

**CLASS at Wisdom's Goldenrod, Hector, NY
with Anthony Damiani (AD)
September 7a, 1984
BUDDHISM; YOGACARA**

TOPIC: Buddhism
SUBJECT: Yogacara

SUBSUBJECTS: Epistemology, Mentalism, Madhyamika, *Meditation on Emptiness* (Hopkins)

CONTENTS:

Reading Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, on Chittamatra/Yogacara

Brief review of main points from WG Class 1984 0831

What object is being referred to? Student discussion of this point

For Yogacara, object does not cause the consciousness of it, cognition and content exist simultaneously; world is brought into phenomenal existence through the activity of consciousness

Continued student discussion of what is meant by object in the four schools

Is Yogacara analyzing the nature of the I AM principle or the nature of the World-Idea?

Continuing to read Hopkins on Chittamatra/Yogacara

What is meant by “subtle selflessness”? Student discussion of this point

“Non-existence of objects as natural bases of engagement of names”; student discussion of this point

“Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist because if they did not, they would not exist at all”; student discussion of this point

For the Yogacara, the object truly exists, and not nominally; if my ego exists, so does an object, can't have one without the other

Yogacara objects to Prasangika notion that object does not inherently exist

Although I *feel* a distinction between myself and the world, analysis points out non-difference of subject and object

The work here is semantic analysis, not philosophical understanding

“In refuting that phenomena naturally exist as ground or bases of names...”; discussion of this passage

Does the object exist for the Prasangika?

Existence means you are, even if only momentarily

Yogacara says you can't qualify existence, a thing is or it isn't, there's no in-between

To say an object is mental is not to say that it's illusory

Existence means to be dependent on causes; ‘existere’ means the principle is outside of itself

Today language has turned things around and ‘Being’ is used for existence and vice versa; the meaning of the word ‘existence’ is going to depend on context
A mirage exists but is not real; the externality of the mirage does not exist; this applies to all appearances
Subject and object are objective to the knower
Continuing to read/discuss Hopkins on Chittamatra/Yogacara view of naming
Your sense of externality is a habit-tendency based on previous experience/wrong thinking; this habit can only be broken through understanding mentalism

BOOKS READ FROM OR REFERENCED:

- Jeffrey Hopkins, Elizabeth Napper (ed.), *Meditation on Emptiness*
- Paul Brunton, *The Hidden Teaching Beyond Yoga*
- Julius Evola, *The Doctrine of Awakening*

DIAGRAMS referred to (not with this transcript version) [Transcriber note: [diagram] means the speaker is referencing a diagram as he or she is speaking. If someone is drawing or writing, with audible sounds of chalk on a blackboard, I indicate this by [drawing] or [writing].]

NOTES:

- This is **1984 09/07a, Buddhism; Yogacara evening class, and the first entry associated with this date. 1984 09/07b = Idea of Man seminar from earlier in the day**, for which we have no audio, just JF notes. See WG Seminar 1984 0907b Astronoesis; Idea of Man.

TRANSCRIBED Verbatim by IT prior to 2018 (V11a); reformatted by jf 2018. This is **V12a** (2023) and has: updated prefatory matter, footer, and audio file name; TOC and Subsubjects completed; typos/errors corrected; new formatting to accord with new conventions. **Archival verbatim transcript – V12a.**

AUDIO FILES: 1984 0907a, 1984 0907b. [Note 1: “Tape” and “Side” refer to original audio cassette tapes that were later digitized into .MP3 Audio Files. Note 2: Audio File 1984 0907b ends abruptly, don’t know how much of the class didn’t get recorded.]

1984 09/07a at Wisdom's Goldenrod Buddhism; Yogacara

[Audio File 1984 0907a Begins]

[3½ seconds of background student talking]

[tape break]

AH: --it's on Madhyamika, before visiting Vermont. And Anthony said that if we didn't have time to do all that on Friday night, we would pick up another night during the week in order to get through that (luch).

S: Ok.

HS: Does everyone have the text that [one words inaudible] Andrew? If you do I probably could sit there and copy out the chapters.

[student assents, very faint]

S: I think (you're right).

HS: And-- 'cause I think-- I doubt if we'll get through this text so-- Andrew, people could read it if they want, it's just like an (empty pot).

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

HS: This seems to be and what we found the most semi-coherent presentation of this doctrine around. And continues over several pages and, you know--

AH: Ok?

HS: So any of you want-- any of you want that done, huh?

S (faint): Yes, uh-hm.

HS (simultaneously): I never did anything like that so I'm not going to do it. (bit of laughter)

AH: The-- the [S simultaneously: Sorry.] book is about 35 dollars so there isn't much point in buying it unless you want to really get into it. We could [one/two words inaudible] with a few chapters.

HS: We can maybe make a sign-up list and-- well, I don't know. (bit of laughter)

S: I'll make a sign-up list for the [one word inaudible]

HS: Ok. I'm not going to do anymore.

AH: Ok. Well, we'll continue then with Chittamatra section tonight. We-- we could do a real brief review of last week in five minutes and continue from there. [student assents] Is it necessary to go over what we talked about last week?

VM: How [couple/few words inaudible] 'Cause Linda-- I'm not getting to this week what we talked about last week.

[student(s) assenting]

AH: Ok, just a couple major points.

[Transcriber note: I am using *Meditation on Emptiness* by Jeffrey Hopkins, assistant editor Elizabeth Napper, Wisdom Publications, London, 1983.]

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 365, AH reading]: "The Chittamatrins (Mind-Only-ists) are so called because they assert [that] all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind."

AH: And that's distinct from saying that phenomena *are* mind. There's a subtle distinction. But then if you say that phenomena *are* mind rather than of the essence or nature of the mind, then you'd have to-- we would have to conclude that all phenomena or minds and so on and so forth would absurdly have objects of cognition. Another name for Chittamatrin is Yogacarin, the Practitioners of Yoga. It's because they use the introspective techniques of yoga. [students assent, very faint] [couple words inaudible] (able) to hear?

S (very faint): Oh yeah.

HS: I don't know, Victor didn't (do like) [one/two words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): Well, I read that footnote by Mr. Hopkins and it was a very long and somewhat pedantic footnote. I mean all he's trying to do is trying to (make sure) that Hearer has two-- two possible meanings. One is the Hearer has realized what he heard and then he pronounces it with others and thereby starts in about the Dharma and they too, you know, start [one word inaudible] through the Dharma. Then the other etymology is that Hearers *don't* realize what they heard but they just heard about how great it is to be a Buddha and they talk about it. And that's what 2½ pages of footnote's about. Beyond that I don't think it's worth discussing it. But there are-- he mentions four levels here, there's the Hearer and there's a Solitary Realizer, the Pratyek Buddha, and these are more I guess Hinayana, say realize their own Buddha nature but they're not worried about-- at least principally worried about helping others, or maybe they realize the compassionate ideal of the Bodhisattva, which is the next level up. That's the man who [one word inaudible] realization and attempts to share his realization with others, like a teaching guru. Again one would be an embodiment of the Bodhisattva ideal, and you need to know him. And then the-- the highest stage is the Buddha, the fully realized teacher. Some schools apparently don't even believe that you can have more than a couple of Buddhas in-- within several aeons so you exceedingly (have a stake--) well, I am. But-- I don't know, I don't know if I-- I certainly don't want to take any of your time to (go over).

AH (simultaneously): No, I think-- I think we should just push ahead. Ok, on page 367, under the topic "Mind-Only," he says--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: "Mind-only is the very core of [the] Chittamatrin teachings; for them it means that there are no objects which are entities external to the

perceiving consciousness. They and the Yogachara-Svatantrikas, who assert mind-only conventionally, are the only Buddhist schools which assert [that] there are no external objects.”

AH: So that was a significant point that we took up last week and we took it up again last night in our little seminar and I’m sure we’ll pick it up again now. But--

VM (simultaneously): Andrew, could I just back up a little?

AH (simultaneously): Yeah, sure.

VM: I don’t want this necessarily answered now but maybe it’s in the future, I hope you can work it in somehow. But you know this definition of what a Chittamatra is?

AH: Yes.

VM: The first part is essentially what you just said--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, VM reading]: “...a person propounding Buddhist tenets who uses reasoning [VM reads: reason] to refute external objects [VM: Fine.] and who asserts that dependent phenomena, such as consciousnesses, [VM: Like I guess the sense-consciousness and the mind, so on.] truly exist.”

VM: I would just like, if we could some time, not now, I don’t think it’s maybe quite appropriate, but to address what they mean, what the Chittamatras mean by ‘exist’ and ‘truly exist’, ok, because it’s not the same as the-- like Prasangika point of view, I mean I could gather that from my reading. But anyway, I find that a just subtle and somewhat difficult point, what they mean by “phenomena truly exist”.

[student assents, faint]

AH: Ok.

VM: So--

AH: I-- no, that was a--

VM (simultaneously): When you want to get into it.

AH: That’s a point that has to be cleared up. Maybe it’ll come out tonight, I’m sure.

VM (simultaneously): Good.

AH: Ok, so, Yogacara are mentalists, not subjective idealists but mentalists. And, they’re the only Buddhist school as you just said that deny external objects. All the other Buddhist schools, Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Prasangika, assert the following. They--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: “...assert that an object of a sense-consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness. For them, objects are a cause of a [AH reads: the] consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image.”

AH: This is not the Yogacara, this is other schools. And this is their reasoning.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 367, AH reading]: “Causes must exist before their effects, not simultaneously or afterward because nothing can affect an already existent entity in that very moment. Thus, because of the cause and effect relationship of object and sense consciousness, and because causally related things must be different entities, the non-mind-only oriented schools assert that object and subject are different entities.”

AH: They’re placed in a causal nexus. They can’t be in the same-- they can’t be in the same moment and are therefore different entities. Yeah.

LR: So--

S: Yeah.

SC: I just wondered what the object being referred to was. Is it-- [LR simultaneously: Isn’t that--] is it a physical sense-object existing in space and time?

S: Yeah.

AH: Phenomena.

S: Yeah.

AH: Any object, [S simultaneously: Right.] any object.

SC: A physical object existing in space and time?

AH: But their defini-- their notion of-- I think generally the notion of object is like any phenomena that you can take into the mind as an object [student assents, very faint] of knowledge.

S: But I thought--

GA (simultaneously): Specifically Andrew though, I mean-- well maybe I just don’t understand, are you asking what the Chittamatrins say an object is or what (their presup--)

SC (simultaneously): No, what he’s-- he’s talking about an object now that’s causal to perception of it, and I wondered what--

GA (simultaneously): Ok, so you’re talking about the external objects of the other three schools.

SC (simultaneously): It-- is that what he’s talking about, is it [GA and another student assent] the external object as we normally take external object(s)?

AH: Sure.

GA (simultaneously): Yes and no.

S (very faint): Uh-hm. (bit of laughter)

GA: In some cases they’re objects that are the way most people take them to be, made of atoms and external to the mind. But-- but in the case of Madhyamika that-- those objects are taken in their logical priority. They’re physical forms that appear to the mind. They’re not non-mental but-- in other words, they’re not made of atoms, yet they have a-- they’re not apprehended in the same instant. There’s a

logical priority of the object we perceive. To Madhyamika this is-- isn't an extreme object. However it's not a physic-- it's a physical object, however not an ex-- externally real object.

VM: I think maybe it isn't the right time now either but [GA: It probably isn't.] I would like to say-- hear more on that distinction too.

GA (simultaneously): Just-- just making a distinction.

VM: No I mean that's a mouthful you said, I'm not sure I understand it.

LR: Yeah because it seems like the whole axis of the difference convenes right on this point, right here [AS simultaneously: Exactly.] in this sentence. Now, I know you want to get further.

AH: No, I think-- I think if-- I think if we could just live with the distinction that is presented here, that Yogacara say there are no external objects and the other schools say there are. And what an object is really depends very much on each school's ontic premises.

LR (simultaneously): But-- Ok.

AH: So, there would be subtleties of that that would take quite a while to--

LR: But they-- they're talking about objects of sense-consciousness.

AH: Uh-huh.

LR: So, it seems, you know, he's talking about "All other schools assert that an object of a sense-consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness."

AH(?): Uh-hm.

LR: So it *seems* that as if you're talking about the sensible subject-object relation [AH: Yeah.] and he's not going further than that.

S: Right.

AH: Yeah, further.

LDS: See, I--

AH: What would be further?

LR: Well--

AH: I mean just, what are you referring to?

LR: Mentalism say, that the same mind produces the-- the dream and the dream object, [AH(?): Uh-hm.] which would be-- ok. But within the dream, what are you going to say about the cause of the dream subject to the dream object? I mean, not stepping back at all, you're in the dream. It doesn't-- there doesn't seem to be-- I don't seem to ha-- be able to come up with an explanation of does the dream subject create the-- the dream object or the dream object sensible awareness of it. But here he seems to be saying that within the dream, the external object creates the awareness of it in the dream subject, because

he's talking about sense-awareness and then he's talk-- he did go through a whole thing of delineating the different consciousness.

S (simultaneously): It seems to be.

AH (simultaneously): But look, this [S simultaneously: (one/two words inaudible) I--] might-- this might be a-- an unnecessary distinction but I don't think 'create' is the word, but produce in their [LR simultaneously: Ok, ok, that's fine.] image, you know, like [S: Right.] if-- the notion that it'll be produced in that image. Whether-- how it would create it or what its principle was is another question.

S: Right.

VM: No but-- so the issue is what('s) this external object is of. To jump ahead, I'm sorry, but it's very relevant, on page 387, the "Prasangika Position on the Mind-Basis-Of-All", the first sentence.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 387, VM reading]: "In the Prasangika system, external objects..."

VM: Now he didn't tell me or I can't find out exactly what those objects are. They're not seeds like the bija seeds in Chittamatra.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 387, VM reading]: "...are what provide sense objects [VM: Like the pole. "...are what provide sense objects] although the overlay of false appearance is produced from seeds."

VM: It seems like there's two uses of the word 'seed' there, at least in my mind but-- I don't know I-- again I-- if it doesn't fit in with the flow of what you're trying to do and especially in light of last night's seminar which I couldn't make, and I don't want to flip the thing all around but, [S simultaneously: Well (one word inaudible)] still the idea of what they mean an external object somehow is causative [AH simultaneously: They--] and productive of my [AH simultaneously: An object--] apprehension of it, I'm having a hard time understanding.

AH (simultaneously): An object-- an object that is felt to be different than the sub-- subject is--

LDS: I think, I think Andrew what we talked about a little bit last night was that for each of the other three schools, even if the Chittamatrins are going to claim that they're-- they're speaking of some kind of externality or duality in the epistemological situation, the objects for the other three schools, each of the schools would have a different framework or characterize their objects differently. [AH assents] Like the Sautrantika are going to talk about the true object as this point-instant.

VM: Sure, ok.

LDS: The Prasangika might be talking about something like the primordial image, I'm not sure, or maybe the physical object. But for each school they're going to have a different characterization of the object. The point I think that the Chittamatrins are saying is, all the other schools are some form of duality, they contain some form of dualistic epistemology, [VM assents] but the objects are not going to be the same so, without going into the other schools' epistemology it's going to be [VM simultaneously: Yeah.] hard

to really char-- [VM simultaneously: You could blow up (couple/three words inaudible)] you can't make a generic definition of object for the other three schools off of-- yeah.

