [one word inaudible] do you think you think of it as a Solitary Realizer?

S (part of background conversation, faint): Oh.

S (part of background conversation, very faint): Oh

AD: Alright.

LDS (part of background conversation): Alan?

AB/S(?) (part of background conversation, faint): Uh-hm.

AH: Ok, so vehicles is clearly that.

AD (simultaneously): Alright, in the [S simultaneously, faint: Yeah.] meantime one of you can look it up and let's see [AH: Alright.] the next sentence.

LR: But wait, can you-- could you reread that then Andrew?

AH: Ok. At this rate we're going to [SP laughing: Yeah.] get three pages done but it's fine, yeah.

AD (simultaneously): Look, do-- look, do you w-- do you-- do you want to go and meet the Dalai Lama with something in your heart or do you want to go there with a big head, a skull? (AH laughs a bit)

S (faint): Uh-hm.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: "This is because Asanga teaches that there are three final vehicles, meaning that some sentient beings never achieve Buddhahood because their vehicle is completed at a lower stage [S, faint: Oh.] at which they remain forever."

AH: Now a little-- in a little while he's going to posit three final vehicles ver-- via Dharmakirti, but that's within the Mahayana tradition rather than the Hinayana. I think that's a distinction. [student assents, very faint] Followers of scripture, followers of reasoning.

LR: So he's saying that-- that--

AH (simultaneously): The greater and lesser vehicle--

LR (simultaneously): --the realizations are-- are really different because if you take one and not the other of these three things you're going to, say, maybe get to accomplish the mystic state but go no further because you've set yourself on a path of [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, it almost seems like it's like PB's cl-- classification, you know, when he speaks about the mystic is only interested in his own [S simultaneously, faint: Right.] peace and goes his own way and then he speaks about the philosopher who's interested not only in peace, his own peace, but also in distributing that and understanding the world and the role he has to play in the world and all that, alright, so you have the Philosopher-Sage who's like a Bodhisattva. Yeah.

LR: Yeah, and he says that if you-- if you do just the mystic path you get to the “Who am I”, to-- you can’t go any fur--

AD (simultaneously): If you follow the mystic path, you’re just concerned about your own peace, you’re a rhinoceros with one horn. You’ve seen a rhinoceros, they have one horn. The lone rhinoceros, he’s only interested in his own peace, once he gets it he says “Goodbye.” He doesn’t want to get involved with you. (laughter)

S (amidst laughter): [couple/few words inaudible]

S: Can you blame him?

LR (simultaneously): Or the World-Idea.

RG (simultaneously): And doesn’t that [AS simultaneously, faint: Yes but (one/two words inaudible)] path lead to-- isn’t that-- in that path the goal is Nirvikalpa and nothing else. [AD, faint: Uh-hm.] Right?

AD: The mystic, yeah.

RG: Yeah, the mystic, yeah.

AD: And you see the Bodhisattva has to do something entirely different.

RG: Right. And it seems the first one is related to the selflessness of person, where you re-- where you’re just pursuing what’s illusory about your-- yourself and not concerned with the phenom-- with the outward phenomena.

[students assent, very faint]

AH: That was the [S simultaneously: That’s (what/the one) you said before.] comment I made earlier, that in the fir-- in-- in regards to PB’s description of the-- the yogi’s tasks, individual mind and World-Mind, is the individual mind is a-- followers of scripture, the mystic, but to understand the relationship of that conscious principle to the World-Mind’s ideation is the path of the philosopher, right?

AD: Now I think, I think you’ll-- we’ll see as we go along that if we could keep doing this, you’ll see-- we’ll actually see with our own eyes the work PB did, how he’s transformed all these Asiatic, you know, terms [AH: Yes.] into English.

JL: The-- the methodol--

AD (simultaneously): Bodhisattva will be a Philosopher-Sage, and we can-- we can understand a, you know, a Philosopher-Sage a little bit now, assuming that we study PB. You don’t know what a Bodhisattva is, it’s just going to be a nice word, going to be a very, you know, a beautiful word, ‘Bodhisattva,’ ‘beautiful being’ and all that or “being made of goodness and light” and all-- But we don’t have the implications, like when PB says now a Philosopher-Sage, the Master, alright, could do certain things. In other words, he could keep you in his mind’s eye, in his light, and practically force you to accept-- not force you but lead you into the direction you have to go, etc. You could see that suggests tremendous power, the same power of a Bodhisattva. But he’s not going to use that word ‘Bodhisattva,’

he's going to use the word 'Philosophic Sage'. And so as you read his notes you begin to see the work he had to do of synthesizing, Anglicizing, Englishing all this foreign terminology.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

AS: Next one is called the Hearer, it might sound a bit--

JL: Sravaka?

AS: The Sravaka.

AD: Srava?

AS (simultaneously): The Hearer, the Solitary Realizer, [S: Right.] and the Bodhisattva.

S: Yeah.

LR/S(?): What is the Hearer then?

AB: The Hearer would be what they call "entering the stream"?

VM: Yeah, the stream-winner.

S: Huh.

AB: The stream-winner?

S (very faint): Uh-huh.

S: They--

S (very faint): That's good.

AD: What are three terms he has again?

AS: He says the Hearer vehicle, the Solitary Realizer vehicle, and the Bodhisattva ve-- the Bodhisattva vehicle.

AD: He doesn't have the equivalent, the Pratyeka, the Bodhisattva--

AS: I think that that's because he's just using the English here. The Solitary might-- is the Pratyeka and-- and the Sra-- Sravaka is a-- is [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, but I guess we would call him an auditor.

AS: I think that's like when PB [S simultaneously: What does that mean?] might speak about the metaphysician.

AD (simultaneously): He's just a listener.

S (faint): He's a what?

AS (simultaneously): Or the one, or the concept-- the metaphysician who has conceptually understood, the hear-- hearing about it. Is that a possibility? He's heard-- heard about the truth [AD simultaneously:

He's heard about it.] without the-- without the-- without the attainment of the-- the final mystical experience.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, so one will be an auditor, then the Solitary Realizer, and then a Bodhisattva.

AS: And the fi-- the Solitary Realizer would be the-- the mystic who's reached that final stage of [AD simultaneously: Uh-hm.] mysticism and then the-- you have only the philosopher.

LR (simultaneously): But what is the au-- what is the guy, what is the Hearer, auditor?

AD (simultaneously): Auditor?

S (faint): Auditor.

AS: I think he's [student assents] the metaphysician.

LR (simultaneously): Does that mean like a bhakti? What does that mean?

AD: No, it means a person who's getting onto the path, that's getting acquainted with it, and the ch-- the decision still hasn't been made.

LR: But in-- that he seems to say [AH simultaneously: I miss--] that's a final path, [AH: No.] that there's three paths and that's [S simultaneously, faint: No.] one of them.

AB: It's a ve-- it's a [VM simultaneously: Yeah, there's a whole long footnote on this issue.] vehicle at which you could stop, it's not the final attainment.

S (very faint): Right.

AH: Those are levels of-- of what a incarnation would be involved with or several incarnations.

LR (simultaneously): I thought the point (in) what you read Andrew was that one-- you-- the guy picks one of these three and so would *not* have the same final realization because he has a different vehicle that he's worked out.

AH: His vehicle is that of a Hearer.

AD (simultaneously): Well first of all he doesn't pick it. It's the destiny that the past brings you to.

LR (simultaneously): Right, it's--

AD: Secondly, I think-- I think again we-- we could keep it very simple by saying, there's the level of the Hearer, the auditor. You have this even in Greek philosopher-- Greek philosophy. If you remember, Proclus speaks to his auditors.

VM (faint): Uh-hm.

AD: Not to his students, to his auditors. At another time he speaks to his students.

S (very faint): Yeah.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

S (possibly part of background, faint): Disappearing.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah. There's actually that distinction. So a Master could be speaking to someone who's an auditor who's *listening* to the doctrine. Then the Master could be speaking to one who has made a *commitment* to the doctrine, he's a mystic, he's going to find it for himself. And then the Master could speak to the third type of person who is going to go through auditing and being a Solitary Realizer or a mystic but also becoming a Sage, a Bodhisattva. These are successive passa-- stages, if I understand [student assents, faint] what they're saying.

SP: I think-- and I think also for some people it's sufficient to have an intellectual understanding or in terms of religious things people go to Church regularly, but they don't have an idea of realization, [AD, faint: Yeah.] you know, it's just-- that's their path, you know, whether it's in terms of feeling or thinking or whatever.

AD: Well think of the commitment that you're asked to make if you want to be a Bodhisattva. [students assent, very faint] Some would say "No, I-- you know, I'll stay as a Pratyeka Buddha."

VM: I know but this-- you know, I don't know if we want to go into it but there's a very long footnote about four, there's four of them apparently, four types of superiors, or Hearer, [student assent, faint] Solitary Realizer, Bodhisattvas, and Buddha-superiors. And his del-- his definition of Hearers is a bit different than [AD: Go ahead.] what you're discussing. [S simultaneously: What-- what page are you on (Vic)?] I'm not sure it's a relevant thing to go into. [S, very faint: Read it.] I don't know how related--

AD (simultaneously): Well, how long is the footnote?

S (faint): What page?

VM (simultaneously): Oh, it's goes on and on Anthony, it's a (whole/full)--

AD (simultaneously): Well then why don't you-- why don't you condense it and have it ready for us? (laughter) Next week.

VM: Alright, [JL: Right.] I'll try.

AD: We don't have to solve everything in one night.

VM: Ok, I'll try.

AH: Alright, it-- shall we hammer at this some more?

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, yeah I'd like to pursue this.

VM (in background): See it on page 846?

AH: You want-- you want to go over what we just did or should we move on a little?

AD: Go on a little bit.

AH: Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 366, AH reading]: “The Chittamatra Followers of Scripture are the only Buddhist school to accept eight consciousnesses: [AH: and these are] the five sense consciousnesses, a mental consciousness, a mind afflicted with egoism [(*klišhtamanas*, *nyon yid*)], and a mind-basis-of-all [(*alayavijñāna*, *kun gzhi rnam shes*)].”

AD: Alright, stop there. What are the terms that we’re familiar with?

AH: This i--

AD (simultaneously): Alaya co-- alaya?

AH (simultaneously): Yeah, [VM/S(?) simultaneously: Ok.] the-- the five sense consciousnesses.

AD: Yeah.

AH: What’s a term that--

AS: [one/two words inaudible] (five senses). The five senses.

S: The fi-- yeah, [S: Yeah.] that’s right.

AD (simultaneously): Five sense consciousness we’re acquainted with, yes.

AH: Yes.

AS (simultaneously): It could be (Nirmana/near manas).

AH: A [JB simultaneously: Manas.] mental consciousness, manas or--

VM (simultaneously, faint): Uh-hm, manas, uh-hm, [S: Manas.] it’s klista manas.

AH: Klista [AD simultaneously, faint: (Uh-huh/Ok).] manas--

LDS: No, the klista manas is the next one after [student assents, faint] that.

AD: The next one?

AH: Yes, the mind afflicted with egoism is the--

AD: Klista manas?

VM (faint): Uh-hm, uh-hm.

AH (simultaneously): Klista manas, yeah. And a mind-basis-for-all?

AS (faint): The alaya-vijñāna.

AD: A mind--

AH: A mind-basis-for-all.