AB: What Vic just read about a-- [VM simultaneously: Well--] about this Prasangika, the false appearance which is not the object for the Prasanga, that might be what the object is for the [student(s) assenting] first two schools so [LDS simultaneously: That's what I'm saying.] it's very complicated.

VM (simultaneously): It's possible-- it's possible, maybe this basis of imputation that they speak of so often is also the external object.

LDS: That's right.

VM: But again, I-- as much as I look in the pages here, and maybe I haven't looked enough, I still don't find a clear indication of what the basis of imputation is.

GA: I think the biggest--

VM: Just maybe a little help there is all.

GA: But the biggest distinction that would be generic to all three rather than getting into which one's higher or lower, [VM: Yeah.] is that there is a-- in Chittamatra there's a simultaneity, so subject and object arise from a consciousness, [VM assents] from a deluded consciousness. [VM assents] Therefore they-- you can analyze it back and say that one is empty of being not related to the other, yeah. In the other schools you can't easily do that or as easily do that because there's a logical priority. There's a moment of the object and then there's a moment of the subject, ok, so the argument gets into this kind of linear thing versus kind of simultaneity so that they're arguing over the fact that two things have to meet and what it means to meet, you know.

VM (simultaneously): Yeah. See I think-- I think a lot of people in here, myself included, have been trained, even if they don't understand it deeply, to appreciate how an empirical subject, an empirical object can be simultaneously produced from a mind. And then you ask them though to consider the possibility [someone drawing/writing on board] of some kind of externally real concrete object producing in some way or contributing to the perception you have of a sense-object. Well, that can be done perhaps in the context of speaking about a world-image, you know, something like that, but it's not [GA simultaneously: No.] clear that's what these guys are talking about.

S: (Yeah), that's not clear.

GA (simultaneously): Right, but that's-- that's the hard part, I mean, determining which school is sort of talking about the World-Idea versus which school's talking about a physical object is another story, but the form of the argument between Chittama-- the uniqueness, what's unique about Chittamatra is their approach, where they kind of dissolve this whole thing of first there's a moment of the object and then there's a moment of consciousness. They say no, it's all coming right out of the consciousness.

VM: Yeah, see maybe Anthony's hint that he gave us last week, they're coming from the point of view of the senses-as-exits, the Chittamatra, [GA simultaneously: Ok.] ok? The mind unfolds the world through the senses as amplifier and bang, there it is. One mind unfolds itself an empirical subject who appears to be here and separate from an empirical object, where these other guys start in the world as it's already

been unfolded, in other words, they use the senses-as-entrances point of view and-- [GA assents] But still that doesn't solve the whole thing but it certainly seems like [GA simultaneously: Yeah, yeah, but that's the crux and--] a-- an appropriate-- yeah, appropriate help.

AH: Yeah I think this little diagram would help and reinforce what Vic has just described as entrances or exits. When a Chittamatra takes the view of the simultaneity of subject and object or the emptiness of their being different entities, they're talking about this presentation is absolutely simultaneous, and that was the reason that we just started to-- [VM: Uh-hm.] to read. The other schools are going to take the view of the *empirical* object and therefore they're able to talk about a causal situation. This [diagram] has to be prior to and in some way generates or causes the subjective image [diagram] to arise. So this is empirical level [AH indicates on diagram] and it seems that Chittamatra's talking at the level of-- of the stills or the moment-by-moment presentation. Yeah?

SC: Andrew, that's what I wasn't sure about. Isn't it also possible that when they're talking about the object that's logically prior to what's presented to the subject, they're also talking about-- they're talking about object up there, above [diagram], and that *that's* what's logically prior, and then the-- it's pre-- the pres-- presentation is then unfolded into what we're calling subject-object relationship.

AH: Yeah.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

AH: But the thing that we-- one--

LR (simultaneously): That's what we would *like* them to be saying.

[few students at once, few words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): Yeah, but I'm not sure though what they *are* saying [AH/S(?) simultaneously: No, who's "they"?] see, and that would make it easy.

AH: I think that's self.

S (simultaneously): Who are they talking (to/here)?

S: Yeah, Richard.

SC (simultaneously): Well, I'm not really-- I'm-- I'm not sure, I'm saying there are these three schools other than Yogacara and in those couple of sentences it was kind of all pushed together, [VM(?): Yeah.] and I'm just trying to delineate the different possibilities of each one of them. I haven't [S simultaneously: Some feel--] read it in a while and I don't know.

LDS: I would say the Sautrantika we could probably do that with, you know, the point-instant being the true object. That might be more like what we talk about as the primordial image.

S: Yeah.

LDS: Now I'm not sure but I think we talked about it that way at one time.

SC: From my vague memories I-- I think even in Vaibhashika when they talk about their elements or their [one/two words inaudible] [VM simultaneously: Yeah, we tried to understand that way too, yeah.] objects, and you could seem them as prior to what we normally take as a subject-object relationship.

LDS: Yeah, it's not simple realism that we're talking about, that's not--

AH (simultaneously): I think-- Excuse me. Go ahead Lou.

LDS: No go ahead of me.

AH: I think the other three schools take the empirical experience for their analysis. And I think when they talk about an object they're talking about the object that-- that you experience right here. Therefore they're able to use this reasoning where there's a causal situation between object and subject. Yogacara's unique in that they choose the object and subject as simultaneous at a different level of analysis. And the reasonings that follow are both completely valid with (respect to/the excep--) the premise that they're operating with. Like, their reasonings are actually contradictory, they're exactly opposite, 180 degrees apart, but they're both correct insofar as you accept the premise. You accept the premise of Chittamatra, then you conclude that there's simultaneous presentation of subject and object.

HS: Ok so what are we saying is the premise of their system?

AH (simultaneously): The premise is their-- their level of analysis is at the-- is-- is that-- World-Mind's moment-by-moment presentation, in our language.

S: Yeah.

AH: The other schools introduce the factors of time and space and all the other categories, talk about empirical object, and then they-- they're able to use this reasoning to decide and to validate this causal nexus. Let me go through the reasonings and see [S simultaneously: Go ahead.] if that-- see if it makes sense. Go ahead.

LR (simultaneously): But, one more thing Andrew. The thing that Anthony left us with [AH simultaneously: Uh-hm.] I think last week--

AH: Yeah. I thought that was the point that he made last week, it was just last week.

LR: What (day? In reference) to what?

S: [couple words inaudible]

LR: Oh, maybe it is, I just want you to clarify it 'cause he was-- I thought he was sort of throwing some kind of koan when he said that you figure out if they're coming from the World-Idea or they're coming from the side of the soul, they're coming from the side of the consciousness. Remember?

GA: No.

LR: He (got) if we're making distinction in terms of where you would-- which principle you wanted to trace.

AH: I think-- yeah, I think quite clearly (it's/that) the world-image.

S: Well--

LDS: At least for the Chittamatrins, yeah.

AH: For Chittamatra.

LR: Yeah, and he thought that perhaps the difference in the school-- I don't know. I *thought* that that's what he was speaking of, I'm not sure.

LDS: He said we weren't sure what the Prasangika was bringing in that was unique.

LR: Yeah.

LDS: It might be the soul.

LR: Ok.

AH: I thought-- well just the one thing that s-- that stood out for me last week was that-- the notion that Chittamatra level of analysis is of that level of the bija seed or the presentation of simultaneous subject and object, [student assents] World-Mind's presentation that we talked about as a still. And all the other schools' analysis is in regard to the empirical. So that point is an important one I think. Is it necessary to go through these reasonings and--

S (faint): Yeah, uh-huh.

AH (simultaneously): Let's do it quickly. So-- [short pause, background student talking] "For them," the other school-- Now, we-- we're going to--

[short pause, background student talking]

AH: Go ahead Avery.

S: Go ahead, yeah.

AS: I-- I'm not-- I'm-- I just want to make sure that everybody's clear that-- or that there is an agreement on that point that we took up with some time last week too, namely, if you say that the Chittamatrins are talking about mind-only [S: Yeah.] and everything is consciousness, is there an agreement on what they mean by consciousness or what they mean by mind? Do they-- do they mean what we've referred to as this ideation, thinking consciousness or ideation of this-- some mind, World-Mind, whatever, or do they mean by "everything is mind" the subjective isness, cognitive-isness?

LR: Well that's what I was trying to ask him.

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, yeah, that was the question last week-- we were left with last week, ok? Is everybody clear on which side? I mean if we-- if we're just-- if we're trying to understand the Chittamatra and they're mind-only, what's this mind that is only? What only mind?

LR (simultaneously): What is that principle?

AS: Yeah, what mind only?

[students assent, very faint]

LR: Yeah, is it the individual mind?

AS: Herb, what do you think?

HS: I think that's a good point and I think maybe we'll try to explore into-- into that question, I think PB conveys their presupposition, what is this mind-only.

S: [few words inaudible]

AH: I've been-- I've been trying to understand it from the point of view that it is *not* the cognitive-ness.

VM: Well that's certainly Anthony's point.

S: [one word inaudible] uh-hm.

LR (simultaneously): Ok, so, that's what you want to investigate now Herb?

HS: Yeah, we'll do-- I think we'll see later how what they de-- define as the mind, the basis of all, and they make a distinction between like a kind of consciousness that underlies the seed within and seeds unfold the world. So, we'll just have to see what that could mean.

AH: I tried to do a little research from other sources today on what they mean by mind, and one thing that was helpful is the tra-- translation by Guenther of some Tibetan material. And it seems that the Yogacara-Chittamatra is res-- or takes their emphasis in the experience, this experience, and they describe it as an aesthetic, aesthetic experience. And it's from this view that much of Buddhist art and aesthetics emerge. It's like that-- maybe the notion of an aesthetic continuum or what has been referred to as vivid world, where subject and object would be presented simultaneously.

HS: That's right, you would say that all this experience, everyone, is, as Andrew just told, takes their stand in experience and particularly, I would say [possibly one word inaudible] before, you start-- you start the *Hidden Teaching* as "I see a tree" and you find out what it means to say-- what it means-- what does it mean when you say "I see a tree," [AH assents] and the object "tree"-- (so they) never changes but the perspective or the viewpoint as to what it is to me to see things. [AH assents] And I think that this is a-- I think this is what I think David pointed out, this is what the Buddhists-- I think we already break down to the four schools, I think they all talk about the same thing, you know, we sit here and we see the pole, and just what does it mean. And some-- So like, when you say like the subject and object are simultaneous for Chit-- Chittamatra, well what-- what does it mean that they're of the same entity? How could there be cognition at all if this-- if this is-- if this is so? I mean [one/two words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): Yes, that's what they would have to--

HS (faint): Yeah.

AH: I think what-- when they say mind-only, they're not referring to an object principle or metaphysical principle of mind that we would be familiar with in other views. Although they hold that mind to be ultimately real, it's only spoken of in a context of experience.

VM: Well it seems they're talking about the undivided mind we've spoken about before.

S: Uh-hm.

VM: Well this may be premature, I-- [HS: Yeah.] I got the sense that Herbert said let's see what the text says and then after we get some background on [S: Ok.] exactly "this is what he says," maybe then it would-- you know, you pin it down, so maybe my question-- I'd [HS simultaneously: (few words inaudible) yeah.] like to retract it, I'd like to retract it.

S: Yeah.

AH: Alright, well Avery's-- Avery's question, suggestion, is probably a good one to keep in mind, that are we going to try to discover the cognitive principle in their notion of mind or are we going to look for-- are we going to understand it as the-- what was your phrase Avery, as the World-Idea?

AS: That-- that this cosmic ideation, [AH simultaneously: Cosmic ideation.] cosmic ideation. Their levels of consciousness, of base consciousness, seventh consciousness, these consciousnesses are-- are-- are the World-Mind's ideation. [SC simultaneously: Does it have to be--] [one/three words inaudible] (subject or Nirvana).

[student assents, faint]

SC: Does it have to be one or the other that we're choosing from? Is it possible that both are included in [LDS simultaneously: That's another--] what they mean by mind?

LDS: It might be, it might be both.

GA: Well, I don't know, I didn't notice the positing of a World-Mind anywhere in the chapter.

HS: Ok, well see--

AS (simultaneously): That's why I said cosmic ideation.

HS: Yeah then we'll see, rather than the World-Mind maybe just a-- the process of manifestation without thinking of the [S simultaneously: Idea.] World-Mind with it.

VM: Evola [one/two words inaudible]

GA (simultaneously): Yeah, I think it's-- yeah. [HS simultaneously: Yeah, yeah.] So it's more of a process point of view.

VM (very faint): Yeah right.

LR (simultaneously): Yeah that's ok, that's-- it's just that you're still talking about the same principle, [AS simultaneously: Changing consciousness.] whether you see it as a-- a process of becoming or, you know.

S: Huh.

LR: That's nothing [couple words inaudible] referring to.

LD: Yeah but, if you trace the world-ideation, can't you come up with not the cognitive-ness but also the unchanging cosmic soul behind that ideation? And so you're still on more of the objective side and not left with the subject.

S: Yeah.

S: [couple/three words inaudible] the same time.

LD: If you examine experience and are led to the ideation behind the world and examine this, cannot you come up with more of an enduring-- the cosmic soul, cannot you come up with that as the unchanging principle and still not come up with the cognitive-- you know, the subject per se, the I AM or the soul, the individual soul?

HS: If you just do, so to say, strictly objective analy-- [LD simultaneously: Yeah.] analysis and [few words inaudible]

LD (simultaneously): Like [S simultaneously: I'm not sure.] isn't that, like isn't *The Doctrine of Awakening* a Yogacara text, and isn't that what they come up with in that?

S (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible]

HS: Yeah but, I mean personally I think it's a conjoint, and toward-- heading towards Yogacara and using Sautrantika and he uses the-- the ethical stuff of the Hinayana and the lower schools, I think he just brings everything in there.

S: Yeah.

HS: Proceed.

[short pause]

AH: Ok? [10¾ second pause] So--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 367-368, AH reading]: "All the other schools... [For them], objects are a cause of a [AH reads: the] consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image. Causes must exist before their effects, not simultaneously or afterward because nothing can affect an already existent entity in that very moment. Thus, because of the cause and effect relationship of objects and sense consciousness, and because causally related things must be different entities, the non-mind-only oriented schools assert that object and subject are different entities.

"The Chittamatrins disagree, saying that Buddha taught that [AH reads: Chittamatrins disagree with that and they present it this way.] a sense consciousness perceives a present object, whereas if object and subject were cause and effect, then, since a cause has ceased when its effect exists, a sense consciousness would be perceiving a past object. The non-mind-only schools must accept that an object of a sense consciousness exists one instant prior to its apprehender, but they say that the object is *present* and that there is no moment intervening between the object moment and the perceiver moment. The Chittamatrins, however, are able to uphold Buddha's [AH reads: the] teaching on this point without any qualifications; for them, object and subject exist simultaneously. A seed (*bija*, *sa ban*) or predisposition (*vasana*, *bag chags*) is activated and simultaneously produces both an object and a cognizing subject, much as in a dream. ...

"For the Chittamatrins, an object is of the same nature or entity as its perceiving subject, although an object is not a mind, not a cognizing agent, illuminating and realizing objects."

AH/S(?): Introspective?

HS: If you say there, following what you just read, if an object is of the same nature of-- as its perceiving subject, and that nature that it's the same-- I mean-- [S: Uh-hm.] You see that? They're saying like in that they're both bija seeds and they're-- and they're [couple/three inaudible student words simultaneous with HS] both contained in the bija, that's what their nature?

VM: They're both the nature of mind, I thought that was the big point these guys are always hammering. I thought this was a-- a repeat of the-- of the very first sentence, that "All phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind, yet this is not the same as asserting that all phenomena are mind because minds are observers of objects."

HS: Ok.

VM: I thought that was just being repeated here, (wasn't it/right)?

HS (simultaneously): Ok, and then when he says objects are produced from predispositions or bijas [VM simultaneously: Oh.] [couple/three words inaudible] [VM: Go ahead, yeah.] now i-- now so you're saying that what a bija is, is a bit of mind? Is that-- [VM simultaneously: Yeah, I mean (one/two words inaudible)] is that their understanding?

VM: If you say it's let's say a structure within mind.

HS: So, even a-- even if there's a particular structure for what [student assents] at the moment that is when you say you're sort of [one word inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): Energy pattern if you like, or something like that. Make it dynamic instead of freezing it into some structure and say it's energy pattern.

HS: So in that sense, in one moment of the world, (where/or) we were putting together these stills, you know, the world-still, there's an object and a subject are potentially in it, actually in it?

VM: I think that depends on what level you're speaking about it. If I follow what the Chittamatra's saying, they're saying these seeds are unfolded as an empirical subject and confronting an empirical object and they're both of the nature of that seed which is the nature of mind.

AH: Well, that presentation is not of the empirical, that presentation--

VM (simultaneously): Which presentation?

AH: Where they're presented simultaneous. At that level--

VM: Well, that would be like two-dimensional epistemology or-- [student assents] not two-dimensional, [HS: Yeah, yeah.] what was the word we used? [LDS simultaneously: Twofold and threefold.] For the Witness-consciousness, do they-- where-- where there is an empirical subject and object but there isn't that felt opposition. [AH: Right.] That comes later with the vashanas perhaps, [AH: Right.] where the individual comes in and reifies his own body and the object and sees that felt opposition.

HS: Ok now, is the subject and object that they're talking about, you would say that they're talking about the-- the way we previously talk of the Witness cognizing the so-called subject-object relationship? Or they're talking about the subject *in* the dream cognizing the object appearing simultaneously?

VM: Why can't both? Why not both?

HS: Well, I don't care, I mean [S: Herbert--] trying to say their thing.

AH: Well they-- they-- they have to point out what they consider to be error, and according to them the final root of error is the conception that object and subject are different ones.

[students assent, faint]

AB: In Herbie's example, it's the dream subject who takes itself to be different than the dream object, so that ignorance that the-- that subject and object are different has to be erased and then you experience that both the cognizing subject and its object are both mental. They are substantially the same even though they're functionally different. [VM assents] It's the consciousness function to perceive the object; whereas the object is not a perceiver, it's still mental sub-- mental-- substantially mental. So I think it's from the point of view of the empirical subject that you have to realize the non-separateness of the two and then maybe that allows you to achieve the Witness-consciousness [student assents] as a result.

LDS: But-- I followed. [students assent] Seems plausible what you're saying now. The only question I would ask (of you), what is this knowing that the empirical subject has access to or functions with? Like, [S: Right.] if we're speculating that the-- the Chittamatrins are coming from an objective unfoldment of World-Idea, like what is the knowing function? Where is it coming from? Like can we make sense of some kind of knowing strictly on the side of the World-Idea unfolding without bringing in the principle of a soul or some subjective principle of a different order? That's been the question that keeps popping up for me right now.

GA: (Well/And) it seems to me after reading this chapter that we could plow through not enough material for that-- [VM/S(?) simultaneously: To answer the question, yeah.] deal with some of these questions yet. It's not that--

LDS (simultaneously): Is it premature?

S: Yeah.

S: Yeah working--

[simultaneously] [student assents, faint]

S: It's true.

GA (simultaneously): That's right, you just got enough room.

S (simultaneously): Me?

HS: Yeah, the questions will come up, [student assents] they're co-- they're coming up.

AH: There's some of the questions [SC simultaneously: Good then--] that-- some of the questions are dealt with in the rest of the chapter.

S (faint): Is that true?

S: Let's keep moving.

VM (faint): Well, except he [possibly another student in background, few words inaudible]

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 368-369, AH reading]: "According to the Chittamatrins [AH reads: Chittamatra], the final root of cyclic existence is the conception that object and subject are different entities; this is the subtlest and strongest of all misconceptions, and when it is destroyed, all misconceptions are destroyed. Thus, the subtle selflessness of all phenomena is a non-difference in entity between subject and object. ...

"Included in the obstructions to simultaneous and direct cognition of all objects of knowledge, together with the conception of object and subject as different entities, is the conception that phenomena naturally exist as the grounds or bases of engagement of names."

AH: Now this is a new point, this is where we left off last week, that-- their notion of nominal existence or nominality.

HS: Andrew, how do you understand that term, "the subtle selflessness"? Just listen to the definition.

S: The definition of (being subtle)?

AH: Well the--

HS (simultaneously): Yeah. No I [one/two words inaudible]

AH: In contradistinction to the gross selflessness.

HS: No but how do you-- but how would then-- what do you-- how-- what do you think that they mean by selflessness?

S: What do you think?

HS: Give me a minute.

AH (simultaneously): Without self.

HS: Without self.

AH: Without a principle of self.

S: I don't think there's [one/two words inaudible] mean anything rather than a principle of self.

S: They don't give it a quality.

[students assent, faint]

VM: No independence, no ability to set [couple words inaudible]

LDS (simultaneously): That's right, no independent existence.

S (simultaneously): No independent existence at all and [one/two words inaudible]

LDS (simultaneously): No self-identicalness.

HS/S(?): Right. Ok. That's what I wanted to ask you.

LD: What's difference-- what makes it different than the gross self?

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

S: Uh-hm.

HS: But (they're/their)-- I think in tho-- I think *I* can handle the grosser self. I think when they use 'gross' they're talking about gross objects, when they're talking about the subtle, they're talking about subtle objects, like mind, your mental thoughts and-- is the stuff of the mind. But it's the selflessness that I don't understand particularly. [student assents, very faint] Like for instance, you know, you say "I am not the body." You know, that would be like disabusing you of the gross self idea, and, you know, and then Andrew's-- by the end there's a recognition that you're not the body. There's a certain selflessness, the self is not the body, you know, you know yourself not to be the body anymore.

AB: Herbert, if you trace those thoughts, "you're not the body," to be different from the o-- object of your experience, that's the opposite of a subtle selflessness, that's a subtle-- well I don't know what you would call it.

VM: Dua-- dualism.

AB: Dualism. In other words, the subtle selflessness is the realization of identity between the whole.

HS: Between two things, yeah.

S: You call it knowledge.

AB (simultaneously): [one/two words inaudible] knowledge.

AH: Generally selflessness is equatable to their notion of emptiness.

VM: Well-- but wait, this is Chittamatra [S simultaneously: Go ahead.] so--

AH: Yes, and it-- in their view of emptiness or selflessness, they say there's an emptiness or a selflessness, (there's distinction), between subject and object.

VM: Right, right.

AH: Ok, so let's pick up this issue of names.

S: Did you all open this book?

AH: Ok.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 368-369, AH reading]: "Included [AH reads: Including] in the obstructions to simultaneous and direct cognition of all objects of knowledge, together with the conception of object and subject as different entities..."

AH: Now these are the mistaken views. Included in these views is also the view of--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, AH reading]: "...the conception that phenomena naturally exist as the grounds or bases of engagement of names."

AH: So it's a phenomena, pillow, the book, or the thought or whatever is, naturally exist as a-- as a basis upon which names are imputed.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, AH reading]: "The non-existence of objects as natural bases of engagement of names is a selflessness of phenomena that is as subtle as the non-existence of subject and object as different entities, but [AH adds: it] is easier to realize. An understanding of it serves as a means of entering into an understanding of non-duality."

AH: So, ok, the fact that there are no phenomena that are self-existently the basis of names, the fact that there are none of those, that understanding is actually the same understanding as the recognition of subject and object not being different entity.

VM: Uh-hm.

AH: Ok. It's the same realization but it's easier to realize, that's suggestion.

AB: Andrew what do you mean it's the *same* realization, because I thought that was one of the differences between the different kinds of aspirants is that you can realize one without realizing the other.

VM: Well that depends if you're an Asanga man or a Dharmakirti man.

AB: Oh.

HS: (Oh-- also the) man, what-- how-- what-- what do you take to be the two views then?

AB: Ok, well, you have-- I mean I think we have to elaborate what this basis of naming is and--

AH (simultaneously): Yeah, we're going to do that now.

AB: So, but the point I was making is you can realize that say the blueness or the name 'pillow' which I give to this object is-- that that-- there's nothing underneath that that I'm giving a name to, [student assents] that's one realization, but still not realize that the subject and the object are non-dual.

AH: I thought this was suggesting that, [S simultaneously: You did it Andrew.] to deprive that-- to deprive that pillow of having its basis upon which pillow is imputed is to un-- is the recognition of non-duality.

S (faint): Well, if it-- it would (lead--)

S: It's quite so.

VM: I thought it was like a platform upon which you understand non-duality. Is that what the last sentence said? "An understanding of it..." In other words, as Alan and you were saying, that there is nothing underneath the object except what I impute to it. "Understanding of [VM emphasis] *it* serves as a *means of entering into* an understanding of non-duality." This may be another little point but--

AB: We could hold off the point and see.

S: Yeah.

S (simultaneously): Right.

HS: But again, this is just an assertion of i-- of subjective idealism here and that there's an error in-- You have to account for error, other-- that object appears to be other or naturally existing thing. And that-- and they're saying that that non-existence is a kind of a realization that objects don't exist naturally outside [students assent] of the thought. But I don't think they're doing (any more), I don't--

MB: They don't do that though.

SC (simultaneously): It doesn't say [S simultaneously: It's broken.] that it--

MB (simultaneously): They don't say that.

VM: Don't say what?

MB: That objects [S simultaneously: Herbert.] do not exist naturally. In fact, in the next-- the next paragraph that's-- they--

VM (simultaneously): No, they truly exist.

MB: --explicate what they mean by this business of im-- imputation of names or whatever. I [VM assents] really don't understand [VM simultaneously: It's a hard section (couple words inaudible)] what they mean but I know that the whole next paragraph goes through what they don't mean, which is one-- one of which is what Herbert just said. (MB laughing a bit)

HS: Well now-- well--

MB: (If/It)--

HS: I would say again that they're saying that the non-existence of phenomena as natural basis is the truth of phenomena for them.

MB: But--

VM/S(?): Uh-hm.

MB: Oh, ok, maybe.

AB: The [VM/S(?) simultaneously: Repeat that once more, please.] truth of phenomena is that it doesn't exist as a base.

HS: On its own side other than your projected thoughts.

AB: Right.

AH: Ok, let me reread that section.

S: Go ahead.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 369-369, AH reading]: “Included [AH reads: Including] in the obstructions to simultaneous and direct cognition of all object of knowledge, together with the conception of object and subject as different entities, is the conception that phenomena naturally exist as the grounds or bases of engagement of names.”

HS: That’s an obstruction to omniscience according to them, right?

AH (simultaneously): That’s an [students assent] obstruction, this conception is an obstruction.

HS: Ok.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, AH reading]: “The non-existence of objects as natural bases of engagement of names is a selflessness of [student assents] phenomena that is as subtle as the non-existence of subject and object as different entities... An understanding of it serves as a means of entering into an understanding of non-duality.”

AH: So that earlier we understood that the basic root of cyclic existence or the basic error was the conception of subjects and objects being different and-- that’s their error spoken of in that point of view. They say that error and this one are really of the same degree of subtlety and if eliminated leaves the same realization of non-duality. That’s the way I followed.

VM: (But listen) Andrew, let’s just throw it in different language and see if we agree [AH assents] with this. You know, PB talks about believing in the material object. You know you believe there’s something out there. It impinges upon the senses and image shows up at the brain, all this and that, and you have your psychological overlays on it and so on and so forth. Isn’t that what he’s saying in this rather foreign language when he says, “the non-existent-- the non-existence of objects as natural basis of engagement of name”? I mean, when you talk about an object as a basis of a name, aren’t you assuming that there’s some kind of material or, you know, the naturally existent object out there?

HS (simultaneously): That exists with different qualities and [VM simultaneously: Yeah, and then I just-- you know, it’s like--] you say-- and you say ‘blue’, ‘white’.

VM: Yeah right. Like the pillow, there really is something here, not just all my imputations of blueness, softness, [students assent, faint] approximate roundness and so on and on.

AH: Yeah but that point-- can [S simultaneously: Good job (Andrew).] we reread it?

(Side 1 of original cassette tape digitized as 1984 0907a Ends; Side 2 Begins)

LD: --nature of the object, and then once that is seen, then the subject is seen as identified with the object?

AH: There seems to-- To-- to have this conception that subject and object are different entities is also the conception of object and subject having a self-nature or a basis upon which name is imputed or a meaning-generalities is imputed. To hold those two things as different is to at once hold them as [LR simultaneously: Non-related.] [S: Yeah.] [HS simultaneously with S and AH: Subsistent entities.] self-subsistent entities.

S: Yeah.

LR: And non-related also.

AH: And non-related.

HS: But, I seem to lose your point, I think it-- personally, I think it's something like it's easier to see that the world and objects are mental. It's not easy to see but I mean I think they're saying it's easier to see that than to see that the-- [LR: Your ego is--] your ego is a fabrication of a totality of processes. [students assent, very faint] You know. You know what a noble, you know. But it's just-- I think they're saying that. [student assents] And then if you could see that the world is-- as thing is mental, you then have an access to seeing yourself so to say as thought too.

[student(s) assenting]

LD: But didn't last week you read just the opposite, that he says first one sees the illusory nature--

HS: (Pulido), yeah.

S: [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Hopkins.

LD: From the [S: That was (a/the) first.] Chittamatra, he spoke about two realizations, the first one being that you see the illusory nature of the phenomena and then the second realization is the subject and object are identified. [student assents] And now you've just reversed-- now you're reversing.

HS (simultaneously): No I think-- (and) I think-- I think that's the same point and I think it was reversed last week by Anthony [couple words inaudible]

LD (simultaneously): Yeah, he reversed it that [one/two words inaudible]

HS (simultaneously): Yeah, but I think it's the same point in the text, I'm just saying what Anthony-- the way the text reads.

LD: I just thought he was reversing what he previously had said, but it don't matter.

VM: No, that was Asanga's point of view anyway which is not agreed [LD simultaneously: Oh.] upon by Dharmakirti. If that matters to anybody.

[student(s) assenting, faint]

AH (simultaneously): Anthony, shall we pursue this notion of nominality?

AD: Yes, please do.

AH: Ok. Ok so-- You know-- Every--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, AH reading]: "In refuting that phenomena naturally exist as grounds or bases of names, the Chittamatrins [AH reads: Chittamatra] are not merely saying that the appearing objects of thought, meaning-generalities, do not naturally exist because of depending on thought."

AH: They're not *just* saying that.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, AH reading]: “For the Sautrantikas propound such, and here a subtle selflessness of phenomena must be more subtle than anything found in the lower systems of tenets.”