S (very faint): (Uh-hm.)

GA (simultaneously): [one word inaudible]

AD: What's-- what would that be?

AH: I don't know, what language do you want?

AS: Alaya-vijnana was (the--)

AD (simultaneously): Well, that's what-- the one that we're [AH simultaneously, faint: Sure.] familiar with, alaya-vijnana consciousness.

AH: Alaya-vijnana.

AD: So you have the alaya-vijnana, the klishtamanas, the manas and the five senses. Those are the ones we're familiar with. We're just trying to, you know, [AH simultaneously: Uh-huh.] correlate with what you're reading.

AH: Ok.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 366-367, AH reading]: "The Followers of Reasoning [AH reads: Reason] and all other Buddhist schools assert only six consciousnesses..."

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

AD: Alright, this-- this is going to be amusing.

AH: Yeah, this is-- this is amusing.

S (faint): If you like words.

AH: The--

AD: How many do we have, eight, six, seven, five? (bit of laughter)

S: Nine. (bit of laughter)

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 366-367, AH reading]: "The Followers of Reasoning... assert only six [consciousnesses] with some of the functions of the seventh and eighth being performed by the mental consciousness. There are sub-schools of Chittamatra which assert one, two, seven, and nine consciousnesses, but they are considered to have strayed from the positions of the four Buddhist schools of tenets." (bit of laughter)

AH: They're going to get into these la-- we'll get into these later, this is just the introduction.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "...a person propounding..."

AH: Definition is, of a Chittamatin--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "...a person propounding Buddhist tenets who uses reasoning to refute external objects and who asserts that dependent phenomena, such as consciousnesses, truly exist."

AD: Alright, let's stop there.

S: Uh-hm.

VM: Yeah.

AH: Ok, let's read it again.

S (faint): Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "...is a person propounding [AH reads: who propounds] Buddhist tenets who uses reasoning to refute external objects..."

AD: You know what he's saying? I can have nothing except the experience of my own mind.

AH: Yes.

AS (very faint): Correct.

AD: That's what a Chittamatra's saying.

VM: Uh-hm.

AH (simultaneously): That's their basic tenet. Nothing out there.

AD: In other words, he's a good mentalist.

AH: Yeah.

AD: Ok. That's--

AH (simultaneously): Ok, "Mind-Only".

S (very faint): (Yeah), uh-hm.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "Mind-only [AH reads: Mind] is the very core of the Chittamatrin teachings [AH reads: teaching]..."

VM (simultaneously): Wait a minute, [LDS/S(?), faint: Yeah Andrew.] wait a minute.

AH: What?

VM: Can we just back up a little bit here?

AD: Sure.

RG/S(?) (simultaneously, faint): Finish the definition.

VM: Because the definition, I-- I think I understand the first part of the definition, is a person who uses reason to refute external objects, no materialism, good.

AH: Uh-hm.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, VM reading]: "...and [VM reads: but] who assert that dependent phenomena, such as consciousnesses..."

VM: Let's say these five sense consciousnesses and others as well.

AH: Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, VM reading]: "...truly exist."

AH: Uh-hm.

VM (simultaneously): Now, I'm not sure what way they're using "truly exist".

AD (simultaneously): Uh-huh.

VM: That, you know, some-- some--

AH (simultaneously): As-- as having the nature or entity of mind.

[student assents, very faint]

AD: "Truly exist." Let's-- what'd you say?

AH: They truly exist insofar as they have the entity or the nature of mind. They're dependent *on* the mind, dependent [student assents] phenomenon are dependent on the mind.

AD: But like these people are saying that your experience of the world isn't illusory. They truly exist, the images that are in the mind.

AH: Yes, because they're-- they hold the mind as their ontic principle, that does truly exist. And phenomena are not *other* than that mind, they have the nature and the entity *of* mind, so they-- therefore they must truly exist. But, their emptiness is the emptiness of sub--

AD (simultaneously): Well wait, wait, wait-- [S: Yeah.] wait till we get to that word because I'm going to hammer away at (the) meaning. [S, faint: Yeah.] So far I understand them to mean, on the one hand, that nothing exists outside of mind, [S, faint: Ok.] alright, and secondly, that these images or whatever activity these senses are performing truly exist. So the functioning of the senses, alright, insofar that they produce some sort of phenomena, they truly exist. They're not going to say that they're illusory. [VM: Yeah.] Is that--

VM (very faint): Well--

AH (simultaneously): Yes.

AD: He just--

VM (simultaneously): I'm just trying to get real clear about what "truly exist" means for these people and Andrew claims that "truly exist" means it's an expression of mind, the mind is the reality, so in that sense they truly exist. Is that a decent paraphrase of what you said Andrew or is that perverted?

S (very faint, possibly part of background): (Go ahead.)

SP: But what they say doesn't exist [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] are these illusory--

VM (simultaneously): Yeah, let's get the other side.

SP: --is a difference in entity of object and-- [VM simultaneously: Ok] and subject.

VM: Ok.

AH: Everything else *does* exist, [SP: Yeah.] as phenomena.

VM: Right, right.

S: [one word inaudible]

AH: Yeah, it's like--

HS (simultaneously): What you said-- is I think that they're saying--

AD (simultaneously): I think this is a very important point.

AH: It becomes clearer if you use Sidney's obverse of what-- [S: Yeah.] what *does* exist and what *doesn't* exist.

S (faint): Right.

LR: Could you go over [S simultaneously, faint: Right.] it Sidney please? (Please/Sid)?

SP: Well the only thing that they negate as lacking true existence is a difference in entity, a s-- a substantial difference in entity between an object and a subject.

S (very faint): Right.

AD: In other words, between where the planet is sitting and what it's manifesting, there is no difference. There *is* no subject-object relationship in your chart. There's only a subject. This is-- they'll deny that there is any object.

(Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1984 0831a Ends; Side 2 Begins)

DB: --the point, I think, because the second part of this quote I-- What does it mean when he speaks of these consciousnesses as phenomena for--

AH (simultaneously): I re-- a phenomena is anything that can be taken to the mind.

DB: Ok, so that-- I mean is the implication there that-- that these consciousnesses, whether they're sense consciousnesses or mental consciousnesses or afflicted mental consciousnesses or whatever--

AD: You're gonna-- you're gonna speak up.

DB: Sorry.

AD: Out!

AH: Yeah, speak up.

DB (simultaneously): Are the consciousnesses that are spoken of in this thing as phenomena, I mean doesn't that mean-- isn't he speaking of them as objective? I mean not-- not phenomenally objective but insofar as [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] they're phenomena--

AH: They're phenomenally objective to the mind.

DB: Right, ok, but, I mean they're not appearances the way thoughts and images are.

AH (simultaneously): Well-- yeah they-- they don't have a distinction. [S, faint: What is he saying?] Phenomenon [AD: No.] are phenomena.

AD: No, I've gotta take it out on them if I get [AH simultaneously: (What if--)] irritated enough. (bit of laughter)

AH: (What if-- what if--)

S (faint): Yeah.

AH: I'm sorry David-- [couple inaudible student words] They don't make a distinction between the pole and the feeling that you had when you were 18 years old. They're phenomena.

DB (simultaneously): No-- no, no, no. (bit of laughter) What is-- I guess I'm just trying to understand what is it-- what-- why-- why do they all of a sudden bring in these consciousnesses and speak of them as--

AD: I want a more specific question.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

DB: Ok. Can I have a book?

AD (simultaneously): I want a specific question. I don't want your anxieties. The question.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

S: Here you go.

DB: Thank you. The question is, "asserting that dependent phenomena such as consciousnesses truly exist," ok, that--

AD (simultaneously): Any kind of phenomena, [DB simultaneously: Yeah, it--] alright, is basically a dependent arising.

DB: Right.

AD: Ok.

DB: Now, he speaks of these as consciousnesses.

AD (simultaneously): Well, well, before you go any further, how would you understand that? Any phenomena is a dependent arising. So you think of the five sense functions, right? Five sense functions.

DB: Yeah.

AD: Now any one of them or any-- any grouping or any number of them working together, alright, insofar that they are (the) causative factors producing a phenomena, you would say they are the causes and conditions which make or bring about the arising of phenomena. [student assents, faint] So you think of the faculty of taste and you think of the faculty of smell and you think of the faculty of sight and you can

imagine these three faculties working together to produce for you the orange that you smell in your dream.

DB: Right, yeah.

AD (simultaneously): Alright? That-- that orange that you smell, taste, and see in your dream is a dependent-arising phenomena brought about by those sense consciousnesses.

DB: Yeah.

AD: Ok. [DB simultaneously: (That's the--)] Then you got the meaning of what they mean.

DB: No, that-- that much I unders-- I understand, ok. What I don't understand is that at the same time they're speaking of refuting external objects, like the orange in the dream, [AD: Yeah.] ok, they're saying that that which gives rise to that external object, the orange in the dream [one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): It's not external, they'll prove to you that there can't be an external object.

DB: Right, right, it's refuted.

AD: Yeah.

AH (simultaneously): External doesn't mean phenomenal.

S (very faint): I thought--

S (faint): Yeah.

HS: External means I would say an object that's taken to be from outside of mind.

AH: Yes.

RG: Right. Doesn't PB have a line talk-- how objects are taken to be what's external to thought and--
[Note: See Paul Brunton, *The Wisdom of the Overself*, Rider and Company, London, 1943, p. 38.]

AH (simultaneously): That's the point.

S: Con--

RG: --and [S simultaneously: Consciousness is what now?] consciousnesses is taken to be what's internal to thought and yes from both those points of view they're phenomena because they're not pure consciousness or they're not the pure object, whichever way-- either way you go, they're not in a Greek sense pure Ideas because they're constructs and mater-- put together things, and they're not pure consciousness from the subject side because they're organs of knowledge and not the light o-- the light of it. [AH/S(?) simultaneously: Right.] Or they would say they're not the clear light I-- from what I understand.

AH: David, was your question that on the one hand he speaks of refuting external objects and then on the other hand we find phenomenon as truly existent? Is that what you were driving at?

DB: I don't have any problem with refuting objects as external, ok. I just don't understand why the assertion of de-- My question was, that I was trying to ask is in this particular sentence the Chittamatra

wasn't implying that the consciousnesses that go to produce the-- the apparent objects which have then been refuted as being external, if those are objective, ok. I mean because they're referred to as phenomena, the functioning of the mind which is never [AH simultaneously: Yes.] apparent in the sense that the pole is, [AH: Yes.] is [student assents, faint] spoken of as being phenomenal. [student assents, faint] And insofar as that's the case I was trying to understand if that was objective, [AH: Yes.] if that's what they meant.

SP: I think they're also-- they may also be taking the point of view of a consciousness which has an object to it as one [S: Sure.] identity, for instance you have the consciousness of blue. I mean I think they're taking that whole consciousness of blue as one unit and calling [student assents, faint] it a consciousness, I mean a conscious-- a consciousness which has an object and [DB assents] then you have a sight consciousness or, you know, an (auditivity) consciousness and so forth.

RG: Yeah, I mean I think it's the same idea that the ego and the world arise together, that you can't separate them as that the consciousness of blue or the-- the [student assents, faint] sense consciousness taken as the ego and the world as blue have to arise together. Insofar that they-- they arise and dissolve they are phenomenal even though one side of the phenomena [student assents] is taken as subjective and the other side's taken as objective.