S: Would you reread that?

AH: Sure. Ok, so, when the Chittamatra refute the natural existence as grounds or basis of names, they’re not *just* saying that these appearing objects of thought do not naturally exist because of depending on thought. There’s more to it for them, that’s the Sautrantika position. They say they do not naturally exist because they depend on thought. Chittamatra is going to say something more about those. The Sautrantikas propound such, they say they lack-- they lack that basis because they depend on thought. “And here a subtle selflessness of phenomena must be more subtle than anything found in the lower schools.” So Chittamatra’s going to offer a more subtle [HS: Understanding.] understanding than just the dependence on thought.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, AH reading]: “Nor are they saying that forms and so forth do not naturally exist because for them forms naturally exist as unpredicable phenomena. Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist because if they did not, they would not exist at all. For the Chittamatrins, the Prasangika view that objects do not naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist is a denial of phenomena; [student assents] if impermanent things did not naturally exist, they would be totally non-existent.”

LR: Can we go over that line again?

VM (simultaneously): This will [couple words inaudible]

LR: I don’t think it’s real hard I just think the language is [VM simultaneously: The whole paragraph?] (fortuitous) but--

S: Yeah.

VM/S(?): Let someone else read it.

LR: I’m going to [one/two words inaudible]

S: Go ahead.

HS: I’ll read it.

S: Put it in English Herb.

VM: If you read you have to explain it to all of us.

HS: I thought if you read you don’t have to explain.

VM: Oooh. (VM laughs)

LD/PD(?): At least read.

HS: At least I’ll read it.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: “In refuting that phenomena naturally exist as ground or bases of names, the Chittamatrins are not merely saying that the appearing objects of thought, meaning-generalities, do not naturally exist because of depending on thought. For the Sautrantikas propound such, and here a subtle selflessness of phenomena must be more subtle than anything found in the lower systems of tenets. Nor are they saying that forms and so forth do not naturally exist because to them [HS: I guess Chittamatra.] forms naturally exist as unpredicable phenomena. Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist because if they did not [HS adds: exist], they would not exist at all.”

HS: That’s true.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: “...if they did not, they would not exist at all.”

HS: If they did not truly, inherently, natural-- naturally and ultimately exist, they would not exist at all.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: “For the Chittamatrins [HS reads: Chittamatra], the Prasangika view that objects do not naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist is a denial of phenomena; if impermanent things did not naturally exist, they would be totally non-existent.”

LR: So is that-- is that like the Chittamatrins are setting up a system of causes of a thing, saying that it’s not just that we don’t agree just that things don’t have existence because they’re dependent on thought, it’s more than that. Things *do* have an existence, *are* dependent on thought, and not only that, there’s an idea of the thing and that’s why it exists. [AH simultaneously: It does truly--] I mean is that what they mean by sort of ultimately, naturally, truly, meaning--

HS (simultaneously): I-- I think [S simultaneously: Yeah.] they’re saying the existence of the world is-- yeah, they would say a totality of causes of reasoning [students assent] which are-- which are consciousnesses, [LR: Yeah.] according to them, and I think that those things actually do exist.

LR: And if you take out any one of those reasons, you wouldn’t have a phenomena.

HS: You wouldn’t have a phenomena but they would exist because they exist, because they are reasonings that-- that ha-- that have gone into the unfolding world.

S: [few words inaudible]

LR (simultaneously): I thought he was saying that-- I thought the Chittamatra there was arguing with the Prasangika, saying that if you take away the-- sort of the ultimate reason-principle behind the thing, you couldn’t have the mere-- there would be no such thing as mere existence, bare phenomenal existence, that [student assents] it’s only because there’s this chain of say reason-principles that go into making an object what it is that you have that object which is indeed dependent on thought.

VM: Would you say ‘forms’ are the way he uses reason-principles or ideas or--

LR (simultaneously): No, I’m taking the reason, I’m--

VM: Are you using it-- are you understanding the word that way?

LR: No, that's not the word I was using [one word inaudible] I thought the whole thing of-- I could be completely wrong, [VM simultaneously: Yeah (few words inaudible)] but I thought the whole thing of naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately pointed to a chain of what the Greeks would call reason-principles or [HS assents] [one/two words inaudible]

AH: I think it's important to remember when they posit this existence, they're speaking of it in regards to their basic premise that there's a-- a non-difference of entity between subject and object.

HS: Everything is mind, everything is an arising of-- that we would call bija seed, [student assents] right? These seeds are of mind.

AH: The object that exists this way is the one that's simultaneously a subject.

HS: That's simultaneously a subject. [AH assents] They do have three levels, in the section on the three natures and they have three levels that we could talk about before. If-- pari-- you know, the higher is paratantra I think was the word, and then they have the-- the imagini-- the imagined-- [SC: Imagined.] imagined-- yeah, you do that, the imagined level, and I think this is the paratantra level where things actually would-- I say, you know, I think reason forms just start to combine and cause and condition each other. [couple words inaudible]

LR (simultaneously): Yeah, I'm just trying to bring out the argument (within--/with him.)

HS: --and are actually existent [S simultaneously: Yeah.] as that.

AH: They truly exist in-- in-- this is-- at this level is where Prasangika will validate phenomena as conventional truth(s).

[student assents]

S: Good.

LR (simultaneously): I thought he was saying here that this was-- the Prasangika view that objects do not have this natural, true, inherent, and ultimate existence for the Chittamatra would be a denial of phenomena.

AH: Yes, that's their view, but Prasangika will find dependent-arising as it-- as existing, [S simultaneously: Well so--] and that's-- that's their conventional truth [S simultaneously: (In existence.)] in conventions.

GA: Just to stay in the [student assents] same argument, that Prasangika would take the reasoning [student assents] that the objects are not separate, don't have any basis sep-- separate from the subject as being a cause of its non-inherent existence--

VM: A *proof* of its non-inherent (existence).

GA: *Proof* of it, yeah, whereas these guys say it proves exactly the opposite, [VM assents] that it's naturally existent.

VM: Yeah, and I still don't understand that.

S: I understood it.

LR (simultaneously): But they'd be saying the same thing though now.

S: [few words inaudible]

GA (simultaneously): So if-- well they're getting at a different things. I think you just, for the moment, just take this as a sign that they're getting at something different rather than saying that they're contradictory.

LR: Yeah but-- no wait a second. I'm not sure--

GA: Look, the point we're getting at has nothing to do with that, just (a side/aside) to Prasangika. The point we're getting to is something completely different.

AH: See I-- I interrupted you but I shouldn't have dropped the hint.

LR: What this doesn't-- I'm talking about this sentence.

VM/S(?): Yeah, yeah.

AH: This sen--

LR (simultaneously): You shouldn't have read this you mean?

AH: No, this sentence, this sentence points out [LR simultaneously: But--] where Chittamatra and Prasangika will debate one another.

LR: Right.

AH: And I was making a point, from the point of view of Prasangika--

LR: Oh I see. But I was just speaking of this sentence, I mean, [AH simultaneously: Ok.] we are allowed to dis-- we are re-- we are [S simultaneously: (Go ahead.)] allowed to bring out what this is saying.

AH (simultaneously): Sure, sure, of course.

LR: So, that's the way I understood it and now I just want to see if anyone else understands [VM simultaneously: Would you go through it again please?] it this way 'cause--

S: [one/two words inaudible]

AH: Just say it-- say it again Linda.

LR: This sentence, "From the Chittamatrin(s)..."

VM: Just read the sentence please.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, LR reading]: "Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist because if they did not, they would not exist at all."

VM: Uh-hm.

LR: So that seems to mean that they need all those causes or-- am I allowed to say reason-principles or levels of reason in order to make a thing, in order to go into a thing, or else [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Isn't it simpler to say that for the Yogacaras the object exists?

[student assents]

LR: Well that's not enough because this-- because this--

AD (simultaneously): It is, it's a great deal. [VM simultaneously: What-- what level of object?] The object truly exists for the Yogacarin. [LR simultaneously: No, but Anthony then--] [GA simultaneously with AD and LR, faint: The object (couple words inaudible)] It does *not* exist for the Prasangikas is what this-- what it amounts to.

AH: But it's not the same object.

LR: But this [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with LR] sentence is bringing in something--

AH: They have different objects.

[student assents, very faint]

S (faint): [couple words inaudible] I don't understand that.

AD: I don't know what object you're talking about, "different object".

AH: I-- I'm just telling you how I understand them and in this view the object that's being discussed is the one that's simultaneously presented with a subject.

AD: Yeah.

AH: We thought that was a still or the moment-by-moment presentation of World-Mind.

AD: I'm sorry?

AH: We were speaking of that as like the moment-by-moment presentation of the World-Mind's imaging.

MB: What is?

AH: When you speak of subject and object being simultaneous.

AD: No, I was thinking about my poor little old ego. If it exists, so does an object. I never found it without an object. In other words it was always embedded in a con-- in a context of a perceptual world.

S: Yeah.

AH: But in regard--

AD: And the Yogacar-- and the Yogacaras are saying that the object does exist and *not nominally*. They're saying it really and truly does exist.

[student assents]

AH (simultaneously): The empirical object?

AD: Yeah.

GA: Yeah. [student assents] The blue in the pillow exists naturally, not in the blue but [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): And-- and they-- and they are objecting to the Prasangika's notion that it does not inherently exist.

AH: But Anthony I was just trying to make a-- I'm trying to understand that in the Pras-- in the Chittamatra, they have this simultaneous situation between subject and object--

[student assents]

AD: Yes.

AH: And in Prasangika--

AD: In other words, [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] from the Yogacara point of view, you got a subject, you got an object.

AH: And I thought that that reasoning led us to conclude last week that their analysis is *not* at the empirical level but something prior to the empirical level.

GA: No.

S: No, that--

AH: Because it's only at the empirical level that we can talk about a causal relationship between subject and object where the object must be one moment apart from the subject.

AD: No, not for the Yogacaras.

AH: No.

AD: The subject and the object simultaneously [student assents] exist.

GA: Yeah, they take exactly the opposite reasoning, they say you can't *get* from one moment to the other.

HS: Yes, that's what Andrew was saying.

S: Right.

GA: Yeah, but that doesn't mean that you're not in the empirical object, that doesn't mean that you-- and when I say they take the opposite reasoning, I mean they really take the opposite reasoning, they don't withdraw into the causal in order to have that reasoning, they stay at the same level. Well again, that refers--

HS (simultaneously): And for Yoga-- and the Chittamatra critique of the Prasangika that when they say non-inherent existence they're talking about non-existence of objects. But the Prasangikas might say that they're not talking about the non-existence of, but Buddha says the *non-inherent* existence.

AH: I was just confused about this.

AD (simultaneously): Well, let's go over the passages again.

VM: Yeah [few words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): I'm confused about a very simple point, where he said in the Chittamatra view that the one-- is su-- what-- what they seek to overcome in their practice is the conception that object and subject are a different entity.

AD: Yes.

AH: That's the purpose of their presentation, [AD simultaneously: Yeah.] to overcome that conception.

AD: In other words, in the Chittamatra point of view, the Yogacara's point of view, subjective functioning, objective manifestation are one and the same.

AH: One and the same.

AD: They're-- yeah. Or, if we put it in a simpler way, although I *feel* that the world is out-- is outside of me, in other words that there's an actual distinction between the world and myself, in actuality, in terms of actual analysis, I know that that cannot be. If there's a subject, there must be an object. I can't make a division between that. But in terms of feeling I'll feel as though the world is alien.

AH: Is it in terms of feeling that phenomena are truly and ultimately existent?

AD: No.

AH: Oh, well that was my point. They're ultimately existent as simultaneously present.

GA: Yeah but that doesn't take away from their objecthood.

AH: Well how about the felt-- how about the feltness that is other than?

GA: Well whether or not you experience that feltness as other, which is a misconception, that misconception can be simultaneous with the reality which is that the objects naturally exist as not separate from a subject.

AH: Ok then, that--

GA (simultaneously): It's still an object not separate from a subject appearing to a subject it's not separate from.

AH: Yeah.

HS (simultaneously): But how do you, even [GA simultaneously: When--] using their logic, how could you even say (that) the same [couple/three words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Now wait a minute, you-- will we-- shall we do the passages and go back to the passages and then go over them again?

AH: Yes.

[simultaneously] [student assents]

LR: Yes, please.

[simultaneously] [student assents]

S: [couple words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): Just one final point. The object that Prasangika says doesn't exist is the one that is felt as different for Chittamatra. [short pause] You know, you just described this felt difference between subject and object, and that's an error, that's not correct? The object that Prasangika denies or says does not exist, it doesn't have inherent existence, is that felt one, that one that appears to have inherent existence.

AD: Well--

AH: So that's what I meant there's two different objects being described.

AD: No, the Yo-- the Prasangikas would say that they know that. And the Yogacaras would say "No, that's not so. You know an object exists." If you remember, that was one of the things that used to drive me up a wall, to speak about something existing not having inherent existence.

AH: Yes, I remember Anthony but-- (some laughter)

AD: How could you speak about something existing and then denying it in the same breath!?

AH: You just-- you just described the felt distinction of being--

AD: I was just trying to use an example in the sense that in your understanding of your experience, the knowledge of your experience would show you that you cannot divide the subject and the object. You-- you have them both or you have neither.

AH: Yes.

AD: Ok? So, from the point of view of knowledge, you know this to be a fact. From the point of view of feeling, the world seems to be, so to speak, alien [student assents] and foreign and *other* than the perceiving mind. From the-- coming just from the point of view of knowledge, the Yogacara would say, "Hey, if you got a subject, you've got an object the same time. They're non-different."

AH: But that object that is from the point of view of feeling, would you say that that o--

AD: Look, look Andrew I-- I think it's better we go to the text because we're trying to build up a terminology in common and to understand this, you know, together. So let's go back and reread those passages [AH: Ok.] and we'll bang them out.

HS: Do-- or you suggest like [one/two words inaudible] mind-only [one/two words inaudible] that type of [one word inaudible]

S (simultaneously): [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): You can see that-- you can see that [few inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] it's in the very nature of the way the text is written that we can't understand it. And we're not supposed to. (some laughter) Let's start, let's reread it because that's what our work is. The work here is semantic analysis, not philosophical understanding. Semantic analysis is what we got to work with. What is this guy saying? So let's tr-- let's reread those passages.

HS: Alright. Well wait, which passage? (some laughter)

SC: "Refuting phenomena naturally..."?

S: Same paragraph, yeah.

HS: Is this the same as--

S: Yeah, yeah. You have to sit down.

HS: Ok, ok [couple words inaudible]

S: Naturally [one/two words inaudible]

S (very faint): (You want to read?)

S: Read it.

HS: Ok, should I read?

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: "In refuting that phenomena naturally exist as ground or bases of names, the Chittamatrins are not merely saying that the appearing objects of thought, meaning-generalities, do not naturally exist because of depending on thought. For the Sautrantikas propound such..."

LR (simultaneously): Wait, [one/two inaudible student words] could we do one sentence at a time?

SC (simultaneously): Should we do-- maybe we could that sentence.

[simultaneously] [students assent]

LR: Wait another--

S: I--

S: I expected [few words inaudible]

SC (simultaneously): For instance the phrase, "phenomena naturally exist as grounds or bases"--

HS (simultaneously): They're refuting that.

SC: Yeah ok, but forgetting about whether they refute it or not I want to get at what that phrase means. "Phenomena naturally exist as [one/two inaudible student words simultaneous with SC] grounds or bases of names." Now-- So "phenomena naturally existing" is one term, the basis-- the 'names' is the other term, and they're related, that-- the one is the ground of the other one. What is the phenomena naturally

existing? Is that some phenomenon-- again, is that some kind of object in time and space or is phenomenon yet taken as some kind of power or--

AD (simultaneously): Isn't phenomena, I mean isn't it a well-known word? [S simultaneously: Well-known word?] We have-- we have to go to the bottom? Phenomena, [AD hits something] you know.

S: [couple words inaudible]

SC (simultaneously): Is it phenomena, well--

AD (intensely): Phenomena--[couple inaudible SC words simultaneous with AD] anything you see, touch, taste, smell, hear, [SC simultaneously: If the ph--] that's phenomena. [SC simultaneously: If the phenomena--] Does it naturally exist or doesn't it?

SC: If the phenomena were what you taste, touch, smell, etc, and that's the immediate experience, how could that be--

AD (simultaneously): Does it naturally exist?

LR: What does 'naturally' mean?

AS: Naturally. (laughter, student words)

LR: No really Anthony, I thought he meant--

VM (simultaneously): (Known/No).

SC: Does that mean--

S (simultaneously): Yeah. (some laughter)

LR: Well I thought he meant something technical by the word 'naturally'.

S: [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): [one/two words inaudible] semantic analysis, now it's lu-- *lunatic* analysis. (laughter)

VM: Well no, they mean something technical [LR/S(?) simultaneously: What is (one word inaudible)] by 'naturally existent'. And I think that is the point and just to say-- I think I-- I really sympathize with what you're saying Anthony, that you can't deny the phenomena that you as an-- as an embodied subject, an ego-based subject, are confronted with. But when they say naturally existent, I think they, at least Hopkins, means something special and technical and that seems to be what the Prasangikas want to nail.

HS: What would you say-- what you would say that [S simultaneously: Yeah.] they do it daily?

LR: So what does it mean?

AD (simultaneously): In that text that you read, this book of Hopkins, has you-- have you come across the use of the word 'natural' in some devious or subterranean or nefarious way? (laughter)

VM: Yes.

AD: Where, show me?

VM: On page 36, 37.

AB: Isn't the point-- the point is [S simultaneously: Wait.] what the [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with AB] object is, [S: Wait.] not whether or not it naturally exists. It's whether or not it naturally exists as a basis of names.

SC: Ok, so--

AB: And that [student assents] is being refuted.

SC: Now-- ok, so now--

S: Wait.

AB: But there is a naturally existing object. [SC simultaneously: Ok, and so--] What is it?

S: Uh-hm.

S: Uh-huh.

AB: Sorry.

SC (simultaneously): Go ahead, I'm sorry.

S: Uh-hm, go.

SC: I just want to jump on, so-- but now we're defining this phenomenon in a kind of-- an immediate experiential way. That being so, what is the name, what's the names that he's talking about? Now he's obviously speaking about it as something other than the (phenomenon/phenomena). So--

MB (simultaneously): Sam, if you-- if you just wait, so like after we finally get through this paragraph, the one after that really gives you the punch line. But [few words inaudible]

SC (simultaneously): Tells you what-- it tells you what names are?

HS: Yeah, yeah.

MB (simultaneously): It talks about-- [student assents] a whole thing about when he's talking about they are saying names and all that stuff. [AH simultaneously: Well this whole is--] If you really want to know we're just going to get through this one paragraph that we haven't gotten through [one/two words inaudible] yet.

S: Well let's just stick to the paragraph then.

SC (simultaneously): But why don't you tell me now, what's names, the-- in the punch line, through the paragraph [one/two words inaudible]

HS (simultaneously): Like for instance, you have a thing that's round and is called bulbous and has a certain shape and it could hold water so you call it a pot. And when you call it a pot you think it's a thing,

pot. You lose sight of the fact that it's [few words inaudible] bulbous, hold-- it's capable of holding water, brown, you know.

MB: In other words, your utilitarian concepts of the thing as an-- as an-- are the name.

HS: It's a name.

MB: Those utilitarian concepts can-- can be able to call [S simultaneously: Sure.] it something because you have use for it.

HS: A pole.

SC (simultaneously): So if an Eskimo sees a car for the first time, he's seeing the phenomena, but that-- but if I see the car, I see it as the car and now I'm seeing the name.

HS (simultaneously): You will see a car, you know what kind of car it was.

AD: It's still a phenomena!

SC: But I've also given it a name, right [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Yes, but it's still a phenomena, you see the car or the Eskimo sees a car.

SC: Right. But he hasn't overlaid the name on it and I have?

AD: Yeah.

SC: I'm just trying to understand the distinction.

AD (simultaneously): I'm just, I'm just talking of the fact that the word 'phenomena' is something we shouldn't argue about. If we don't know that then it's time for us to go home and bake apple pie.

(laughter, student words)

AB: I thought that (especially) in this paragraph they're denying the phenomena that's underlying the name you give it. They're saying what you know of the thing *is* the qualities, the naming. There's not something that you're applying the names to.

S: What?

AB: That's what they're denying.

S (very faint): I don't think so.

VM: I think so.

HS: Yeah you explained it, I mean--

AB (simultaneously): Just like PB--

VM: There's not some material entity upon which you impute concepts or names or the labels or convention. That's all.

S: Ok.

AB (simultaneously): Just like in the-- there's a point in the *Hidden Teaching* where he shows you that the only thing you know about the objects are the qualities [student assents] and that those qualities are mental. [student assents] Therefore there is not some thing called an object to which you ascribe qualities.

MB: I thought they were saying that there *was* something independent of those qualities.

VM: Who?

AB: They're saying--

MB: The--

VM (simultaneously): Who's saying that?

AB: They're saying [MB simultaneously: The Chittamatrins.] that the qualities [VM/S(?) simultaneously: Oh no.] are naturally existent, that there is a real object, but the real object is not a base upon which you've ascribed.

LDS: You know, maybe it would help, he--

VM (simultaneously): People read the book.

LDS: If-- he brings in-- (laughter) he brings in the Sautrantika point here juxtaposing it with [students assent] Chittamatrin and for them there is a real object apart from the productive imagination of the individual.

VM: Uh-hm.

LDS: And the Yogacarins are saying, "Look, if you tell me that all I ever really know is what my productive imagination overlays on the object, then how can you even posit a real object outside of my own individual mind if you say all I ever know is my mind? How did you-- where did you stand to talk about an object outside of that situation?"

S: That's a good point.

LDS: So the Yogacara goes on to say, "Look, *all* there is are these mi-- mind objects, objects of mind, there is no other thing outside of the mind." So they've taken the Sau-- Sautrantika reasoning and carried its momentum through and said, "There's nothing outside of the mind." So, it's not as if the objects don't exist. The point is that they exist as mental phenomena.

S: Yeah.

S (simultaneously): Ultimately.

AB: But not as the [LDS simultaneously: Yeah.] basis of names.

S: Right.

AH: Why don't we read the last two paragraphs?

S: Ok.

AD: Well let's read the whole paragraph, sure.

[students assent]

HS: What-- ok. Now I'll read the first sentence again because the second sentence he goes through separate.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: "In refuting that phenomena naturally exist as ground or bases of names, the Chittamatrins are not merely saying that the appearing objects of thought, meaning-generalities, do not naturally exist because of depending on thought. For the Sautrantikas propound such [HS reads: this], and here a subtle selflessness of phenomena must be more subtle than anything found in the lower systems of tenets [HS reads: lower school]."

HS: Ok?

AH: So, let's--

S (faint): Uh-hm. Go on.

HS: Go on.

AH (simultaneously): More su-- [VM/S(?) simultaneously: Go ahead (one/two words inaudible)] more subtle-- more subtle in the way that Louis described, that they're not going to hold an object apart from mind in the way Sautrantikas are, [S: Ok.] or for an instant it's outside of the mental event, but the whole situation is interior to the mental event and they're still able to validate it as existing elsewhere.

HS: Ok.

S (faint): Ok.

S (faint): Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: "Nor are they saying that forms and so forth do not naturally exist..."

HS: Ok? They're not saying that forms do *not* naturally exist--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: "...because to [HS reads: for] them forms naturally exist as unpredictable phenomena."

S (faint): Right.

SC: Shall we stop there for a second?

HS: My interpretation of that phrase, "Forms do not naturally exist as unpredictable phenomena," I think they're saying that there is a world out there but you can't say anything about it. You can't predicate anything of it other than the fact of its being [S simultaneously: Well, uh, Herbert--] a, you know-- a phenomena. That's it.

AH: Yeah. You can't make statements about it the way Sautrantika did or the way Vaibhashika did, predicate or posit certain phenomena as external.

HS: Ok, unless you want to give the meaning of unpredictable, you know, composite changeless things in themselves, I don't really know, but in the simple sense the way we're using it.

[student assents, very faint]

LDS: Herbie, would you say that if we substituted for forms, "mental forms naturally exist as unpredictable phenomena," would that be true to this statement?

HS: I-- per-- yeah I think so, I think that was what Linda was trying to get to before.

AH: But their notion of forms, there are no other forms apart from mental [LDS: Right.] (initiation).

S: (We did.)

S: Right.

AH: Right.

HS: That's what we're saying.

AB: But what they are stating very strongly is that there are objects and those objects are real.

AH: Right.

HS: Ok then how--

AB: They're not denying the reality of the objects too.

LR (simultaneously): He's-- but they-- but they don't-- but there's more they're saying is [one word inaudible] point.

AB (simultaneously): I know, and then they go on [one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Not real.

S (faint): Yeah.

AD: Existent.

AB: Existent, excuse me, naturally existent.

AD: Huh?

S: Uh-hm.

AP: No, I wonder what does unpredictable mean because if they are forms they, I mean-- they're saying similar--

HS: Something, yeah.

AP: Something.

HS: Yeah.

AH: Isn't to predicate to establish or to posit?

LDS: To predicate is to name, characterize something.

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

AB: Yeah, "A is the characteristic of B." That's where the predication and they're denying that in this analysis. So that it's unpredicable of forms. They're not qualities of an object.

VM (simultaneously): They're just saying that in which you (introduce character of). In that way they're unpredicable. [AB assents] It's repeating what's in the first section he read.

S: Yeah.

AB: Form is not a quality of an object which underlies the object.

MB: The name, isn't it?

AB: The name.

MB: Maybe (the/these) form and object is the same thing he's talking about.

AB/S(?): Ok.

AH: [couple/three words inaudible] the name.

LR: Ok so, I'd like to know about the next two sentences.

HS: Ok.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: "Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist [HS: But they exist now.] because if they did not, they would not exist at all."

LR: Ok. What about it?

S (simultaneously): I think--

AD: You follow that?

LR/S(?) (simultaneously): He's just saying, what about it?

AD: I mean, [LR simultaneously: What does that mean Anthony?] it seems to be an important point for them. They do naturally exist and if they did not, they would not exist at all.

S: Right.

S: But--

LR (simultaneously): What does 'naturally' mean?

AD (simultaneously): Now, what are they countering? Who are they arguing against, the Prasangikas, right?

S: Uh-hm.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

AD: What do the Prasangikas say about existence [one/two inaudible student words] of an object?

VM: No inherent self-existence.

AD: What-- could we use a different language?

HS (simultaneously): No-- there's no actual existence, there's no true existence other than--

AD (simultaneously): That they don't exist. Isn't that what they're saying?

Few students at once: No.

VM (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible] either of (them/those).

AD (simultaneously): No?

AH: I didn't understand.

AD: They say that the object does exist?

HS: I--

AH: Yes. It does.

HS (simultaneously): They say the object does not exist inherently and (if/in) (my person)?

AD: Wait a minute. They say the object does exist or doesn't exist?

S (simultaneously): [couple words inaudible] yes.

AH (simultaneously): It does exist [one/two words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): It does exist as a dependent arising.

AH: Very definitely exists as a variety of dependent arising.

VM: Right.

[short pause with faint background student talking]

AH: It doesn't [GA simultaneously: (one word inaudible) it's dependent.] ultimate-- it doesn't ultimately exist but nor does it not exist.

AD (simultaneously): Well then could we talk English Andrew?

LR: Yeah.

AD: Does the object exist or doesn't it exist? Don't bring in the fact that an object, alright, is the result of a concomitant causes. I'm not asking what brings the object into being. I'm asking, does the object exist?

AH: Yes.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

S: [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): For the Prasangikas?

AH: Yes.

HS (simultaneously): Yes.

VM: Yes.

S (simultaneously): Uh-uh.

S (faint): Yeah.

S: [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): I don't think so.

S (very faint): I don't think so either.

VM: I could do both.

AB: Isn't the difference in whether it ultimately exists, whatever they mean by that word 'ultimate'?

LR: Anthony, [AD simultaneously: If--] I think we have to bring in all these words because I think without them you-- you know you-- there's no--

AD: It's not a question of bringing in these words, I'm just saying that the Prasangikas, as far as I understand them, an object does not exist.

LR: In a certain way.

AD (very intensely): An object does not exist, there's only [AD hitting something] one meaning to existence!! Don't let me go home. I can't argue trivialities.

LR: Don't let you go home.

VM: You mean, [one/two inaudible student words simultaneous with VM] if we don't get off the point you're gonna go home, is that what you're saying? (laughter)

AD: No. (more laughter)

VM: If you do get off [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): I mean let's not become absurd.

VM: No, I don't want to become absurd.

AD (simultaneously, passionately): What does existence mean?

VM: I really want to understand.

AD (passionately): There's only one meaning to existence, that's all, period.

HS: Ok, what?

AD (passionately): If you're-- if you're going to start arguing about what existence [S simultaneously: Yeah?] means, let me go home.

HS: Then it's so.

GA: I think that's entirely the point.

VM (simultaneously): Don't go home but just tell me how you use the term please? Could-- can you just say how you use the term?

AD: The term 'existence'?

VM: Yeah.

S (simultaneously): Uh-huh.

AD: You are, even if it's momentarily.

VM: See then, [few inaudible student words simultaneous with VM] my understanding of the Prasangika is they would agree with that Anthony and I could be all wet. (bit of laughter)

S: What was your--

LR (simultaneously): Would you read the next sentence? [S simultaneously: We will pretty soon.] Maybe it'll say it (there). (bit of laughter)

AD (simultaneously): Well, can we--

VM: Well, I [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): What do they mean by imputation?

VM: Pardon?

AD: What do they mean by imputation?

VM: I would say that they mean that the mind overlays this object, which they say something is the basis of imputation, I don't know what that is.

AD (passionately): Well that's what I'm asking you! If you say that the name must have a basis for imputation, what is that?

VM: I can never get that out of them, [AD simultaneously: Oh.] and that's maybe my deficiency. [couple/three words inaudible]

GA (simultaneously): They-- they [few words inaudible] and it'll show up.

S (simultaneously): They state quite clearly what [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously with GA): Well then, isn't it wiser that we continue reading it and go along the way we started than anticipate because the next section is going to be on the Prasangikas and I'm willing to

say, alright, you say they-- they say an object exists and I say they don't, alright. We could wait till we get there.