AH (simultaneously): That's the issue of the true aspect or the false aspect versions of Yogacara, whether that aspect of blue is true or false based on--

AD: Andrew, do you think we're getting some common understanding from that?

AH: Yeah, I think the next part of it's gonna be-- gonna be fruitful.

AD (simultaneously): Let's continue, ok, let's hammer away.

AH: Alright.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "Mind-only is the very core of the Chittamatin teachings [AH reads: Chittamatra teaching]; for them it means that there are no objects which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness. [AH rereads: "...there are no objects which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness."] [student assents, faint] They and the Yogachara-Svatantrikas, who assert mind-only conventionally, [AH: Just skip that.] are the only Buddhist schools which assert that there are no external objects."

AH: Like you said, they're the only truly [RG, faint: Mentalist.] menta-- yeah.

AD (simultaneously): As far as I-- as far as I know.

SP (faint): (Yeah.)

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "All..."

AD: That doesn't mean anything!

S (faint): (No/Yeah).

S (faint): (Yeah), for sure.

AH (simultaneously): Well, all of us--

AD (simultaneously): I don't think I've ever read through the history of Asiatic philosophy, it's too big a subject. But the schools that I read like you know Dasgupta and the Chinese thus-- you know, the Chinese schools, I've never come across any idealistic school except the-- the Yogacara.

S (simultaneously, faint): Uh-hm.

AH: Yeah I think it-- it would be meaningful that they're the only idealistic school within Tibetan structure. That-- that could help to understand what that might mean.

AD (faint): Ok.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "All the other schools--Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Sautrantika-Svatantrika, and Prasangika--assert that an object of a sense consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness."

RG: Right.

AH: So all the other schools assert that "an object of a sense consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness" as opposed to "there are no objects which are entities external to the perceiving consciousness".

AD: Before Sidney leaves, I'd like to--

MW (simultaneously): Yikes.

S (simultaneously): You gotta go home. (laughter)

AD: I'd like to ask a question. This is in anticipation and trouble, alright.

S (simultaneously): Look at that.

S: He's already-- (student laughs heartily)

AD: Do you think the Prasangika school is going to posit the existence of something outside of a perceiving consciousness?

SP: Yes.

AD: Ok.

SP: Prasangika.

AD: I just-- I just want us to have a-- a real meeting-ground.

VM: He says it [S simultaneously: Ok.] right here but I don't know what that means.

[few background student words]

AD (simultaneously): Alright but-- huh? Well we'll wait, we'll wait, he's coming back.

S (faint): [couple/three words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): Ok, don't go too far Sidney. (laughter)

S: [couple words inaudible] [AH simultaneously: Alright.] If his light's out, watch out. (laughter)

AH: Get some rope, we'll tie him [one/two words inaudible] (laughter) [few seconds of background student talking] Ok. So all the other schools assert an object of a sense consciousness external perceiving consciousness.

RG: Well, and this sounds like individual mentalism in a very pure form.

AD: It may be, but this is only the Asanga school, there are other schools that evolved out of that.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "For them, [AH: The Mind-Only school I think.] objects are a cause of a consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image."

VM: Well don't you think that replies to-- [couple/three inaudible student words] [S simultaneously: Uh-uh.] applies to everybody *but* Yogacara?

AH: Everybody but, everybody but, yes.

S (simultaneously): Those are the other school(s).

RG (simultaneously with AH): Right, those are the other schools.

AH: Yes.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "For them, [AH: The other schools.] objects are a cause of a consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image."

VM/S(?): Right.

VM: So it's almost like the-- reminds me in some ways of the Vedanta idea the way the object consciousness in some ways [AH: Yes.] moves towards the subject consciousness and generates an image in that.

AH: In Yogacara they speak of that one bija seed producing *both* subject and object.

VM (simultaneously): Yeah, but that's the opposite side though, right?

AH (simultaneously): Yeah, yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "Causes must exist before their effects, not simultaneously or afterward because nothing can affect an already existent entity in that very moment. Thus, because of the cause and effect relationship of object and sense consciousness, and because causally [AH reads: casually] related things must be different entities, the non-mind-only oriented schools assert that object and subject are different entities."

AH: So he's just giving the logic for the other schools' position. Would you like to hear that again or it [AD simultaneously: Yeah.] doesn't matter?

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

VM (simultaneously): Yeah I-- I find that mysterious.

AD: Ok Vic?

VM: No, I find that mysterious.

AD (simultaneously): Is that-- do you accept of what he s-- the way he interpreted it?

S: Yeah Vic, yeah.

VM: Which?

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

AD: What he just said.

AB: The non-mind-only school(s).

AD (simultaneously): The reason I'm doing this is that as we move along, alright, we will have a body of thought that we have agreed upon, [VM: Yeah, yeah well--] that this is the way we understand it.

VM: I don't think I understand it well enough to agree, just--

AD (simultaneously): Alright, then let him reread it [AH: Alright.] and make the comments you made, see if you agree with what he says, alright, and Richard, whatever you think, and either we stop or we go on.

AH: Ok, so he's going to describe what mind-only. Mind-only is-- they--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "...it means that there are no objects which are entities external to [a] perceiving consciousness."

S: Could you read slow again because I just didn't pick up.

AH: Alright.

S: Thank you.

AH: That the Mind-Only school holds--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "...that there are no objects which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness."

AH: That's the basic view. Now he's going to describe all the other schools that take another view and he's going to give the logic for their view, why they say that there *are* entities external. And I'll go through that.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "[All] the other schools--Vaibhashika [AH: etc]...assert that an object of a sense consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness. For them, [AH reads: These other schools believe that a cause of a consciousness--] objects are a cause of a consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image."

AH: In Prasangika that would be described through the imputation and etc, etc.

AD: So in other words it's like a very contemporary view, that that pole causes a reflex image of itself in my-- in my physical psychosomatic being and I get an image of the pole. That *caused* the image in me.

AH: I wouldn't say it's that--

AD (simultaneously): No?

AH: It's not that way for Prasangika at all, in fact--

AD: No, not Prasangika, the [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] Vaibhashika.

VM: Yeah but they say--

AH (simultaneously): Vaibhashika would be something like that, yes.

LDS (faint): Sautrantika too.

RG: And you have two--

AH (simultaneously): Sautrantika. [S: Fine.] And this is--

RG (simultaneously): You have two very different possibilities. From the Vaibhashika materialist modern view, you could say that the material object causes your perception of it. But from a-- a-- if you like the Pr-- what Andrew's saying this Prasangika or from a more objective view that sometimes we take you could also say that that object is the World-Idea and that causes you to have a perception of it.

AD: Good, yeah. Yeah, yeah, [RG simultaneously: So I think he's--] that more may be what the Prasangikas [RG simultaneously: Right, right.] are referring to. [S simultaneously: Yeah.] Yeah.

AH (simultaneously): If we'd like to, I read today a very beautiful and terse description of that process by the Dalai Lama in that book *The Interview*, if someone has it I could find it quickly. [S, faint: Oh yeah?] Or do you want to stick with Yogacara for now?

AD: Well, well, you're there, not me, you're there.

AH: Just, let me see if I can find it quickly.

[13¼ second pause, flipping of pages]

GA/S(?): Page 41 Andrew, yeah.

AH: 41.

S: Well--

AH: Why don't you read it?

VM (simultaneously): It's on the right hand side.

AH: Why don't you read it Chip.

GA (simultaneously): (We) read about the same thing, that-- we're all reading the same (thing).

AH: It's where he [GA simultaneously: Well what--] talks about a face in a mirror.

VM: Oh, no, that's a different one.

GA (simultaneously): Oh, well, you're thinking of a different-- Vic and I are [one word inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): Yeah, Chip and I are on a different wavelength.

AH: Well go ahead and read it.

S: Ok. Go ahead.

GA: (Go ahead/Alright), well, in this-- in this particular case, what he's speaking of here as the objects being the cause of consciousness is one of four causes that he enumerates, just to put it in some perspective.

AH: This is from Prasangika, right?

GA: The interviewer asks what has caused this mind. And the DL says--

[Transcriber note: I am using *In Exile from the Land of Snows* by John F. Avedon, Vintage Books, New York, 2015. Originally in *An Interview with the Dalai Lama* by John F. Avedon, Littlebird Publications, New York, 1980, to which I have no access.]

John F. Avedon [*In Exile from the Land of Snows*, p. 386, GA reading]: "As regarding the causes of mind, there is a substantial cause, as well as cooperative conditions--an empowering condition and an observed object condition."

GA: And I think what we're talking about in this paragraph is the observed object condition.

VM/S(?): Uh-hm.

John F. Avedon [*In Exile from the Land of Snows*, p. 386, GA reading]: "This last condition--the object that [GA reads: which] is perceived--could be a form; but a form, a physical thing, cannot be the substantial cause of a mind. [RG: Uh-hm] It must be something that, itself, is illuminating and knowing."

GA: So he's saying the real cause of the mind has to be something of the nature of mind but that a form is accepted by these three schools [S: Yeah.] as an empowering condition, [AB: So--] as casting its image into the mind.

AB: So that there is an object external to consciousness but it is not a cause of consciousness, whereas Sautrantika and Vaibhashika would say the object actually [GA simultaneously: Actually causes.] *causes* your consciousness of it.

AH: In some way, yeah.

GA (simultaneously): Precise-- well, in a more-- yeah, each as you go down there would be more-- a more strict causality. [student assents] In Prasangika it's much further away.

S: Uh-hm.

AH: Ok? And then he uses the logic, why the other schools make this distinction or hold this separation. And, it's-- it is-- it is as follows.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: “For them, [AH: The other schools.] objects are a cause of a consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image.”

AH: And this is the reasoning.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: “Causes must exist before their effects, not simultaneously or afterward because nothing can affect an already existent entity in that very moment. Thus, because of the cause and effect relationship of object and sense consciousness, and because causally related things must be different entities, the non-mind-only oriented schools assert that object and subject are different entities.

“The Chittamatrins disagree, saying that Buddha taught that a sense consciousness perceives a present object, whereas if object and subject were cause and effect, then, since a cause has ceased when its effect exists, a sense consciousness would be perceiving a past object.”

S: Uh-hm.

AH: You want to do that one again?

S: Yeah do that again.

S (simultaneously): Yeah do that [one/two words inaudible]

VM (faint): Yeah.

AH: The Chittamatrins disagree with the argument of why they're distinct or why they must be held as one causing the other, and they say “It's not that way, it's as we describe because”--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: “...Buddha taught that a sense consciousness perceives a present object, whereas if object and subject were cause and effect, [AH: if they were causally related] then, since a cause has ceased when its effect exists, a sense consciousness would be perceiving a past object.”

S (very faint): Yeah.

AH: It's really-- it really pretty clever.

AD: If it's cause and effect, that's exactly what's going [student assents] to happen.

S (faint): Yeah.

S (faint): Yeah.

AH: Yeah.

AD: But why do they insist on cause and effect as being the later? In other words, an effect, (an) eclipse for instance, the cause and the effect are simultaneous, they don't have to be separated.

VM: Yeah, I think the Prasangika view wouldn't take that historical approach at all.

AD: What historical approach?

VM: This idea that the cause is prior either logically or temporally to the effect. [AH simultaneously: But is--] (At least) my understanding of their notion of causality is not that at all. Maybe these other schools, that's another story.