S: Ok, yeah.

AH (simultaneously): Anthony, could I-- I-- it's the only way to work.

LR: I still want to know what this sentence means though, I wasn't jumping to the Prasangika(s). I--

TS(?) (simultaneously): *Angi--*

LR: Prasangika(s).

AD: What's the sentence?

HS: Forms do exist because if they did not exist, they couldn't exist at all.

LR: No.

SC: Forms do [one word inaudible]

AD (simultaneously, passionately): Don't you see what the [few inaudible LR words simultaneous with AD] Yogacaras are saying is, "You can't qualify existence, a thing exists or it doesn't!"

LR: So you think there's no value in just-- in trying to figure out what "naturally, truly, and-- and ultimate"--

AD (simultaneously): No, I don't think there's any-- I don't think there's any value in that. They say something naturally exists, alright, you know what they mean.

LR: And what about "true, ultimate, [HS talking in background] and inherent"? You don't think we need to know what those terms mean?

AD (simultaneously): Read the passage then, read the passage.

S (faint): Yeah.

S (possibly part of background): [few words inaudible]

LR: (Well/But) let me read the passage.

LDS: Yeah read it, read it.

S (possibly part of background): Ok.

S (possibly part of background, faint): Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, LR reading]: "The Chittamatrins-- The Prasan..."

LR: Ah no, I'm sorry.

HS: Forms do--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, LR reading (simultaneously with HS above)]: “Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist...”

AD (intensely): Now what-- [LR: Because if you--] how would you say that in plain ordinary English if you were talking to me? What would you say!? [GA simultaneously: Doesn't depend on anything--] Wouldn't you say that object exists!?

GA: Doesn't depend on anything else for its existence.

AD: No, no, no, no.

GA (simultaneously): It exists by itself.

HS: But that's [AD simultaneously: No!] what *they* mean.

GA: Yeah it's what *they* mean.

AD (simultaneously, passionately): No, you see, you want to bring in dependent arising. All they're saying is [AD hits something] an object exists!

GA: I'm just saying [S simultaneously: No more (one word inaudible)] that if--

AD (passionately): And they're not talking [LR/S(?) simultaneously: (couple words inaudible) worse.] about the concomitant causes that bring that object's existence about.

LR: Well then what does truly, naturally-- [GA simultaneously: I didn't (couple/three words inaudible)] I'm sorry, I don't (understand)!

AD (simultaneously, intensely): Well I'm just telling you!! I'm just telling you. Truly, naturally, and ultimately exist, an object [AD hits something] is.

SC(?): Now--

S: But that's not what they mean.

AD: That's not what they mean? [LR simultaneously: It's very frustrating (one/two words inaudible)] Well, ok, you tell me what they mean!

S: We can try.

PD (simultaneously): I can tell you what the Yogacaras mean. Now that statement is written by a Prasangika [VM: That's right.] who is doing a *caricature* [student assents] of a Yogacarin.

S: Oh yeah.

VM: That could be, that could very well be.

AS (simultaneously): (That one just happens to be.) Very good point but--

PD (simultaneously): You find in Asanga where he will put the two words 'natural existence' and 'ultimate existence' in the [student assents] same sentence, or Dharmakirti. You find any of the Yogacarins using that language that was used in that sentence.

LR: You're saying they wouldn't use it?

SC: Yeah.

PD (simultaneously): That sentence is totally wrong as far as a Yogacarīn statement.

AS: Now I agree with Paul.

PD: That's a caricature of a Yogacarīn or a straw man that the Prasāṅgika has created.

AS: And, you know Paul, they brought up the point about [GA simultaneously: Yeah.] the three levels of paratantra, you know, the [half/one word inaudible]

PD (simultaneously): Three lev-- yeah.

AS (simultaneously): Yeah, the three levels [S simultaneously: (Here we go again.)] and it seems, if I follow your point, that it may even be that the very sentence itself-- I don't want to follow the book but-- (Go ahead.)

PD: But in that very text you're referring [AS simultaneously: Uh-hm, yeah.] to Avery where it says three levels were designated: [AS simultaneously: Yeah. And that--] ultimate, [AS: Right.] [student assents] paratantric level, and imaginal.

AS: And they-- and they all [student assents] have some kind of an existence.

VM: That's right.

AD (passionately): You see, the word 'existence' you can't quibble with. There's no *shading* between existence and non-existence. You know what I mean? You can't say, "Well, it's not black and it's not white, it's in between, it's grey." Existence *is* or *isn't*. There's *no* in-between. You-- you don't know now what I'm talking about?

VM: Anthony, I think you-- I think I do but if I-- if I could risk your ire, can I just proceed?

AD: Yes, risk my ire.

VM: Alright. (bit of laughter)

AD: It's-- I told you, it's the Theodora, it's not my ire.

LR: The Theodora.

VM: Theodora?

AD: Yeah.

LR: That's his latest anima figure.

AD: That's my negative medicine.

VM: Negative anima.

[few students at once in background, inaudible]

LR (simultaneously): Comes in a pill form [few words inaudible]

VM (simultaneously): Well-- 'Cause really we could blame it on Michael and whatever. (some laughter) Michael's fault. Alright, I have no excuse, but as I understand the Prasangika-- I would agree with Paul that this is shaded towards the Prasangika no doubt. But their whole point of denying naturally or truly or inherently existing I understand to be a little different in the sense that they use those words in a technical way saying that pole doesn't exist on its own right. It doesn't exist-- it's not self-subsistent, we could use that language perhaps.

AH: Right.

VM: Ok? [student assents] And insofar as it's not self-subsistent, it doesn't exist as an entity on-- in its own right and completely independent from my imputation, my relationship to it, its relationship to the rest of the world, insofar as it does not exist in that way--

AD (simultaneously): But we're not discussing that. We're not [VM simultaneously: Oh.] discussing that. You're trying to tell me that I can't pick out from the panoramic view, the phenomenal manifestation, I can't pick out a piece without at the same time picking up the whole-- the whole tissue. [VM simultaneously: I think so.] In other words, like a net, if I pick up one corner, [VM: Yeah.] the whole net comes up.

VM: Yeah.

AD (passionately): What we're discussing now is what the Yogacarins are saying. They're saying objects naturally exist, alright. [LR simultaneously: And ultimately.] Now, how-- how could we say it? This naturally exists? [AD hitting something] This naturally exists, alright? I'm not asking, and I'm not-- (some laughter, student words) I'm not bringing up the point how this comes into existence. I'm just saying this naturally exists.

VM: Fine Anthony, and I think because there is a lack of clarity on the-- the two different positions, that there's this continuous argument goes on all the time and in some way perhaps it's unnecessary. The Yogacarins--

AD: No, it's necessary. It's necessary.

VM (simultaneously): Ok, it's necessary for us.

AD: It's necessary for them more than for us, because we got to make it our own so we're having the difficulty. But semantic analysis is, you know, absolutely essential here. Because if we don't understand the words they're using in the simplest English, there's no sense reading the text. [S, very faint: I agree.] Now I-- I read a text like that, she just read a sentence, and I say-- I would say as I'm reading, well, the Yogis are saying that an object naturally exists. They don't want to say, and they don't want to be understood, that the object is illusory. They're saying [student assents] [AD hits pole] this pole exists.

VM: I don't think the Prasangikas, I know they don't need me to defend them, but they're not saying the object is illusory either, not the way I understand it.

AD: Alright, could we wait till we [few inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] get to that section and as we go along try to understand what the *Yogacaras* are saying!? (some laughter) Could we do that?

AS (simultaneously): [couple/three words inaudible]

VM: Ok, the only trouble is Anthony, the reason I keep--

AD (simultaneously): Because I'm-- you can see I disagree with you so far, I'm going to probably disagree even further.

VM: I know, you're probably right too but I have [AD simultaneously: No, no.] to believe it, no choice. But, the only reason I keep going to the Prasangika is it's *written* from the point of view of a Prasangika and it's employing technical language that the Prasangikas like to use, from the three adverbs or adjectives that Linda keeps harping on, "inherently, naturally, truly," and I think they do use them in a peculiar way. So I'll drop it though but I don't-- didn't think Theodora was so bad after all.

HS: Ok, is that clear now Linda?

S: Yeah.

LR/S(?): Just go to the next one.

S: [few words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Let's read it. Let's read it.

HS (simultaneously): Ok--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: "Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist because if they did not, they would not exist at all. For the Chittamatrins [HS reads: Chittamatras], the Prasangika view that [HS adds: the] objects do not naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist is a denial..."

HS: Excuse me. Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 369, HS reading]: "For the Chittamatrins [HS reads: Chittamatras], the Prasangika view that objects do not naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist is a denial of phenomena; if impermanent things did not naturally exist, they would be totally non-existent."

VM: Yeah, ok.

HS: That--

S: (Uh-hm.)

AH (simultaneously): Does natural existence for Chittamatras mean *inherent* existence?

MB: (Hm?) Yeah.

AD (passionately): I refuse-- I refuse to dangle that word anymore. Existence is existence and like [S simultaneously: Uh-hm, sure.] I said, alright, you either are or you are not, to be or not to be. There is no

in-between. Are we discussing existence or are we discussing eternity, alright, or permanency? What are we discussing!?

AH: That's-- I've been trying to ask that question for about twenty minutes.

S: No [one/two words inaudible]

GA (simultaneously): The Chittamatrins [S simultaneously: Yeah.] employ [AH simultaneously: When we talk--] exactly the same tactic. I mean they claim that what's existent-- when they say the object exists, [HS simultaneously: Uh-hm, yeah (few words inaudible)] they already have analyzed it and said that it's an object not separate from a subject. They're employing exact-- very exact analysis and saying, "This exists inherently." Now there's these other guys who would employ the same analysis and use different words.

AH: See that's the point.

GA (simultaneously): And I can't see your argument because you're-- the Chittamatrins are just as carefully presenting what it is they feel exists as the Madhyamikas. [S: But--] And to negate it on semantics doesn't make sense to me 'cause they're both using similar semantics.

AH: And doesn't it also seem that Prasangika is talking about an empirical object, Chittamatra's talking about--

GA: See I wouldn't even get into what Prasangika says, [AD simultaneously: Oh for heaven--] he's just pointing out here--

AD (simultaneously): Andrew, an object is an object.

GA (simultaneously): He's just raising a red flag. He's just saying "These guys use the word totally differently. Look, they wouldn't pull-- they wouldn't say it this way."

AH: Anthony, you mentioned earlier that there's this experience that we have of feltness where we experience object to be other than ourselves. Now is that what you're propounding [AD simultaneously: I--] as existing, that felt--

AD (simultaneously): I'm sorry I ever brought that up, I was just trying to point out that in our experience, alright, the world is felt as alien, out there, alright, *not* "I", alright, but under the stress of analysis-- analysis in knowledge, one recognizes that they are s-- the same.

S: Yeah.

AD: I don't know why you keep going [student assents] back to that.

GA (simultaneously): Yeah, yeah. And for the Chittamatrin that object that exists out there as external doesn't exist. [AS simultaneously: As external.] Now the Prasangika--

AS: Wait a minute, an object, what?

GA (simultaneously): Yeah. That object that e-- that is out there external from a subject doesn't exist at all for them. [HS/S(?): Ok.] That's not what they're talking about.

VM (simultaneously): Or external from the subject.

GA: Yeah.

VM: Fine, fine, yeah.

GA (simultaneously): That's just imaginary, that doesn't exist at all.

VM (simultaneously): Right. Right, right. Only objects that are relation--

GA (simultaneously): Now if you were-- you were a Prasangika you would say that doesn't inherently exist, you know, you would--

VM: I agree, I agree.

GA (simultaneously): Ok Paul? And they would agree too, [VM simultaneously: (That's ok.)] but then they [one word inaudible] the next para and they disagree. And I'm just saying they're employing the analysis up to a point and they stop there and they say-- once they get there, that exists naturally in its own right, doesn't depend on anything else.

AS: I--

GA: Ok.

AS: Ok I-- I had a different slant on what they were saying in that Gabriel, I-- so just tell me how--

GA: Yeah, go ahead.

AS: I thought they were saying something like what PB says after his analysis of the object as mental when he says it's not two different things, the thing and the thought of it. And then he has to be very careful to say that just because we say the object is mental *does not mean* that it doesn't exist, [student assents] (that) the object--

AD (simultaneously): Does not mean that is illusory.

S: That's right.

AS (simultaneously): It doesn't mean it's illusory.

S (simultaneously): Can't deny it.

AS: It-- [few inaudible student words simultaneous with AS] you can't-- The whole analysis of the mentalists and the Chittamatrins and so on saying that the object is a mental object, they want to be very very careful to say, "We do not mean by mental that therefore it doesn't-- it doesn't have this kind of existence or is [GA assents] illusory because the 10-ton locomotive is not going to disappear when you say it's mental." [student assents] And that's why they have to be very careful because the normal-- the normal view, you know, as soon as you say it's just an idea, then the guy or the other school might come and say to you, "Hey, well then just it's illusory you mean." And they say "No, no, no. No, no, mental means it does exist. The fact that it's a mental object in fact is what *gives* it its existence because mind *is* what gives a thing its existence. And when we say that the object is the thought, we're not taking away-- we're not making it illusory or anything [few words inaudible]"

GA (simultaneously): Yeah but Avery, but that's not what they're saying, they're not saying that-- that it's mi--

AS (simultaneously): Well, ok, and I said correct me on that.

GA (simultaneously): I don't think that--

AD: Well that's what we want to find out. [GA simultaneously: I don't think--] In that-- in that sentence that he just [GA simultaneously: In this sentence I think the point is--] read, alright, in that sentence that he just read, without-- without even-- let's say I have no idea what the Prasangikas are saying, the Yogacara [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] is saying, "Look, when we say something exists, we mean that it exists, [GA assents] and there's no (pseudo-ness/pseudomas) in [GA assents] this existence."

GA: But the argument towards its existence here I don't-- is not that it's mental and there-- and that it exists but that it is not separate from its-- the subject. It's the object not separate from the subject that they're talking is naturally existing. It's the conventional object.

AS: I'm talking about the conventional object too.

GA (simultaneously): As soon as you back up and say that it's, you know, of the mind-basis-of-all, that's not what they're--

AS (simultaneously): I didn't say mind-basis-of-all, I said [GA simultaneously: Yeah.] in PB's analysis too, he say-- he's talking about this object, [GA simultaneously: This object.] the very object you see, he goes through the analysis and shows you that it's really mental, there's no object and-- there's no duality between an object and a thought of the object. The idea *is* the object. And you might want to say "Well I know about ideas, they're illusory. You mean to say that this locomotive is illusory." Well PB has to be very careful to say no, the locomotive is *not illusory* just because we said it's mental, we're just describing its nature. [GA assents] It's mental, it's-- And mental means-- I think mental can mean the same thing you just said, that it [GA(?) assents] doesn't have a different nature from the subject.

GA: Uh-hm.

LR: What's the difference between saying that and saying [S: I see.] the object [VM/S(?): I don't--] is-- has-- is dependent on causes?

TS(?) (simultaneously, possibly part of background): [three words inaudible]

S (possibly part of background): Yeah, but that's what I thought.

AS: What's the difference between them?

LR (simultaneously): Yeah. I mean if you say the object has true--

AS (simultaneously): Well all objects are dependent on causes.