AD (simultaneously): The other schools, I don't know Prasangika, but these other schools insist that this is the nature [VM: Ok.] of-- in other words, that perception depends upon a causal relationship, [VM: Right.] the Yogacara school denies.

VM: Right.

AH: Yes.

AD: A cognition includes the content, alright, [student assents, faint] so they have to exist simultaneously. The others are saying no, the thing has to be out there [VM simultaneously: And come in.] and *cause*, alright, a reflex of its own being. [VM, faint: Yeah.] So they're saying that's going to be the cause and this is going to be the effect.

AH: And Yogacara's going to pou-- point out, if you set up that kind of causality, then you *must* deal with this conclusion, [AD: Uh-huh.] that you're perceiving a past object.

AD: Yeah.

AH: Yeah.

AD: Yeah.

LR: May I ask a question?

AH: Yeah.

VM: You (don't) believe that in astronomy though.

LR: Would Yogacara say that it's the other way around, that is that the consciousness produces the object? Or, would they say that both arise in this--

AD (simultaneously): Absolutely, absolutely, that's exactly what the Yogacara says. They're [AH simultaneously: Simul--] absolute Plutonians.

LR: Well, would they--

AH: Simultaneous.

AD: Consciousness produces its object.

S: Uh-hm.

AH: Yeah.

S: Yeah.

S (very faint): Yeah.

S: But--

LR: So-- so wouldn't there be one view [AS simultaneously: Uh-hm.] that says-- I mean one view then would say, you know, you're saying the Yogacara would say that the consciousness is the cause of the effect which is the object, whereas what the--

AD (simultaneously): Yeah but they won't describe it as an effect. It's simultaneous.

LR: Well then-- ok, that was my other question, would--

AD (simultaneously): Consciousness produces what it perceives. There isn't a cause-effect relationship.

LR: But if you say 'produce'--

AD: Yeah, it's used in this way.

LR: Is it possible to conceive of consciousness producing without consciousness being a cause?

AD: No, you're using it the wrong way. Production here does not mean cause and effect.

AH: To cause sh--

S (simultaneously): It means revelation.

LR: And I'm-- yes, I mean I hear what you're saying [AD simultaneously: Let me try this way, I'm--] (but) the word 'production'--

AD: Yeah, let me try this way. If everything is laid out in eternity, alright, then when you get a-- a piece of that knowledge, alright, it isn't something that consciousness is making, in the sense that it's going to add these things together and produce what it wants to *view*.

AS: You're just manifesting it.

AD: You're just-- ok.

S: [one/two words inaudible] revelation.

AH (simultaneously): Anthony, Anthony, does a-- [AS simultaneously: Manifesting.] does a cause have to exist before its effect?

AD: But that would be the Vaibhashika schools, the other schools are--

AH (simultaneously): Well I just want to-- I just want to do the other reasoning to see how we would contend with it. The other schools reason that because--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "Causes must exist before their effects [AH reads: effect], not simultaneously or afterward [AH reads: the-- they don't exist-- they can't be simultaneously or afterward] because nothing can affect an already existent entity in that very moment. [AH adds: And] [Thus], because of the cause and effect relationship of object and sense consciousness [AH reads: consciousnesses], and because causally related things must be different entities, the non-mind-only [oriented] schools assert that object and subject are different entities."

AH: So they're able to hold to their view because of their reasoning. If you-- if you agree that causes must exist before the effect and not simultaneously or not afterward, because nothing can affect an already existent entity in that very moment, I'm just wondering if both reasonings are valid.

AB: It's the premises that--

AH: Well you'd have to look at the premises, yeah.

S (simultaneously, faint): Yeah.

AB: But if the premise isn't valid, the reasoning comes up with the wrong conclusion.

RG: But I would say they're both valid and it's the perspective that each school's taking, the one-- the mentalistic school, knowledge is revelatory and that the subject and object arise together and that's an appropriate view of their causal-- acausality, however you're going to say it, or (they're/their) manifesting idea. But from-- from a World-Idea point of view it seems that the cause *is* prior to the individual's knowing of it.

JL: But not temporally.

RG: But not temporally, but that's still a proper view of causality from that perspective.

AH: Logically prior.

RG: Yeah. [couple inaudible student words] And if they mean that I think you could hold both views.

AH: I think it's the premise.

VM (simultaneously): I don't think it's just logical priority though.

RG: No it-- well, I think it's ontological priority also, I mean we talk about that a lot, the World-Idea precedes principally the-- the unfoldment of manifestation.

VM (simultaneously): No but I think the other schools even take a temporal view. The seed exists before the sprout and so on.

RG (simultaneously): Yeah, but that's the Svatantrika view, I mean I'm-- I mean if you took the view, right, I mean the other-- the lower schools take the view that the object, [VM simultaneously: (Is) temporally prior.] the material object is it.

VM: Yeah.

RG: But if the Prasangikas have an idea that the object [S simultaneously: Right.] does not exist temporally and yet causes the perception of it, [AB simultaneously: That's true.] then you could hold that it's an in-- untemporal [one/two words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): They will describe it not as simultaneous but they'll describe the imputation upon a base and--

SP: Yeah I think they would hold that the base of imputation is prior to the imputation.

RG: Now what would be the base, how would the [TS(?) simultaneously: Yeah.] base get to that?

TS/SP(?): You'll get [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with TS/SP(?)] into that later.

AH: Let's-- we're going to have-- [JL: Well--] [S: No.] we're going to have a--

VM (simultaneously): Can't get that out of [JL simultaneously: Well what's--] Sidney yet, he's definitely going to give it to me.

JL (simultaneously): What's-- what's also in question here [AH simultaneously: The base is thought Dickie, the base.] is the relationship between consciousness [student assents] and its objects. [AH or another student assents] If they say-- if the prior schools say that the object produces the sense consciousness of it as an effect, and what they're saying, because the two-- if they're not simultaneous and the sense-- sense consciousness itself sort of stand on its own, then the whole knowledge situation is null.

AH: You know you wonder if-- if the onto-- ontol-- ontological background would not be helpful understanding what they mean because it's like if you're going to talk about simultaneous production of subject and object and also speak of subject and object being not-- not distinct or not different entities, you wonder if that's not the World-Mind's presentation, the moment-by-moment presentation, if that isn't their view. I'm just curious. Ok well--

AD: Well let's hear it again, let's hear it again.

AH: This--

AD: Yeah.

AH: Do you want to go through that reasoning again?

AD: Yeah, go through their reasoning.

AH: Both views?

AD: Uh-huh.

AH: Ok. The issue is-- issue under discussion is that Mind-Only school means that no objects which are entities external to perceiving consciousness, and they're the only Buddhist school that-- which assert that there are no external objects. All the other schools do, all the other schools *do* make this assertion that there *are* external objects. And they do it because of the following reason. They assert that an o-- this is the following reasoning.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "...[AH adds: they] assert that an object of a sense consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness. For them, objects are a cause of the consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image [AH reads: images]. Causes must exist before their effects, not simultaneously or afterward, because nothing can affect an already..."

AD (simultaneously): Stop. Could you read it again?

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "Causes must exist..."

AD: No, the whole thing.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "...[AH adds: they] assert that an object of a sense consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness."

AD: That's the non-mind school.

AH: Non-mind school.

AD: Then these are the pe-- these people are taking for granted or starting-- the premises of the argument is already *in* manifestation.

S (faint): Uh-hm, uh-hm.

S (very faint): Yeah.

AH: The other schools, the non-mind--

AD: The non-mind schools have as their premises, alright, the existence of the phenomenal world.

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

AH: Yes.

S (very faint): Yeah.

LR: They start--

AD (simultaneously): The Yogacaras do *not* have that [student assents, faint] as their premises.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AH: I think that's true, yes.

AD: The Yogacaras are *bringing* that world into phenomenal existence [student assents] through consciousness. [student assents] These people are taking for granted the manifested world from which they will base their understanding of epistemology.

S: Uh-hm.

AH: Yes.

VM (faint): Right, uh-hm.

AH: Well--

AD: In other words, the Yogacara school is saying something like this. I-- I mean the two schools. One school is saying that the senses are the *entrances* of knowledge [students assent, faint] and the other school [student assent] is saying the senses are the *exits* of knowledge.

VM: Uh-hm.

AD: The Yogacara school is saying the senses, alright, through the senses the world gets manifested.

AH: Exits.

AD: The other school is saying, taking that for granted, that the object's got to be out there in order to interact with my senses.

AH: Yes.

S (faint): What (senses)?

AH: Thank you, that's a real insight for me, I--

AD: That's no insight. [S, faint: Yeah.] That goes on all the time. There's no two schools that have the same premises.

AH: Yeah.

RG: But Anthony, I don't see why out of that sentence you couldn't also hold the possibility that the independence of the object and a subject relates to a prior object rather than just the manifested object.

AH: Well basically the bija seed in their view, just the seed.

RG: Well--

AH: I'm sorry, I--

RG: Well, why from that reasoning you only hold it's a manifested world as independent. Why couldn't it also be the world prior to its unfoldment to the Yogacara?

AD: I still don't get the gist.

RG: Yeah.

S: Why couldn't the premise--

RG: Why couldn't the premise also be--

AH: Of the non-mind.

RG: --of the non-mind schools hold that-- I agree that for the Vaibhashika and the other ones that the world-- your-- the premise is the manifested world exists independently of the mind that knows it. But we also have a point of view that the real-- that the real world exists independently of *our* mind that only unfold it but don't create it.

AD: In-- exists independent of--

RG: Exist in-- exists independent of our mind.

AD: Which one?

RG: Our [student assents] mind, the indiv--

AD (simultaneously): Which one?

AS (faint): Both of them.

RG: The individual mind.

AD: You mean the mind that you see in the chart?

RG: Yeah.

AD: Or do you mean, or do you mean the root of that mind?

S (faint): [couple words inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): No, the mind in the chart.

AD: The mind in the chart.

RG: That the world is given to that mind.

AD: Ok, that's what-- wait, then in that case, alright, then in that case, it's not *given* to your mind.

RG: What is it?

S: Hm.

LR/S(?): I didn't follow you.

S: [one/two words inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): I didn't follow.

AD: In-- what we're saying is the primal world, the primal Idea, is something which is as inherent in *your* mind, alright, as in the World-Mind. When you speak about it being given to the mind, [RG: Right.] you're speaking about the sense mind now, [RG: Uh-hm.] you're speaking about the afflicted mind. *There* you can speak about, so to speak, the premises are already there.

RG: Oh.

AD: Let me try again, and you have to take this criticism seriously, not because I'm saying it but I think it's worth it. The premises of the Yogacara, alright, of the-- the epistemology of the Yogacara is in the very nature, in the very nature of what a human being is. In other words, in order for there to be a world for me, alright, this is the way I've got to understand epistemology. And PB goes through that description [RG assents] about the seeds coming out and manifesting a world and then you're in that world and you react to that world which is done, ok? [S: Yeah.] If you don't take that seriously then [RG: Right.] the second part won't make any sense. [RG: No, I agree.] Because when the Vaibhashikas come along and say that there *is* an external object, they have to first take that world for granted, the world that your consciousness manifested to you. So what I'm saying is their analysis is based on the premises that there is a world to be experienced. The Yogacara's analysis of expe-- of the world is that it has to arise into being through your conscious activity.