LR: When you say the object does truly exist and it's given by mind--

[Audio File 1984 0907a Ends]

[Audio File 1984 0907b Begins]

AS: (All) existence dependent on cause.

S (faint): [few words inaudible]

AS (simultaneously): That to exist means to be dependent on-- But I don't know, just to answer Linda, I thought that the very word 'exist' means to be dependent on causes. So the fact that the object e-- exists (and/in) dependent upon mind or anything else is to say nothing except that it exists.

AD: Exactly!

AS: It isn't saying anything [one/two words inaudible] mean. 'Exist' means "dependent on causes".

AD (simultaneously): 'Existere' means precisely that, that the principle is outside [LR simultaneously: And I'm--] of itself.

LDS (simultaneously): Yeah.

LR: And that's what I think they mean by ultimately, naturally, and inherently.

AS: Well--

AH: No.

AS: That-- I don't-- that's of course a question but I think no matter what you say, I mean-- saying that-- in other words, saying that the mind is the cause or something else is the cause, yeah, that means it exi-- [student assents] it exists, sure, because it's dependent. [LR assents] That's right, I mean, to exist means, yeah-- it means it's dependent.

LR (simultaneously): And if they ta-- and if you take away any of the causes you take away the pheno-- the object.

AD: Well, if you notice [S simultaneously: What?] in that last sentence [VM simultaneously: Sure, otherwise (couple/three words inaudible)] the way the Yogacara said, the thing exist. Its existence is total. Now, it's just like I try to say before, there is no in-between. A thing is or isn't, there isn't any in-between. Now, I was just pointing out, insofar that the Yogacaras are making this remark, do you get the feeling like they're telling the Prasangikas, "Look. There can't be that kind of existence you're talking about. A thing is or it isn't." Now, what that thing is that the Prasangikas are talking about I say-- I say let's wait, we'll get to it, in a few pages we'll get to their-- what the Prasangikas are going to say about that.

VM: Fine.

AD: Ok? Well we're-- let's go on with it.

S: Ok.

HS: Ok. Give me a few minutes with Anthony.

LR: (Uh-hm.)

S: (Yeah.)

AD (simultaneously): You see, Andrew, a lot of the argument, a lot of the-- a lot of the hostility that arises, is that words are being bandied and unless we get to a semantical analysis of what a person is saying, we're going to-- we're going to get very annoyed at one another. You ever try reading some of the medieval texts? You have the same problem. Go ahead Herbie.

HS: Can I ask the question now? And it is about wording. When you-- when you say is or is-- existence is or isn't, now, this is just my understanding, I thought existence is like a peculiar-- I'm not trying to do middle way or anything, just-- I thought existence was a very peculiar state, so to say, when you can't say it truly is or you can't say it isn't at all obviously because, as you say, it's re-- it's something real standing outside of its principle. [students assent, very faint] And so I don't understand what you mean when you say existence is. I'm not-- I'm not joking around either. Because existence is necessarily fleeting, you know, we die, so to say.

AD: Yes but even-- even if it-- even that it is fleeting and let's say it only takes a moment, alright, it arises in an instant and disappears the next, [S: Yeah.] that instant is enough to say the thing is.

HS: Ok, that's the way-- this is how you're doing it, alright.

AD (simultaneously): When a-- when for instance some of the Buddhist Logicians say of a thing that it arises, abides, and [one/two inaudible HS words simultaneous with AD] disappears all within the same instant, then like he's asking us to do a mental somersault that I can't do.

HS: Ok, now when you say then existence is, you then referring to the Being-- so to say the Being part of existence all the time?

AD (passionately): No, I'm referring to the existence, I'm not referring to Being because Being doesn't come and go, [HS and another student assent] the way I use the words, alright. We could-- we could throw the words out and use other words. But for instance I have a cinema picture, alright, and there's a still, it gets projected on the screen this instant. [HS simultaneously: Ok.] The next instant another one gets projected and that one's gone. The moment that it was on the screen it existed. The next moment it's gone, it doesn't exist.

AH: Yes sir.

S: (Ok.)

AD (simultaneously, passionately): Is that clear? [VM assents] That's the way I use the word 'existence'.

HS: Ok, you--

AD (simultaneously, passionately): Alright. Now, [AB simultaneously: You (have/had) a--] if you say Being, I would have to say go back to the film, there's its Being, it'll always be that.

HS: Oh ok.

AD (passionately): Ok, that's the way I use it.

HS: Ok.

AD: Now, today language has turned things around [HS simultaneously: Yeah, I'm very confused.] and very often the word 'Being' is used for existence and existence is used for Being.

HS: Ok.

AD (passionately): Alright, so I gotta go by the context and then I determine how he's using that word.

VM (faint, possibly part of background): Right in here?

HS: Ok, so-- so you'd say it even in thi-- in-- there's no set way then to-- even the word 'existence' is always going to be what now, something that truly is?

AD (simultaneously, passionately): The word 'existence' is going to depend on its definition in terms of context.

HS: Like for instance, when you say the thing in existere, that which stands outside its principle, is that-- that (am/and)--

AD (simultaneously): Well that's the etymological meaning of [HS assents] the word 'existere'.

HS: Right, and that implies that existence has to be real because only something that comes from principle(s)--

AD (passionately): No, not real, [AD hitting something] not real!

S (simultaneously): That's unreal.

HS: Ok, but you--

LDS: But undeniable.

HS: No, no.

S: I'll be there.

HS: But you wouldn't say it is?

AD (simultaneously, very intensely): Oh for heaven's sakes. There's a mirage, I see a lake, I go jump, it turns out to be sand!!!! Does the mirage exist!?!?

AH: Yes.

AD (very intensely): Is it real!?!?!?

AH: No.

S (simultaneously): No.

HS: Ok, that's very helpful to me.

AH (simultaneously): Anthony, just one further clarification. When we talk about existence in this way, we're not-- we're not necessarily equating that with appearance.

AD: Well what would you equate it-- why not? [AH: Because we do--] Appearance has the same-- the same-- the same [S simultaneously: Yeah we do.] level as existence.

AH: In the-- in the case of the mi--

AD (simultaneously): Appearance can only be momentary. For heaven's sakes we've went through these things 28,000 times. Where's my doctor? Take me home. (bit of laughter) My doctor around? Take me home. (bit of laughter)

VM/S(?): Which one? (bit of laughter)

AD: Don't you look these words up in a dictionary!?

VM: Yeah, [S simultaneously: They do.] yeah, yeah, no I did that (before).

S: Anthony, don't go home.

LR (simultaneously): Anthony, you used to scream at me [S simultaneously: Yeah.] that the mirage did not exist. (laughter, student words)

GA (amidst laughter): In fact, in fact that's the point Linda because in here they define very carefully [one word inaudible] that an imaginary [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously, intensely): Look, a mirage, the image does exist.

LR: Yeah.

AD: The mirage does exist [LR simultaneously: Ok, good, I didn't--] and it isn't real. Now if I yelled at you you should've gone back and hit me over the head.

GA: But the Chittamatrins would say the externality of the mirage doesn't exist even if it appears.

AD (intensely): Exactly, so would I, [GA/S(?) simultaneously: It doesn't.] so would I. The externality [GA simultaneously: Ok.] of that cloud 100 miles away does not exist. [students assent] If it did exist, then I'd never get to know it.

S: Huh.

LR: Get to know it.

S: Yeah, right.

AD (simultaneously): Let's go back, reread the sentence.

[couple seconds of faint background student talking]

HS: Or--

AD: I want to understand the Prasangikas, I even want to agree. But I'm not [AD hits table] going to give up my reasoning.

HS: Ok.

AD: Never.

LR: Is it alright-- are we allowed to get you frustrated Anthony? (some laughter)

AD: Look, [LR simultaneously: Is this legal?] I can [S simultaneously, to LR: Yeah.] assure you [LR simultaneously: I mean I (one word inaudible)] that that's all that life is, frustration. (laughter) It's the only thing, it varies in degrees, (some laughter) [S simultaneously: Some people make it happy.] alright. Some people go out very frustrated, some with a little frustration, some with tiny bit. But frustration you're guaranteed. Go ahead.

VM: It's the Frustration-Only school. (laughter)

[few seconds of laughter, background student talking]

AD: In PB, in PB, in the *Hidden Teaching*, doesn't he say that? Doesn't he say the image, the illusion, does exist [student assents] [S simultaneously: But it's not (real), ok.] but it's not real.

AS: It's exactly what he says.

S (simultaneously): Yeah.

AD: But you can't say the dream that you're looking at, the images, don't exist because then how could you talk about it?

LR: Good, that's wonderful, [HS simultaneously: Ok.] then roll.

S: Good.

S: Ok.

HS: Ok.

S: Ok, yeah.

AD: So if I said something like that to you, I must have been *drunk*! (some laughter) I don't know with what, probably with coffee.

LR (simultaneously): Well it's ok, it's ok. I probably (some laughter) misquoted you Anthony. It's all (an illusion anyway).

LDS (simultaneously): Anthony, one more clarification, you brought up that if the felt distinction between me and the cloud really existed, then I would never be able to get to know the cloud. So you're saying, even though there-- there's a-- a feltness of this distinction, that's an absolute error.

AD: Yes.

LDS: That's an absolute e--

AD (simultaneously, intensely): How many times did you love a woman that was an error!?! (AD slams something) (bit of laughter)

LR: That's a different story.

LDS (simultaneously): Wait a minute.

AD: That's the same thing! (some laughter)

S (amidst laughter): That's right.

LDS: The undeniability of an appearance, even if it's a momentary appearance, because of its undeniability, it does have existence. I can't deny the dream image, I can't deny the illusion, [S simultaneously: Hallucination.] I can't deny the appearance of any phenomena.

AD (simultaneously): Look, you say, you say that this is external, this pole is external.

LDS: That's an absolute error.

AD (simultaneously): What you mean is that it's in a relationship to [one/two inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] my body. You can't mean that it's external to my understanding [LDS assents] or my consciousness or my mind, because if it was outside of your mind then you can't know it! [student assents] How could you know something outside of your mind? [student assents] So what you-- what you mean and what you say very often are two different things. That's why I said, in the *analysis* of our experience, alright, you're going to see that the pole is included with the body, alright, as part of our experience. But in the actual experience when I go-- my head hits that, I'm going to say that was outside of me.

AH: How about-- how do we categorize mental objects as being external?

S: [couple words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): Mental objects? You mean the thoughts that we have are external? External to what?

AH: External in the sense that the subject and an object are construed as being different entities.

AS: That's the false [LDS simultaneously: It's an absolute error.] externality, isn't it Andrew?

S: Yeah.

AH: I'm sorry Avery?

AS: Is-- isn't that the fal-- the illusory externality, it just said that the externality is what's illusory.

AH: Yes, but yes, that's true.

AS (simultaneously): The mind is immediately there whatever it is.

LDS (simultaneously): That has no existence whatsoever.

AH: No but I was just questioning the example of external to the body, that made sense, but I wanted to understand [one/two words inaudible]

AD (simultaneously): But the example we had, you remember how we spent time, and I think you were there when we tried to point out, your planet sits on a degree, alright, that's a subjective functioning and its outward manifestation is the opposite degree. You see that operating over and over and over. All you

have to do is keep looking at it for a while and you begin to realize that these two things, a subjective and an objective, are included within a greater whole which, you know, is not objective to you. In other words, that perceiving consciousness within which these two, the subject and the object, are included, you can't objectively relate to that knower. But heaven's sakes, you know that *you are that knower!*

S: Ok.

AD: Alright, now you have to hold on to these things and as we go through, I think you'll see the Yogacaras are making a certain stance. Now, like I said, I have to work out what the-- what their stance is. Are they-- is their analysis in terms of the World-Mind's Idea, alright, and this is the analysis that they're carrying through, or is it from the point of view of the I AM principle analyzing, you know, whatever a person thinks himself to be in terms of the World-Mind Idea. Or, you know, is the Prasangika going to come from an analysis of the-- within the World-Idea, and just within that, and consequently be very sure about what they're talking about? I got to hear the discussion.

S: Ok.

AD: I don't know any other way to do it.

HS: Ok.

AD: So let's read the next paragraph.

HS: The next paragraph.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 369-370, HS reading]: "When the Chittamatrins [HS reads: Chittamatras] speak of objects as not being naturally bases of names, they base this on the adventitious relationship between objects and names and between names and objects. For instance, when an ordinary being's eye consciousness perceives a pot, the pot not only appears to be a bulbous thing able to hold fluid, but also the bulbous thing appears to be the basis of the designation 'pot'. The bulbous thing seems to be the basis of the designation 'pot' by way of its own being and not just established so by verbal convention. After an eye consciousness perceives the object, thought imputes, 'This is a pot,' without the intervention of any other thought. The sense consciousness alone is able to draw thought into imputing, 'This is a pot,' without the aid of intervening reflection. Therefore, when another asks what the expression 'pot' means, people do not say 'It is the "pot" that is only nominally imputed to [HS adds: be] a bulbous thing capable of holding water.' They say, 'It *is* a bulbous thing capable of holding water.'"

AH: In saying that it *is*, they establish its-- its erroneous nature.

HS: My-- my interpretation is that they're saying the cloud is out-- is external to me, [S simultaneously, very faint: No.] over and over again. "That is a pot."

AH: Thus, this notion that they say it *is* they're attributing this quality of being to it.

S: Yes.

AH/S(?): You can't-- you never know the subject.

LR: I don't know Herb, you know, I don't really follow this Herbert because-- can you explain this to me please?

S: Yeah.

HS: Well what if my name was Joe?

LR (simultaneously): I mean just to give a thing a name [S: Yeah.] doesn't--

HS: Would I still be the same person?

[student assents, very faint]

S: Could be the (same).

LR (simultaneously): That's my point. Just because you name a thing, why does that-- what does that mean that you're imputing externality of the mind here?

HS: Oh, what-- why did I say what I said?

LR: Yeah.

VM/S(?) (faint): Don't know.

LR: Just because you give a thing a name doesn't mean that you then take the thing to be independent of a mental cause.

RN: Right, exactly. Linda, it's not just that you give the thing a name but that you forget that you gave the thing the name. Someone says-- someone says [student assents] to you, "What's a pot?" Instead of saying, "Oh pot is just a word that I made up to try to be the concretization of a set of experiences," [LR: Right.] you say, "Oh thi-- a pot is [VM: This thing here.] this thing," and you for-- that's what this sentence is saying, you forget that you just made up that name pot. And Herbert's saying, "Yeah, you forget that you made that cloud external." You-- I mean, it's not-- it's not simply that you've externalized the cloud that makes you deny mentalism, it's that you forget or, you know, you're not aware at this-- at-- moment-to-moment that you're the one giving externality to the cloud.

LR: So it's more like an analogy you're saying? [couple inaudible student words simultaneous with LR] This thing about names is more of [couple words inaudible]

RN (simultaneously): Well it's an [VM simultaneously: No, no.] example, it's an example, it's one-- it's an instance of how we deny mentalism in everyday life or, you know, we forget about mentalism.

LR: I didn't say [couple words inaudible]

LR/S(?): [few words inaudible]

AH: What-- (bit of laughter) because--

S: Be.