RG: Right, [VM: Uh-hm.] right, I--

AD: No I-- ok.

RG: I agree-- I follow that, I agree [AD simultaneously: Yeah.] with that, but I would-- is there a possibility that in the Prasangika or that the sch-- in the other school(s), which doesn't seem to hold-- there is in the non-mind school of the Madhyamika that doesn't seem to take the sense world for its premise, or at least doesn't talk that way, that the world could be some other world. Why does it have to be the manifested world that gives rise to the perception?

AH: The Prasangika speaks quite clearly of the manifested world.

RG: They do?

GA: Well [couple words inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): So you would agree with it.

AH: That's the only--

GA (simultaneously): There's an example that they use [RG: Yeah.] for this point. You know-- you know the example of the water and, you know, a god perceives that as ambrosia, human being as water, and a hell being as urine. And they have that-- give that example, alright. Here you have a manifested object which through the force of the collective karma of each of those beings is experienced in a different way. Now for each of those beings you could take a Chittamatra point of view and say that primordially, in the very nature of their mind, there is this force of karma which is going to manifest that object a certain way. But from the Prasangika point of view there could still be this object which appears differently to different beings, whereas for Chittamatra they would not accept that that water is the same object being perceived collectively differently by different realms.

RG: Right. Well, yeah.

AD: I don't accept that, I do not accept the relativity of subjective-- subjective perceivers, alright, [RG: You don't?] in any way-- in any way, alright, gets to the problem of experience. The Yogacara school, just like PB, is analyzing experience and their analysis ultimately leads them to the fact that you have these seed-thoughts which evolve, alright, and become-- these seed-thoughts become your world. I could point out where a person's impulse, which takes place at a certain time, a few months later becomes his lifestyle, but I won't go into that. All I'm saying is this here. The analysis of experience by the Yogacaras is that it takes them, alright, so to speak, right to the heart center where the mind receives the World-Idea. *All other schools take as their premises that there is a world to be experienced.*

AH: Yes, that's very clear Anthony. [S simultaneously: (I agree.)] But I don't know what that-- I was asking a question, I don't-- maybe--

AD: You follow Sidney?

SP: Yes, yes.

AD: Alright, I-- we don't have to agree or disagree about this. Do we understand what we're saying, is this what PB for instance is saying? I think that's what he's saying. I think this is what Asanga is saying and a few of his followers, [AH simultaneously: What are--] like Atisha and the others. They were idealists, subjective idealists in the true sense of the word.

SP: Uh-hm.

AH: How would you describe their premise again, the Yogacara, that they take the world-to-be as their premise?

VM (faint): No, no.

AD: They take-- the premises that they work with is that the World-Mind, alright, your mind is a particle of the World-Mind. [AH: Yes.] That mind is what's giving you the experience of a world. How does it do it? Well the whole description that PB goes through. And until that arises, in other words, until those seed-thoughts are exfoliated and become the manifested world where you could say, "Now there's a piano over there and there's a tuning fork here, and I'm going to analyze what happens when I sound the tuning fork," I say it's too late. You can't get an epistemology no more.

AH: Anthony, would you also consider that the Yogacara is the only truly cosmological presentation?

AS/S(?): [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): No (I--) I don't-- I don't want to go into that.

AS: That-- [AD simultaneously: That--] he's just saying that the-- the object appears because the mind thinks it, not that the object is there [AH: I see.] and then the mind (just/is) [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): That would be Sautrantika and Vaibhashika.

AS: That-- I think he's saying that the premise here is that the-- the-- what's-- what you-- what you experience as object is what you-- your-- what consciousness or your mind has projected as object, whereas the other schools say what you experience as object is an object that's there and you discover it some way or other. [AH: Yeah it's--] Or it forces itself upon your consciousness or--

VM (faint): Sometimes I [couple words inaudible]

DB (simultaneously): How does-- how does Yogacara deal with the-- with the apparent solipsism that would be implied [one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Well--

AS: World-Mind, the-- they could have a World-Constructor. If they-- then even in PB the meeting of the individual mind with the World-Mind [DB simultaneously: I know how PB does that.] says that your-- says that if all-- well, I'm just-- [DB simultaneously: I've read that.] well we once read that-- we once read the one on the-- the World-Constructor and some-- some argued that that World-Constructor was only an individual World-Constructor but there's no-- there's no reason why that couldn't be a cosmic World-Constructor that is of the [DB assents] essentially the same nature as your individual mind. At least in that (view/school).

AD (simultaneously): You know, if we have serious questions here, it's a good idea to write them down and ask. And ask someone who knows. I'm referring to the DL. [AS simultaneously: That might be a good question.] So anyone who has a serious question here should get it down [AS simultaneously: Vic--] because I'm taking a stand, I'm taking a very firm stand here.

S (very faint): Uh-hm, yes.

AH: I think you have--

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, that might be a--

AD (simultaneously): All you have to do is prove me wrong.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AH: Anthony I couldn't-- I couldn't think of one shred of disagreement to that.

LR (laughing): Who does that refer to?

RG (laughing): Well what does that mean?

AD: I'll retire. (laughter, student words)

S (amidst laughter): Uh-huh, no.

AH: But, we're going to have some problems when we get to Prasangika.

S: [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): But that's alright, [AH/S(?) simultaneously: Uh-hm.] they're good, problems are good! [AH: Yeah.] What else is going to make you grow? You got no problems, you're dead! [AH, faint: Yeah.] [AD hits board with chalk] Let's go on. Oh go ahead Avery, go ahead.

KD (simultaneously): So, wait, wait, wait for me. Andrew [AS simultaneously: I wanted to-- can I-- I (have) (couple/three words inaudible)] when-- when you use the term 'seed'-- Just a second Avery, wait. [couple inaudible AS words simultaneous with KD] When you use the term 'seed' then, the bija seed that becomes a subject and object, you also use the word 'consciousness', are these then different modes of that con-- of that mind when you say mind-only?

AD: I would-- I would suggest, Kathleen, you wait because that's going to require a tremendous amount of work, how the bija seeds evolve. [AS assents] First of [KD simultaneously: But then--] all that there's two kinds, there's a temporary kind and there's [S simultaneously: (Uh-hm/Ok).] eternal kind. We worked this out [few inaudible AS words simultaneous with AD] a long time ago, we even have a paper written up on it. [S: Yeah.] But it would take-- it would take a considerable amount of time, an hour or so, to show the way this was answered.

KD: Ok, I just [AS simultaneously: That--] wondered because like on his diagram it seems like everything-- there wouldn't be that second category then that you're talking [AH simultaneously: Well that was-- that-- that was last week.] about trans-- transformation of that one mind-only into--

AH: That was last week Kathy.

KD (simultaneously): --into the-- ok. (bit of laughter)

S: [couple/few words inaudible]

S (simultaneously): They've already done it.

AH: Things change real fast. (some laughter) Avery?

AS: Well, just, it was in regard to David's question, I just thought because when we did have that whole paper about the Yogacara there was this question of whether the Madhyamikas interpreted or whether others interpreted that World-Constructor as only an individual mind or whether they allow Yogacara to speak of the cosmic mind. It might be a good thing to know if the DL considers that the Yogacarins do have a cosmic mind and do talk about cosmic mentalism.

AH: Yogacarins certainly do. Are you asking if [AS simultaneously: No.] Prasangika does?

AS: I'm ask-- well it's--

AD (simultaneously): The Prasangikas yeah, [AS simultaneously: I'm asking whether the Prasangika--] because he spoke about 57 ema-- emanations of the same cosmic mind.

AS: Yeah. Or the co-- whether the Prasangikas accept a cosmic mind and whether the Prasangikas interpret the Yogacarins as having a cosmic mind. There even was a discussion as to whether the Yogacarins had such a--

AH: Well just generally I-- one thing I know for sure, that Prasangika wouldn't hold any ontic principles, cosmic mind or World-Mind. I mean they wouldn't do (that).

AD (simultaneously): Well that [AS simultaneously: You'd have to say more (couple words inaudible)] might be in print, let's ask him.

S: Yeah.

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, why-- I mean they'd have to [AH simultaneously: See this is--] deny them-- [AH simultaneously: (This is--)] to deny the cosmic mind, I mean, would be [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): Yeah this issue, we just go around this again and again and again.

AS: That's--

S: (Right, true.)

AH (simultaneously): Wh-- it's-- like what's wrong with presuppositions? Nothing, they're great, as long as you know that you're making them.

AD (simultaneously): If-- if you know them.

S: Yeah.

S: Well--

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AD: Well, [SP/S(?) simultaneously: Yeah.] look, let's continue. We've been doing good so far? Let's continue [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] a little more with this book so we have-- we'll at least say, [AH simultaneously: We--] well, according to Jeffrey Hopkins, this is what he said, right? And you'd have to agree and I'd have to agree and we could argue from that point on.

AH (simultaneously): Alright, alright. Ok. Uh--

AD: I'm sure we're going to get to a lot of points where we're-- you know, like imputation.

AH (simultaneously): Sidney, would you read a while? Go ahead.

SP (simultaneously): It's got your markings? I don't know where to go.

AH: Well, my markings aren't significant, read--

SP: This chapter isn't marked very well in (Andrew's) book. (student laughs a bit)

S: (Uh-huh/Right).

S (very faint): (Right.)

S: What's that like?

AD (simultaneously): No.

AS: Which section is (this/it)?

S (faint): What?

S: I think 357.

S (faint): Yeah, uh-hm.

AS (simultaneously): Well I got the-- I got the whole new (bound).

VM/S(?) (faint): Oh, (yes).

AD (simultaneously): What are you quitting Andrew?

AH: No I just have to eat something.

S (simultaneously, faint): Eat something Andrew.

AD: Oh.

AS: Some of them are there and some of them are different.

GA (simultaneously): Yeah, get some lunch for your body.

RG: Sidney, the-- this--

SP: Yeah.

RG: The non-mind aspect of Prasangika, I mean would you agree with the discussion that took place?

[AD pounding on something]

SP (amidst pounding): That was the place. (bit of laughter) What?

AD: Don't break the continuity.

RG: Ok, go ahead.

AD: Let's not [student assents, faint] get off.

S (faint): (Usually) [one/two words inaudible]

SP: Yeah.

AD: Let's follow the-- let's follow the sequence relayed now. If we get into an argument over what-- the Prasangikas or non-mind school, we'll get into an argument, we'll never get this-- we'll never get this over.

RG (simultaneously): (Right), go ahead, alright.

AD: You know how anxious we all are to reach that, don't you?

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, let's take tonight to get it-- get the [S simultaneously: Yes.] Chittamatra (in the open).

TS/S(?): Yeah. (some laughter)

AD: There's nothing I like better than to disagree with Andrew and get him upset. (bit of laughter)

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, SP reading]: "The Chittamatrins disagree, saying that Buddha taught that a sense consciousness perceives a present object, whereas if object and subject were cause and effect, then, since a cause has ceased when its effect exists, a sense consciousness would be perceiving a past object."

AD (simultaneously): You remember the first-- you remember the first verse of the *Dhammapada*? [students assent, faint] I think that's what he's referring to.

S (faint): Yeah, it's not the first.

RG/S(?) (faint): Right.

S: But will you listen [one word inaudible]

AD: You don't have a copy around do (we/you)? Well there, of course, the Buddha-- in that quotation the Buddha says that everything is made from mind. It's-- it's a very beautiful quote but it's very very precise in the sense that he points out that anything that exists is mind-made, that the thief who was taking my peace is mind. He goes through that, it's [S simultaneously, faint: Oh yeah.] only four lines but they're very very precise. [S, faint: Oh yeah.] I think that's the reference there.

AS (simultaneously): Oh yeah, I have found-- I have found the thief who has--

S (faint): [one word inaudible]

AD: Stole my peace.

S (faint): Stolen-- yeah, right.

AD: Well, alright. But if you-- if you find the *Dhammapada* first quatrain is the one he's-- I think he's referring to here. [S, faint: Yeah.] Go ahead, Sid.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 367-368, SP reading]: "The non-mind-only schools must accept that an object of a sense consciousness exists one instant prior to its apprehender, but they say that the object is *present* in that there is no moment intervening between the object moment and the perceiver moment. The Chittamatrins, however, are able to uphold Buddha's teachings on this point without any qualification; for them, object and subject exist simultaneously. A seed (*bija, sa bon*) or predisposition (*vasana, bag chags*) is activated and simultaneously produces both an object and a cognizing subject, much as in a dream."

S (very faint): Uh-hm.

SP: Ok?

VM: How about the next thing after that one?

AS: A Buddha has no seeds (or--)

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 368, SP reading]: "(A Buddha has no seeds or latencies but perceives objects through the complete awakening or actualization of his collections of merit and wisdom.)"

VM: You think he's saying that something like [S simultaneously, faint: Right.] a Buddha actually contacts the world-image without his own vasanas in the way? [S simultaneously: Yeah.] Or is he saying-- or is he saying more than that?

SP (simultaneously): Yeah maybe-- maybe when PB talks about a Sage being a-- a pure channel.

VM (faint): Uh-hm.

S: Right.

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

SP: Maybe that's it, he's drawing from something [student assents] impersonal rather than personal.

VM (simultaneously): Right.

DB: Sidney?

SP: Yes.

DB: Was the first part of that, before-- before he brought the Buddha into the discussion, are these-- is one to understand these bija seeds as like, well there's a telephone bija seed and it comes up and I hear it ring and my hearing of it ring and its ringing and so forth are one moment, or is it a seed that includes the totality of all the sense consciousnesses and all the object consciousnesses all at once?

SP: I would assume all at once, that's the only way I can make sense out of sense consciousness.

DB: But-- [S: Yeah.] ok, yeah, I mean that-- the problem then is that what they mean by object is-- is not the differentiated, you know, there's a tree [SP: Uh-hm.] but there's the-- there's a total event.

SP (very faint): Uh-hm.

DB: Ok, that's all [couple words inaudible]

KD (simultaneously): But, you know what that-- you know what that sounds like in PB? That sounds like that moment-to-moment, the World-Idea that contains [AS: Yeah.] everything, the consciousness, he even uses the word, [AH/S(?) simultaneously: Is it (some--)] it contains all of these things.

AH: I think that's what the-- it's that moment-by-moment?

KD (simultaneously): Because he said the consciousness of it is included right in that [one word inaudible]

AD: No, now I don't understand it like that but we'll-- I'll have to read it again Sidney.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 368, SP reading]: "The Chittamatrins, however, are able to uphold Buddha's teachings on this point without any qualifications; for them, object and subject exist simultaneously. A seed (*bija*, *sa bon*) or predisposition (*vasana*, *bag chags*) is activated and simultaneously produces both an object and a cognizing subject, much as in a dream."

AH: Is that like the atom in the heart, the heart-atom?

AD: Well, [S: What was the objective (possibly one word inaudible)] I'm thinking of the way the-- what the possible meaning of sense experience could be here. Now what sense experience is he referring to, that's-- that's where I'm trying to get to.

SP: What-- what was your question, the word again?

AD (simultaneously): Sense experience. [LR simultaneously: What possible sense experience.] What sense experience is he referring to?

AH: What *level* of sense? Pure presentation.

AD: In other words, what I-- what I'm talking about is something like this. You have on the one hand the mind with the five senses, the *faculty* of mind, ok. And on the other hand you have the mind with the five senses, nose, eyes, ears, the real stuff, you know, [student assents] these are the organs, ok. [student assents, faint] Now, which senses is he referring to? If he's-- if he's saying for instance something like this. If he says the mind with its senses grasp the object, then I would put that in the manifested world.

RG: Oh yeah.

AD: In other words, here's a [AD hits something] tuning fork, I smack it, alright, there's a reaction in my ear drum. That is the manifested world that I am analyzing in the experience. [students assent, faint] Now, there are the senses in themselves, the psychical senses in themselves. They grasp the *idea* of the world. Which one is he referring to?

S (faint): Right.

AH: If it's [AD simultaneously: Could you read that quote?] simultaneous-- if it's simultaneous it has to be the second.

AD: But, don't you see, if-- if it's this here [diagram], it's cause and effect.

AH: Yes, that's what I said.

AD: If it's the other one, it's simultaneous.

S (faint): Yeah.

AH: Yeah.

S (simultaneously, faint): Uh-hm.

AD: According to the quote, alright, [SP: Uh-hm.] they're analyzing from what point of view, [SP simultaneously: From the--] and *what* are they analyzing?

SP (simultaneously): From the-- well they're analyzing from the point of view of an already established conscious [AD: Ok.] image.

S (faint): Yeah.

AD: So once, once you have established the existence of the world, then the analysis of experience has to be based on the fact that the object and the subject is a-- or, so to speak, divided.

AH: The other three schools have to do that [AD: Yeah.] of necessity. [AD, faint: Yeah.] So the-- but this school they're talking about--

DB: But he--

AD (simultaneously): Yogacara school would not accept that. They would say that the mind and its senses, alright, [AH: Right.] project or let's say evolve the seed-thought, the idea, and from within themselves and within themselves manifest the world.

AH: Time and space, uh--

AD (simultaneously): Yeah.

AH: Yeah.

AD: So their analysis is different.

S (faint): Yeah.

AD: Now we assume that they're analyzing the same thing and I'm saying wait a minute, maybe they're not.

AH (faint): No that's (right/true).

AD: Maybe they're talking about two entirely different analyses that are going on.

AH: Very different, very different.

DB: But the--

S (faint): Uh-hm.

S (faint): Yeah.

DB: So they're talking about, they're talking about the presentation of the world, ok, they're not talking about an individual that's within that who like say is reading--

AD: No, I won't accept that David because if I'm going to analyze experience, I can only analyze my experience [DB: Ok.] and I will then say it applies to everyone else.

DB: Ok.

AD: But I don't start out analyzing experience through your subjectivity, but my subjectivity.

DB (simultaneously): A good thing. No but--

AD: So it's always-- well what I'm trying to get at is, is that the analysis of experience is always on the basis of the individual.

DB: Yes.

AD: Ok.

DB: Ok. The-- I guess I-- I'm still not clear as to-- as to what we're-- what we're saying because they're-- they're refuting the other schools basically because they're saying look, there's a gap between the first instant of the object-moment and they've got this big gap.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, that's enough, that's enough, sure.

DB (simultaneously): Ok. But, it seems that when they analyze the gap, they're no longer talking about the particular perception that I have of the pole but they're talking about the whole-- the presentation of the total world and me in it, ok, I mean it just seems to me that they're changing frameworks when they-- when they get rid of that gap, ok, in their analysis and that's what I don't understand.

AD: For the Buddhists, I mean for the Yogacaras, there is no gap between the sense object, blue, [DB: Yeah.] and the cognition of blue, [DB: Right.] because blue and its cognition are both of mind.

[Audio File 1984 0831a Ends]

[Audio File 1984 0831b Begins]

DB: --and my eyes seeing that blue [AD, very faint: Yeah.] at that instant? Or is the bija seed the totality of-- of the world-image within which I find myself, which includes all these possibilities? I mean, at [VM simultaneously: If you follow--] what level are they defining subject here?

VM: But if you follow Anthony's point it has to be the higher level, the whole world-image, because it's only at that level that you can speak about the individual mind unfolding the world. When you can get to a point where you could separate out David Bulkley or Vic Mansfield within that world-image, then

you're coming from the point of view of the manifested realm and then the other schools, the non-mind-only schools, their analysis then begins.

DB: Ok so the--

VM: Right? I mean--

DB (simultaneously): Yeah, right, yeah, that's-- So but I mean I just wanted to make clear to myself that in understanding the Yogacara's position with respect to the other school, there's a really major difference in where the--

LR: The premise.

S: Yeah right.

VM (simultaneously): Maybe that's why they never understand each other and never get on.

DB (faint): Right, yeah, right.

RG: Isn't--

S (possibly part of background): Oh.

AH: Sure.

LD: How-- how do the-- the-- the Yogacara--

AD (simultaneously): Wait, wait, wait.

LD: Oh, I'm sorry.

AD: Let's just stop and keep silent for a moment or two. No stress. Absolute stillness for a moment. [1 minute 1 second pause] We had spoken of there are two kinds of consciousnesses. There's one kind of consciousness which is permanent, doesn't alter, doesn't change, it is what it is, always what it is. And we spoke about another kind of consciousness which is moment-by-moment. We spoke about that, so to speak, as the World-Mind projecting the universe from within itself moment-to-moment. So we have these two kinds of consciousnesses. Now, from the point of view of the Yogacara school, in their analysis of experience, alright, where there's-- you know, there'll be-- the fundamental or the ultimate manifestation is going to be a subject and object which are non-different from one another, we would-- we would be able to, I think, discern or point out and say something like this. The Yag-- Yogacara is pointing to the World-Mind Idea. Within the Idea of the World-Mind, alright, there's going to exist this ego. So if we-- if we analyze the experience we're going to be analyzing the existence of the World-Mind's Idea, and within that Idea ultimately the projection of the subject and the object, the subject and the object in the case of, you know, the chart like the way your planets are functioning subjectively and the outward manifestation. Could you pick up from there, from what I just said, could you pick up from there where the Yogacara is coming from?

[short pause]

AH: What they're premising?

VM: I didn't understand it. You mean from within the picture of the chart or from-- when you say "there", the whole discussion?

AD (simultaneously): No, from the point of view, from the point of view of what the Yogacara is analyzing, [KD simultaneously: Their (whole--)] what is he analyzing? Is he analyzing the nature of the I AM principle? [S: No.] [KD: No.] Or is he analyzing the nature of a subject which is really something-- which is really vehicle crea-- vehicles created by the World-Mind Idea?

KD: Yeah, the World-Idea, they'd be coming from the-- [AD simultaneously: What is he--] from the World-Idea side.

AD: The World-Idea side.

KD: Yeah, 'cause it sound-- it sounds like PB's description of that World-Idea that flashes moment-by-moment and within that is the consciousness, the subject and the object. Everything is in-- is in that [AD simultaneously: Within that.] side of the World-Idea.

AD: Alright, so you remember the diagram we used, we imagine the Sun is the center and all the planets around it and the Earth as one, alright, and within that diagram we laid out that the Sun would represent the Overself, the Soul of the Sun would be the Overself, that would be also my Self too, alright. And then the physical Sun would represent to us the center within which all this is going to be manifest, the world-- it's going to manifest the World-Idea. So, it would mean that it would be fabricating the physical bodies within which a soul could inhabit and function through that physical body. But now that physical body, alright, which is fabricated by the Sun is something which is, what we said, from moment-to-moment. Right? So that the experience that the I AM principle would have there would be the experience of consciousness as moment-to-moment.