JB: [three/few words inaudible]

VM: But look in France they call him--

AD: Could-- could [one/two inaudible student words simultaneous with AD] we continue, [S simultaneously: Yeah.] could we go on [VM: S'il vous plait.] a little bit? Because obviously here until we really understand the Prasangika's interpretation of what an object is, we're going to misinterpret this.

HS: Ok.

AD: Let's go on a little bit more.

HS: You want to stay in the Chittamatra section?

AD: Yeah, we want [student assents] to stay there. Let-- do what we can and then go to the Prasangikas and then we'll have to try [HS simultaneously: Ok.] to combine. A tradition that's been around 2,000 years, they know what they're talking about. If we don't understand them let's blame ourselves [HS: Ok.] ...after we finish blaming the translators. (AD laughs)

HS: Ok. (AD laughs, some laughter)

[student assents, faint]

VM: Slowly we'll get them.

HS: Ok, to proceed now, next--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 370, HS reading]: "Due to previous conditioning, objects falsely appear to sense consciousnesses as if naturally bases of names, and then thought, assenting to this appearance, falsely conceives them likewise."

HS: This is the Chittamatra asser-- assertion.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 370, HS reading]: "The Sautrantikas say that both the appearance of objects as naturally bases of names [HS reads: naming] and the conception of them as so are correct because sense objects are truly existent external objects, and when they appear to a faultless sense consciousness, their very mode of being must appear just as it is. Still, they say that mental images which appear to internal thought do not naturally exist and are only a reification of what depends on thought for its existence."

AD: You see how difficult now it would be to understand that, [HS and another student assents] if not impossible? We gotta go through that all over again.

[students assent, very faint]

[couple seconds of faint background student talking]

AD: I don't know how people could study 28 languages, I think I'd go crazy, stark-raving mad with one language. Let's try it.

HS: Ok. To follow previous paragraph now.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 370, HS reading]: “Due to previous conditioning, objects falsely appear to sense consciousnesses as if naturally bases of names, and then thought, assenting to this appearance, falsely conceives them likewise.”

LR: Right but--

HS (simultaneously): To be naturally exis-- bases of naming.

GA: In other words if--

LR (simultaneously): And you said because of our ha-- because of our habits, because of previous conditioning, we take these things to be outside of our [one word inaudible] our mental--

S: Right.

[VM assents, very faint]

LR: [one word inaudible]

HS (simultaneously): (They believe--) material objects other than mental.

LR: And you say it's due to, you know, habit.

VM (simultaneously): Bad karma, yeah.

KD (simultaneously): Bad habit.

[student assents, very faint]

GA: But they're also saying it's so ingrained that it appears to a sense consciousness as being basis of names and then [HS simultaneously: The thought picks it up, yeah.] after the [one word inaudible] it's a thought consciousness but like they're saying it's so ingrained that just seeing it you automatically--

LDS: It's like a double witness.

GA: Yeah.

AD: You want to repeat that Chip once again?

GA (simultaneously): I'm saying they're saying [AD simultaneously: Yeah.] that this-- they're saying that this is so ingrained that the appearance to a sense consciousness-- in other words, if an object appears to a sense consciousness as a basis of a name, they're not saying it just appears to thought as a meaning-general, they're saying this is so ingrained that, well like the Sautrantikas say, you know, they say that you can sense-- [HS simultaneously: There is an object, yeah.] directly perceive father. The child sees the father. Remember we argued about that and argued about that? “Oh no, you can't have a sensory perception of father.” We said no, that's not [one/two words inaudible] They're saying something similar, they're saying that this is so ingrained that even to a sense consciousness, the-- you know, [student assents] whatever, the jar appears to be the basis of a name. [LR assents, faint] That's all.

AH: It was expressed in the earlier paragraph, the sense consciousness alone was able to draw thought into imputing.

S: Yeah.

HS: (I can't) imagine this is this state. I mean is this let's say, even though the Chittamatra say-- and they-- the-- they-- he differentiates--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 370, HS reading]: "The Sautrantikas say that both the appearance of objects as naturally bases of names and the conception of them as so are correct because sense objects are truly existent external objects, and when they appear to a faultless sense consciousness, their very mode of being must appear just as it is."

HS: Is that what you meant by saying you could actually see father if I (chose to)?

GA (simultaneously): Yeah.

HS: Ok.

GA (simultaneously): I would say that's ok.

[student assents, very faint]

HS: Ok.

S: I think so.

VM: The point-instant *is* pure sensation, so properly functioning senses will pick up the fact that there is a naturally existent real object out there and the productive imagination overlays it with names.

[student assents, faint]

HS: And sometimes [couple/three words inaudible]

GA (simultaneously): But (there/there're) also-- possibly there might be the indication here that karma can translate mental impressions into physical. In other words because (the/of) karma does this or thought consciousness imposing names, that karmically that gets translated right into the sense consciousness so like the sense consciousness has this impetus to see something as the basis of a name.

AH: That might be the previous conditioning.

GA: Yeah. See we normally wouldn't accept that because of saying well (once/one's) sense consciousness went to thought consciousness, you can't have a meaning-generalty in a sense consciousness.

AH: Yeah.

GA: But I think they're in-- indicating that the predispositions of naming things actually affect sensation(s). [S: Just like--] I think PB points that out in that prior to the image we experience, all kinds of things go on, memory and sensations and all that. [LDS simultaneously: So really Chip--] Maybe karma is influencing those-- gathering of those sensations.

HS: Ok.

LDS (simultaneously): The Chittamatrins are actually [couple inaudible HS words] criticizing the Sautrantika position that you could have a direct perception through the senses. They're saying "No. Your senses are so conditioned to believe in or accept the externality of objects that you have [student assents] become a believer in that error." And they're going to say "No, even-- even at the sense level you can't have this because it isn't the way things are."

VM: And I would say as a Sautrantika, "You're misunderstanding what I mean by senses. You're confusing what we call the productive imagination with my notion of sense." I would say that would be a-- a reasonable response to (him/'em).

AH: The Chittamatra would respond, "No-- nowhere is there justification for positing an object outside of the mind."

LDS: Yeah.

HS: Yeah, ok. [couple inaudible VM(?) words simultaneous with HS] But can I go to the next two paragraphs?

S: Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 370, HS reading]: "In the Chittamatra system, forms and so forth are not external objects; they appear to be external objects through the force of predispositions accumulated through beginningless conditioning to the naming of objects. Forms are only of the nature of inner consciousness, but appear to be natural bases of names through the force of predispositions for expression. Therefore, the appearance of forms as naturally existent bases of names is not suitable to arise from the way things are, without dependence [HS reads: depending] on establishment by names and thoughts. Otherwise, the fact that forms are the bases of names would [HS reads: will] not depend on a consciousness, in which case forms would be different entities from a perceiving consciousness, and this is refuted by many reasonings. The assertion that things are not by way of their own character grounds of the designation of names meets back to the assertion that subject and object are not different entities."

S: Uh-hm.

AH: That's what I'd like to--

MW: No the (once--)

LDS (simultaneously): Well the whole chap-- [AH simultaneously: Ok.] it seems like the whole paragraph has to do with correcting the error of believing in the externality of objects.

S (faint): Yes, perceiving (though).

AH: In regard to form as a different entity than the perceiver, that's the fundamental error of subject and object being different entities.

S: Yes.

[student assents, faint]

HS: (I'll offer the kundalini.)

VM: Well we could (drive to Tibet/try the Tibetan).

[student assents]

HS: Ok? Shall I proceed or--

S (faint): Yeah you can proceed.

AH: Can we just take that first sentence please?

S: Yeah.

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 370, AH reading]: “In the Chittamatra system, forms and so forth are not external objects; they appear to be external objects through the force of predispositions...”

AH: Now earlier we spoke of those forms existing. And no one’s going to argue that, that they do exist. So we’re still able within the context of that existence to discover their appearance as external objects being an error.

PD: Say what?

AH: We’re able to decide that their appearance as external objects is wrong, but that’s not to speak to their existence or non-existence. Forms do exist, we’ve established that for them. They do exist. But when they appear to be external through the force of previous conditioning, we’re able to see the error of that without destroying the existence of the form.

[students assent]

S (simultaneously): Isn’t this--

GA: I think the point of this now is when before where the error was that if they were separate from a subject or external to a subject. Now he’s saying, same reasoning, that (a) forms appear to be external “through the force of predispositions and accumulated through beginningless conditioning to the *naming of objects*,” not to the externality of subject. It’s the naming of object(s), this predispositions to name objects [AH: Yes.] that is imbuing it with this externality.

S: Yeah.

AH: But the whole paragraph in--

GA (simultaneously): He’s talking about a different way that things seem to be external. They [HS assents] seem to be external as meant, as the meaning is inherent in the thing and not in me.

S (faint): Yeah.

AH: That’s so, but the conclusion of that paragraph Gabe is “The assertion that things are not by way of their own character grounds of the designation of names meets back to the assertion that subject and object [GA assents] are not different entities.” It goes [GA assents] *back* to that point.

GA: From the back end.

HS: And would you say that that's the seed that was postulated as giving rise to the subject-object in the beginning the same predisposition? [student assents, faint] [GA simultaneously: I would just say yeah, I think-- I think they--] Or would you say this is another or a concurrent set of seeds that's running within that seed?

VM: I would say they have two sets of seeds. They talk about bija seeds and vasanas and I would say that the vasanas, they're just amazing, but the bija seed does have some higher reality let's say.

[students assent]

HS: So the existence--

VM (simultaneously): In other words, let's put it this way. The bija seed as I look at it is sort of like when we think about a collection of reason-principles or a collocation of forces in the World-Mind, something like that, (or/where)--

HS (simultaneously): The actual existence of a thing.

VM: Yeah right, or, let's say a prakritic entity there or something like that, whereas the vasana is this business of assuming that the thing is external or separate from us and that it's the basis for our imputations or our overlays of various properties, blueness, hardness, whatever, [S: I thought that you--] but there is something there. [S simultaneously: The thing.] That whole idea, that's a vasana and something that can be-- you can train yourself to overcome. But you won't destroy the bija seed.

HS: So [one word inaudible] you're saying it's the World-Idea that goes on thinking through you that supplies the object for you upon which you then, you know, project this inner experience on.

S: Yeah.

AH: You were suggesting that vasana is of necessity a context of duality. The bija seed is [S: No.] in a context of non-duality. [VM: Alright.] They're simultaneous.

VM: Well I see what you're saying.

LDS: But I thought Herbie, too, may have been suggesting or asking where is the-- where is the error? Are there two levels of error? Is there-- in other words, the error of externality is-- is being attempted to get directly here, but is it the result of something inherent in the bija seed itself or does it arise only after the unfoldment of it and-- it seems like there may be two levels of error. [VM simultaneously: Maybe (couple words inaudible) too.] There may be an inherent error. [HS: Yeah.] There may be one in the bija seed itself.

AH: But see at the level of the bija seed they talk about that not as being non-entity. If it's-- if it perceives it--

S: So does [one/two words inaudible]

LDS (simultaneously): What gives rise-- well the question is, what gives rise to my sense of externality? Is that error inherent in the bija seed itself?

AD: Isn't that error inherent in your previous experience?

S (faint): Yeah.

LDS: Well that seems to be the answer here.

AD (simultaneously): And before that more previous experience?

VM (simultaneously): The vasanas, yeah.

LDS: That seems that--

AD (simultaneously): So then it's inherent in the very tendencies that you operate.

LDS: But if those tendencies are a consequence of something within the bija seed, then where is the--

AD: Well wait a minute, wait a minute. Tendencies, bija seed are the same thing to me.

VM: But--

LDS: Wait a minute.

VM: But tropes are not the same thing as--

AD (simultaneously): Same thing.

LDS: From the [VM simultaneously: Wait a minute.] point of view of the bija seed-- if I could appreciate--

AD (simultaneously): From the point of view of bija seed-- [very intensely] What does bija does mean to you!?! [AD hits something] Tendencies means something to me. [student assents, faint] Bija doesn't mean a damn thing!!!

GA: If existence is beginningless, you can't point to a different-- a cause for those tendencies. This ignorance goes around but you can't say there's causal ignorance, it's always been there. [HS(?): But I think--] (It) always been some brief experience that you'll point back to, [students assent] say well, that was in the past, this is what's happening now.

S (simultaneously): Uh-hm.

AH: Yeah.

LDS: So, in other words, if I use the term 'vasana', 'bija', 'tendency', they're-- that's all talking about the same thing that unifies this subject and object. [VM: I'm not sure though.] Is that what you're saying, that if I--

S (faint): But doesn't it?

MB: [few words inaudible]

AH (simultaneously): It unifies them or causes them to be--

GA: I don't see that they're trying-- I mean there's certainly many different kinds of seeds but so far they've made no differentiation. [HS simultaneously: Chip--] So, an analysis so far would say, let's not make one. (GA laughs a bit)

S: Yeah.

HS: Well--

VM (simultaneously): But they do make differentiations later.

HS: Let me just read--

LDS: That's what I was asking about, yeah.

HS: Let me just ask, be kind to me because I want to make a differentiation [one word inaudible] [GA simultaneously: Ok.] that's what I was doing. So--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 368, HS reading]: "A [HS reads: This] seed [(*bija*, *sa bon*)] or predisposition [(*vasana*, *bag chags*)] is activated and simultaneously produces both an object and a cognizing subject, much as in a dream."

HS: And this is how-- this is how the Chittamatra's account for the world. And then--

Jeffrey Hopkins [*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 370, HS reading]: "Forms are only [of] the nature of inner consciousness, but appear [HS reads: appearing] to be natural bases of names through the force of predispositions for expression."

HS: Now, is the-- is the force of predispositions or expression, is that what they meant by seed or predisposition here?

AD: Well doesn't he say that, doesn't he-- didn't you just read him say that *bija* or predisposition are the same thing?

HS: Yeah. Well it says-- it-- usually it says 'or', I don't know, yes.

AH: Actually they equated earlier a seed, *bija*, predisposition, *vasana* as all the same.

AD: Yeah, tendency.

S: Yeah.

AD: Good old English word, tendency. [HS simultaneously: Ok.] Habit.

VM/AH(?): But you--

AD: I had a habit in the past of thinking that the cloud was a hundred miles away and I was here. And in this co-- incarnation, I still believe that cloud's a hundred miles away and I'm here. And in my next incarnation, that cloud is still going to be a hundred miles away and I'm still here. (student assents, bit of laughter) That's a tendency, it's a habit. And the [AH simultaneously: Well--] only thing that's going to break that habit is when I understand the nature of mentalism and realize, "No, I'm not here and that's there but everything is within me!"

HS: Ok, now is the "everything within me" that which supplies the existence of the cloud which you then take to be 100 miles away or--

AD: Yes, yes.

HS: And is that s-- now that would--

AD (simultaneously): That would be supplied.

HS: Even as seed?

AD (simultaneously): My subjective functioning and its outward manifestation would be supplied. [S simultaneously: But--] They would be of the nature of one thing, mind.

HS: So the existence of the cloud and however you conceive it--

AD (simultaneously): And my understanding of that.

HS (simultaneously): However it is, all supplied in the same seed as it were.

AD (simultaneously): Yeah, if you want to use that word.

HS: Whatever, whatever, I-- at the-- at the same time.

AD: Yeah.

HS: I like that.

VM: But Anthony, can't you make a distinction between let's say the inerratic sphere and the trope?

S: That's right.

[Audio File 1984 0907b Ends]