[student assents, very faint]

AH: Still--

AD (simultaneously): I'm asking. The Yogacara's analysis of experience, is the analysis of the experience-- of *what* experience? Of his I AM or an analysis of the vehicles that the I AM principle uses? You take it from there, I'm out of breath. You take it from there. Go ahead.

LR: I see, so there's no abiding consciousness you're saying, because coming from the point of view of the World-Idea, and we spoke of there being two consciousnesses, coming from the point of view of the World-Idea side, there *is* no abiding entity, there is only this flashing moment which produces the consciousness from within.

AD: Yeah.

LR (simultaneously): And if you-- and if you restrict yourself to that point of view, there *is*-- there *is* no completely abiding consciousness, [VM simultaneously: But why can't you say that the mind, there's mi--] it's all contained within [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously with LR and VM): Go ahead, go ahead, wait, wait, let her finish, go ahead.

VM (simultaneously): Why can't you say that a principle of mind is the abiding consciousness and that flashing consciousness--

LR (simultaneously): Because he's just said that the mind, what we're s-- what he's speaking of as mind *is* the flashing Idea held within the World-Mind, so it's the World-Idea that's referred to as mind here.

AH: The alaya.

LR: That's what Anthony-- (oh/or) that's what we started with. He started saying there's two kinds of consciousness posited, right?

AD: Yeah, one is a permanent principle, right? And this is the one that the Vedantists are always hammering at, the I AM, alright.

LR (simultaneously): Right, and this is-- yeah.

AD: Then we have the World-Idea and we said that the World-Idea, our Sun for instance, fabricates the physical bodies that our soul is going to inhabit and fabricates the subtle bodies and even the causal body, [student assents, faint] alright? Now the World-Idea, in other word-- the World-Mind is fabricating these bodies. In fabricating the world, simultaneously these three levels of bodies are included within it. Ok? Now, insofar that the Sun projects forth the u-- its world, we say it's doing it moment-to-moment. So that means that the body that is being fabricated by the cosmic soul or our World-Mind, alright, is being fabricated moment-to-moment. Its consc-- the consciousness of the World-Mind is fabricating that universe instant-to-instant. Is your consciousness of the same nature?

AH: No.

AD: The consciousness of the soul is *not* of that nature.

AH (simultaneously): No.

AD (passionately): Alright. You can't *analyze*, you can't analyze that I AM consciousness. [students assent, faint] But you *can* analyze the consciousness that is, let's say, when the soul inhabits a body which has been fabricated by the World-Mind *for* it, that you can analyze. [student assents, very faint] In other words, when I say I have a subtle body, I'm analyzing part of the World-Mind's fabrication of the world. When I say there's a causal body, I'm analyzing part of the World-Mind's Idea of this body that my soul's going to inhabit. Now again the question-- I don't know if I made it clear, but I would ask you, what is the Yogacara propounding?

AS: In other words, [RG/S(?) simultaneously: Anthony--] when the Yogacara or Chittamatra says that it's mind-only or consciousness-only, do they mean the pure unchanging consciousness of the I AM or do they mean the consciousness--

AD (simultaneously): Yes exactly, that's the question.

AS: --the changing consciousness of the World-Idea. Which-- which consciousness-only?

AD (simultaneously): But, we first [AH simultaneously: Well, I--] have to-- Yeah, we first have to see if they could understand [AH simultaneously: Yeah, the second, I understand, they mean the second.] and now, [AD snaps fingers] and now you got the question (and you) [three/few words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously): Which consciousness-only?

AH (simultaneously with AD and AS): They mean the second, they mean [AD simultaneously: Huh?] the second because--

S: Second.

S (simultaneously, faint): [one word inaudible] only.

AH: They mean the-- the vehicles of the World-Mind because some translators don't translate it as mind-only, they translate it as experience-only or as experience counts. And now I can understand why they had to reply to the Madhyamika. This was a reply to the Madhyamika to explain this unfolding of experience at that level 'cause Madhyamika took the view of-- [S, faint: Yeah.] of [AD: (Uh/A)--] the pure light of the mind, yeah, yeah.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, [student assents] that's what's going to be interesting, [AH: Yep.] that perhaps the Prasangikas are coming from an entirely different point of view and we don't *know* where they're coming from, (laughter) and we need to find out. But if we lay out the ground of what the Yogacara school is, when the Prasangikas analyze them maybe we'll see where *they're* coming from.

AH: Yeah.

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AD: But we understand this much now?

LDS: You know, Anthony--

AD: That's why it's so important to try to get to PB's writings because they're simplicity itself. I mean, there's actual quotes where he says there's a [AD hitting board with chalk] consciousness which is abiding, permanent, never changes. Boom, period. And if you bring in the re-embodying soul, that too doesn't change, although I won't argue that point now. [RG: Right.] He says then there's consciousness which is always changing, you remember? Then he's got another quote, he says the Vedantists stand on one side and they're arguing this point of view, the Buddhists are on another and they're arguing their point of view. And he says, "The pity of it. They're both right, if they come together." Separate them, they're wrong.

JL: But, Anthony--

AD: Go ahead.

JL: One is not constituent of the other.

AD: One is not constituent? No. But [JL/S(?) simultaneously: Right. There (is/isn't)--] if you want, if you want a true philosophy, if you want the philosophy-- the *whole* of philosophy, [JL: You have to have both.] you got to take both points of view together.

JL: But dis-- but distinctly though.

AD: You got to take both points of view together, right? There's no sense saying that Mind is ultimate.

JL (faint): Uh-hm.

AD: That's not enough. You got to say also that the practical world is real at the same time, there's something of reality in the practical illusory world.

AH: Yes. Anthony--

AD (simultaneously): You can't just deny it.

AH: Anthony, would you be willing to perhaps to correlate what the Yogacara position is in terms of a meditational experience or a [possibly one word inaudible] Is there any other way of speaking of that level of the s-- the moment-by-moment?

AD (simultaneously): Well, we can. I would suggest something like this, we have written this up. This is something Dave-- Avery could do. We wrote up this-- the experience, you know, that can be had if you follow the Patanjali school or you follow the Buddhist, doesn't matter. At different levels where different levels of consciousness are experienced, one begins to realize that what he's experiences different dimensions within the Idea of the world which has been, you know, projected by the World-Mind. The World-Mind projects the World-Idea, within the World-Idea there are different levels. For convenience we'll say three levels, you know the so-called gross, the subtle, and the causal. There are much more. I mean I have to respect Vic here but the fact is that even scientists doesn't have a *minute idea* of the complexity of this universe. It's utterly impossible! And you can see why. What finite intelligence can understand this Infinite Mind? It's nonsense to say "Well, I'll subsume them under a unified field theory." I mean that's the work of a lunatic! (bit of laughter) "I'm going to unify all the knowledge in the universe and be the World-Mind."

S: No.

AS: Wait, what was the point?

AD (simultaneously): But anyway, if we get back to that point--

S: Wait, what-- (laughter, student words)

AS: What was-- Anthony, what was--

VM (simultaneously): I think I threw you off Anthony, just my very presence.

AS (simultaneously): What was the point? You didn't get to the-- you were s-- I didn't get (the point).

AH (simultaneously): I asked a question.

AS: Yeah and--

AH: I was curious because the Dalai Lama said that you have to have this view of Yogacara [AS simultaneously: Oh right.] or the view of Prasangika or-- in order to practice the Tantra, and I was

wondering, your des-- I-- I just would like another way of understanding what that moment-by-moment level is. Is that the level of the stills?

S (faint): Uh-hm.

AS: He started talking about the levels within that, right, that--

AD: Yeah.

AS: And then you got off.

AH: That's where the world is known as a series of stills, yeah.

AD (simultaneously): Stills, yeah.

AH: Han-Shan described it.

AD: Uh-huh.

AH: Yes. Yes.

RG: But you know, that--

AD (simultaneously): Now, as a series of stills, in other words, as the cosmic mind is producing one image after another, [AH: Right.] from our point of view, from *its* point of view there may not be images at all.

AH: And that image includes everything.

AD: Yeah. So it produces one image after another, constantly, without, you know, any interruption, and it's an uninterrupted stream, so to speak, which is projecting its universe and its Idea of the world from within itself and also according to the World-Idea which governs it. And this would not conflict with the Buddhist notion that each one of us, so to speak, is a mind, you know, creating its own karma and those with similar karma come together and create a world in common, it would not contradict that.

AH: There's certainly meditational experience beyond that. There's meditational experience beyond that series of stills.

AD: Oh yes, oh yes, very much so. There are visitations that you-- you and I can't even imagine or conceive.

AH: I'm just trying to understand this structure that they do of the four schools, what might-- what might be the actual meditational experience that each school would provide before moving to a next one, you know.

AD: Well, we certainly could look up a lot of the Yogacara material. I-- they have quite a bit on that.

S (faint): Yeah.

S (very faint): Yeah but--

AH (simultaneously): Avery--

AS: But Andrew then-- then is-- then I-- am I misunderstanding or-- the question seems to be or the interpretation of the basis, ontological basis Andrew of this-- this business [AH: Yeah.] is postulated as the, we could call it-- not the abiding or-- say not the abiding permanently still aspect of mind but that the mind that they're talking about, even the mind that contains this-- these seeds in Chittamatra is that mind which is continually active in the universe the way PB says.

AH: Yes.

AS: Is that-- is that-- is that-- is that what they're mean-- is that what we're interpreting as [AD simultaneously: Well, what I--] the same as the chitta in the Chittamatra?

AD (simultaneously): Yeah well-- well basically what I'm asking is something like this. The Yogacaras are analyzing experience. They're coming from a certain point of view. I'm trying to bring in the fact that there's two possible points of view they can come from.

AS: Right.

AD: They can come from the point of view of the pure consciousness principle which is within every one of us, alright.

AS: Uh-hm.

AD: They can come from the I AM principle, analyze that, or they can come from the notion of trying to analyze the nature of the World-Mind's Idea and reach a-- and-- I'm sorry. That their analysis would be basically concerned with understanding the nature of the World-Mind Idea.

S: Yeah.

AS: And the World-Mind's [AD simultaneously: Now--] activity.

AD: Yeah. Now which one or from-- the question, [AS simultaneously: That's what I was asking.] what are they-- what question are they answering?

AS (faint): (Overself.)

AH (simultaneously): I think they're defining mind as alaya.

AD: Huh?

AH: They're defining the mind as the alaya, the alaya-vijnana, the storehouse. They're not speaking of mind as--

AD: I thought alaya meant pure consciousness but I may be mistaken.

AH (simultaneously): The alaya-vijnana, I'm sorry Anthony.

AD: Oh.

AH: The storehouse consciousness.

S (faint): No but--

AH: They're not talking about alaya, they're talking about alaya-vijnana, I--

AD: Well, [AS simultaneously: See, I (think) (one/two words inaudible)] from what you've read so far, what do you think they're analyzing, the "I" as part of the World-Mind Idea or the pure I AM, alright, which is unrelated to the World-Idea?

AH: The first thing, the "I" as part of the World-Idea.

AD (simultaneously, faint): World-Idea.

AH (faint): That's right.

S (simultaneously, faint): That's nice to know.

AD: Go ahead.

RG: Although, you know, [JL simultaneously: That's the conventional truth.] the first two sentences we read I guess a paragraph ago were the difference between analyzing the selflessness of person and the-- and the difference between analyzing the selflessness of person and an object. And in the beginning of the discussion you-- we had said and you had offered that when you analyze only the selflessness of person you're purs--

AD (simultaneously): Get to your question, yeah.

RG: --you're pursuing a-- a path towards Nirvikalpa say.

AD: Yeah.

RG: Now--

AD: The mystic.

RG: The mystic.

AD: Uh-huh.

RG: But is that possible within the view of the pulsating World-Idea, in other words--

AD (simultaneously): Of course it's possible. I mean there are people that are born who's primary interests are to investigate the nature of the world and they become scientists.

RG: Right, right, but that's what I'm saying.

AD (simultaneously): And there's other people that are born who's primary interest [S simultaneously: Ok.] is in themselves and don't care about the world.

LDS (possibly part of background, faint): I was going to say [one/two words inaudible]

RG (simultaneously): But to be a Yogacara you're saying your primary interest is to investigate the nature of the World-Idea. Is it?

AD (simultaneously): They're investigating the nature of your-- yeah, um--

RG (simultaneously): So then your meditative realizations would seem to follow that and *not* lead you to Nirvikalpa as the mystic would.

AD: Uh-huh.

VM: So you mean a Yogacarin can't have a Nirvikalpa experience?

AH: If he's a follower of--

AD (simultaneously): Oh he certainly can. I-- what-- what we're doing though is understanding what's going on in the sense of the analysis of these formulas. I am not saying what's going to go on with you as an individual [RG simultaneously: Right.] if you start doing these [RG simultaneously: Right, ok.] things, I don't know. [RG: Ok.] Because the individual [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] path will break-- break out into the open.

RG (simultaneously): So-- so thi-- this is the intellectual perspective but [AD simultaneously: Uh-huh.] the meditative states are-- are undeterminate [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Well, you can't-- I can't tell because once a person starts meditating he could be led one way or another.

RG/S(?): Yeah.

AH: But they [S simultaneously: Fair enough.] do suggest--

AD: Or he could be led to go all the way.

AH: They do suggest that each school will provide a certain level of experience, at--

AD: Yeah. That the-- that the marvelous thing here, the really wondrous thing here, is that all these schools are not in conflict. They're just showing us how extensive, how incomprehensible the whole of it is, alright, and not that they're in conflict with each other. [AH: Yes.] So if a person as a Yogacara studies and, you know, goes through certain experiences and another person without, you know, going through the Yogacara method, let's say a Hinayana goes through his experience, they're not going to be in conflict, not at all.

VM: Uh-hm.

AD: Alright.

DB: Within--

AD: Go ahead.

DB: Within the-- within the understanding that the Yogacara working with the unfoldment of the World-Idea's presentation by moment-to-moment, is it possible to make a distinction within that of the relation of the, you know, the seeds that are coming from the heart of the individual to his mind or to his brain and then unfolded as his world of experience as opposed to the totality of the world-image which includes that body as being presented moment-by-moment?

AD: As opposed to that?

DB: Yes. I'm trying to see that-- and this might be really wrong, I just-- so bear with me please, like there are three perspectives. One is the empirical, one is the relationship of the sub-- that pure subjective consciousness to the-- to the body and the unfoldment of the pure sensation moment-to-moment, ok. And prior to that is the totality of the World-Mind's presentation with-- with that body as included as part of it, ok. The second one takes as a focal point the body of the individual, ok. The third one includes that body as part of the totality of-- of the world that is being unfolded. And I'm wondering if Yogacara is starting in the second-- the second perspective.

[12¼ second pause]

AD: I don't think I understand you but I'll try and attempt. There is such a thing as, you know, spiritual gnosis where an individual receives the spiritual knowledge through the heart center and in just such a fashion like we spoke of as a moment-to-moment thing. And that is usually referred to as spiritual gnosis. There is another kind of knowledge where the totality, and here I could refer you to for instance the vision, cosmic vision, that A-- Krishna granted Arjuna, and there you have the total presented to an individual mystic, he has a cosmic vision. Now, that too takes place inwardly and that too is a spiritual gnosis. You don't-- that vision is not of-- a sensible vision. It isn't through the physical eyes or the physical ears that he has this vision of the cosmos, you know, with all the reason-principles that underlie everything in the cosmos. He's not working with that, he's-- it is in the heart. But what do we-- what does he-- what do they mean when they say the heart? They mean the Overself, they mean the Mind which is part of the World-Mind. That's-- that's where the vision is, that's where (you're/you) seeing it. You're not seeing it with the brain.

DB: Yes, right.

AD: So there there's not even-- that question doesn't even arise. There's no-- there's no possibility of speaking about manifestation in that kind of knowledge. Spiritual knowledge is not manifested in the way that we speak about manifestation, although it's available to the Saint or the Sage.

DB: Yeah, ok.

AD: I'm going to have to call it quits, I'm tired.

VM: Thanks a lot Anthony, we [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): Thank you very much.

S (simultaneously): [couple/three words inaudible]

S (faint): Uh-hm, yeah.

AD: No, I want you to [VM/S(?) simultaneously: Quit.] continue with that. I think this is the way to go at it. Build a common reservoir, you know, a reservoir where you have terms in common so that when you start saying "imputation according to the base," I'm not going to throw a pillow at you. Because you'll be able to say it to me in other words. [VM: Yes.] In other words, I *don't* want you to be a parrot. That's a word devised by Jeffrey Hopkins.

AH: But Anthony, what--

AD (simultaneously, passionately): But I did ask you to be creative and original!

VM: Well, we--

AH (simultaneously): That one issue--

AD (passionately): Did you think I asked you something simple?

AH: Forgive me, sir, but that one issue, I don't think there are any words that are going to please you about--

AD (simultaneously): Well maybe there are, maybe there are.

VM (simultaneously): No, I think there is a word, given what you said tonight, that basis is the manifested world and that's what you're imputing on if you say that Prasangika comes from the point of view of the already manifested world.

AH: But what's [few students at once, few words inaudible] imputing upon what? What's imputing upon what?

AD (simultaneously): Alright. Alright.

S (faint): [one word inaudible]

S: Look at how he jumps.

S: Oh yeah.

AD (simultaneously): That's why it's best [S simultaneously: (How?)] to continue [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] in this orderly way, sequence. Read the whole chapter on the Chittamatras, then go to the Prasangika. Go ahead.

AH: This is what you'd like us to do, this is what--

AD: I think, I think it will build up the necessary background so that we could have an intelligent discussion without getting mad at one another. (RG laughs a bit) [AH: We do--] Because that's what happens, we get mad at one another because we don't understand what the other guy's saying! (RG laughs)

S (faint): Nice.

AH: We'll do Chittamatra and Madhyaga-- Madhyamika?

AD (simultaneously): Yeah. And then if you want to, do the other schools too, which I think are deserving, you know, of some respect. But I think the Prasangika and the Chittamatrins is the ones we're fighting to understand and, you know, bring out into the open.

AH: Alright.

AD: If we build up the common terminology, Andrew, we'll be able to discuss things without getting mad at each other.

AH: I don't get mad anymore.

VM: Oh.

S: Oh no. (laughter)

Many students at once (simultaneously, amidst laughter): No.

AH: Not about--

AD (simultaneously): That sounds-- that sounds good.

VM (simultaneously): Uh, take that down Kathleen, that's 9:43--

AH (simultaneously): Not about this point. (laughter)

S: Write that down Kathleen.

AD: Now the other thing too is later on I think, later on we still have that paper that we wrote about the Yogacara, we-- we evolved this terminology, the symbolism and all that, we can go over it again. You might appreciate it *after* you do this here. At that time maybe it was premature, you know.

AH: Could you-- could you ask-- entertain just one [S simultaneously, faint: (No.)] short question?

S (very faint): No, Anthony can't do that (now).

S (simultaneously): No, no, no, no, no, (no).

S: No.

S: No, no [one word inaudible]

S (simultaneously, faint): [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Just a short question, [CDA simultaneously: No.] yes, no.

AS (simultaneously): No (more) [possibly one word inaudible] next week.

S (faint): Right, yeah.

CDA (simultaneously): No.

S (faint): If you can get it in.

AH: Skip it, next week.

AD: No, [S simultaneously: Yes.] go ahead.

RG: Oh no.

CDA (simultaneously): No.

AH: No, yes, no, yes, what?

AD: Come on [one/two words inaudible]

S (simultaneously, faint): [couple/few words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible] even (this).

LDS (simultaneously with S and AS): He's tired, he's tired.

S (faint): Oh, this is [three/few words inaudible]

KD (simultaneously): Get angry. (some laughter)

LDS/S(?): Yeah but--

AD: Go ahead.

AH: The notion-- [VM simultaneously: He's a union guru.] (do) you think that the Yogacara presentation, in comparison let's say Madhyamika, do you think they're talking about the same realization or different levels of realization?

AD: I don't know that much about the [AH simultaneously: Yeah.] Prasangikas.

AH: Ok.

AD: I have an idea of the Yogacaras because I read quite a bit on them but I cannot say of the Prasangikas what-- you know, what their realizations is, and I don't regard them as small fry. So, you know, I just back off and say I'll wait till I study them enough.

AH: Ok, thank you.

AD: And besides, you know, the Dalai Lama's an example of a-- a Prasangika, I have to shut my mouth. (bit of laughter)

S: Right.

S (faint): Right.

S (faint): Thank you.

DB (faint): Good point.

S (very faint): Right.

AD: The other thing we wanted to do was-- and I still think it's worthwhile but it may-- it may be kind of difficult, *The Wisdom of the Overself*, "The Birth of the Universe," those four sections. I think it would be worth our while now, I think you have enough maturity to try to understand in depth what PB wrote there. But you also have to know what to cut off. Because there are many things in there that he would have said differently or rewritten differently if he was here. So that's the problem with doing the *Wisdom*. But still, you can get gems out of there that I mean will actually make your hair [slight pause] tingle and sparkle. (laughter) I've experienced that regardless of the number of times I read this. Every now and then it just comes right through, I see what he's saying so clearly even though the words aren't doing it. (AD laughs a bit, bit of laughter, student words) So, I think that maybe-- maybe what to do is leave Friday for the Buddhist rounds right now and maybe you could do this Sunday, [VM: Yeah.] instead, you know, for a

while, just for a little while. [S, faint: Uh-hm.] [AD flipping through pages of the *Wisdom*] I s-- I still love this book. [AD shuts book] Ok.

AH: Thank you Anthony.

AS/VM(?): No, thank you.

AD: It made me hungry.

S (simultaneously, faint): Thank you Anthony.

S (faint): I could hear you. (bit of laughter)

S (faint): So Friday--

RG: What did he say?

AD (simultaneously, very faint in background): (Do the entire sentence.)

S: It made him hungry. (some laughter)

[few seconds of background student talking]

AD: Could I borrow that book back?

AH: Sure.

VM (possibly part of background): (Perhaps.) Oh you're saying which--

[Audio File 1984 0831b Ends]